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76


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


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
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HERMATHENA.

A NEW EDITION OF MANILIUS. BOOK I

ERRATUM.

Page 8, line 19—*For* 'le Clerc' *read* 'Leclercq'.

a half, and ended in nothing, I found that, as the MS. would not come to Oxford, I must go for it to Madrid. There, accordingly, I occupied a month in collating it during the Easter vacation of 1892; the result is published in vols. vii. and viii. of *The Classical Review*. After Poggio's find, transcripts of Manilius soon became frequent in Italy, the history of which can only imperfectly be traced, the whole material not being yet examined. But, as often happened in the first days of printing, the earliest editions were based on poor MSS., which cannot compare with those discovered later, whether earlier in date, as the *Gemblacensis*





HERMATHENA.

A NEW EDITION OF MANILIUS, BOOK I.

THE fate of Manilius is a singular one. Hardly noticed by his contemporaries; transmitted in MSS. which leave the author's name problematical; read but little in the Middle Age, yet coming to the cognizance of Gerbert, afterwards Pope Silvester II.; he was all but forgotten when, early in the fifteenth century, Poggio, the leader of classical research in that age, brought to light a MS. which had hitherto lain hidden in the obscurity of a Swiss library. A copy of this, and seemingly a direct copy, is now in the National Library of Madrid; after much tiresome negotiation, which lasted for a year and a half, and ended in nothing, I found that, as the MS. would not come to Oxford, I must go for it to Madrid. There, accordingly, I occupied a month in collating it during the Easter vacation of 1892; the result is published in vols. vii. and viii. of *The Classical Review*. After Poggio's find, transcripts of Manilius soon became frequent in Italy, the history of which can only imperfectly be traced, the whole material not being yet examined. But, as often happened in the first days of printing, the earliest editions were based on poor MSS., which cannot compare with those discovered later, whether earlier in date, as the *Gemblacensis*

(*G*) and *Lipsiensis*. (*L*) of the tenth and eleventh centuries, or written in the fifteenth century like the two *Vossiani*. According to Prof. Housman, our new editor, the edition now believed to be the Princeps, and published by Johannes Müller of Königsberg in Franconia (whence he is called Regiomontanus), is undated; it was followed by that of Bonincontrius, published at Rome, 1484, with a commentary.

It was not till 1579 that Scaliger published his first edition; a second in 1600; a third, posthumously edited by Boecler, appeared in 1655. This was emphatically *the* period in which astrology may be said to have flourished: Shakespere's sonnets attest this for England; for Germany, the hold which this pseudo-science had over the statesmen and warriors of the Thirty Years' War, like Wallenstein; for Sweden, the devotion with which it was cultivated, before and after her abdication, by the famous Christina.

Scaliger's edition was in the truest sense an epoch-making one; Prof. Housman rightly says of it: "After all deductions, there remains enough to make a dozen editors illustrious. The commentary is the one commentary on Manilius without forerunner and without successor." Yet its weak points are equally conspicuous, the chief of them, perhaps, an occasional parade of learning which not only does nothing to clear up Manilius' meaning, but, as Huet, Bishop of Avranches, said, makes what was only dim, obscure and even unintelligible. Huet's own contribution to the better understanding of the poem is, in my judgment, of the very highest value; he is sane and judicious where Scaliger is wild; in complete possession of his subject, and capable of stating his view in a few clear words—the very merits which we look for in a French savant, and which also recommend the translation published just before the French Revolution by

another Frenchman, Pingré. Prof. Housman, who appears to me not quite deferential enough to Huet's criticisms, has done great service in calling attention to the too little regarded corrections of the poet's text made by Pingré.

What is to be said of Bentley's *Manilius*? All and perhaps more than all that can be said in glorification of it will be found on pp. xvii and xviii of Housman's *Prolegomena*. Bentley had projected his edition before 1700; it did not appear till he was an old man of seventy-seven in 1739, brought out by his nephew. No one will deny to it the merit of lucidity and undoubted grasp of the subject; no one, on the other hand, will deny that, from the standpoint even of the eighteenth century, far more of the nineteenth, a large proportion of the corrections are untenable. I do not think an unbiassed judgment can here follow Prof. Housman, who considers Bentley's *Manilius* a greater work than his *Horace* or his *Phalaris*. My own opinion would rank it very far below the *Phalaris* at least; in extent of reading it hardly competes with the *Horace*, though its power of stating in brief and clear words the difficult and abstruse results of Astronomy in its connexion with Astrology, makes it much more interesting than the cumbrous accumulation of parallels which largely make up the commentary on *Horace*. The book indeed was received with no very great favour on its first publication, partly, no doubt, because the interest in astrology was then on the wane, but much more because the text of *Manilius*, as re-constituted by Bentley, was felt to be an impossible one. The poem was not so much emended as re-written: no one who compares Bechert's recent text with Bentley's can fail to see how large is the gain which the interval between the two has made possible. Moreover, Bentley is not free from the fault of holding up to ridicule corrections which are manifestly right—a notable instance of which is v. 706, 7: *Ille elephanta premet*

dorso stimulisque mouebit Turpiter in tanto cedentem pondere cunctis, where Huet, or, according to Prof. Housman, an earlier critic, had conjectured *punctis*.

To talk of the 'advent' of Bentley appears to me (in the case of Manilius) an exaggeration quite inconsistent with the much-advanced light in which, thanks to the increasing examination of MSS., our age stands as regards the criticism of Latin poetry. The word would be far more true of him in other branches of learning, notably in his wonderful emendation of corrupt passages in Greek. Nor can his reputation suffer if a work written by snatches and constantly interrupted by the perpetual struggle which Bentley waged with the Fellows of Trinity and the London faction headed by Miller—a work, too, which we have no reason to believe he himself rated exaltedly—should be thought to suffer in comparison with such a masterpiece of erudition and criticism as his *Dissertation on Phalaris*.

I hardly know what to say of Housman's verdict on Jacob's edition (1846). "Bentley," he writes, "is first, and Scaliger second, among the conjectural emendators of Manilius, and there is no third; but if there were a third, it would be Jacob." And he goes on to speak of "his arresting ingenuity and penetration." It is strange this "arresting ingenuity" should have produced so little effect on the Germans themselves. The chief merit of Jacob's edition is (1) its providing a text of the poem which, unlike the re-written text of Bentley, might be depended upon as a true representation of the Manilian MSS.; (2) the diagrams at the end of the volume, which make the abstruser parts of the poem more easily intelligible. The requirements, indeed, of 1846 were not those of the present day; and though still valuable, and presenting some clever emendations, and at least one certain transposition, the edition was far from final, and cannot

compare—at least in completeness of textual apparatus—with Bechert's (1902).

Prof. Housman has used for his own revision of B. I. four MSS. : *G*, Gemblacensis, of which Prof. Paul Thomas, of Gand, published a perfect collation in 1888 (the truest foundation of modern criticism on Manilius, and without which we should still be floundering in darkness); *L*, at Leipzig, assigned to the eleventh century; *M*, Matritensis, of the fifteenth century, collated by myself at Madrid; Vossianus alter of Jacob, at Leyden. Of these *GL* form a class distinct from *MV*. As a supplement to these four he has added two Vatican MSS. of the fifteenth century, Urbin. 667 (*U*) and 668 (*R*), which, however, are comparatively of little importance, and are only occasionally cited. He considers *GL* to represent a text more correct, but worse interpolated; *MV*, a text which is fuller of copyists' errors, but less interpolated. This point he illustrates at length on pp. xxiv-xxvii, one of the most important parts of the volume.

The end of this chapter of the *Prolegomena* has an interesting discussion of one of the chief cruces in Manilius, the famous line iv. 776 :—

Qua genitus Caesarque meus nunc possidet orbem (so *MV*),
or, as *G* gives it,

Qua genitus cum fratre Remus hanc condidit urbem.

As the following line (777) ends with *orbem*, Housman considers that *urbem* is to be preferred in 776; with this *condidit*, not *possidet*, suits best; *hanc*, however, of *G* can hardly be right, on metrical grounds, against *nunc* of *MVL*. Rejecting *cum fratre Remus*, he considers *Caesarque meus* to be a corruption of *Caesar melius*—a compliment to the *princeps* of the time when the line was written (perhaps Tiberius), as the later and truer founder of Rome.

no doubt, undesirable words; but there are cases where they are or may seem to be required; and in England they are, since Porson, rare. The worst of it is that Housman deals his blows indiscriminately; no one is exempted; the field is strewn with the corpses of his slain.

Coming to the main body of the work, the Commentary on B. I., I may say that this, the most astronomical section of Manilius' poem, has received from its new editor much more care and thought than could be expected from the slashing style in which it is his custom to write. The Commentary, unlike the English Introduction, is in Latin. It is obvious that every line has been scrupulously weighed, and that the results, however they may be judged (as they surely must be, in spite of the slowness of English scholars to recognise any interest or merit in a poem on astrology), are deliberately arrived at, and embody the views of a prolonged, laborious, and at times sagacious criticism. The editor may fairly claim to have made a substantial addition, not only to the correction of the text, but to the elucidation of the cosmical standpoint of the poet. With this object he has quoted many of the physical writers, mainly Greek, whose very names are strange to not a few Englishmen, but whose works have, in the last twenty or thirty years, been brought into new prominence by the cheap and excellent press of Messrs. Teubner. I am amused to observe that Posidonius is *not* among them; Sudhaus has given us a little too much of him, and Sudhaus is to Housman a veritable *bête noire*. Spite of which, a new edition of the fragments of this really important physicist would be a great boon, and, more than anything else perhaps, would tend to give the writers, Greek or Roman, on kindred subjects (astronomy, geography, ethnography, &c.) a new interest and importance. Manilius' first book is, in itself, not a

favourable specimen either of the poet's manner or of astronomical description; but it becomes more interesting when confronted with Aratus, Geminus, Hipparchus, Cleomedes, the catasterisms of Pseud-Eratosthenes, and the three bodies of hexameter *Aratea* drawn up by Cicero, Germanicus, and Avienus.

Anyone who has looked at my *Noctes Manilianae*, published in 1891, will have seen how full of perplexities the poem of Manilius is, and how large the field of conjecture. During the thirteen years which have elapsed since then, not a little has been done. Postgate's *Silva Maniliana* (1897), though only amounting to seventy-two pages, contains various bright suggestions; Breiter and Rossberg have added to their former articles new criticisms; *The Classical Review* has published my collation of the *Matritensis*, followed by my paper on it in *Hermathena* (1893); several large and important works illustrating the astronomy of the ancients have appeared in France and Germany, notably those of Bouché le Clerc, Thiele, Maass, and Franz Boll¹; and the latest, and in some ways the best, re-constitution of the text, by Malvinus Bechert, has been issued in the new Cambridge Corpus Poetarum. The subject, therefore, must be considered to be advancing.

Prof. Housman's is the latest contribution to this literature. It contains so much that is new, that I feel at a loss where to begin. There are, as might be expected, a great number of emendations, and these of the most various merit. I shall not be suspected of over-partiality to an editor with whom, at starting, I am at variance on a point of the greatest moment—I mean in my estimate of the Aristarchus of Cambridge, Bentley. Housman considers

¹ In particular the *Sphaera* of the last-mentioned savant, *Neue Griechische Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Sternbilder*, Teubner, 1903, is quite indispensable for a thorough study of our poet.

Bentley the first of Manilian emendators: I think him far inferior to Scaliger. Many much humbler scholars have made conjectures on the *Astronomica* which are, I will not say more likely to be right than Bentley's, but which, I do not fear to say, are less certainly wrong. That this is so, is sufficiently proved by inspecting any considerable passage as printed in Bentley's edition, and then comparing it either with Scaliger's or with Jacob's. It will be found that whole lines are given by Bentley in a "corrected" form which, if we found it in a MS., we should not hesitate to call an interpolation. At the present time, and mainly owing to the powerful influence of Lachmann, Madvig, and Cobet, the limits of conjectural emendation are bounded far more straitly than in the time of Bentley and Markland. Both these scholars allowed themselves a freedom which neither Lachmann nor Madvig nor Cobet would ever have thought of. The reason of which is that palæography has in the meantime erected itself into something like a science. MSS. teach us the possible and impossible in alteration. Hence much that Bentley and Markland offer in this line is now at once rejected, not that their corrections are not always linguistically plausible, but that, on palæographical grounds, they are inconsistent with the new training. This "gospel" of our day may be a hard saying; but it has to be said; and it is repeated here because from the work I am reviewing, it might be thought that, in the case of Bentley, if not of Markland, a dispensing clause interfered with rules by which all modern scholars are bound.

With this preliminary notification of a most essential discrepancy between myself and the new editor, I will call attention to some of his most striking corrections:—

25 Quem primum interius licuit cognoscere terris
Munere caelestum?

H. reads *ulterius*, 'to extend his knowledge beyond

the earth.' He shows that *ultra, intra, ultima, intima*, are elsewhere confused.

87-8 Et uagus in caecum penetrauit nauita pontum
Fecit et ignotis †itiner commercia terris.

itiner *GL*, inter *M*, iter in *Gronovius*.

H. ingeniously *linter*, quoting Avien. descr. orb. 1065
primi docuere carinis Ferre cauis orbis commercia.

145-6 Semper erit †genus in pugna dubiumque manebit
Quod latet.

H. Semper erit *pugna ingeniis*, rightly rejecting the interpretations of *genus in pugna* given by Fay and Gronovius.

216-7 Nusquam inuenies fulgere Canopon,
Donec †niliacas per pontum ueneris oras.

niliacas *GL*, adeiacas *M*, ad Heliacas *Housm*.

This conj. is based on the statements of Cleomedes, Geminus, the scholiast on Aratus, Hipparchus, and Pliny, that the star Canopus is first visible, not at Alexandria, but Rhodes. The connexion of this island with the sun (Helios) and its mythical occupation by a family of Heliadae are well known. Yet, on the other hand, *M*'s adeiacas may be a corruption, since both Vitruvius and Mart. Capella say Canopus is first visible in *Egypt*.

285 Nec uero e solido stat robore †corporis ei.

ei *GLM*; eius *M e corr.* corporeusque *Housm*.

This appears to me very doubtful. Possibly *stant robore corpora caeli*.

331-2 Serpentem magnis Ophiuchus nomine †signis
Diuidit et toto †ingentem corpore corpus.

331 gyris *Housm*. 332 cingentem *Housm*.

It is difficult to say what *signis* means or covers: but

cingentem for *M's ingentem* is more than probable. I agree with H. in thinking that *et iam toto ingentem* of *L*, *atque etiam toto ingens* of *G*, are interpolations, and that *M* is here nearest to the truth.

399-400 nunc horrida frigore surgit,
 †Ne uacuum solis fulgentem deserit orbem.

Canicula is described. For *Ne* of *M*, *G* has *Haec*. Breiter conj. *Nunc*, which H. accepts, altering *solis* to *solī*; *uacuum* he explains "*ut is uacuu fieret soli aestatem inducturo.*"

516-7 Nec se cognoscunt terrae uertentibus annis
 Exutas †uariam faciem per saecula gentes.

uariantque uicem Housm. I have defended the MS. tradition in *Noct. Man.* p. 11, but it is undeniably harsh. Yet *uariantque uicem* does not appear to me a very happy diction in this connexion. In *Aen.* ix. 164, *uariantque uices*, and in *Hor. C.* iv. 7. 3, *mutat terra uices*, the idea is of a steadily recurring series of changes: in the passage of Manilius a series of successive but variable changes passes over the earth. *Exutas*, too, requires something to define it, and is hardly intelligible by itself. Lastly, though *uariam* might be *uariant*, *uicem* for *faciem* is very uncertain, to say nothing of the suppleted *que*.

654-6 Haec quoque per totum uolitabit linea caelum
 Nunc †tantum ad medium uergens †mediumque repente
 Orbem, nunc septem ad stellas nunc mota sub astra.

Bentley pronounced these vv. to be spurious. H. thinks them corrupted, and alters *tantum* to *tractum*, *mediumque repente* to *mundique tepentem*, comparing *Luc.* viii. 366 *Quidquid ad eos tractus mundique teporem*. Again, *nunc mota* he changes to *nec mota*. This is a very sweeping change, but it makes consistent sense, and may be right.

768-70

Nec te Mauortia uirgo

Praeteream, regesque alios quos †Graecia misit

Atque Asiae gentes et Magno maxima Pella.

Housm. *Thraecia*, referring to the Thracians under Acamas and Peirooms, and the detachment under Rhesus.

In so adventurous, not to say audacious, a writer as Prof. Housman, it will not seem surprising that a great many suggestions are very open to criticism. My limits will not allow me to mention more than one or two of these.

211-214 are given by *G* thus :

Haec aeterna manet diuisque simillima forma

212 Cui neque principium est usquam nec finis in ipso

Sed similis toto remanet perque omnia par est.

Sic stellis glomerata manent mundumque figurant.

Manilius is here speaking of roundness as eternal and divine, being, as it is, without beginning or end, and throughout uniform. Hence it is the shape given to the stars. If we read *toto ore* manet in 213, to which, and not to *orbe*, palæography decidedly points, the passage is sufficiently intelligible as it stands, except that *manent*, *figurant* should be *manet*, *figurat*. The style of Manilius is not so choice as to make this impossible: such a repetition in 214 of what he has said just before in 207, *teretes facit esse figuras stellarum*, is quite in his manner; but it is, of course, possible that 214 is, as Bentley suggests, a spurious interpolation, and as such not to be meddled with.

Prof. Housman, adopting from Jacob *tellus* for *stellis*, changes *manent mundumque figurant* to *manens mundumque refugit*, and subjoins to it 167 *Imaque de cunctis mediam tenet undique sedem*.

Sic tellus glomerata manens mundumque refugit

Imaque de cunctis mediam tenet undique sedem.

refugit out of *figurant* through *figuret*. This would be

juggling with letters, even if MSS. in any way supported *tellus*: as it is, they all give *stellis*. And why, when he is speaking of roundness as the divinest of shapes, and arguing for this and about this alone, should Manilius end his argument with anything so irrelevant as the position of the Earth at the lowest point of the universe?

221, *sqq.* :—

Te testem dat luna sui glomeraminis orbis
Quae cum mersa nigris per noctem deficiis umbris
Non omnis pariter confundis sidere gentes
Sed prius eoae quaerunt tua lumina †gentes

225 Post medio subiecta polo quaecumque coluntur
†Ultima ad hesperios infectis uolueris alis
Seraque in extremis quatiuntur gentibus aera.

223 gentes] terrae *Bentl.*, perhaps partis. 225-6 were thought spurious by Bentley.

225-6 are very faulty: for *subiecta* we should expect *subiectae*: *ultima* is not good Latin. The moon is not generally represented as winged: or if winged, *flies*, and does not *roll*.

Hence Bentley with good reason prints them in italics as non-Manilian. Housman has a very long note to show that *ultima* is completely impossible, and prints *tum uice ad h. infecti u. axis*, the genitive depending on *uice*. "curru locum ex loco mutante."

To begin with what is most difficult in Manilian criticism, are we justified in assuming that where the Latin is queer and unclassical, the passage *either* requires emendation as corrupt, *or* is to be rejected altogether as spurious? I do not think this has been yet sufficiently examined; and I imagine these two verses are as good an occasion as any that may occur for raising the third possibility—that the style is at its best not very good, and that what seem violations of correct Latin are, in

particular cases, to be ascribed to the negligence, not of the copyists, but of the poet himself. Thus, in 225, *subiecta* is possible, agreeing with *quaecumque* (neuter), 'anything habitable that lies beneath the centre of the sky'—a piece of loose writing which is easily intelligible: *ultima*, 'in its last phase,' or, 'as it is seen last,' the moon represented in its different stages as *prima*, *media*, *ultima*. As for the stained wings of the moon, who can say with confidence that no such description exists in ancient art as we now possess its remains, or at least existed in the thousands of lost writings which may have come to the knowledge of Manilius? *uolueris* keeps up the notion of the moon's chariot.

Turning to H.'s emendation, I must say I find it far more difficult to understand than the line as the MSS. give it. I should have been inclined to translate it, 'after this you roll on to the western peoples like a discoloured wheel,' which is nonsense (to use a favourite phrase of H.'s own). Palæographically, too, is not *tum uice* for *ultima* extremely violent?

I have said enough, I hope, to show my attitude towards the new editor: it is one of considerable respect for his intrepid probing of corrupt or difficult passages, regret that his opinion is so often at variance with my own, and fear that his uncompromising vituperation, particularly of German scholars, may prove hostile to his own cause, and that in which we both combine, the advancement of the study, not only of Manilius, but of similar scientific poems.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

NOTES ON CONEYS' "IRISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY."

ΔΙΤΡΕΔĆ, *adj.*, also *subst.*, Gen. vi. 6 ; 2 Cor. vii. 10. In the following word ċ is an error for ċ.

ΔΤΑΡΡΔĆ . . . "change, fashion." *Dele* 'fashion', which seems to have been suggested by the E. V. of Phil. iii. 21, where, however, the Irish has Δ. CPOĆΔ.

ΔΤΞΔΒΔΙΛ . . . "a reconciling, Rom. vi. 15"; rather 'receiving again'; ΠΡΌΣΛΗΨΙΣ, 'assumptio.'

ΒΕΔΞ. Add the phrase 17 βΕΔΞ ΟΡΥΜ, 'I hate' (Ps. ci. 3); Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 27 (ed. 1602).

ΒΟΝΝΔΙΟ, "an ankle-bone, pl., Acts iii. 7." The same rendering is given for ΜΥΞΔΡΗΝ with the same reference, which is correct; but the former word signifies 'base' or 'sole' = ΒΥΝΔΙΤ, and the text has ΒΟΝΝΔΙΟΕ Δ ĆΟΡ, corresponding to the Greek ΒΆΣΕΙΣ, the order of the words being changed. The Vulg. has 'bases ejus et plantae.'

ΒΥΝ, "a foundation, 2 Tim. ii. 19." In the passage cited ΨΑΝΥΘ . . . ΔΡΙ ΒΥΝ = ΞΌΤΗΚΕΝ, so that ΔΡΙ ΒΥΝ = 'on a firm base.'

ΚΑΛΛΌΙΟ. For 'Is. i. 10' read '3 John 10'.

ΚΔΟΡ. For 'properly' read 'probably'.

ΚΕΥΟΤΟΡΡΔΘ. For '1 Cor. xvi.' read '1 Cor. xv.'

ΚΙΔΡΔΛΔĆ. Omit 'perverse' (taken from E.V., *l.c.*). The Greek is ΔΙΑΠΑΡΑΤΡΙΒΑΪ, 'wranglings.' The Irish has ΟΙΟΡΒΌΙΡΕΔĆΟ ΚΙΔΡΔΛΔĆ.

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Σιορρβαδὸ. Add signif. 'a being vexed' (Luke vi. 18).

Κλαοόλοιο. Omit 'repent,' taken from E.V. in Exod. xxxii. 12, where the verb means 'change from.' (Correct οο to ό.)

Κόιμβεοόυις, "quicken". Read 'quicken together'.

Κόιμφιδόνυρε, in *l.c.*, is not 'a witness', but 'joint testimony'.

Κόιμμεδρ in Matt. xx. 12 means 'equality.'

Κόιμδινμ. Add 'of the same name', c. αν λόοι, 'anniversary of the day' (Mark vi. 21).

Κόιμζτε. *Dele* 'quaternion', taken from E.V. The word has nothing to do with 'four.'

Κόιμριρε, "a recommendation, an appeal, protection, Acts xv. 40 and xxv. 12." *Dele* the first two words.

In Acts xv. 40 the expression is κυρ διρ κόιμριρε ζήδρ Όέ, 'to commit to the protection of.' In Acts xxv. 11, the text has τίδζυιμ διρ c. Shédρδιρ; so also has ver. 12; xxvi. 32, 'come on the protection of' = 'appeal to.'

Κομάοιρ, "a recompense," seems taken from the passage cited (Luke xiv. 12), where, however, the expression for 'recompense' is c. έεδοηα.

Κόιμριτδ. Note c. υδινζμζτε, 'earnest,' άρραβών, 2 Cor. i. 22; v. 6.

Κόιμλδνν, "a combat, complement." Add 'a company' (Mark vi. 39).

Κόιμλυδδρ. The rendering 'multitude' was clearly suggested by the E. V. of Acts vi. 5, but 'company' suits the passage well enough.

Κόιμλυδ is only 'partners'; 'fellow-labourers' is c. οιβρε.

Κόιμρδc, "a conflict, fighting." Add c. ηδ ρόο, 'cross-roads' (Matt. vi. 5).

Κρδρ. For 'wrap', read 'warp'. So also under next word.

Κυιθριονη, "a couch, a room, pl., Luke xx. 46, literally a

due share . . . " *Dele* 'couch' and 'room' (which were suggested by πρωτοκλισίας in *l. c.*, and 'rooms', *i. e.* 'places' in the E.V.), and substitute 'a company at a meal.' In Matt. xiv. 9, of Herod, 'on account of his oath and of those who sat' ἡ δὲ συντροφία 'in his company (at table).' John xvi. 11, 'the disciples distributed' διὰ τὰς συντροφίας 'to the companies,' 'discumbentibus.' In Luke xx. 46, the Vulg. has 'discubitus.' This is the meaning in Keating's 'Three Shafts,' 95, 26 (of the prodigal son) 50 μβιοῦ ἡ συντροφία καὶ μὲν φα'ν μεσῶν = 'in the swine's mess' = 'messaging with the swine,' also 96, 4 of Nebuchadnezzar ἡ συντροφία καὶ μὲν φα'ν βρέων 'messaging with the cattle.' Compare Oss. Soc. iii., p. 270, σιων συντροφία. Shaw's Dictionary has συμτροφία, 'share, portion, eating together, messaging.' Transferred to the concrete, the latter signification agrees exactly with that here inferred. May it be that this is the original spelling, the other having been adopted for etymological reasons, namely, in order to suggest a connexion with συνθεῖν? I may note that Foley gives for 'mess,' verb and noun, συμφοιρῶν. συντροφίον, in the sense of 'portion,' occurs in the Scottish Gaelic Bible, in Gen. xiv. 24, Josh. xvii. 14, and Job xx. 29, where the Irish Bible has curo ponna; also Gen. xlvii. 22 (where the Irish is συμφοιρῶν).

Сυναιε, 'touch.' In this sense always followed by με or μῦ. In John ix. 6, it means 'rub [something] on,' viz. ἀνέλαβεν οὐ τοῦ ἱματίου. Vulg. 'linivit lutum super.'

Сυνεταρ, "a work, an account." *Dele* 'work'. Here again the E.V. is the source. In the passage cited, namely, Rom. ix. 28, the Greek is λόγον (Vulg. 'verbum').

p. 114 b, last line. In the place cited, John v. 29, ὁ ἀμαρτανῶν is the gen. of the following noun.

ῥεαδρίδω. *Dele* 'unsearchableness.' In *loc. cit.* Rom. xi. 33, the expression is ῥεαδρίδω . . . σο ἑαυτῷ, and the word has its proper signification, 'difficulty.'

Περσβ, "persuaded, Rom. xiv. 14." In *l.c.* it means
'certain.' 1τ ο. λεαμ, "I am persuaded."

Θεαρῳδῶ, "assurance, experience, Acts xvii. 31; Rom.
 v. 4." In the former passage it means 'proof, ground
 of belief'; in the latter 'proof, approval on trial.'
 Vulg. 'probatio.' For the latter sense see also James
 i. 3, 12; 1 Pet. i. 7. 'Assurance' and 'experience' are
 taken from the E.V. Add Θεαρῳδῶδες, 1 Cor. ii. 4;
 Phil. ii. 22.

Πιστομεναι, "faithful, Gal. iii. 9; 1 Tim. vi. 2." In both places the word means 'right-believing.'

Deictēar, "diligence, a hastening, 2 Tim. iv. 9." *Omit*
'diligence.' véan v., *l. c.*, is 'make haste' (so in iv. 21,
Judges xx. 37).

Óile is used specially of Noah's flood.

ῥοῖδαλας in *loc. cit.* (2 Sam. xiii. 25) is not 'chargeable' (E. V.), but 'burdensome' = 'injurious.'

Θιογλυκεας. For 'Phil. i. 1' read 'Philem. 19'.

ὅτι, "a sufficiency, an object . . . , 1 Cor. xv. 19,"
ὅτις τραυίζει. *Dele* 'object.' The text is ἀρ ῥον ἡ
μό σο ὅτις τραυίζει σο να ἡμε ὅδοις, and ὅτις
is a verb, 'to deserve.' See Atkinson's Glossary to
Homilies.

ὁγῖς, "guide, lift up, direct." *Omit* 'lift up,' taken from Luke xiii. 11, where the word means 'straighten.'

ὀλις, "owe, Matt. xviii. 24 & 28." In *ll. cc.* it means 'due to one.' In 28 it occurs a second time in the sense 'ought' (viz. to pay). Compare the colloquial use of 'have a right to do' = 'ought to do.' See Glossary to Hom.

ῥοδάμιλας, -λῆγε. In Mark x. 23, cited for the comparative, ῥοδάμιλῆγε is a substantive.

Doimne pl. Rev. ii. 24. The word there is probably intended for gen. sing.

Domam, comp. doimne. John iv. 11 seems to be cited for the comparative erroneously.

Εαρραόα, in Rev. xviii. 12, seems to be sing., not pl. (so in ver. 11). Here, as well as in the passage cited from Jonah i. 5, 'cargo' seems to be the meaning intended.

Εαραοντα. Add signif. 'disagreement' (Acts xv. 39).

Εόλγας, "knowing, skilful, 1 Cor. viii. 3." In *loc. cit.* it means 'known.'

Ευλτός, "withdraw thyself, Gal. ii. 12." But this is an error in some modern editions of the N. T. The eds. of 1602 and 1681 have το τέυλτό γε (for τέυλτός). O'Reilly quotes with τέυλτοθ, which he gives as from τευλλοθ (following O'Brien). Ed. 1818 misprints ο for ε.

Εαρραό, "a company, Deut. xxxii. 16." 'Company' might pass, but not 'a company.' In *loc. cit.* and in Acts xxviii. 16, α εαρραό = 'apud.' In 2 Cor. iii. 10, it corresponds to εκεν, 'propter.' The translator doubtless meant to express 'in comparison with' as if 'when put beside.' So in Keating, 113, 6. Compare the phrase quoted in O'Growney, § 829; also the use of α λάταιρ in Rom. vii. 18.

Ειδόνιγε, "a witness." Also 'testimony,' Exod. xx. 16, Mark xiv. 56 *pl.*

Εαρρυθε. For 'answer' read 'inquiry' (επερώρημα). Is the word a misprint?

Εύ. Add the signification 'even, as much as' (Mark iii. 20; Luke xviii. 13; Heb. xii. 20). Compare εο εύ, Luke x. 11; Acts vii. 5.

Ευέ, "boil." Also 'spring up,' as water in a well, John iv. 14. Ευέας, "a boiling." Also 'burning, scorching,' Rev. xvi. 9.

Ευαςός, ευό φ. in Luke xviii. 11, = 'extortioners.'

፮፭፭. Add to significations the following from N.T.:

'go' (take one's way), John xii. 35; 2 Cor. i. 16.

ῥ. ἀρ, 'beat,' Acts v. 40. ῥ. πῑ, 'be on the side of,'

1 Cor. i. 12. 5. 45, 'spare,' 2 Cor. i. 23. Compare

Keating, 79, l. 19.

𐤒𐤕𐤋, James iv. 14, = 'vapour.'

Ἰερριὰν, Matt. viii. 12, = 'gnashing.'

Σειρ, "sharp, perfect." *Dele* 'perfect' (from E. V., Acts xxiii. 20, ἀκριβέστερον).

Σειροκόμειο, "a mark, a watch, Rom. xvi. 17." *Dele*

'a mark,' taken apparently from E. V., 'mark them.'

σκοπεῖν, 'ut observetis.' It is simply 'a sharp watch.'

ḡleur "means a trap, a manner." *Dele* 'a trap'. In *loc. cit.*

Rom. xi. 9, 'trap' is $\zeta\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\ \zeta\alpha\beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$.

ἡρῶν, "... an obtaining ... 2 Thess. ii. 14." The word there is doubtless gen. of ἡρῶνζαῶ.

Συμφέουσις, "grudge." Rather 'murmur', στενάξατε.
'Grudge' in this sense is obsolete.

ἄν, "call." Note that when it means 'give a name to,' it takes the name in the acc. with **οο** before the person or thing named.

809. For iv. 17, read xiv. 67.

Σπινν, "perfect, James i. 25." *Dele* 'perfect'. The text is

and ἡ. means 'attentive.' παρακύψας, 'perspexerit.'

Sur, "to." Only in Sur an = so ran.

innme, "danger, Luke v. 7." *Dele* 'danger'. Δn innme Δ
mbáioce = 'on the point of being drowned.' Compare

Exod. xvii. 4 : ր եօց յնձ Եփրայիմի և զոհմե ճճձձձ ո՞
ժօգնի օրս. T. Connellan glosses it there by '*riocht*,'

In Walsh and O'Neachtan's Latin-Irish Dictionary (Plunket's) one of the equivalents of 'pené' is 'an inne.' M'Alpine's Gaelic Dictionary gives for 'inbh,' 'condition, rank, . . . state of advancement . . .,'

and quotes as examples: "dé an inbh bheil thu? 'how far have you advanced?' . . . bha mi an inbh is an dorus a dhúnadh, 'I was on the eve of shutting the door.'" The H. S. Dict. renders 'promote' by 'tog gu innbhe' and 'advancement (of another),' inbh - thabairt. In Keating, 15, 16, innbhe means 'condition' or 'state' generally; úirirle na innbhe. See also 15, 22; 25, 23. In 216, 27, ceann innbhe seems to mean 'the limit or climax of one's progress.' *Contraíróda* 'a céile atá ceann innbhe an uíomraí 7 an uimhí; óir ríor céir an uíomraí 1 n-irreann, 7 ruidh ar neamh céir an t-uimhí.

innleaco. *Dele* 'a device,' E.V. Acts xxvii. 29, where, however, 'device' = 'devising,' *ἐνθύμησις*.

iomarcuró. For 'overmuch' read 'excess'; and add 'oppression', James ii. 6.

iomlunt, "change, exchange." Add 'remove', Matt. xxvii. 2.

iomraíró, "publish, divulge, report" (= O'Reilly). Add 'talk' or 'confer' (Acts iv. 15), *u'iomraíróeasdar easoirra féin*.

ionnur, "so that." 'So that' is *ionnur* 50, the word being properly a subst.

láoáil. For 'xvii.' read 'xxvii.'

lirg. *Dele* 'press' taken from E. V. (Luke v. 1). Vulg. has 'irruerent.'

líon, "a portion, a number, rate, Ex. xvi. 4; Mark v. 16."

In the former passage *líon* *airige* = 'a certain amount';

in the latter *an líon* = 'the full number, all.'

lúguil, "lament, bewail, see; John xi. 35." Seems to be a ghost-word. The verse cited is *oo guil íora*.

luidro, "mention, tell, enumerate." Add 'talk' (Luke vi. 11), *oo luidroasdar ré a céile*.

p. 230 *b*, last line, for 'lespyllum' read 'serpyllum'.

p. 231 *a*, l. 3, for 'Myosolis' read 'Myosotis'.

„ l. 14, for 'Symphylum' read 'Symphytum'.

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p. 231 *a*, l. 19, for 'chamoemoris' read 'chamaemorus'.

„ l. 25, for 'Thiaspi' read 'Thlaspi'.

„ l. 32, for 'belladona' read 'belladonna'.

„ l. 34, for 'crasula' read 'crassula'.

„ l. 35, for 'chrysosplenium' read 'chrysosplenium'.

p. 231 *b*, l. 9, for 'Strachys palustre' read 'Stachys palustris'.

„ l. 14, for 'Pyretrum' read 'Pyrethrum'.

μινγεαλ, "soft & fair" (= O'Reilly). In Rev. xviii. 13, πλύρ m. = "fine flour." For 'soft and fair' read 'fine white'.

Μιολ, "a whale, a louse." 'Whale' is m. μόρ. See Ezek. xxxii. 2; Job vii. 12; Matt. xii. 40.

μιοναδω. For 'often' read 'frequency'; and see Matt. xviii. 21.

μεδουγ. Mark vi. 48, το μ. πὲρ οὐλ ἐπαρηα, 'he would have passed by them.'

μεαρ v.a. *Dele* 'tax' (Luke ii. 1).

μινιγ, "declare, open." *Dele* 'declare' taken from E.V. in Matt. xiii. 36, where it means 'explain,' a meaning of 'declare' which is now obsolete.

μόριδεαρ. For 'clemency' read 'fairness' (ἐπιεικεία).

p. 248 *a*, l. 3, from bottom, for '7' read '17'.

μότυγ, "perceive, touch, Luke viii. 46—Heb. iv. 15."

Dele 'touch,' which was apparently suggested by the E. V. in Heb. iv. 15, 'be touched with a feeling of.' συμπαθήσαι, 'compati.'

μυινιγνεαδ. For 'confidential' read 'confident'.

νεαμδαι. For 'stept foil' read 'sept foil'.

νειμδελιυδ. For 'reprobate' read 'void of judgment'. The translator has taken ἀδόκιμος in the active sense, not passive, as E.V.

νειμιομδυδαιυ. For 'unworthy' read 'unfitting'. 5ο 1., 'in an unfitting manner' (1 Cor. xi. 27. A correct rendering).

νημ-μεσφρῶδ. For 'incontinent' read 'intemperate';
and for '1 Tim.' read '2 Tim.'

Obann, "sudden . . ." Also 'froward,' beul o., Prov. iv. 24.

Όρῶδ. *Dele* 'inn.' In the passages cited from Exod. and
S. Luke, 'inn' is τῖς ὅρῶδ. In Acts xxi. 16, ἀξά
mbeimír ἄρ ὅρῶδ = 'with whom we were to lodge.'

ῤραιρεᾶδ θυρε. For 'naven' read 'navew'.

ῤραιρεᾶδ μίν. For 'Artiplex' read 'Atriplex'.

ῤεῖο, in 1 Cor. x. 5, = 'pleased.'

ῤευσῖν, in 1 Pet. iii. 15, is not pl.

ῤευσῖντα, "Mul." need not be cited as an authority, since
the word occurs in Rom. xii. 1.

ῤοῶδιν, "a journeying, Acts xxii. 6." *Dele* 'journeying'.

In *loc. cit.* it means 'arriving', τάρῖα ὁδῖν ἄρ πο ἔμμεδ
ἄρ ποῶδιν ὁδῖν ῥο ῥᾶρ το Ὅημαρῑ.

Σάιτεᾶδ, "filled, full." Read 'satisfied.'

Σαῖτῖς, "fill." Read 'satisfy.'

Soῑρᾶιῖ: after Soῑρᾶιῖ insert 'well-formed, beautiful (of
the heart),' Luke viii. 15. ποῑρᾶιῖ μαῖτ = καλῇ καὶ
ἀγαθῇ.

Σοορᾶῖ, l. 3, for 'iv. 4' read 'iv. 12'.

Σοῖτ (or ῖτῖτ), "rest, Ex. xxxi. 17." But ῖτῖτ means
properly 'fatigue, weariness,' and here and elsewhere,
where it may seem to mean 'rest,' it is in combination
with the verb λέῖγῖν, so that the literal signification
may be 'to let go weariness.' Compare Keating, 262, x ;
289, 29.

Seᾶδ, "aside, Rom. xv. 24." Not 'aside', but 'past'.

Teᾶῥ, Eph. ii. 22 has sing., not pl.

Τιονηῖῥ. For 'xxi. 1' read 'xxi. 28'.

Τῖρεᾶν, "a quarrel, a grudge, Mark vi. 19." A ghost-word.
το δι ἡερόσιᾶρ ἄρ ᾶ τῖρεᾶν 'was (set) against him,'
i.e. ἄρ ᾶ τῖ with suffix ῖρεᾶν. C., however, omits τῖ.
See ἄρ τῖ, 'about to,' John xii. 4, Heb. viii. 5. ῥο ὅτῖ,
'even unto,' Mark xiv. 34. See Keating, Glossary.

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τοῖς αἰ, "please, Col. i. 27." Rather 'be pleased'. The English verb 'please' is used for 'be pleased' or 'choose' in dependent clauses.

τοῖς. For 'borough' read 'burrow'.

τοῖς. To the significations add 'find room' (Mark ii. 2).

See O'Donovan, Suppl.

τεῖν, "embrace, greet, cleave to, join." When it means 'embrace, greet,' it is followed by *ne* or *le* with suffix of the object. Thus, in Gen. xxix. 13, *ἔτι πῦρ ἐ*; Gen. xlviii. 10, Tit. iii. 15, *τ. ποτ*; Prov. iv. 8, *τ. λεῖδο*; 2 Cor. xiii. 12, *τ. πῆ ἐτε*. The verb then retains the signification 'join.' Used intransitively, it means 'cleave to,' Jer. xiii. 11; Prov. v. 20; or 'press on,' Luke xxiii. 5. In Is. ix. 11, *τ. πῆ ἐτε* = 'cause to join together.'

p. 134 *δ*, *ᾠομβιυθεῖς*. Read '*ᾠομβιυθεῖς*'.

p. 181 *α*, *ἡδῆ*. For '1 Pet.' read '2 Pet.'

p. 191 *α*, under *ἡδῆ*. For 'poor' read 'pure'.

p. 193 *α*, l. 3, from bottom. For '*cutweed*, Pilago', read '*cutweed*, Filago'.

p. 211 *δ*, l. 3. For 'abuse' read 'abase'.

p. 310 *δ*, *σεαμρός*. Read '*ρεαμρός*'.

p. 322 *δ*, *σιος*. For 'streak' read 'stook'.

I note a few words occurring in the N. T. which are not in Coneys or O'Reilly.

ἀποστολική (Acts xxviii. 16).

ἀνλόν (Matt. xii. 12).

ἀποστόλῃ (Heb. xiii. 20; 1 Pet. v. 4).

θεομυμῖς (1 Pet. i. 3).

κάσματος, 'a casement' (Prov. vii. 6).

κομῆμα is in O'Reilly, but should be rendered 'number together with,' Mark xv. 28.

Comlân, 'a company' (Mark vi. 29). O'Reilly has the word (Suppl.), but renders it 'a couple.'

Comṭa (Rom. i. 30), luṭo comṭa uile, ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν.

O'Reilly has cumṭa = 'form, fashion.'

Ṭioḃallaḋ, 'maimed' (Matt. xviii. 8).

Ṭroḋḋoinḡill, 'implacable' (2 Tim. iii. 3).

Ḍarṭonḋar, 'south-west' (Acts xxvii. 12), (ed. 1602). Coney and O'Reilly have Ḍarḋḋar.

Ḍarṭuḋiḋ, 'north-west' (Acts xxvii. 12), (ed. 1602).

Edd. 1818-37 have Ḍarṭonḋar and Ḍarṭuḋiḋ.

Ḍurḡuioḋṭa, 'scribendum' (Acts xv. 20).

Ḍoḋana, 'pains of childbirth' (1 Thess. v. 3), dat. pl. Ḍoḋnuḋ, Gal. iv. 9, 27; Jer. vi. 24.

Ḍurṭuḋiḋ, 'north-east' (Acts xxvii. 14).

Ḍáṭṭarṭa (Acts ii. 29).

Ḍóimp (Acts xxv. 23); Region, John iv. 35.

Roḋar, 'anxiety' (Matt. x. 19; Mark xiii. 11).

Ṭuḋarim (lit. 'a guess'), 'about (of time)' (Acts xxv. 9); ṫá ṭ., 'at random,' 1 Cor. ix. 26.

T. K. ABBOTT.

THE ORIGIN OF PELAGIUS.

§1. **T**HE question whether the native country of Pelagius was Ireland or Britain is still one on which different opinions are held.¹ Some think that it cannot be definitely decided, because the evidence appears to be ambiguous. The discussions of it seem open to the criticism that they deal with the crucial passages out of relation to the whole context of evidence furnished by the anti-Pelagian writings of the time.

It is well known that contemporaries of Pelagius used to describe him as a Briton.² Those who hold that he was a Scot say simply that 'Briton' is a loose description of one who came *de Britannorum vicinia*. Todd, for instance, remarks: "Possibly in that age the name of Briton in popular use may have included the Scots." Now, this is a point which can be decided by evidence only. There is nothing antecedently impossible in such a loose use of *Brito*, *Britannus*. If clear testimony exists that Pelagius was born in Ireland, it would follow that 'Briton' was popularly used in this wider comprehension. At the same

¹ Professor Zimmer has no doubt that he was a native of Ireland (*Pelagius in Ireland*, p. 18). Todd inclined to this view (*St. Patrick*, 189 *sqq.*). I observe that Mr. Williams, in his criticisms of Zimmer's views on the Celtic Church, in *Zeitschrift für keltische Philologie*, iv. 532 *sqq.*, argues against Zimmer for

the view (held by Ussher) that Pelagius was a Briton.

² (Alypius and) Augustine, *Ep.* 186 (Migne, P. L. 33, 816); Orosius, *Liber Apol.* c. 12 (Migne 31, 1182); Prosper, *Chron.* s. a. 413, and *De Ingratis* (Migne 51, 94); Marius Mercator, *Common.* c. 1 (Migne 48).

time, it must be admitted that if Ireland was his birth-country, it is difficult to see why he should not have been described as *Scottus* or *Hibernus*—names which were intelligible to everyone.

§ 2. The Scottic theory rests on two passages in Jerome's Commentary on Jeremiah, which must be quoted at length:—

1. *Prologus*, Migne 24, 680-2: ut nuper indoctus calumniator erupit qui Commentarios meos in Epistolam Pauli ad Ephesios reprehendendos putat . . . Quod non videns praecursor eius Grunnius olim nisus est carpere. Cui duobus respondi libris . . . Nec recordatur stolidissimus et Scottorum pultibus praegravatus nos in ipso dixisse opere "Non damno digamos . . ." Legat eiusdem operis Apologiam quam ante annos plurimos adversus magistrum eius gaudens Roma suscepit et tunc animadvertet alienis se vocibus blasphemare et in tantum esse imperitum ut ne maledicta quidem habeat propria, sed inimicorum etiam olim sepultorum contra nos utatur rabie.

2. Preface to Book vi., *ib.* 757-8: Lernaem anguem fabulae ferunt multis ex medio capite pullulasse serpentibus et Scyllam Siculi monstrum freti facie quidem virginali sed succinctam canibus miserorum lacerare naufragia; iuncto in eodem litore Sirenarum mortifero carmine quae ut vitaret Ulysses Homericus clausisse aures dicitur et malum inexsuperabile prudenti vitasse consilio. Hoc ego cum facere cuperem et haereticorum rabiem declinare et iuxta Ismeniam mihi canens et meis illudque propheticum revolverem: *cum consisteret adversum me peccator obmutui et silui de bonis non est passus diabolus me optata quiete contentum Scripturarum sanctarum explanationi insistere, et hominibus linguae meae Hebraeorum Graecorumque eruditionem tradere; sed id agit diebus et noctibus et aperte et per insidiam, veris falsa miscendo, immo universa mendacia subdolo melle circumlinens, ut qui audit verborum dulcedinem, venena pectoris non formidet: pacem pollicetur ut graviora bella exerceat: ridet ut mordeat: manum offert ut ex improvise simplicem interficiat Abner. Nimirum hoc illud est quod et Apostolus loquebatur: non enim eius ignoramus astutias.*

Hic tacet alibi criminatur: mittit in universum orbem epistolas biblinas prius auriferas nunc maledicas, et patientiam nostram de Christi humilitate venientem malae conscientiae signum interpretatur. Ipseque mutus latrat per Alpinum¹ canem grandem et corpulentum et qui calcibus magis possit saevire quam dentibus. Habet enim progeniem Scotticae gentis de Britannorum vicinia qui iuxta fabulas poetarum instar Cerberi spirituali percutiendus est clava ut aeterno cum suo magistro Plutone silentio conitescat.

§ 3. In the first passage Rufinus, whom Jerome constantly referred to by the nickname "Grunnius," is designated as the *praecursor* and *magister* of the *calumniator*. The *Apologia* means, of course, Jerome's *Libri duo contra Rufinum*. The expression *inimicorum olim sepulorum* is explained by the fact that Rufinus had died c. 410 A.D. There are other clear references to the calumniator in the Commentary on Jeremiah. Thus, in Book v. (Migne, 856): compulit me tractator indoctus et sectator calumniae Grunnianae aperte ponere aliena vitia. Again, in Book iv. (Migne, 817)*:—

Quod et ipse miserabilis Grunnius et post multos annos discipuli Joviniani et illius calumniati sunt et calumniantur me sub alienis hominibus proprias sententias ponere, quod ego causa benevolentiae facio ne aliquem certo nomine videar lacerare. Quia igitur benignitas versa est in calumniam nunc dico et illi qui mortuus est [Rufinus] et isti qui vivit et haeresim illius instaurare conatur [the *indoctus calumniator* of the Prologue] magistrum eorum Originem hunc locum referre ad Christum, etc.

The Commentary on Jeremiah was being written in the years 415 and 416 A.D., when Palestine was agitated by

¹ *Alpinum* has not much point; but, before considering the alleged variant *Albinum*, one would like to know the evidence of the mss. (cp. Tillemont, *Mémoires*, xiii., p. 1007).

² Compare also Book v. (Migne 862): quae cum audiunt discipuli eius [= preceding *delirus interpres*] et Grunnianae familiae stercora putant se divina audire mysteria.

the Pelagian controversy; and those who know the history of that controversy are aware that Jerome connected it with Origenism,¹ and therefore was ready to regard the detested Rufinus, the representative and exponent of Origenism, as a master of the Pelagians.

§ 4. Before considering the identity of the calumniator, we may turn to the second passage, which has caused much more difficulty. The questions are, who is meant by *ipse mutus*? and who is the dog? One explanation is that *ipse mutus* is Pelagius, and that his dog is Caelestius, and the inference is drawn that Caelestius was a Scot. The last words of the passage are then interpreted to mean: "This Cerberus, Caelestius, must be reduced to eternal silence, along with his master Pluto, namely, Pelagius." Another notion, to which Tillemont hesitatingly inclined,² is that *ipse* refers to John of Jerusalem, and the dog is Pelagius. This theory is a rash guess, for which no positive or plausible argument can be alleged. But it is useless to consider either interpretation particularly, as it can be shown, from a consideration of the passage as a whole, that both are alike inconsistent with what Jerome actually says. The grammatical subject of all the verbs from *non passus est* to *interpretatur* is *diabolus*: no other name is mentioned. It is the devil himself who—acting, of course, it is implied, through human agents—*tacet, criminatur, mittit epistolas*. And *ipse mutus latrat*, which immediately follows, can, grammatically, refer only to the devil.³ This is the plain meaning of Jerome's words. In the last sentence the *diabolus* becomes Pluto, to suit the simile of Cerberus.

I am unable to see how any other interpretation is possible without doing violence to the author's language.

¹ Cp., for instance, the letter to Ctesiphon (*Ep.* 133, Migne 22, 1152): doctrina tua Origenis ramusculus est.

² *Mémoires*, xii., p. 336: cp. xiii.,

p. 1007.

³ This was recognised by Todd (*St. Patrick*, 190, note ¹).

Up to the sentence beginning *ipse mutus*, the dissemination of calumnies of which Jerome complains is ascribed to the prompting of the devil. The words *ipse mutus latrat* introduce a description of the human agent whom the devil employed, and who is likened to a dog.

§ 5. This interpretation is adequate for our present purpose, without attempting to read between the lines. But as I am dealing with it, I may call attention to one or two indications which suggest that, in writing this Preface, Rufinus was in the writer's mind. The detested Grunnius, even in his grave, was an obsession of Jerome; and it seems to me little short of certain that, in the first sentence of this Prologue, the metaphors of the hydra and the *Sicilian* Scylla allude to Rufinus, who died in Sicily. The proof of this is furnished by two passages in the Commentary on Ezekiel, which was composed before the Commentary on Jeremiah, and after the year 410.

Preface to Book i. (Migne 25, p. 15): *Scorpiusque inter Encecladum et Porphyryonem Trinacriae humo premitur et hydra multorum capitum contra nos aliquando sibilare cessavit.*

Preface to Book vi. (p. 165, *sqq.*): *putabam quod medio serpente confosso non reviviscerent hydrae novella plantaria et iuxta fabulas poetarum Scylla mortua nequaquam in me Scyllaei saevirent canes qui latrare non cessant, et haereticis Dei percussis manu ne tentarentur si fieri potest etiam electi Dei haeresis ipsa non moritur, haereditariis contra nos odiorum suorum catulis derelictis qui nostra simulantes genetricis antiquae et pellacis Ulyssis venena non deserunt labiaque tantum mella circumlinunt; et iuxta eloquia Scripturarum mollierunt verba suum super oleum, ipsi autem sunt iacula et iacula ignita quae scuto fidei repellenda simul et extinguenda sunt.*

In both these passages Rufinus is likened to the hydra. In the second he is likened both to the hydra and to Scylla, and the Pelagian heretics to the hydra's new heads and

Scylla's whelps. The repetition of the same pair of similitudes in the Preface to Jeremiah, Book vi., which deals with the Pelagian heresy, must evidently be explained as an allusion to Rufinus. But if so, it seems possible that, when Jerome *speaks* of the devil in the passage following, he may have been really *thinking* of Rufinus,¹ in the company of Enceladus and Porphyryon, and that this thought determines the turn of some of his phrases; *mutus*, and *magistro suo* of Pluto in relation to the Pelagian calumniator, would thus have particular significance.

§ 6. If it is clear then that Jerome in this passage refers only to one living opponent, there is no shadow of a case for distinguishing this person, the Alpine dog, from the *calumniator*, who is reviled in other passages of the Commentary on Jeremiah, and especially in the Prologue. There is no pretext or reason for rejecting the obvious inference that the person described as *Scottorum pultibus praegravatus* is identical with the adversary *Scotticae gentis*, who is described as large and corpulent.

§ 7. The question is, accordingly, reduced to this: who is the *calumniator* of Scottic birth, mentioned in several passages in the Commentary on Jeremiah, who troubled Jerome's retirement in the years 415 and 416? There can, I think, be no doubt that it was Pelagius, the protagonist in Palestine of the heresy called by his name. The reference to a criticism on Jerome's Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians suggests this, as Pelagius had written a Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. But, though this explanation seems to be commonly accepted, it is obviously not decisive. It is conceivable that some other

¹ Garnier thought Rufinus was meant (see his ed. of Marius Mercator, vol. i., p. 32, quoted by Tillemont, *Mémoires*,

xiii., p. 1007); but that is obviously an impossible interpretation.

person, who had not himself written a Commentary, might have attacked passages in Jerome's exegesis. This point then does not in itself furnish a ground for identification. The true reason for identifying the *calumniator* with Pelagius lies in the general consideration that, in Jerome's writings on Pelagianism, the protagonist, the arch-foe, is Pelagius himself. This is so in the *Letter to Ctesiphon*, and in the three Books *adversus Pelagium*. Nothing less than the express mention of a name could convince us that the heretical leader who is referred to repeatedly in the Commentary on Jeremiah, which was being written at that time, was any other personage. It must not be left out of account that Caelestius, who is the only conceivable competitor for the honour of the identity, does not seem to have been in Palestine. He plays no part in the narrative of Orosius, which is our source for the course of events in Palestine in 415-6 A.D.; he does not appear at the meeting in Jerusalem or at the Council of Diospolis. If he was there, he must have belied his character as the agitator and mouthpiece of his party—a character which is given to him by Jerome in the *Letter to Ctesiphon* (c. 5, Migne 22, 1154): *Unus disci pulorum eius, imo iam magister et totius ductor exercitus, et contra Apostolum vas perditionis per soloecismorum et non uti iactitant syllogismorum spineta decurrens sic philosophatur*. Here we have a clear reference to Caelestius, the author of *Syllogismi*; and I believe it is the only reference in Jerome, excepting the allusion in the *tres homunculi* of the same letter (c. 12, p. 1161): *per unum* [Pelagius] *aut ut multum tres homunculos* (Pelagius, Caelestius, Julian).

§ 8. There is a particular confirmation of the identity of the *calumniator* with *Pelagius* in the circumstance that both were conspicuous for large stature. The *calumniator* was *grandis et corpulentus*. Orosius, in more than one passage,

mentions or alludes to this characteristic of Pelagius, whom he describes as Goliath,¹ and Jerome's *Milonis humeris intumescis superbia* (*Adv. Pelag.* i. c. 28, Migne 23, 522) is obviously an allusion to the same thing.

§ 9. The evidence then points unmistakably to the conclusion that Jerome's Scottic *calumniator* is Pelagius; and we may seem to have to decide between two possibilities: that he was a Briton, and that Jerome, having a low opinion of the Scots, pretended maliciously that he was a Scot, or that he was really a Scot, and that the name 'Briton' was applied loosely to him, because the name 'Briton' was more familiar than 'Scot' to the Roman public. While we admit that Jerome was a master in the art of reviling, we must, I think, acknowledge that the second alternative is far the more probable, and that such a loose use of 'Briton' would not be unnatural.

§ 10. These alternatives, however, are not exhaustive. It is possible to reconcile the double description of Pelagius as a Briton and of 'Irish race,' without putting such a strain on the proper connotation of *Britannus*. We have only to suppose that his family belonged to the Irish settlements in South-Western Britain, and the two equations are satisfied. For these Irish settlements, which seem to have begun with the migration of the Dessi from Meath in the

¹ *Lib. Apol.* (Migne 31) c. 31 balneis epulisque nutritus latos humeros gestas robustamque cervicem, praeferens etiam in fronte pinguedinem; c. 24 Goliath cum armigero suo calumniator mihi; c. 2 immanissimus superbia Goliath... habens post se armigerum suum qui etsi ipse non dimicat cuncta tamen aeris et ferri suffragia subministrat. The common assertion that Caelestius did all the fighting, and Pelagius was

mute, is refuted by the whole account of the Palestinian episode as given by Orosius (if Caelestius was there, it was he who was dumb), and by such passages as this, where Pelagius (Goliath) is contrasted with the *armiger* who does not fight, or the passage in c. 6, where letters are to be sent to Pope Innocent that Pelagius *imposito sibi eatenus silentio conticesceret*.

third century A.D.,¹ and must have been formed with the consent of the Imperial Government, we have not only the evidence of the Ogam inscriptions in South Wales and the South-Western peninsula, but also of Irish records. If this is the secret of the origin of Pelagius, it would have been quite correct to designate him *Brito* or *Britannus*, because he was born in Britannia, and his family lived there; while it was equally open to anyone to describe him more precisely as *Scotticae gentis*. Nor can Jerome's qualifying words *de Britannorum vicinia* be pressed to imply necessarily that Pelagius was born in Ireland; they can be equally well taken as an explanation of *Scotticae gentis*.

§ 11. I do not put forward this solution as certain, only as offering a simple explanation of the data. But it may safely be said that the only alternative is to suppose that the other writers besides Jerome who refer to the country of Pelagius used 'Briton' in a very wide sense, including the Scots of Ireland. I may add that there is a passage in Jerome's *Letter to Ctesiphon* which would win considerably in rhetorical point if Pelagius were a Scot, not of Ireland, but of Britain.

. . . Et ad extremum quod solet nobis obicere contubernalis vester Porphyrius qua ratione clemens et misericors Deus ab Adam usque ad Moysen et a Moyse usque ad adventum Christi passus sit universas gentes perire ignorantia legis et mandatorum Dei. Neque enim Britannia fertilis provincia tyrannorum et Scotticae gentes omnesque usque ad Oceanum per circuitum barbarae nationes Moysen Prophetasque cognoverant (Migne, p. 1157).

No reader will feel much doubt that it was the Scottic origin of Pelagius that prompted Jerome to single out for

¹ (1) K. Meyer, *The Expulsion of the Dessi* (Y Cymmrodor, 14, 101 sqq.), from two Bodleian mss.; Zimmer, *Nennius Vindicatus*, p. 84 sqq. discusses this document, and puts the date of its com-

position c. 750 A.D. (2) Cormac's *Glossary* (ed. Stokes) s. v. *mogeime*. See also *Historia Brittonum*, 14 (ed. Mommsen, p. 156). The settlement of the Dessi was in S. Wales (Demed), Meyer, p. 113.

special mention the *Scotticae gentes*; and the association of Britannia is in itself natural. But it is to be observed that he attaches to Britannia a reproach—*fertilis provincia tyrannorum*—which is totally irrelevant to the argument, and can be intended only as contumely; and this seems pointless, or, indeed, almost inexplicable, unless Pelagius was associated with Britain as well as with *Scotticae gentes*. This passage then may reasonably be urged as a consideration in favour of the conclusion that Pelagius, while he was of a Scottic family, was born in Britain.¹

§ 12. There is no ground whatever for connecting Caelestius with Ireland. Before he entered the lists of polemical theology, he was engaged in legal pursuits at Rome; he is described as an *auditorialis scholasticus*. His birthplace was probably in Campania. We arrive at this, by a method of exclusion, from Prosper's *Epigramma in Augustini obtrectatorem* (Migne 51, p. 151):—

aut hunc fruge sua aequorei pavere Britanni
aut huic Campano gramine corda tument.

The first line evidently refers to Pelagius; and the suggestion that the motive of the epithet *aequorei* was the etymology of the name *Pelagius* is very plausible. The second line must designate Caelestius or Julian. But Julian (bishop of Eclana, near Beneventum) was an Apulian; Augustine, *Opus imperfectum c. Julianum*, vi. c. 18 (Migne 45, 1542): *non enim quia te Apulia genuit, ideo Paenos existumes gente quos non potes mente*. The inference is that Prosper's *Campano gramine* alludes to the native country of Caelestius.

J. B. BURY.

¹ I observe that Mr. Nicholson, in his recently published *Keltic Researches* (1904), infers from the expression *Scotticae gentis de Britannorum vicinia*, that Pelagius "was doubtless a Goidel of Britain" (p. 169). The common view

that *Pelagius* translates a native name is consistent with Scottic and British origin alike (it might correspond to a name like *Muirchu* or a name like *Morgan*). Mr. Nicholson thinks that the name itself is Celtic.

M. BELLANGER'S *ORIENTIUS*.

ORIENTIUS is one of those writers who improve on acquaintance; and the reason is apparent. He is gifted with a respectable vein of poetical talent, has trained that talent to the best of his powers, and writes with no affectation and with the most earnest sincerity. Nor has he lacked his reward. Somehow, nearly every editor who has come to treat of his works seriously is a Latinist of the highest rank—Delrio, Commire, Ellis. The admirable critical edition of the last-named scholar¹ is recognized, and justly recognized, as the authoritative and definitive edition of the poet.² The Introduction is a model of well-digested and lucidly set-forth learning; and the volume is enriched with most valuable indices. Among the many works of Professor Ellis, none is more perfect in every respect; and that is saying a good deal.

Lately M. Louis Bellanger, Professor at the Lycée of Auch, has published a most attractive Essay on *Orientius*,³ and still more recently (1903) a critical edition of the *Commonitorium*. We must frankly say that we cannot think that the latter is at all as good as the edition of Professor Ellis. It is not by any means so accurate. Thus at 1. 535 we find it stated that AB read *tantas furor aptat habenas*,

¹ In the 16th volume of the Vienna Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 1888.

² Thus it is regarded in the great new Thesaurus.

³ *Étude sur le poème d'Orientius*.

Thèse présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris pour le Doctorat ès Lettres par Louis Bellanger, ancien élève de cette Faculté, Professeur agrégé au Lycée d'Auch, 1902.

though M. Bellanger knows very well (*Étude*, p. 51) that they read *tantus furor laxat habenas*. Looking across to the previous page, we find at line 509 *inmittere*, and in the note *inmittere* B. The former should have been *inmittere*. (Similar mistakes at 1. 424, 456; 2. 46, 332.) And we cannot help thinking that M. Bellanger has been too ready to follow and adopt as corrections of Orientius several suggestions of M. Havet, which, though in all cases they show cultivated and accomplished scholarship, are as a rule so far from the *ductus litterarum* that they cannot be regarded as what Orientius actually wrote.

But the case is quite different with regard to M. Bellanger's Essay. This is a specimen of the best kind of work produced by French scholars—one in which profound erudition is set forth with a most attractive charm of style. It is what Orientius would have called a *blandum opus*. It is the kind of book which allures one on to the study of the author of which it treats. It is a labour of love to M. Bellanger to devote his best powers to do honour to the saintly bishop who, in times long past, adorned the city wherein M. Bellanger himself has his lot cast to-day: and so no pains are spared to make the Essay in every way perfect. Beginning with a criticism of the text, in which he shows a complete mastery of all the literature on the subject, he discusses the date and personality, real and legendary, of the author (and this must have entailed no small amount of study); then proceeds to treat of the language, versification, style, and obligations of the poet; and finally in a masterly section dilates on the ideas expressed in the poem. As an appendix an elegant translation of the whole poem is given, enriched with short and pertinent notes. The volume is dedicated to Professor Ellis; and to no one is better due every token of respect which can be paid by a writer on Orientius.

The few remarks made in the succeeding pages are

mainly on questions of criticism in the *Commonitorium*, and occasionally offer an explanation. In all other matters M. Bellanger has hardly left anything for his successors to glean. The text of the first book of *Orientius* rests on two MSS., viz. that of Tours, of the tenth century, now in Paris (A), discovered in 1700; and that of Anchin (B), discovered in 1599. The latter was faithfully transcribed by Delrio, but apparently has not been seen by anyone since his time. The text of the second book and the Hymns rests on A alone. As to the comparative value of A and B, M. Bellanger (p. 25) forms a sound estimate—"Nous verrons que B¹ mérite bien moins confiance que A. Les leçons de B sont souvent ineptes et presque toujours sans valeur.² Sans doute il y a aussi des fautes dans A; mais là le copiste paraît avoir reproduit sincèrement ce qu'il avait sous les yeux. Dans B on reconnaît la main pédante de quelque clerc de l'époque carolingienne, corrigeant et refaisant le texte confié à ses soins. Ce clerc savait scander et se préoccupait de la versification: ses corrections choquent d'ordinaire plutôt le bon sens que la métrique."³

¹ The supposed Oxford codex referred to by Schurzfleisch is only a series of corrections in the margin of the Bodleian edition of Rivinus. M. Bellanger (p. 30) thinks they may have MS. authority, but Professor Ellis does not appear to share this opinion; see pp. 201, 202 of his edition. From the general character of the readings, I should be inclined to agree with M. Bellanger; but I cannot think that it is at all necessary to suppose (see M. Bellanger, p. 221) that the writer of the Epitaph on Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, quoted by Bede, had read *Orientius*; and that evidence is thus afforded that a copy of *Orientius* had reached Britain at the end of the seventh century. That angels should be represented in both authors as *in arce poli* is not sufficient

to prove obligation of the later to the earlier writer.

² Yet B not infrequently gives the right reading, e.g. (in addition to the instances given by Professor Ellis on p. 199 of his edition) 148 *frenis*: 167 *opibus*: 184 *invalidos*: 198 *idque*: 223 *nutare* (*mutare* A): 233 *pudoris*: 249 *Ast tamen est* (cp. for *Ast tamen* Stat. Theb. 2. 668. The reading of A, *Est tamen est*, gives a kind of repetition not found, I think, elsewhere in the poem): 286 *rident germine*: 306 *sontes*. In 139 *nubile* of B is less corrupt than *nubile* of A (the right reading being *nubila*; cp. below, note to 1. 545).

³ Though B's readings are generally metrical, they are not so always, e.g. 1. 182 *et blanda fera ferae*: 231 *certè tibi*.

1. 35.

Non potuit (*sc.* Balaam) proprie motam sibi subdere linguam,
 Ore aliud dicens, corde aliud cupiens.
 Nam male dicturus nimie benedicere coepit,
 Impendens aliis *ora* parata aliis.

Delrio has not shown his usual judgment in altering *proprie* to *propere*. The word means, 'so that it should be strictly his own, under his own special control' (cp. Horace, A. P. 128 *Difficile est proprie communia dicere*), and *proprius* seems rather a favourite word of Orientius.¹ Hence one cannot be quite sure that in line 31 *Atque sua stimulis* (so A), the reading of B *Et stimulis propria* is not to be preferred, with, of course, the necessary alteration of the order to *Et propria stimulis*, on which *sua* was a gloss or a variant in the archetype. Similar variants in the archetype may perhaps be inferred from 30 *loquens* A, *fruens* B: 595 *laudaverat* A, *praedixerat* B: 608 *frenat* A, *premit* B, though in these cases A has recorded the correct reading.²

In the last line *ora* can hardly be right? It has probably crept in from *ore* in the preceding pentameter. We should expect *verba* (*vā*), as 1. 34. Cp. 1. 24, where *solus* in A has crept in owing to the proximity of *soles*; and 2. 228, where *cibo* has come from *cibis* of 226; also Hymn 3. 5, where *solus* at the end of the line is repeated from *solus* in the middle, and has ousted some word like *unus* or *idem*.

1. 47.

Nullum sentirent animae dispendia finem.

Orientius seems to regard the soul as a centre of force, which it is constantly expending, but which will never

¹ It occurs in 1. 35, 50, 72, 107, 178, 243, 530, 596; 2. 76, 240.

² We may perhaps infer the same from the following variants: 3 *vitet* A, *vincat* B; 161 *iactatum* A, *lassatum*

B: 200 *quis neget hoc facile* A, *quis neget esse probum* B: 561 *in vilam* A² (*in ven* A¹): *in mundum* B (perhaps rightly, cp. 1 Tim. 6. 7).

cease: cp. 1. 275 *Scilicet ad motus animarum carne reversa*. Hence there is no need to adopt M. Havet's conjecture *cinctus*. There does not seem much analogy in the artificial expression quoted by M. Bellanger (p. 41) from Lucan viii. 2 *Haemoniae deserta petens dispendia silvae*—a word used apparently there and in Martial, ix. 99. 5, as the opposite to *compendia viarum*, 'a short cut' (Tac., Ann. i. 63). A more pertinent parallel would perhaps be Ennius, Ann. 8 *terraque corpus Quae dedit ipsa capit nec dispendi facit hilum*.

1. 50.

Hanc cura et propriis consequitur meritis.

In his critical ed. M. Bellanger does not take account of the fact that the MSS. have *et*. He is rightly anxious to retain *consequitur*, and not alter to *consequitor* (Delrio)—Orientius does not seem to be partial to such forms, though he uses *claudere* (imperat. passive) in 2. 385—or to *consequimur* (Schondonch). But the nominative may be general, 'a man,' taken out of *omnibus*, the more so as metrical reasons would preclude the use of the plural. *Cura ex propriis meritis*, suggested by Schenkl and Bährens, is a somewhat awkward expression; the *cura* is the *merita*, and does not arise from them. It is unlikely that copyists would have felt the metrical difficulty of lengthening the *a* of *cura* before *pr.*, considering the many unmetrical lines they have left standing. No such difficulty was felt by the copyist of A at line 502 *nata bona pravis usibus esse mala*, though there it would appear that the copyist of B added *et* from metrical considerations of his own.

A few lines further on (1. 56) M. Bellanger is right in retaining the MS. reading *tutis* against the alteration of Lipsius *totis*, adopted by Prof. Ellis. Conversely, at 1. 548 *in bene securo pectore blanda quies* (so A: B has *tuta*).

I see no reason for deserting the best manuscript. It has been frequently noticed how partial Orientius is to the word *blandus*: cp. i. 117, 161, 182, 208, 325, 450, 617; ii. 4, 13, 92, 111, 319, 337.

I. 76.

Et species agri mecum est et gloria caeli,
Orbis *enim* meus est et quod in orbe meum.

So A; but B has *et hic* for *enim*, and so M. Bellanger reads. But surely Professor Ellis is right in retaining *enim*: cp. Psalm 50. 11, 12 *Cognovi omnia volatilia caeli, et pulcritudo agri mecum est. Si esuriero non dicam tibi: meus est enim orbis terrae et plenitudo eius.*

I. 114.

Aera librantur, fluctuat Oceanus.

This form of the plural of *aer* is also found in Cassiodorus and Venantius Fortunatus—see Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre* i³. 977; but this place in Orientius seems the earliest extant occasion of its use. The form *aethera* is found in a writer of about the same age, Marius Victor of Marseilles, in his verse commentary on Genesis, i. 143: see the same volume of the Vienna Corpus as contains Prof. Ellis's Orientius, p. 444. *Aurae*, proposed by Manitius (Rhein. Mus. 1894, p. 173), is quite needless.

I. 125-8.

Levia nec desunt nivei velamina lini;
Sunt etiam Eois pallia velleribus:
Illa ferax iacto reddet tibi semine tellus,
Haec carpent celsis Seres in arboribus.

The reference is of course to silk. This belief that silk was a vegetable product was prevalent in the time of the Empire. In addition to the passage from Seneca, Herc.

Oetaeus 671, quoted by Prof. Ellis, we may refer to Virgil, Georgics ii. 121—

Velleraque ut foliis depectant tenuia Seres—

and Pliny, H. N. vi. 54, quoted by Conington: also Ammianus xxiii. 6. 67 *Apud eos (Seres) . . . abunde silvae sublucidae a quibus arborum fetus aquarum asperginibus crebris velut quaedam vellera molientes ex lanugine et liquore mixtam subtilitatem tenerrimam pectunt, nentesque subtegmina conficiunt sericum.* Pausanias (vi. 26. 4) seems to be the first classical writer who knew of the silk-worm: cp. Gibbon, iv. pp. 228, 229, ed. Bury.

I. 147.

Prona petis ferro, canibus fugientia sistis.

M. Bellanger (p. 299) rightly sees an antithesis between *prona* and *fugientia*. The former word refers to browsing cattle (*pascentia*, as Delrio explains it), like kine and sheep, which make no resistance, and which man butchers for food, as opposed to animals which he has to hunt: cp. Sallust, Cat. i. 1 *pecora quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit.* On the strength of two passages in Ovid (Met. x. 538; Rem. Am. 201), Prof. Ellis interprets 'swift.' In both passages the word is applied to hares. In the former there seems to be a contrast between the *pronus lepores* and the *celsum in cornua cervum*, so that the word may be interpreted 'lowly,' 'crouching,' lit. 'lying near the ground'; and there is no reason why the same meaning may not be applied to it in the other place. Ovid Met. i. 84 *Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram* is a nearer parallel from Ovid to our passage.

I. 167.

Aut quibus haec opibus quibus et persolvere donis.

So B: A omits *et*. M. Bellanger follows M. Havet in reading *quantis* for *quibus et*; but surely Professor Ellis

is right in his conjecture *quibus haec*. The proximity of *haec* caused the loss of the word in A, and it was filled up by the usual stop-gap *et* in B. Cp. above note on 1. 50.

1. 251.

Hoc tamen est melior qui Christo vindice gaudet,
Servet si domino quod dedit ille sibi.

Orientius is probably referring to Romans 12. 18, 19 *Non vosmet ipsos defendentes, carissimi, sed date locum irae scriptum est enim: mihi vindictam, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus*; cp. 1 Thess. 4. 6.

1. 283.

Spiceus . . densis calamus flavescit aristis.

So A: B has *apiceus*. Lipsius added *en*, Professor Ellis *at*; Delrio altered to *adspicis ut*: but the most attractive conjecture is M. Havet's *Triticeus*. Still probably nothing else is required except to add *et*, which we find omitted elsewhere in A: e.g. 2. 297: Hymn 3. 99. The second couplet of the enumeration probably contained *et* as well as the third (1. 285).

1. 295.

Nam finem noster finis non accipit, et mors
Qua primum morimur perpetuo moritur.

The editors refer to Hosea 13. 14 and its noble repetition in 1 Cor. 15. 55. One is reminded of Shakespeare's Sonnet 146, a poem which Orientius would have highly prized:—

Then, soul, live thou upon thy servant's loss,
And let that pine to aggravate thy store;
Buy terms divine in selling hours of dross;
Within be fed, without be rich no more:
So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men,
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then.

1. 319.

Contere calcatum *mortis* cum principe mundum.

So A: but B has *cum mundi princeps*. If the reading of A is retained, the reference is probably to Heb. 2. 14 *ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, id est diabolus*: but I am not by any means sure of this. I cannot find any place in the Vulgate where the *princeps mortis* in those exact words is mentioned: but *princeps mundi huius* occurs in at least three places—in St. John 12. 31; 14. 30; 16. 11.

1. 321.

Praecipue semper *famosos* despice vultus.

M. Bellanger rightly keeps the reading of AB *famosos*, and does not alter with Commire to the simple *formosos*. He justly refers (p. 48) to l. 344:

Cernere *laudatam* sic fugies faciem.

Orientius seems to be fond of the word *famosus*: cp. 1. 375, 494: 2. 359.

1. 326.

Naribus *assiduam* non metet unque rosam.

So AB: but Bährens, with a kind of passion for alteration, wants to read *attiguam*, and M. Bellanger follows him. Prof. Ellis is indubitably right in adhering to the manuscript reading, which is much more forcible, 'the rose by its *constant action* on the nostrils.' *Attiguam* would mean no more than 'in proximity to.' It is to be further noted that *assiduus* is a word often used by Virgil, of whom Orientius is a devoted imitator, as M. Bellanger has so excellently shown (pp. 205 ff.). The whole of this passage, 323-332, is a diffuse amplification of the idea in Proverbs 6. 27, 28 (used in the same connexion) *Numquid potest homo abscondere ignem in sinu suo ut vestimenta illius non ardeant? Aut ambulare super prunas ut non comburantur plantae eius?*

I. 347.

Praetereo clades Spartanas et Troica bella.

So A : B has *Praeterea clades Spartanas, Troica bella*. The Prosody of Mico the Levite (see Ellis in Journal of Philology, 43 (1893), p. 18) has exactly the same unmetrical reading as A. This evidence, added to the general superiority of A, strongly supports the genuineness of *et*. I think we should read *cladem Spartanam et Troica bella*, and understand the reference to be to Helen, the ἑλένας, ἑλάνδρος, ἑλέπτολις (Aesch., Agam. 689), as much as to the ruin she brought on Sparta. For *clades* applied to a person cp. Virgil, Aen. 6. 843 *Scipiadas, cladem Libyae*. The *s* of *Spartanas* got attached to *cladē*, with the result that *Spartanam* was altered to *Spartanas*. The conjecture of M. Havet, adopted by M. Bellanger, *fraudes Spartanae*, 'the perfidies of the Spartan dame,' is not only far from the tradition of the MSS., but gives an enfeebled sense. Prof. Ellis omits the *et* before *Troica*.

I. 351.

Qua furor impulerat lascivus duceret error.

So B : and this is the reading usually adopted. But if it is right, we cannot understand how the corruption in A took place—*ducere* (or *duceref*) *victum* (or *victam*). It seems that what Orientius wrote must be elicited from A, and the too obvious reading of B regarded as a mere emendation. Prof. Ellis conjectures *auctor*. Better, I think, is Schenkl's emendation (Wiener Studien, 1897, p. 157) *duceret ictus*, for which he compares Cic. Fin. 2. 32 *nec ullum habet ictum quo pellat animum status hic non dolendi*. But while *ictus* goes excellently with *pellere*, it is hardly the word for *ducere*. Perhaps *actus*, 'movement': cp. Lucr. 3. 191 *At contra mellis constantior est natura et pigri latices magis et*

cunctantior actus, where Munro refers to Virg. Aen. 12. 687, on which passage Servius interprets *actus* by *impetus*, *impulsus*.

1. 377.

Sanctus et victor per tot modo proelia miles
Heu male femineis subditur arte choris.

This still refers, I think, to Samson, and not to the children of Israel generally, and their transgressions 'in the matter of Peor' (Numbers 25 and 31), as the commentators hold. To be sure, there is nothing in the narrative of Judges 16 about Samson turning his back upon his foes (l. 380); but neither is there anything in the passages from Numbers about the children of Israel doing so. The punishment there is a plague. The reading usually adopted is that of Commire *Sanctus et <in> victus*. Prof. Ellis suggests *Sanctus <is> et victor*, to which Dr. Sanday (Classical Review ii. (1888) 21) objects that there is a "tendency to the disuse of *is* in writers of this date." He adds: "I do not remember an example in these poems beyond the attractive conjecture just mentioned."¹ The Bodleian corrector has *Sanctus ad haec victor*. However, the right reading seems to be *Sanctus et <hic> victor*, as *hic* might easily have been lost before *vic*-. It is questionable if we should not read *thoris* for *choris*, as Delilah does not appear to have had female accomplices, though perhaps the Philistines, 'the liars in wait in the inner chamber' (Judges 16. 9), might be called a *femineus chorus*.

1. 417.

Nam veluti flores *ictus* metit, atterit aestus.

If *ictus* is right, it must mean, as M. Bellanger says, 'a stroke of the scythe.' But the expression is strange.

¹ I cannot find *is* elsewhere in the poem: but *eius* occurs at l. 71: 2. 77: and *id* l. 217: 2. 95.

The Bodleian corrector gives *digitus*, a clever conjecture, if it has not MS. authority. Perhaps *florem*¹ *sector*. The Dictionaries quote from Columella, *sector feni*, for 'a mower.'

I. 423.

Hi modo qui canent albo² sordente capillo.

So the MSS. : Prof. Ellis most admirably reads *capilli*, as he rightly observes the 'gradatio' *capilli ora pes cervix colla manus lumina*. Professor Ellis also refers in this connexion to the first elegy of Maximianus, the burden of whose muse is, "Age, I do abhor thee," a composition which shows that old age was a favourite subject for detailed treatment by verse-writers. In 1. 425 *Pendula quae maerent rugis deformibus ora*, it is to be regretted that M. Bellanger did not adopt the excellent conjecture of Prof. Ellis, *marcent*. Prof. Ellis, too, is surely right in adhering to the MSS. reading in 429 *Cervix colla manus ET quod nunc omnibus horret*, where M. Bellanger alters (with M. Havet) *et* to *os*. The rhythm of the line is like that of Ovid, Met. 13. 140 *Nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi Vix ea nostra voco*.

I. 433.

Respice quam paucis floret nec permanet annis!

The nom. to *floret* is virtually the *vultus quicumque placet* of 1. 419 which pervades the whole passage, the decay of which in its several parts has just been detailed. The indicative is used, as in Virgil Aen. 6. 855 *Aspice ut insignis spoliis Marcellus opimis ingreditur*. M. Bellanger adopts the hardly necessary alteration of M. Havet, *flos fit*, itself not so satisfactory as *flos est* of Bährens. M. Bellanger ought to have noticed in his critical commentary that the MSS.

¹ It is the singular that is used in Isaiah 40. 6, 7.

² *Albo* used substantively for 'white' is common: cp. Virg. G. iii. 56 *maculis insignis et albo*. So also *terrenum* (1. 137) is found in Livy 23. 13, 14; and

read by Lachmann in Hor. Carm. 3. 24. 4. A much stranger adjective used substantively is *saeva* for the 'ills' that assail the life of ambition, 2. 95 *Quidquid id est variis quod vexat corpora saevis*.

read *floret*. Nettleship (Journal of Philology, 33 (1888), p. 118) suggests *flora aetas* for *floret nec*. But, with the exception of the notorious and doubtful passage in Naevius (*ut videam Volcani opera haec flammis flora fieri*), I think *florus* is only used of hair; cp. the English 'auburn.'

1. 437.

Atque ut sis penitus sic corde ut corpore purus
 Ut nullum facias suspicione reum
 Da studium curans, et semper providus opta
 Ut sit nulla tibi femina iuncta nimis.

It is not very easy to say what the second line means. Possibly it is this: 'And take earnest heed that you be in the fullest degree as pure in thought as in conduct, so much so that you do not even suspect anyone to be guilty of illicit love, and be ever watchful and pray that a woman may not become too dear to you.' For the expression, cp. 2. 33 *Nullum saeva reum faciat sententia*, 'Let not a cruel judgment arraign anyone,' a passage which seems to have reference to Matthew 7. 1 "Judge not that ye be not judged." M. Bellanger translates our passage differently, "afin que personne ne devienne coupable en te soupçonnant d'aimer"; but he does not feel at all certain, for he adds in a note: "sens douteux, car le vers est bien peu naturel." *Reus* is a word of which Orientius is very fond: cp. 1. 237, 245, 276, 438, 464, 519; 2. 33, 365, 392.

1. 447.

Oderit ignotos audax attendere vultus
 Seque etiam motis addere luminibus.
 Nam male permixto ludentia lumina visu
 Blandum saepe solent ore tacente loqui.
 Atque amor, ut lacrimae, quas fundi iniuria cogit,
 Ex oculis surgit, pectoris ima petit.

¹ Possibly we should translate 'And even supposing you are so pure in heart that . . . yet take earnest heed and ever watchful pray, &c.' But a word

like *tamen* would be desirable in the apodosis; and it is doubtful whether Orientius uses *ut* in the sense of 'supposing that.'

The second line is not exactly as it appears in the MSS. In A it is *seque tam & notis*, and in B *seque tamen notis*—at least I think so. As *luminibus* almost certainly means 'eyes,' we must alter to *motis*, as has been already done by Bährens, though his suggestion *Nequitiam et motis addere luminibus* is too violent. The passage may be translated some way thus: 'Let a woman refrain from boldly gazing on the countenances of strangers, and also from further taking active part herself (being forward herself) with movements of her eyes; for dancing eyes with guilty looks combined are often wont to speak an alluring language, though the lips are silent. And Love, like the tears which a wrong forces from us, rises in the eyes, but sinks to the heart.' *Se addere* means to put herself as an active agent into the intercourse of amorous glances. The last couplet means that love is engendered suddenly in the eyes (cp. Eur. Hipp. 525 Ἐρως ὁ κατ' ὀμμάτων στάζων πρόθεν), like the tears that spring up when one gets a sudden insulting blow. Love by the ancients was generally regarded as coming at first sight, and itself was likened to a blow: hence the frequent use of the word *vulnus* to represent its action. There is no constraining force to induce us to alter *visu* to the easier *risu*.

I. 459.

Invidia infelix mortem moritura paravit :
 Angelus hac celsi decedit arce poli,
 Dumque hominem properat caelesti pelleret regno
 Detrudi in tenebras ipse prior meruit.

The reference in the first line is probably to Wisdom
 2. 24 *Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum.*

The fourth line shows that the reading of the Bodleian corrector *nocitura* cannot be adopted.

I. 475.

Haec (sc. invidia) postrema dedit crucis in ludibria Christum
Dum peragit livor *credulitatis* opus.

That *credulitatis*, the correction of the unmetrical *crudelitas* of the MSS. made by Delrio, is right can hardly be questioned. The explanation, as far as I can understand the passage, is virtually that of Professor Ellis, whose words are these:—"Credulitatis Delrio, quod sic interpretor, dum cruci figitur Christus propter Pharisaeorum invidiam, non propter plebis credulae libidinem. Nam ut nimis credulum est uulgus, Christum modo pro rege accipiebant, modo pro nequam et malefico interficiebant." However, I am not sure that *credulitas* does not mean 'faith,' a commendable quality, cp. 83-88 *Sufficit ut dominum mundi rerumque parentem . . . Corde pius credas, credulus ore roges*; Hymn 3. 42 *Credule confessor, tua vita hoc sanguine vivet*; and its opposite *incredulus* and *incredulitus*, which are often used for 'lack of faith' (e.g. John 3. 36: Matt. 13. 58). The people saw Christ's miracles, and were inclined, or at least not disinclined, to believe in Him; they received Him with apparent enthusiasm (Matt. 21. 9): but their faith lacked firmness (*pectore non recipit*); it was liable to be swept away by any strong counteracting force. This force was supplied by the envy of the Pharisees, which was apparent even to Pilate (Matthew 27. 18). This force, acting on them with fury-like impulse, completed, brought to an end, the work that faith had begun (*peragit credulitatis opus*), turned them from the truth to crime (*in tantum studiis furialibus improba cunctos A vero in facinus verterat invidia*)—in which passage *verum* is the object of the state of mind represented by *credulitas*.

I. 493

Quid quereris diros *portus* ventosque furentes.

It is better to adhere to this, the MSS. reading, with Professor Ellis, rather than to alter to *motus* with Bährens, or *fluctus* with M. Bellanger and M. Havet. It is possible that Orientius was not thinking of any definite place, but was merely using a forcible oxymoron, 'a dreadful harbour-age,' 'a landing-place of horror'; whereas a landing-place or a harbour where a ship comes to land is generally a place of safety. Here the ships are driven on the rocks, and these are called *diros portus*, the word *diros* being a 'limiting' epithet, such as we meet with in (say) Aeschylus, ἀρπαγῆς κύνες (Prom. 803), and the like: cp. *portubus infidis* in Ovid, Met. 13. 710; and the opposite *portus puppibus aptos* in Met. 3. 596. In many places harbours that are no harbours have gained a disastrous notoriety. Reference may be made to the name of 'False Bay' close to the Cape of Good Hope. It is barely possible that the shipwreck of the heroes when returning from Troy, *communis hiems importunusque Caphareus* (Ovid, Met. 14. 481), may have been hovering before the mind of Orientius.

Another interpretation may, however, be offered. The harbours may be real harbours, but entry into them be fraught with danger owing to storms. Compare Lucretius 1. 271—

Principio venti vis verberat incita portus

Ingentisque ruit navis et nubila differt—

with Munro's note: "The wind beats against the harbours, and prevents all ingress to ships, rendering them therefore more dangerous than the sea. This so careful an observer as Lucretius would doubtless understand," to which is added some examples of ships being wrecked while trying to make harbour. According to this interpretation, the oxymoron still survives.

I. 503.

E terra genitum terrena in munera ferrum
 Falcibus incurvum, vomeribus rigidum
 In caedem et diras, bellorum crimina, *mentes*
Armamus contis missilibus gladiis.

mentes A, *mortes* B. We are inclined to adhere to the reading of A *mentes*. The phrase *diras mentes* might well mean 'monstrous thoughts,' 'unnatural devisings,' here almost 'savagery.' The phrase is Virgilian, Aen. 2. 519 *Quae mens tam dira, miserrime coniunx, Impulit his cingi telis*: 9. 183 *an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido*; cp. Georg. i. 37, Aen. vi. 721, of unnatural, wild desire. The reading *mortes* is rather tame and tautological. M. Havet's conjecture *messes* is very attractive: but the reading of either of the manuscripts gives a fairly good sense, and renders conjecture unnecessary.

It is difficult, on the other hand, to acquiesce in *armamus*. It would certainly require a parallel. Bährens seems to be right in reading *aptamus*. Once P became R, the alteration of T to M would follow. Orientius used the word with special reference to *contis* and *missilibus*, 'on our poles and javelins,' and, in adding *gladiis*, was not thinking that the word would not altogether suit *aptamus*, as swords are wholly made of *ferrum*.

I. 509.

Coepimus insani flammas inmittere tectis
 Atque exurendis subdere corporibus.

M. Bellanger (p. 314, cp. p. 256) seems in doubt whether Orientius is here speaking of the cremation of corpses, or of punishments inflicted on martyrs. But is he speaking of either? Rather, probably, he is referring generally to what must have been a frequent occurrence in the invasions of the Vandals and Alans at the beginning of the fifth

century, the burning of houses and their inhabitants ;
cp. 2. 179 :—

Hi canibus iacuere cibus, flagrantia multis,
Quae rapuere animam, tecta dedere rogam—

adopting the correction of Professor Ellis, *rogum* for *rogo*.
The latter could hardly be translated 'gave the houses for
a pyre for many.'

I. 529.

Ut pater alterius *factus* credatur et heres
Non possit proprii filius esse patris.

The theme is forgery of wills and other such falsifications
as are suggested by avarice. It is difficult to think that
factus of the MSS. can stand: nor is M. Bellanger's
alteration to *falsus* quite satisfactory; the word *falsum*
had occurred in 526. Rather *fictus*: cp. Dig. 47. 2. 52. 15
in eo qui se patrem familias finxit, cum esset filius, and
elsewhere.

I. 535.

Dic rogo quid miserum tantus furor flaxat habenas
Ut tibi sat non sit quod tibi iam satis est.

The first line is given as it appears in the MSS. M.
Bellanger (p. 51) approves of the conjecture of Rivinus:

Dic rogo quis miserum tantus furor urget habendi.

But this is far too bold. Better the marginal note in his
Bodleian edition:

Dic rogo quis misero tantas furor aptat habenas¹—

for it retains *habeas*; and it suggests the word *aptat*, which
possibly found a place in the line. This emendation has
won the approval of Bährens and Manitius. But we must
read *laxas* or some derivative of it; otherwise it is almost
impossible to account for its appearance. Perhaps

Dic rogo quis laxas tantus furor aptat habenas.

¹ In his critical edition M. Bellanger erroneously states that this is the reading
of AB.

If *laxas* got blended with *aptat*, a stop-gap like *miserum* would have been rendered necessary, which led to the change of *quis* to *quid*. However, it is hard to feel clear on anything except that the line contained *habenas*, and *laxas* or some derivative.

I. 545.

Comitur in somnos tenuato lucida vitro
Marmoribus variis lubrica cella tibi.

Comit A : *cur itur* B. Prof. Ellis retains *comitur*. But what does it mean? Is it 'is prepared,' 'is adorned'? But can this word be applied to a room? I should adopt the emendation of Lipsius *Quaeritur*. That passed into *Quor itur*, *cur itur* : and as *cur* and *com* are indistinguishable in abbreviated writing, the final step in the corruption was reached in A.¹ The participle *comptus* is used in a few passages of Lucretius of things 'put together' (Munro on i. 950); but these passages will not justify *comitur* = 'is constructed.'

I. 564.

Mitte *secuturus* quae duplicentur opes.

'*secuturas Delrio*,' says M. Bellanger, and apparently Prof. Ellis also. In the edition of Delrio in our College Library (in the Bibliotheca Patrum, Cologne, 1618), he is represented as having this note : "Mitte *secuturus*], Matth. xix. 21, 29. Hoc ait : praemitte eleemosynas ut *postea moriens* eas in coelis duplicatas invenias et quasi sortem cum foenere. Cave *secuturas* reponere : quae praecedunt."

I. 565.

Nam servata nimis *quae* mox bona non tua fient,
Si tibi non serves, sic erit ut tua sint.

The MSS. give *quae* : which Bährens cannot refrain from

¹ Another passage where A shows the second stage of corruption is i. 139 *nubila*] Delrio : *nubile* B : *nobile* A.

altering to the easy *quam*; and in this M. Bellanger follows him. Prof. Ellis, however, wisely keeps to the MSS., with the excellent interpretation: "nam quae bona mox fient non tua si nimis servata fuerint ['if you keep them with undue caution'], tua erunt si serves non tibi":¹ cp. Gibbon vi. 452, ed. Bury "And the epitaph of Edward [Earl of Devon] surnamed, from his misfortunes, *the blind*, from his virtues, *the good*, Earl, inculcates with much ingenuity a moral sentence, which may, however, be abused by thoughtless generosity. . . . The good Earl thus speaks from the tomb:

What we gave, we have;
What we spent, we had;
What we left, we lost."

The somewhat cynical couplet of Orientius which follows—

Munera quae donat moriens, haec munera non sunt,
Donat enim quod iam desinit esse suum—

became famous: see M. Bellanger, p. 277. By Paullus Diaconus it is attributed to *quidam sapiens* (Migne 95. 1347). He gives *tibi dat* for *donat*.

1. 576.

Caelo autem condes quidquid pro nomine Christi,
Christum *recipiens*, pauperibus tribues.

Manitius (Rhein. Mus. 1894, p. 173) urges the retention of *recipiens* (so A: *respiciens* B) referring to Matthew 10. 40-42 (cp. v. 42 with Orientius 1. 587) *Qui recipit vos, me recipit; et qui me recipit, recipit eum qui me misit, &c.* I suppose that the quantity *rēcipiens* (or should we print *reccipiens*?) would be justified by such forms as *reccido*, *redduco*, see Munro on Lucr. 1. 228: but it would be satis-

¹ Bährens' note here is, 'ex more suo,' very arrogant. It is: Nec non v. 565 aperte est rectum hoc: *Nam servata nimis quam mox bona non*

tua fient! nam codicum scripturam *quae mox* contortissime Ellisius ex more suo defendit.

factory if an example of *rēcipere* were adduced. Lucian Müller (*De re metrica*, p. 362) says, "Denique Christianorum poetarum libris productum aliquotiens invenitur illud *re* formis aliter ineptis metro. Ita habes longa initiali *rēperimus* (Dan. i. 38. 12), *rēperies* (Paul. 18. 313) . . . *rēcolitis* (Martian. i. 93. 49) *rēfixus* (Venant. misc. ii. 4. 35)." Add *rēcondens* (Paulinus Vita Martini iv. 343). L. Müller (*l.c.*) refers to Lucilius v. 4 for *rēceptus*, but I cannot find it.

I. 592.

Ipsa etenim ante Deum non est petitura voluntas,
Si bene non poterit quae *bene velle cupit*.

A read *quae bene vel cupiet*. B reads as given above. It seems preferable, and is justly retained by M. Bellanger. The present tense is required in *cupit*; and the *vel* is awkward, and does not occur elsewhere, I think, in this sense in the poem. It is to be noted that the Bodleian corrector has *bene velle*.

I. 602.

Quae (*sc. concordia*) brutis etiam *cum ratione* datur.

This phrase *cum ratione* occurs also in l. 44—

Principio geminam debes cognoscere vitam
A domino indultam cum ratione homini.

M. Bellanger (p. 52) rightly supposes that this has the sense of *κατὰ λόγον*. It means 'under the guidance of,' or 'consistently with, reason.' It answers to *εὐλογος* in so many Stoical definitions. Thus Cicero Tusc. i. 12, says *voluntas est quae quid cum ratione desiderat. Quae autem, ratione adversa, incitata est vehementius ea libido est*: cp. Diog. Laert. vii. 116 τῇ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὐλογον. See also the definitions of *cautio* in Cicero Tusc. i. 13 and *εὐλάβεια* in Diog. Laert. *l.c.* It is thus something different from 'dans une certaine mesure'

(p. 53). In explaining why Christ is called Reason (Ratio) in Hymn 3. 143, Orientius says:—

Nunc Ratio: haec ratio est, per quam stat fabrica mundi.

Bährens' alteration *non ratione* is not to be commended.

1. 608.

Corporeum frenat pacis amor populum.

This seems to mean 'the people as a corporate unity,' the word being used instead of *corporatus* from metrical reasons.

1. 615.

Pelle odium, contemne minas, depone tumorem.

This is the brilliant and certain emendation of Prof. Ellis for *rumorem* of A (*rigorem* B); cp. 229:

Elatos fastu damnas: depone tumorem.

Possibly *r* and *t* may have been very like one another in the archetype; hence such variants as 66 *rara* A; *tanta* (*tāta*) B: 65 *ture* A: *rure* B—the latter quoted by M. Bellanger (p. 53).

2. 1.

*Si monitis gradiare meis, fidissime lector,
Caerula securus colla premes colubri.*

M. Bellanger seems right in holding that this refers to "the old serpent, he that is called the Devil and Satan" (Rev. 12. 9), and not to Pelagius, though this heresiarch was sometimes spoken of by the orthodox as *Britannus coluber*. The very passing allusions made by Orientius to the doctrines of Pelagius (1. 40-42) are an infinitesimal portion of his *monita*, which are almost wholly moral and not doctrinal. The reference even to the doctrine of the Trinity is most perfunctory (2. 403-406): and if Orientius intended the *coluber* to refer to Pelagius, would the ordinary reader have been able to guess the reference? And would not *caerula* be somewhat strange?

2. 18.

Utque suis nullus non faveat vitiis.

A gives *fau& inuitiis*, the *a* and the dots by a later hand. We require the indicative. I should adhere to the first hand of A, and read *Utque suis nullus non faveat in vitiis*, "and as everyone is biassed [lit., 'is a partisan,' 'favours himself'] in the case of his own vices"—*favet* = *favet sibi*, the *sibi* being easily supplied from *suis*. Manitius reads *non faveat ah! vitiis*. But Orientius is not partial to this interjection. Possibly we should read *Atque* for *Utque*.

2. 37.

Iniuste alterius cupiet †*decrimine* vitam
Assertor vitae qui nequit esse suae.

In the margin A has *describere*, which Prof. Ellis reads. M. Bellanger adopts M. Havet's conjecture *destringere*, a word used in the sense of 'censure' in Ovid Trist. 2. 563. Possibly we should read *decernere*, and take the acc. *vitam*, instead of *de vita*, as a construction analogous to that in the line of Ennius (Ann. 198):—

Ferro non auro *vitam cernamus* utrique.

This makes a better antithesis to *assertor* than either of the other words.

In l. 39 we should read *damnati* with A (*dampnati*) and Prof. Ellis, and not alter to *damnatis* with M. Bellanger. Orientius is speaking rhetorically, meaning not much more than 'with a curse upon us,' the curse probably of original sin.

2. 42.

Os quod mentitur morte animum perimit.

Both Prof. Ellis and M. Bellanger refer to Proverbs 26. 28 *Lingua fallax non amat veritatem* (hateth those that it has wounded, R. V.) *et os lubricum operatur ruinas*. I

doubt the reference. Rather it is to Proverbs 19. 9 *Falsus testis non erit impunitus; et qui loquitur mendacia peribit.* We should probably read *animam* for *animum*.

2. 46.

Ne sapor antiquum saeviat illecebris.

This seems to mean, 'lest the taste may feel its furious craving of old at the presence of dainties': probably *illecebris* is strictly an instrumental ablative. It is, of course, easy to alter *antiquū* of A to *antiquis* or *antiquus*; but Prof. Ellis shows wisdom in adhering to the stronger expression. An obvious alteration to *serviat* is suggested by Manitius¹; but thereby would be lost a vigorous expression worthy of Juvenal: cp. 5. 94 *dum gula saevit.* M. Bellanger rightly retains *saeviat*. Using this adverbial accusative as a parallel, we may defend the reading of A in 1. 247 *Et licet haec melius mutaret gratia Christi,* and not feel obliged to alter, with M. Havet, into *Haec licet in melius*: cp. 1. 543 *ceu non casuras immensum construis arces*; 1. 318 *Quae rectum ducunt continuare vias.*

2. 65.

Claudantur gravido vergentia lumina somno,
Quod facis ignores tum quoque cum facias.
Quid loquar ablatum vultu spumante calorem,
Et male compositis verba soluta modis.

In 1. 2 I adopt *Quod* (for *Quid* of A) the excellent emendation of Prof. Ellis: also *tum* (for *tu*) as suggested by Bährens—'at the very moment even of doing,' a strong emphasis on the exact moment is required. In the next line M. Havet has made a brilliant suggestion, *vultu spumante* for *vultus fumante*. But a doubt may be felt

¹ Manitius considers *antiquū* of A stands for *antiquorum*, and that the reference is to Adam and Eve. Could

Orientius have expected his readers to understand that?

about *calorem*. It is questionable if a feeling of chillness generally accompanies intoxication. Rather, perhaps, *colorem*¹, referring to the pallor which comes on when the reaction from the excitement of intoxication sets in, and the drunkard tends to become 'drivelling' and perspiring.

2. 105.

Ille prior forsán qui serior adfuit ibit (ibi *A*),

At tua (Atria *A*) pulsabit stulta querela notos (notus *A*).

The three certain and striking emendations made in this couplet by Commire will serve to show what an admirable scholar he was. Teuffel (Rom. Lit. § 464: 9) cannot have had any idea of the versification of Orientius when he supposed that he could have made *ibi* a spondee.

2. 129.

Sed qui terreno tantum dependis honori,

Tantaque nunc homines ambitione colis.

M. Bellanger (p. 56) rightly rejects the idea that Orientius would make the *-a* of the abl. short; but we require a word like *nunc* signifying 'this mortal life' as opposed to the future life; and again *-que* is not likely to have arisen from nothing, and we want a conjunction. Nothing seems better than *Tantaque hic* of Bährens, or possibly *Tanta et nunc*. A few lines further down Professor Ellis reads *Ecquid* for *Et quid* (as he does also in 309). These may be right, but some doubt may be felt as to the use of these pronouns by Orientius. M. Bellanger (p. 56) seems certainly right in supposing a lacuna between 133 and 134.

2. 163.

Lassa senescentem despectant omnia finem.

Professor Ellis attractively suggests *respectant*, 'expect.'

¹ I find this has been already suggested by Bährens: Jahrb. 1888, p. 393, n. 9.

But life is regarded as a journey on a declivity, the goal of which we see before us: cp. 1. 55 *Prima* (sc. *vita*) *tamen celeri fertur per prona rotatu*. So that, perhaps, *despectant* (of A), 'look down into,' is somewhat more picturesque.

2. 171.

Non cava non etiam †metuis sub rupibus antra.

M. Bellanger follows Professor Ellis in reading *tetricis*—an elegant word, but not elsewhere, as far as I can discover, applied to objects of nature, and rather far from the MS. A second hand of the MS. has *metuendis*, a plain emendation; and we certainly want *sub*. (Manitius reads *etiam in metuendis rupibus*.) Possibly *tumidis*, cp. Ovid Am. 2. 16. 51 *tumidi subsidite montes*. The passage, however, still demands emendation.

2. 183.

Mors dolor, excidium . . . , incendia luctus.

A word has been lost in the MS. between *excidium* and *incendia*. Martène and Professor Ellis add *strages*; Schenkl and M. Bellanger *clades*. The line looks as if it was composed of three groups of two words each, the first word in each group being one connoting destruction, the second word connoting grief or mourning. Accordingly, we should prefer to read *sordes*.

2. 190.

Praetereo gladiis quantum, quantumque ruinis,
Igni, *graminibus*, fluminibus liceat.

M. Bellanger (p. 58) retains the MS. reading *graminibus*, interpreting it in the sense of 'medicinal' (cp. 1. 153) or poisonous herbs, and quoting Ovid Met. 7. 137. But would not the effect of the combination, 'to fire, to herbs,

to rivers,' be somewhat strange? for *gramina* by itself does not mean 'poison.' M. Bellanger rejects Schurzfleisch's emendation *grandinibus*: for (he says) hail injures the crops, but does not ordinarily kill men. Yet oriental hail seems to have been thought a fairly dangerous thing. As regards the plague of hail in Exodus 9. 19, we read: "For every man and beast which shall be found in the field, and shall not be brought home, the hail shall come down upon them, and they shall die": cp. 9. 25. And hail was considered sufficiently terrible to be a feature of the Day of Judgment: cp. 350—

At passim flammae, fulgura, grando ruent.

This line might tend not only to support Schurzfleisch's emendation *grandinibus*, but to urge us to alter *fluminibus* into *fulguribus*: but we cannot suppose that the invasions of the Vandals were accompanied by phenomena as awful as Orientius supposed the Day of Judgment would be.

M. Bellanger supports his view by referring to a passage of Catullus 23. 9, 10 (suggested to him by Professor Ellis) *Non incendia, non graves ruinas, Non facta impia, non dolos veneni*, where, no doubt, the *variae mortis viae* are enumerated. But such enumerations are easily made, and were frequent in the schools¹; and it would require a much closer verbal agreement to make me believe that, in a passage of this strain, Orientius had even remotely in his mind such a poem as the 23rd of Catullus. I cannot believe that there is any evidence of borrowing by Orientius from Catullus; the two poets are of such very different character that Orientius is most unlikely to have imitated him. Certainly the three passages cited by M. Bellanger (pp. 211, 212) prove nothing more than that when the two

¹ In this way I would explain the superficial resemblance between Orientius 1. 515 and Catull. 64. 398. Com-

pare Ovid Met. 1. 144 sqq. for a similar enumeration.

poets wanted to express the same thing, they used the same natural word. A passage a few lines further on, 195-202, reminds one, not merely in the sentiment, but to some degree in the rhythm, of Juvenal 9. 126-129: but I should not suppose any connexion between the poets on the strength of similarity of ideas in the treatment of such trite themes.

2. 221.

Num, nisi dum frueris, fructu tangere fruendi,
Et vita haec vitae vivat in officio ?

M. Havet's *Num* (*um* A) seems certain. The only change required is *vivet* for *vivat*, so that the tense may become parallel to the future *tangere*. Sensation and its enjoyment are of the moment. "Surely it is only in the moment of enjoyment that you will be affected by enjoyment's joy, and that this life will live in life's function"—the function of this life being sensation.

But it is just possible that *vivat* might be potential—'life can live.' The couplet is a very artificial one in its elaborate repetitions of *frui* and *vita*.

2. 225.

Quid tandem prodest si te ieiunia vexent
Hesternis large membra onerasse cibis
Cumque tuas hodie stringat ieiunia sitis
Ante diem nimio praemaduisse cibo.

The second couplet shows two corruptions due to repetitions of words from the preceding couplet. The third line has been admirably restored by Commire *stringat sitis arida fauces*: for the note in the margin of A *assidua* is a pure conjecture, and a poor one, as the one essential word in the line is *hodie*. Similarly in the fourth line *cibo*, repeated from the previous couplet, has ousted the word *Orientius* wrote, which we can only guess at.

M. Bellanger (p. 60) very cleverly suggests *scypho*,¹ and is confirmed in his conjecture by Professor Ellis, who himself also appears to have thought of this emendation. He quotes a passage of Pliny the Elder where *scyphi* appears as *cyphi* in the Vossianus, and *cyphis* in the Riccardianus. Still, while acknowledging to the full this cleverness and learning, I cannot help thinking that *cibo*, like *ieiunia*, is a mere repetition, and has wholly ousted the word Orientius wrote: so that we need not seek to find a word which bears a resemblance to *cibo*. Accordingly Nettleship's *mero* would seem to have as good a claim as any other word. The collocation *cibus* and *vinum* is of course common. It would obviate the irregularity of shortening the final vowel of *praemaduisse* before *scypho*. In 1. 31 *Atque sua stimulis subigentem terga Balaam*, the *a* of *sua* is lengthened before *st*.

2. 233.

Cum quidquid fuimus dolor est meminisse, fidemque
Omnibus eripiant proxima praeteritis.

Compare Matthew Arnold's poem on *Growing Old* :—

What is it to grow old ?

.

It is to spend long days,

And not once feel that we were ever young.

I do not remember to have found this touching sentiment in the whole of Maximianus' lamentations about his old age.

2. 249.

Nemo tamen cautus credit quod cernit et *illum*
Quod non vult, censet se quoque posse pati.

Should we not alter, with Manitius, to *illud*? No doubt, in the Vulgate at times, and in some fifth-century writers

¹ The same correction has been suggested by Bährens: Jahrb. 1888, p. 394, n. 12.

(e.g. Victor Vitensis), we find *illum* used for the neuter of *ille*; see Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre* ii¹. 426; but one would be slow to attribute it to such a good writer as Orientius. It would be very harsh to take *illum* as masculine.

2. 255.

Felix qui *licitum* finem putat esse laborum
Quod, post, ne timeat, caverat ante timens.

This word has caused trouble. Prof. Ellis proposes *liquidum*, meaning (does it not ?) that there is a clear end of troubles. Hilberg (Wiener Studien, 1888, p. 165) and Havet alter² to *letum*, Bährens to *lucrum*. But may not *licitum* be tolerated? "Happy he who thinks (believes, has faith) that a rest from toils is granted (allowed, lawful) to us." One thinks of Hebrews 4. 1-11, esp. v. 3 *Ingre-*
diemur enim in requiem qui credimus: v. 9 relinquitur
sabbatismus populo Dei: v. 11. Festinemus ergo ingredi in
illam requiem ut ne in id ipsum quis incidat incredulitatis
exemplum. The antecedent to *quod* will be the clause
licitum finem esse laborum.

2. 276.

His lumen ꝑtunc flamma severa dabit.

Commire reads *tenuē*. He could justify the lengthening of the *-e* by 254 *Serius excipere credimus esse lucrum*: cp. 1. 118 and 502, [quoted by M. Bellanger, p. 162. Bährens gives *torvum*, a most unlikely word, though it is better than his other attempt—*His lamentatum lamna*. Other conjectures are *maestum* (Thomas)—hardly strong enough—and *cunctum* (Haverfield). Possibly *taetrum*: cp. Paulinus Vita Martini 3. 312 *tenebris et taetrior ignis Lampade terribili mentita et luce micavit.*

2. 299.

Invidus impatiens mollis falsator adulter,
 Et vini totus, totus et illecebrae,
 Dextram caede nocens, lingua in convicia promptam
 Pervasor iactans impius indocilis.

This passage reminds us of such lists of the wicked as are found in 1 Cor. 6. 9, 10: Gal. 5. 19-21: Rev. 21. 8. *Impatiens* (cp. ii. 140) means 'hasty,' 'quick to anger,' and is not infrequently found in the Vulgate in this sense: e.g. Proverbs 14. 7, 29: 19. 19: 26. 17. *Falsator* is, I think, a ἀπαξ εἰρημνόν, the usual word being *falsarius*. The phrase *vini totus* perhaps hints at 'wholly slave of wine,' like *Martialis C Oli Primi* (C. I. L. x. 826), the designation *servus* being very often omitted; cp. also *sum totus vester* (Cic. Fam. xv. 7), 'I am entirely at your service.'

Professor Ellis reads in the next line *linguam in convicia promptans*; and M. Bellanger *Dextrá caede nocens, lingud in convicia promptá*, translating 'celui dont la main se sera souillée d'un meurtre, celui dont la langue aura été prompte à l'injure.' But the double ablative seems awkward. Rather, perhaps,

Dextera caede nocens, lingua in convicia prompta,

taking *Dextera* and *lingua* as nominatives, the hand and tongue being put for the actor and the speaker as so often in Scripture, e.g. Psalm 144. 8. *Pervasor* is a late Latin word for 'an encroacher' found in the Theodosian Code, and occasionally in Mediæval Latin (see Du Cange).

2. 323.

Instar flammantis fulgebunt lumina solis.

M. Bellanger (p. 153) says *Orientius* takes *instar* as a preposition governing the accusative; and he quotes another author of the fifth century, Pelagionius, for a similar con-

struction, *instar magnitudinem nucis Avellanae*. Wölfflin (Archiv ii. 584, 587) adds *Columella* 12. 28. 1 *irim cribatam quae sit instar pondo quincuncem et trientem*. But he doubts if the reading is sound there; and in the passage from Pelagonius considers that *magnitudinem* is either Greek accusative, or should be emended into *magnitudine* (cp. the passage of Festus (180.9), quoted just before by Wölfflin, *Orchitis genus oleae ex Graeco dictum quod magnitudine sit instar testiculorum*). The construction with the accusative is in the highest degree doubtful; the regular construction is with the genitive, and is probably what Orientius meant here, 'The righteous will shine as lights, the likeness of the rising sun.' A few lines above, M. Bellanger rightly adopts Professor Ellis's conjecture *blandorum turba* (for *verba*) *piorum*.

On the three most notoriously difficult passages in the poem a few words may be said, though they can offer no definite solution of the difficulties.

I. 12.

Heu noxarum malus origo praecipitat.

So A. B omits the line. The word *praecipitat* seems to be above suspicion; and so too *noxarum* (cp. 2. 291). After *Heu* generally comes *male* (e.g. 1. 378, 528; 2. 58), though of course not always (e.g. 1. 337, 430). *Origo* seems certainly wrong, as it will with difficulty fit into any part of the verse if we retain *praecipitat* in the latter half. It may be a variant of some word like *copia*. A possible line would then be

Heu male noxarum copia praecipitat.

I think in line 9 Bährens is right in reading *Et* for *Ut*. A similar error of A exists at 1. 513.

2. 7-12.

This passage I would arrange almost as Schenkl originally arranged it (see Prof. Ellis's edition, p. 254):—

An si ventosae moveat te gloria linguae,
 Quam suadet vano Tullius eloquio,—
 Sin fugienda iocus convivia sermo voluptas,
Sique etiam aequaevis dissociande tuis,—
 Quo studio nostri servabis verba libelli,
Tum vitae meritis consociande Deo.

The points in which the above differs from Schenkl are that it retains (l. 4) *Sique* of A, and does not alter to *Sic*; and alters (l. 6) *Ut* of A to *Tum*. The *Sin* in l. 3 takes up the protasis anew, not without a certain impetuosity. The vocative *dissociande* may be defended by Persius 3. 28:

an deceat pulmonem rumpere ventis,
 Stemmata quod Tusco ramum millesime ducis,
 Censoremvē tuum vel quod trabeate salutas?

and in a less degree by such 'emotional' vocatives as Virgil Aen. 2. 282; 12. 947; which saves us from the temptation to read *dissociandus eris*, supposing the vocative to have arisen from the proximity of *consociande*.

In the Wiener Studien (1897), p. 157, Schenkl expresses approval of the emendations of Bährens (except that he retains *An* for *Cum* in l. 1), which make the passage read as follows:—

Cum si ventosae moveat te gloria linguae,
 Quam (or Qua) suadet vano Tullius eloquio,
Sint fugienda iocus convivia sermo voluptas,
Sisque etiam aequaevis dissociande tuis,
 Quo studio, &c.

But I cannot bring myself to believe that *An* and *Sin* and *Sique* are not genuine.

2. 215.

Intereunt decies qui ternos vixerit annos

Atque illum vixit qui modo missile sim.

So A¹; but A² has the *si* of *missile* marked for omission. If we retain *illum*, we must alter (with Schurzfleisch) *Intereunt* into *Inter eum*; but *Intereunt* seems sound, so that *illum* is probably corrupt. The whole of the pentameter looks like what printers call 'pie,' so that desperate suggestions are allowable. The word *modo* leads one to suppose that the number designated in this line is a very small one; hence we cannot accept *millesimus* even if we acquiesce in the false quantity (not to mention the fact that men do not live for a thousand years). Perhaps *mis-* of *missile* is the remains of a compound of *semi-*; and some kind of couplet like the following might emerge:—

Intereunt decies qui denos (*ternos* A) vixerit annos .

Atque simul vixit qui modo semidiem.

But this is far from satisfactory. The passage earnestly craves for emendation.

L. C. PURSER.

MISCELLANEA.

SOPHOCLES, *Philoctetes*, 42.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν νοσῶν ἀνὴρ
κῶλον παλαιᾷ κηρὶ προσβαίη μακράν;

HERE Herwerden conj. προστείχοι, Blaydes ποι βαίη, and Sir R. Jebb (our great master as regards Sophocles) once thought of and proposed προσκάζοι, which, in his last edition (1898), he still supports, not, however, feeling "sure that προσβαίη is corrupt, though it is 'suspicious.'" The ground of the suspicion is given by Jebb in these words:—"προσβαίη in the sense of 'advance,' where we should have expected προβαίη, is certainly strange." He proceeds to offer an excuse for it which is *per se* somewhat unsatisfying. The real excuse, or rather justification, of the reading is to be found in a translation different from the one which seems to have commended itself to all editors so far as I know. The word does not here mean 'go' or 'advance' (Jebb), 'get to a place' (Paley), but 'ascend.' That this meaning, though most simply expressed by ἀναβαίνειν, is sometimes expressed in a modified form by προσβαίνειν, the following references sufficiently show. Thucydides iii. 22, 3 (where the ascent of the wall of Plataea is described)—

πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες. ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ . . . ἀνέβαινον.
. . . ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ ἄλλοι . . . ἀνέβαινον, οἷς ἕτεροι κατόπιν τὰς ἀσπίδας
ἔφερον, ὅπως ἐκείνοι ῥᾶον προσβαίνοιν—

i.e., that they might *climb* (not *approach*) more easily, being unencumbered.

Thucyd. iv. 36, 2 :

κατὰ τὸ ἀεὶ παρῆικον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου προσβαίνων, καὶ ἡ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίου ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες οὐκ ἐφύλασσον . . . περιελθὼν ἔλαβε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου . . . ἀναφανείς κ.τ.έ.

Here the editors, Stahl and Classen, both prefer to read *προβαίνων*, but against the authority of most MSS., and in spite of Arnold's defence of *προσβαίνων*. This defence, it is true, is not adequate, for he does not grasp the fact that *προσβαίνειν* can = 'climb,' rendering it 'getting on *towards his object*, i.e., in this instance, getting *up*.' Arnold refers, however, to iii. 22, 3, and also to vii. 43, 3, viz.:

καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς (sc. ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς) κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἥπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ . . . ἀνέβη, λανθάνουσι . . . καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχοςμα . . . αἰροῦσι.

I may also refer to Herod. i. 84 :

ὁ αὐτός τε ἀναβεβήκεε, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ἄλλοι Περσέων ἀνέβαινον· προσβάντων δὲ συγχῶν κ.τ.έ.

Eurip., *Cyclops*, 707 :

ἄνω δ' ἐπ' ὄχθον εἶμι, καίπερ ὦν τυφλός,
δι' ἀμφιτρῆτος τῆσδε προσβαίνων ποδί.

In this passage (where ἄνω εἶμι explains *προσβαίνων*) the use of the word closely resembles that in *Philoctetes* 42, because the ascent is in each case regarded as made from a cave in the side of a sea-cliff to the heights above. Add Eurip. *Helena*, 1556 :

ταύρειος δὲ πούς
οὐκ ἤθελ' ὀρθὸς σανίδα προσβῆναι κάτα.

The bull refuses to ascend the plank inclined upwards against the vessel's side. *Helena*, as we read *v.* 1570, got on board by a ladder. We may refer to 1443 of the same

play to illustrate how *πρός* in composition with *βαίνειν* can give to this compound the force of *ascending* or *climbing*.

ὦ Ζεῦ, . . .

βλέψον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. . . .

ἐλκουσι δ' ἡμῖν πρὸς λέπας τὰς συμφορὰς

σπουδῇ σύναψαι.

The prominent notion is that of 'breasting a hill.'

So with the noun *πρόσβασις*. Cf. Thucyd. vii. 45, ἰ ἐπὶ τε ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ἧ ἡ πρόσβασις, . . . where Classen's note explains *πρόσβασις* as = "das Ersteigen (der Höhe bei dem Euryelus)"; and Eurip. *Phoen.* 181, where it is said that Kapanews

προσβάσεις τεκμαίρεται

πύργων, ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω τείχη μετρῶν,

and where *προσβάσεις* is not (as L. & S. say) "the means of *approaching* the πύργοι," or, as Paley says, "the *accessible parts* of the fortifications," but "the points at which the walls could be *scaled*" by κλίμακες. The same idea is made more distinct and explicit in *προσαμβάσεις* :

Καπανεύς . . . ἐμαίνετο,

μακραύχενος γὰρ κλίμακος προσαμβάσεις

ἔχων ἐχώρει,

where, however, the fuller compound = the ladders themselves—the means of scaling.

Further illustration is needless. Sophocles conceives Philoctetes as having his αὔλιον in the cliff-side overhanging the beach, from which he occasionally ascended to the heights above to shoot birds, &c.¹ The speaker in *Phil.* 42 argues that one so lame and feeble could not have made much headway in climbing the steep and rugged cliff-paths which led to the uplands: that therefore he cannot be far off.

¹ The position of the αὔλιον is most definitely stated in v. 272, εἴδοιτ' ἐπ' ἀκτῆς ἐν καταρφεὶ πέτρῃ, which τῆδε, v. 286, identifies with the cave in which

Philoctetes had continued to reside. That it was nevertheless at a considerable height above the ἀκτὴ appears from vv. 1000, 1001.

ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, ii. 83, 419^b22-25.

Δεῖ γὰρ φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὄρμαθὸν ψάμμον τύπτοι τις φερόμενον ταχύ.

Wallace renders—‘a heap or *line* of sand in rapid motion.’ But ὄρμαθος is not simply a line; and editors have felt a difficulty in conceiving what it could be as applied to sand. ‘A rope of sand’ has been a proverb for something not feasible: how then could there be a ὄρμαθος—a series or whole consisting of homogeneous parts strung together—when the material is mere sand? Wallace has no remark upon this point. Trendelenburg-Belger feel the difficulty, and comment on it as follows:—“Velut si quis acervum aut cumulum celeriter feriat. Quid est cur ὄρμαθόν quasi orationem corrigens addiderit? ὄρμαθος proprie series est, ita ὄρμαθος νεοττιῶν, Arist., *Hist. An.* VI. i. 559^a8 ; ὄρμαθοι τῶν ἀμαξῶν, Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 3. 2. Quid autem arenae series? Quid quod additur arenae series mota? De arenae serie nobis non constat. Exemplum ita sibi finxisse videtur.” Thus Trendelenburg and his editor are quite at sea. Alexander, in his commentary, omits ἡ ὄρμαθόν. Samuel ben Yehuda’s ‘interpretatio Hebraica’ of an older Arabic version of the *De Anima* (given under the text of Alexander’s commentary by Ivo Bruns in the Berlin edition) throws no light on the matter. Torstrik says nothing about it. There is not the least reason to suppose, nor does any editor suppose, that anything is wrong with the text—that ἡ ὄρμαθόν is an incorporated gloss. But the idea of Trendelenburg, that Aristotle’s illustration is purely fictitious—‘exemplum sibi finxisse videtur’—is unworthy of a commentator on the *De Anima*. If Aristotle could believe that he was free to illustrate and explain a natural process—the production of sound by a πληγή—by reference to a mere fiction, a something that, like a rope of sand, does not occur in nature, it

would be hard to account for his reputation. However, it is no fiction. The *δρμαθός φερόμενος* is a 'revolving ring,' a sand-whirl, such as often appears in warm, sandy countries when a wind plays upon the sand in a certain way. A vortical motion occurs in the mass of sand, which arranges itself in a revolving ring, and, besides revolving on its centre, also moves onward with a certain speed. These rings, which are of all sizes, are frequent in South Africa, and are vulgarly known as 'devils,' owing to their unwelcome effects when they happen to collide with and break over a traveller. The word *δρμαθός* is very well suited to designate a revolving ring of this kind. Hesychius gives *χορός* as the first meaning of *δρμαθός*; and indeed the revolving movement of a circle of dancers, linked hand-in-hand, well illustrates the rapid whirling of the eddy of sand or dust.

Thus Aristotle improves upon his first example, *σῶρον*, which might or might not be in motion, and which therefore here may or may not agree with *φερόμενον*, by adding *ἢ δρμαθόν*, which must of course move in order to exist. The object of the whole illustration is to enable one to 'envisage' more clearly what the writer supposes to take place in the sound-medium, the air, when the *πληγή* which causes sound is inflicted upon it. Trendelenburg's suggestion that "*φερόμενον ταχύ*, si recte se habet, quasi ab effectu dictum videtur: si quis arenae cumulum ita pulset ut arena celeriter moveatur," is utterly astray. The rapid vortical motion constitutes the *raison d'être*, or rather the physical cause, of the *δρμαθός*, and is not an effect of the *πληγή*.

ARISTOTLE, *de Sensu*, vii.

I have not seen attention called to the extraordinary and, as I regard it, utterly mistaken view held by Grote (Aristotle, p. 473) as to the conclusion at which Aristotle

arrives in this chapter. "Aristotle devotes a chapter (i.e. *de S. vii.*) to the inquiry: Whether we can perceive two distinct sensations at once (i.e. in one and the same moment of time). He decides that we cannot: that the sentient soul is one and indivisible, and can only have a single energy or actuality at once." These read very much like the words of a person who had only perused the first half of the chapter attentively, and skimmed over the second half. What is, of course, the truth as to Aristotle's conclusion (which was not that of the school of psychology to which Grote belonged) is stated by Alexander, viz. that, assuming the then popular or current doctrine of sensibility to be true, co-instantaneous perception of several objects with one sense or with different senses together would be impossible—which is a sufficient refutation of the said doctrine, inasmuch as such co-instantaneous perception is a manifest fact of experience; that accordingly we must look for a different theory of sensibility, in order to explain co-instantaneous perception. This is found by Aristotle in what practically amounts to the theory of 'a synthetic unity' of *perception*, in which, however, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, the faculty of sensible perception, is, at least for the time being, isolated from the faculty of understanding, and has ascribed to it the power of comparing and distinguishing the particular data of sense, which it can present to itself simultaneously, whether they occur simultaneously or not. It is in virtue of this power of τὸ αἰσθητικόν, by which it 'transcends' the limitation of each particular αἴσθησις to a particular ἐνέργεια at a particular instant, that the co-instantaneous perception, which is to Aristotle a manifest fact, is possible. Cf. Alexander (Ed. Wendland, p. 157):—

ὁ ζητῶν ἐπιχειρήσας εἰς τὸ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι δι' ἐνδόξων, νῦν ἐπὶ τὸ ὅπως ἔχει λέγειν μέτεισι καὶ πῶς οἶόν τε γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν πλείωνων ἅμα αἰσθῆσιν. Ἐναργὲς γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο δοκεῖ.

It is matter for regret that the acute speculations of this chapter, which foreshadow or anticipate so much of comparatively recent speculation, should have been completely misrepresented by Grote, whose authority has been deservedly so great on questions referring to Aristotle and ancient philosophy in general. But there is an obvious want of finality in Grote's studies and conclusions respecting the psychology of Aristotle. His work on Aristotle was published posthumously; and in all probability he had not reached what he would have considered mature impressions on many of the questions arising in connexion with this difficult subject. He does not record and does not seem to have known the views of Alexander on the particular question above considered; and it was not like his usual practice to make up his mind on a question of this sort without going over all the evidence. He in other cases pays close attention to what Alexander—Aristotle's best ancient commentator—says; and I cannot think that he would have neglected to do so here. Probably we have in the book at this point, as his editors have given it to us, only a set of first impressions, which would have been altered had he lived to revise them.

PINDAR, *Pyth.* ii. 84-85.

ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρόν ᾗτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι
ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς.

Here the translators show to more advantage than the editors of Pindar. E. Myers renders 'will cross his path'; Paley, 'will run across his path'; Dissen renders ὑποθεύσομαι, '*incursionem faciam.*' Gildersleeve says: "It is more than that [*viz. incursionem faciam*]: it involves overtaking. The persistency and surprise of the wolf's pursuit are the points of comparison." He uses the word 'circumvent' to give the general idea of Pindar's precept for dealing with an enemy. Christ does not translate. I think Dissen had

the right view of ὑποθεύσομαι before his mind. This, however, is not fully expressed in his '*incursionem faciam*,' which Gildersleeve takes up, but rather in the supplementary explanation with which Dissen continues, *per obliquum incursans*, though probably in this last he is thinking of ἀγὰν διαπλέκει and ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς. At all events, the notion of ὑπο- in this compound is, as Paley and Myers take it, that of *crossing*. We may compare its use in ὑποτευχίζειν, e.g. Thucyd. vi. 99. 2 :

ὑποτευχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι ἢ ἐκείνοι ἐμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος καὶ, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλήσεις γίνεσθαι,

on which Poppo-Stahl explain 'exstruere murum qui intercipiat hostilem.' So in the compounds ὑποτείχισις, ὑποτείχισμα, *ch.* 100. Classen also explains ὑποτευχίζειν as an attempt to build a wall in a direction which *crossed* that of the other wall at a right angle, which is of course the obvious meaning. But, to come to closer quarters with ὑποθεῖν itself; cf. Ar. *Equites*, 1158-1161, where ὁ Παφλαγὼν and ὁ Ἀλλαντοπώλης are to run a race, with Δῆμος as the βραβεύς.

'ΑΛΛ. ἄφες ἀπὸ βαλβίδων ἐμέ τε καὶ τουτονί,

ἵνα σ' εὖ ποιῶμεν ἐξ ἴσον. ΔΗ. δρᾶν ταῦτα χρή.

ἄπιτον· ΚΛ. ἰδοῦ. ΔΗ. θέοιτ' ἄν. 'ΑΛΛ. ὑποθεῖν οὐκ ἐῷ.

Here Neil correctly explains:—"In the compound ὑποθεῖν, the ὑπο- has the meaning 'before,' as in ὑποτρέχω, . . . so the word means 'cross the path,' as in Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 155 (*al.* 84), and is used of eclipses when the moon crosses the sun's path σελήνης ὑποδραμούσης. . . . Here some trick in running must be meant." The trick is that which Pindar figuratively recommends in dealing with a foe. For a particular account of this trick cf. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* for 1903, p. 264. It consisted in making a false start, and, of course, crossing the opponent and getting before him. The ὕσπληγξ was, like the modern rope or

starting-gate, often used to prevent such tricks. No *editor* of Pindar, so far as I know, has brought these facts with regard to ὑπο- in composition to bear as they should on the interpretation of ὑποθεύσομαι in *Pyth.* ii. 84. Another passage might have been added to show the force of ὑπό in this connexion, viz. Eurip. *Iph. in A.* 633 :

ὦ μήτερ, ὑποδραμοῦσά σ', ὀργισθῆς δὲ μή,
πρὸς στέρνα πατρὸς στέρνα τὰμὰ περιβαλῶ—

where Paley compares ὑποθεῖν in Ar. *Eq.* 1162. Iphigenia should, according to etiquette, have allowed her mother to salute her father first; but, with affectionate eagerness, she starts before her, gets between her and Agamemnon, and then asks to be excused.

EURIP., *Suppl.* 222.

λαμπρὸν δὲ θολερῷ δῶμα συμμείζας τὸ σὸν
ἤλκωσας οἴκου.

One may easily suspect that Euripides wrote here not δῶμα, but πῶμα. Cp. Aesch. *Eumen.* 697 (Wecklein) :

κακαῖς ἐπιρροαῖσι βορβόρῳ θ' ὕδωρ
λαμπρὸν μαιίνων οὐ ποθ' εὐρήσεις ποτόν.

The words are, as Zenobius, quoted by Wecklein, states, from a popular proverb, ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ κάλλιστα μινύντων τοῖς αἰσχίστοις. But the full expression, implied in the text of Euripides as it stands, viz. λαμπρὸν δῶμα θολερῷ δώματι συμμείζαι, would merely involve a harsh *confusion* between the literal and the figurative senses of the words λαμπρός and θολερός. The sense required is—"you have, like one who mixes pure drinking-water with water that is muddy, brought ruin upon your household (as he does upon his chance of obtaining a drink)": not "you have, *like* one who mixes a pure (or illustrious) with a muddy (or

disturbed) house, brought ruin on your household.” Perhaps it would be still more to the point to say that δῶμα *anticipates* and *spoils* the metaphor which πῶμα would have fitly introduced according to the proverb as expressed in Aeschylus. δῶμα συμμείξας denotes literally, not metaphorically, what Adrastus had actually done; and in all probability represents a superficial correction suggested by οἶκον in the next line. The obviousness of πῶμα here does not necessarily tell against it.

EURIP., *Rhesus*, 808–812.

ΕΚ. πῶς, ὦ μέγιστα πῆματ' ἐχειρασμένοι,
 μολόντες ὑμᾶς πολεμίων κατὰσκοποι
 λήθουσιν αἰσχροῦς, καὶ κατεσφάγη στρατός,
 κοῦτ' εἰσιόντας στρατόπεδ' ἐξαπώσατε
 οὔτ' ἐξιόντας;

It is more than questionable whether the form of aor. above given from ἐξαπωθῶ could stand in this excellent specimen of Attic drama, of the Euripidean authorship of which there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt on grounds of style, diction, or composition. True, a fragment of Sophocles has ἀπῶσε; yet this form is characteristically Epic and Ionic. But, besides the form, there is the further objection to its use here, that though εἰσιόντας ἐξαπώσατε makes good sense, ἐξιόντας ἐξαπώσατε makes none. We should probably read ἐξοπώπατε. What Hector intends to ask is, how the φύλακες had failed to *descri* the spies who had entered the camp; had failed to keep a good lookout, and see them either at their entrance or at their departure, at both of which they should have passed the sentinels. Herwerden, attending only to the form of the aorist, and not providing for the sense of the passage, proposed to read ἐξεώσατε.

THUCYD. V. 36. 2.

τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἰδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίοις.

On this Classen remarks that, "as it stands it cannot have come from Thucydides, because by his rule neither the acc. Βοιωτοὺς nor the ὅπως can be joined with ἰδέοντο." Stahl thinks it may be allowed that in this one place Thucydides (like Herod. ix. 117) should have used ἰδέοντο ὅπως, just as he in one place (i. 119, 1) has used δέισθαι ὥστε; but he cannot tolerate the accusative Βοιωτοὺς after ἰδέοντο. Both Stahl and Classen think something has fallen out which would explain this accusative, and the former elicits from the schol. (τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἰδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς οὕτω ποιῆσαι ὅπως παραδώσουσι) the conjectural reading, ἰδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς παρασκευάζειν ὅπως παραδώσουσι, i. e. 'petebant ut Boeotos sollicitarent ad oppidum tradendum.' Arnold, like the rest, finds a solecism in Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι, yet contents himself with suggesting a comma after ἰδέοντο, and supposing a confusion between two modes of expression, ἰδέοντο αὐτῶν, Βοιωτοὺς παραδοῦναι, and ἰδέοντο ποιῆσαι ὅπως Βοιωτοὶ παραδώσουσι.

In spite of the real difficulties thus pointed out by editors, the passage as it stands may be sound. There are two peculiarities in the construction—(a) the acc. after ἰδέοντο, (b) the ὅπως after it. The latter has its parallels or analogues in excellent Greek—that of Herodotus and Sophocles.

To take (b) first, let us turn to Soph. *Phil.* 54-55 :—

τὴν Φιλοκτῆτου σε δεῖ
ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων,

where Jebb, to illustrate ὅπως after δεῖ, compares our ἰδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως; and also *Ajax*, 556 :—

δεῖ σ' ὅπως πατρός
δείξεις ἐν ἰχθροῖς οἷος ἐξ οἴου ἑτράφη,

and Cratinus (old comedy), *Nemesis* Fr. 3 :—

δεῖ σ' ὅπως εὐσχήμονος
ἀλεκτρύονος μηδὲν διοίσεις τοὺς τρόπους.

Now, bearing in mind the respective meanings of δεῖν and δεῖσθαι, we must admit that δεῖ ὅπως is *a priori* a harder construction than δεῖσθαι ὅπως; so that if we have to grant the former, we must grant the latter. And thus objection (b), if it does not quite cease to affect our minds, at all events loses most of its cogency. As to the other objection (a), viz. that to the accus. after ἰδέοντο, it cannot be so confidently repelled. And yet something may be said for this construction. If δεῖ can, as it often does (e.g. in Aesch. *Prom.* 86 αὐτὸν γὰρ σὶ δεῖ προμηθέως), take acc. of the person on whom the binding force of the necessity comes, how far does this offer analogy for the accus. after ἰδέοντο here? The latter word means 'requested' or 'besought,' and we cannot argue that it contains the same idea as δεῖ does in the other cases. But yet δεῖσθαι in Sophocles in at least one place (if Jebb is right) comes very near to δεῖν, i.e., it is used impersonally and in the same sense as this. Cp. *Oed. Col.* 570 :—

Θησεῦ, τὸ σὸν γενναῖον ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ
παρήκεν ὥστε βραχέ' ἐμοὶ δεῖσθαι φράσαι.

Here Jebb renders ὥστ' ἐμοὶ δεῖσθαι, 'so that there is need for me,' δεῖσθαι "being *Middle* impersonal = δεῖν [for a similar though disputed case cp. Herondas vi. 41, ἡ πολλὰ τήν μεν γλῶσσαν ἰκτεμεῖν δέεται, with Crusius' note, p. 51], not passive, with βραχεία for subject." He defends the very rare ἐμοὶ with δεῖσθαι (= δεῖν) φράσαι by the parallel of Eurip. *Hipp.* 940 θεοῖσι προσβαλεῖν . . . δέησι. To which he might add Plato, *Rep.* x. 9 τί οὖν; οἷι ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι; and elsewhere (e.g. *O. C.* 721) he calls this "an admissible, though rare, construction." Assuming that Jebb is right (and

no living scholar speaks with greater authority than his on such points), we see that ἐδέοντο (notwithstanding difference of sense, i.e. notwithstanding that it means 'requested' or something of this kind), approaches nearer than one would have anticipated to δεῖν in point of possible usage and construction. It may be that, in the particular case before the writer's mind (Thucyd. v. 36, 2), the Boeotian people were not the persons *of* whom the δέησις was directly made, though they were those who should give it effect if successful; so that the idea is as if we were to translate—'that the Boeotians,' &c. But the central thought, which δεῖσθαι shares in common with δεῖν, of moral cogency in some form or other, may sufficiently justify the use of the objective accusative here, with the personal, as with the impersonal, verb; and if we may reason from δεῖ σε ὅπως to δεῖται σε ὅπως (as would seem admissible), may we not go a step further, and reason on to ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως in the case before us? With all reverence for the Ἀδράστεια which punishes scholars for laxity in the observance of grammatical rules, some may think that the step is permissible; that the text, unassailable except on the ground of defective analogy, is, in fact, its own analogy, giving us the one remaining classical instance of the construction in question; and that our not having more instances of it is only an accident. Analogy, however, is not quite lacking, for δεῖσθαι in the sense of 'beseech' takes accus. in Herondas v. 19:—

μὴ μὴ, Βίτιννα, τῶν σε γονάτων δεῦμαι.

SOPHOCLES, *Antig.*, 1216-7.

ἄρμὸν χώματος λιθοσπαδῇ

δύντες πρὸς αὐτὸ στόμιον.

This, Jebb, following the majority of editors, I think, and agreeing with L. & S., renders: "pass through the

gap where the stones have been wrenched away." His note runs: "ἀρμόν χ. λ., an opening in the stones heaped up at the entrance, made by dragging some of them away. Cp. 848 ἔργμα τυμβόχωστον. Haemon, in his frenzy of despair, had broken into the tomb by wrenching away part of this rude wall-work. The gap still remained as he had made it. He had reached the spot only a short time before Creon." Of ἀρμόν he says: "The word means (1) 'a fastening': Eur. *Med.* 1315 ἐκλύεθ' ἀρμούς, 'undo the fastenings of the doors'; (2) the chink between two things which are joined together; so in Plut. *Alex.* 3 a furtive listener is described as τῷ τῆς θύρας ἀρμῷ προσβαλὼν τὴν ὄψιν, 'having put his eye to the chink in the door.' So here ἀρμός is an aperture just wide enough to admit of a man going through (cp. δύντες)." In the words from Plutarch, however, ἀρμός may have its simple sense of 'joint'; and to render it 'chink' is quite unnecessary for the sense there, though, of course, convenient for the sake of a parallel with the accepted translation of the word here in the *Antigone*. In fact, however, there is no parallel—no *real* parallel—for ἀρμός = 'aperture,' 'gap,' or 'opening.' The more one thinks over the word, its etymology and its usage, the more one feels the difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of acquiescing permanently in such a translation of it here. But what is the evidence for this remarkable 'aperture'? Creon had not noticed it: indeed, he was only just approaching the χῶμα (ἐρποντι μᾶλλον ἄσσον); nor had the servants, who had been the first to hear the ominous sounds, and, in advance of him, were proceeding to enter the mound and pass through the δρόμος to the νυμφεῖον ᾧ Αἰδου, where Antigone was entombed. That Haemon had entered before them proved to be the fact, but as yet they and Creon did not know this; and if the ἀρμός λιθοσπαδῆς meant an opening made by wrenching away (parenthetically one may ask where the notion of *saw* comes from?) stones, I cannot help

thinking greater stress would have been laid upon the significance of this, as indicating what was to follow. The ἀρμός λιθοσπαδής is, however, spoken of as something taken for granted, and requiring no special notice. Creon bids the men to enter the ἀρμός . . . λ. as if it were the ordinary procedure, and pass on to the στόμιον, having been rendered anxious by recognising the tones of his son's voice, not by anything he had seen at the tomb, to which he was going without a thought of Haemon being there, and merely for the purpose of releasing Antigone. But the sight of the stones (which had closed the entrance) torn away would certainly have arrested attention, whether his mind were bent on the subject of Antigone or on the subject of his son. If the stones which had confined her were thus torn away, her imprisonment would have been over, or at least some one must have broken into the prison. But no word of reference to this matter, so germane to the object which Creon had then in view, escapes from him or his attendants. These considerations are almost as powerful as the natural meaning of ἀρμός in making one doubt the soundness of the received translation. Whether ἄνωθεν (1206) implies that the attendants of Creon were still far off from the χῶμα as a whole, or that while close to the mouth of the χῶμα they were separated by the long δρόμος, or entrance-passageway, from him who made the sound, does not really matter. The important thing is that their attention was first excited, not by anything which they saw, but by what they heard. A third point against the received translation of ἀρμός as 'aperture' is derived from the usage of δύντες, the accusative after which, when it means 'to penetrate,' is seldom, indeed never so far as I can discover, conceived as an *aperture*, but some whole (generally material) into which penetration is effected.

Δύναι has three senses—*subire*, *induere*, *occidere*—of which only the first is here in point. This word and its compounds are very frequent in Homer. With the help

of Ebeling and Dunbar I have examined every instance of their occurrence, and find none in which the object accusative (with or without a preposition) is a mere *passage*. Of some hundred cases, the following are fairly typical: *δὺ δὲ βάθος λίμνης, δύνει δόμον, δύνει δὲ τ' ἀλοιφή* (sc. *βοσίνην*), *δύοντο δὲ τείχος ἀνάγκη*. The places in which it occurs metaphorically confirm the rule, e.g. *Μελέαγρον ἔδν χολος, κάματος γνῖα δέδυνεν*. One instance alone (to which Dr. Purser has called my attention) seems an exception, *πύλας καὶ τείχεα δύνω* (X. 99); but here the occurrence of *τείχεα* (like *τείχος*, in *δύοντο δὲ τείχος ἀνάγκη*) saves the rule. This usage of the word is followed by Sophocles and Aeschylus; at least Ellendt and Linwood show nothing to the contrary. I have not examined Euripides.¹ The point is novel and curious, and about it one may hesitate, but classical usage apparently tends to establish it. Though, therefore, in the *Antigone*, those who entered the *χῶμα* did so by the regular passage,—the *δρόμος*—yet, if what has been just said is true, *δύντες* implies that Creon's command was to pass *into the ἀρ. λιθ. itself*, not to pass *through* or *by* it into the *χῶμα*. A fourth point (already touched upon) is the illicit importation of *away* into the translation of the compound *λιθοσπαδής*. This notion belongs *properly* no more to *λιθοσπαδής* than to *νευροσπαδής* (Soph. *Phil.* 290). Both are loose poetic compounds, each found only once, and in Sophocles. They mean simply 'stone-drawn' and 'string-drawn' respectively, any further determination being supplied from the context. For 'draw *away*,' in prose, *ἀποσπᾶν* would be required, as *ἐπισπᾶν* for 'draw *to*' or '*towards*.' That both these compounds are equally frequent shows that *σπᾶν* itself is neutral. If *σπᾶν* *essentially* involved the idea of 'drawing *away*,' *ἐπισπᾶν* would be as unheard of as *ἐπιδιδράσκω*.

The fact is that this idea of *ἀρμός* being an 'aperture' is traditional, and apparently derived from one of the two

¹ Aristophanes conforms. Only in Pseudo-Arist. *Probl.* have I found an exception.

Laurentian scholia on the passage, viz., λιθοσπαδῇ] ὡς λίθου ἀποσπασθέντος, ὅπως εἰσέλθῃ ὁ Αἴμων, to which the scholiast adds the alternative view—ἡ ὑμεῖς ἀποσπάσαντες ἀθρήσατε. This version of the sense is determined by the supposition that -σπαδῇ must = ‘torn away’; hence the ἀποσπασθέντος. It was natural for commentators, who knew of what Haemon had done, to leap to this translation. There is, however, another scholium which points to the true interpretation, though Jebb makes no mention of it: ἄρμον χώματος λιθοσπαδῇ] τὴν ἐκ λίθων ἁρμονίαν τοῦ τάφου, ἣ τὸ ὑψηλὸν μέρος τοῦ χώματος τὸ ἡρμοσμένον λίθοις. This note is correct in the main, except that it does not explain λιθοσπαδῇ. It appears either (a) that the gen. χώματος is *appositive*, and the ἄρμος λιθοσπαδῆς was the χῶμα, which consisted of earth heaped over a substructure made, after the manner of Cyclopean masonry, of huge stones; or (b) that the ἁ. λ. was this substructure itself, χώματος being *partit. gen.* I prefer the latter alternative. Giving up the gratuitous notion of *away*, and regarding λιθοσπαδῇ as descriptive of the massive stones, we are at once reminded of a similar epithet used with similar effect in *Odyssey* vi. 267 of the stones of which the Phaeacian ἀγορή was constructed:—

ἐνθα δέ τέ σφ' ἀγορή καλὸν Ποσιδῆιον ἄμφις,
 ῥυτοῖσιν λάεσσι κατωρυχέεσσ' ἀραρυῖα—

where ῥυτοῖσι, ‘dragged to their places,’ describes or refers to the huge size of the stones, as I cannot help thinking λιθοσπαδῇ, perhaps a Sophoclean coinage, does also. Thus the interpretation of the words before us becomes ‘passing through the rock-built fabric [or, with (b), ‘substructure’] of the χῶμα, inwards, to the very στόμιον.’ The δρόμος implied, not mentioned, in the text was the normal, or permanent, passage through the stone substructure. The great mound at New Grange sufficiently illustrates the meaning of χῶμα here in its general features, so far as they are spoken of in the text.

JOHN I. BEARE.

NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM I.

THE progress which has been made during recent years in the criticism of Cicero's correspondence is reflected in Dr. Purser's recent edition. In the course of examining his text of the letters addressed to Atticus, I have had occasion to revise the conclusions at which I had arrived in the course of a prolonged study. In the notes which I now proceed to give on the first book, I avoid the great and difficult problems presented by the streams of tradition which have flowed into the extant MSS.; excepting as regards a few passages where I touch on these problems incidentally. Dr. Purser's opinion is in favour, but not very strongly, of the superiority of the Σ MSS. over those commonly denoted by Δ . My own view tends in the other direction. The Σ tradition seems to me to owe more to conscious manipulation, while the Medicean MS. is richer in the uncorrected nonsense which attests the honesty of transcribers, and often opens the way to true conclusions. But I am more concerned here, in the first place, to bring to bear on questions of interpretation the force of arguments drawn from linguistic usage, which, as it seems to me, recent critics tend to underestimate; and, in the second place, to draw attention to considerations not immediately connected with language which appear to be undervalued or overlooked. The abbreviations used here to indicate MSS. and editions are those which appear

in Dr. Purser's text. In quoting passages for comment, I give them in accordance with his text.

Ep. 1. § 1. Aquilium non arbitrabamur (sc. candidatum fore), qui denegauit et iurauit morbum et illud suum regnum iudiciale opposuit.

The variants *denegant* (M) and *et negauit* (Z^b) have some interest. They originated, to all appearance, in a feeble gloss *denegauit*, written on the margin to explain the unfamiliar phrase *iurauit morbum*; then this was worked into the text and connected with it by the common device of inserting a conjunction.

Ep. 1. § 2. Nemo est enim ex iis qui nunc petunt qui, si in nostrum annum reciderit, firmior candidatus fore uideatur, propterea quod curator est uiae Flaminiae †que cum erit absoluta sane facile eum libenter nunc ceteri consuli acciderim†. [Variants here are *um* (Z); *nunciteri* (Z); *nuntiteri* (M marg.); *acciderunt* (Z).]

The difficulty of emending this passage is notorious. Yet the sense of the original shines clearly through the corruptions. Cicero's desire is that Thermus should be consul for 64 along with L. Iulius Caesar; and he thinks that the work done by Thermus in repairing the Flaminian road will help him to success. Some widely-accepted ideas about the reconstitution of the readings may be rejected at once. To attach the words *sane facile* to *erit absoluta*, is to make Cicero say, "The road will be finished easily, I swear." Why should he emphasize his belief in the ease with which the work would be completed? Clearly *sane facile* (as Pretor contended) must begin a fresh sentence. Then it is astonishing that the conjecture of Bosius, *accuderim* for *acciderim*, should have been received with great favour. Madvig's modified proposal (Advers. 2, p. 165), *Eum nunc Caesari consulem accuderim*, is a remarkable piece of Latin to have emanated from such a source. He explains it thus: "Iocosus Cicero uerbo utitur de pari consulum conflando."

Would this recondite jest, "I should like to coin him into one piece with Caesar," be understood by any Roman reader? Tyrrell does not mend the case much when he represents *accuderim* by "pound up together." The one other extant passage in Latin where *accudere* appears is Plaut. Merc. 432 *tris minas accudere etiam possim ut triginta sient*. This is the passage which decides Tyrrell in favour of Madvig's proposal, though Madvig himself does not refer to it. It can hardly be supposed that Cicero had this verse in mind when he wrote, for the application he makes of the verb *accudere* is quite different; and if Atticus had recalled the line of Plautus to mind (an unlikely supposition), he would have been no nearer to an understanding of Cicero's jest. In Plautus the question is one of adding to the amount of a money offer. Looking to other Plautine phrases, such as *quas mihi tenebras cudis?* and *nauem malleolo excudere*, we may see that Plautus meant 'hammer out in addition,' not 'coin into one piece with,' or 'hammer into one piece.' Whether the slangy metaphor is derived from the mint or from the anvil may be doubted; but, in either case, it is readily applicable to the context in Plautus, and incongruous with the context in Cicero. I can, at least, claim for my own correction—*quae tum erit absoluta. Sane facile eum ac libenter consulem renuntiari acceperim*—that it gives an easy and natural sense, and assumes affections of the text which are common elsewhere; the dropping of *ac*, and of *re* in *renuntiari* after *er* in *libenter*; the confusion of terminations in *consulem, consuli*, and the change of *p* to *d*, which (as also the converse change) has frequently acted on the text of these Letters. The verbs *accipere* and *accidere* are thus confused in Orat. 187. Here the change to *acciderim* from *acceperim* was rendered easier by the existence of *reciderit*, a little above.

Ep. 4. § 1. Sentio . . . uenias ad id tempus quod scribis.

Sentio (all MSS.) is accepted without question by

nearly all recent editors, as against *censeo*, the conjecture of Lambinus. But the subjunctive directly associated with *sentio* is found here alone, while with *censeo* it is regular. It is true that *sentio* and *censeo* are often alike in their meanings. But evidently that did not lead to common syntactical relations. It is true also that in the case of many verbs subjunctives are directly attached to them once or twice only in the range of Latin literature. But the *ut*-clause is invariably also found following on these verbs; and the direct construction, if rare in the case of the particular verb, has many real analogies. The insertion of *ut* in texts in such circumstances has often been made unnecessarily, e.g. in Acad. 2, 71, after *adigo*; in Fam. 1, 7, 10, after *admoneo* (in some MSS.); Fam. 2, 8, 1, after *curo*; and also in Att. 14, 16, 4 (Z^b and L marg.); and in Att. 9, 7a, 1, after *suadeo*. But no *ut*-clause after *sentio* occurs. It seems hardly possible to account for the facts excepting on the supposition that the subjunctive, with or without *ut*, after *sentio* was contrary to the *ius et norma loquendi* as Cicero conceived it. Further, the confusion in the MSS. between *sentio* and *censeo* is common: see my critical note on Acad. 2, 134; Petschenig on Corippus, 4, 49; Madv. Em. Liv., p. 655, ed. 2. In De Diuin. 1, 3, B¹ (according to Deiter) has *sensuit* for *censuit*. Cicero must have written here either *censeo* or *suadeo*, the transition of which to *sentio* would be easy.

Ep. 4. § 2. Nos hic incredibili ac singulari populi uoluntate de C. Macro transegimus. Cui cum aequi fuisset, tamen multo maiorem fructum ex populi existimatione illo damnato cepimus quam ex ipsius si absolutus esset gratia cepissemus.

The true explanation of this much-debated passage depends, I believe, not at all on the exact sense to be given to *aequi*, on which great stress has been laid by many commentators. The degree to which the presiding judge in a criminal court could sway the issue of a trial, is a difficult

subject, and I have not met with an exhaustive treatment of it. But judges frequently exhibited strong bias in the one direction or the other; and a defendant might well be thankful if he met with strict impartiality. Yet in order to account for Cicero's expectation of gratitude from Macer if the trial had gone the other way, it has been thought needful to take *aequi* as meaning 'favourable'; and further to assume that Cicero speaks not of actual, but of hypothetical, circumstances: "Though I might have shown him favour." It is assumed that Macer would in that case have been acquitted. But it would be, I believe, impossible to produce from Cicero's writings a *cum*-clause in which the verb bears a hypothetical sense. The clause need not be rendered here in any but a natural manner: "Although I treated Macer fairly (or with favour), and therefore might have expected his gratitude had he been pronounced not guilty, yet his condemnation brought me greater gratitude from the view the people took of it" (either because Cicero's fairness was deemed to have contributed to the result, or because his partiality was entirely lost sight of in the result). That *aequi* means 'fair' rather than 'favourable,' is most probable: cp. the use of the word in *Fin.* 1, 11, and *Off.* 2, 64.

Ep. 4. § 3. Quod ad me de Hermathena scribis, per mihi gratum est. Est ornamentum Academiae proprium meae, quod et Hermes commune omnium et Minerva singulare est insigne eius gymnasi.

Here *insigne* is in ΣΖ^bL (marg.), but absent from Δ. It is one of the most striking of the additions made by Σ to the text as given in Δ. And it bears the same stamp as the majority; the word is not a necessary addition. Here *insigne* has a remarkable look of being a marginal comment on *singulare*. The whole question about the bearing of lacunæ in various classes of MSS. on the history of the text is confessedly hard, and is too large for

discussion here. But I wish to draw attention to some features of the supplements whereby Σ fill up lacunae in Δ . It is remarkable how few of them there are which might not have occurred to a copyist with a very moderate knowledge of Latin if he chose to give attention to the context. In by far the largest number of instances, some small word (often a pronoun or conjunction), or a very short phrase, is supplied which is not needed, though it makes the syntax or sense run more smoothly. Thus 1, 6, 1 Non committam posthac ut me accusare de epistularum neglegentia possis; tu modo uideto ut par IN HOC mihi sis. Here apparently *par* was thought to be too general, and *in hoc* was brought in from 1, 1, 1, and other places, to introduce a qualification. A similar motive may have led to the addition of *paulo* to *secus* in 6, 1, 2. And in 13, 6a Operam tuam multam qui haec et cures et mea expedias et sis in tuis NON multo minus diligens quam in meis, it was thought that Cicero could not have written so extravagantly. Yet cp. 5, 18, 4. In 12, 5b, 1 *proximis*, we seem to have the product of erudition. In 13, 10, 2 Brutus si quid EGERIT, curabis ut sciam, an ellipse which is of a type far from uncommon, is abolished. In 4, 1, 4, if the whole context be examined, it will be seen not to be likely that the words *quom Brundisi essem* were written by Cicero. So with *de Dionysio* in 8, 5, 1; *mihi*, 16, 15, 5; *tibi* in 4, 8a, 1; *eandem* in 1, 16, 8; *idem* in 12, 13, 1; and *id* in 1, 16, 2 (rejected by Purser). The subject *me* before the infinitive is added in 2, 1, 1, and 2, 6, 2, and 13, 48, 2. In other works of Cicero, this is sometimes a feature of inferior, as against superior, MSS. Small words have often been inserted where obviously needed, and where correct conjecture was easy: *et* in 5, 2, 2; *non* in 5, 10, 3, and 12, 2, 1; *ut* in 8, 6, 2; *quam* in 12, 23, 3; and *a* in 1, 16, 5 (confirmed by Seneca). On the other hand, we have an unnecessary *et* in 1, 17, §§ 2, 5; *ad* in 9, 3, 2; *autem* in

12, 5a, 1; *ergo* in 13, 2b, 1; *sed* in 12, 43, 2, and *uero* in 4, 3, 2, where it is open to great suspicion. Sometimes where a gap must be filled, it is doubtful whether it has been treated rightly by Σ , as in the case of *Idibus* in 4, 12, 1, and *et rogas* in 3, 15, 1. The instances (apart from the simple matters already mentioned) where the supplement may be accepted unhesitatingly are few; so the well-known passage in 12, 12, 1; and another in 13, 9, 1; also *interim* in 5, 20, 3. In 15, 3, 1, where Σ give *nati*, and Cicero wrote either *in Arpinati* or *in Atinati*, we have no doubt a *proprius error* in Δ . The additions of *plane* in 6, 7, 2, and *dies* in 6, 1, 22, are not certain. Passages like these may be set against the few where Δ fill a lacuna in Σ , as in 4, 15, 4, *debemus* (in a passage not yet successfully corrected). I omit a few unimportant details; but I submit that, on the whole, so far as such passages are concerned, not only is the superiority of Σ over Δ not proved, but the balance inclines the other way.

In some cases where $\Sigma\Delta$ agree, additions have been foisted on the text in other MSS. by obvious conjecture. So in 16, 8, 1: *atque a me postulat primum ut clam conloquatur mecum uel Capuae VEL NON LONGE A CAPUA*. The first *uel* has developed from the last syllable of *mecum*, and has caused the insertion. So *de ea re* in 16, 16a, 4 is a patent invention. And even where there is a certain lacuna in $\Sigma\Delta$, it is sometimes very doubtful whether it has been correctly filled by other MSS. as, e.g., in 4, 1, 4. But I cannot pursue the subject of these *commenta* further at this time.

Ep. 8. § 1. Cum Acutilio sum locutus. Is sibi negat a suo procuratore quicquam scriptum esse et miratur istam controuersiam fuisse quod ille recusarit satis dare amplius abs te non peti.

Here *recusarit* is Malaspina's correction of *recusarat* (M). Cicero seems to have allowed himself more licence in such sentences than his editors are willing to believe, and

even the best texts are inconsistent in their treatment. Thus, C. F. W. Müller has an admirable note on Deiot. 21, showing that Cicero sometimes uses an indicative clause in circumstances where we should be inclined to see cogent reasons for a subjunctive. He wrote in Cluent. 83: *cur, cum in consilium mittebant, Staienum iudicem, cui pecuniam dederant, non requirebant?* The fact expressed by *dederant* is, of course, one which Cicero is contesting. Hence scholars have often condemned the clause (so Hartman in "Mnemosyne" xxii). Analogies elsewhere are amply sufficient to justify it; yet, in some precisely similar passages, Müller abandons the codices. Relative clauses which might well have been treated as causal or consecutive, are dealt with by Cicero as descriptive in many places, as Sest. 64; 98 (*abhorret* need not be altered); Phil. 5, 14. Compare, too, Fam. 9, 2, 3 (*possunt*, codd. rightly); 6, 13, 4 (*debebam*, codd. with which cp. *deberem* in Fam. 6, 10, 2). Many indicative clauses embedded in *oratio obliqua* testify similarly to Cicero's freedom, so *cum*-clauses (e.g.) in Fam. 6, 4, 4, and a relative clause in 6, 14, 2, and a *si*-clause in Fam. 16, 1, 2. Many of these passages have been needlessly altered.

Ep. 11. § 1. *Incredibile est quanto mihi uideatur illius uoluntas obstinator et in hac iracundia affirmator.*

Here *affirmator* is from Ascensius; M has *affirmator*. It seems more likely that Cicero wrote *confirmator*, for which there are many parallels in his writings, than *affirmator*, for which there is none. The error began, perhaps, by writing *̄firmator*: compare *afficiar* for *conficiar* in 11, 8, 1 (ΣΔ); or, perhaps, with the loss of the initial letter (a common cause of error). Müller introduces *offirmatius* by conjecture in 13, 10 fin.

Ep. 11. § 3. *Academiae nostrae.*

One of the few passages in which Purser has accepted the order of the words given in Δ as against that presented

by Σ. Similarly in 1, 14, 1 *huic uix*. There is hardly an instance in which the one order is absolutely right and the other absolutely wrong, unless it be 8, 12c, 3. But in some places Σ may have substituted a usual for an unusual succession of words; thus *tamen* may have been ousted from the beginning of a sentence in 5, 14, 1, and *denique* in 5, 21, 11; in 6, 1, 9, and 10, 1, 4 the adverb at the end of a sentence may have displeased. In 8, 1, 4: *putat omnis hostis illi esse oportere* (Σ) is not more, but less, distinctively Ciceronian than *oportere esse*. And in 12, 16: *mihi nihil adhuc aptius fuit hac solitudine*, as against *mihi adhuc nihil*, the temptation to transfer *adhuc* may have been found in its silver Latin use as modifying a comparative.

Ep. 12. § 1. *Teucris illa lentum san enegotium, neque Cornelius ad Terentiam postea rediit.*

Compare also Ep. 13. § 6: *Teucris illa lentum negotium est*, and 14. § 7: *Τεῦκρης* promissa patrauit. I feel inclined to apologize for raising the question of *Teucris* (or *Τεῦκρης*) once more; but some important considerations seem to be overlooked, even by recent critics. I see no proof that by *Τεῦκρης* Cicero meant 'a Trojan lady,' applying the expression either sincerely to a woman or contemptuously to a man (a member of a *familia Troiana*?). If that were so, we should be bound to accept the use of *negotium* of a person (like *χοῆμα*) as good Ciceronian Latin. The alleged parallels are not convincing. Take 5, 18, 4 *ego tui Bruti rem sic ago ut suam ipse non ageret. Sed iam exhibeo pupillum neque defendo; sunt enim negotia et lenta et inania*. That men not specially defined should be described as 'fellows slow and worthless,' seems strange. Cicero really means, 'all this business is tedious and foolish'; *negotia* as in 16, 12 de *Ἡρακλειδίῳ* Varronis *negotia salsa*. In 14, 8, 1 *Baiana negotia chorumque illum*, we have an oxymoron, 'the business of Baiae,' a

place of no business. In 6, 1, 13, Cicero is praising the purity of his own government of Cilicia, and, after mentioning officers who are doing well (including himself), adds: "Iam Scrofa uellem haberet ubi posset; est enim lautum negotium. Ceteri infirmant πολίτευμα Catonis." By *lautum negotium* he means the whole government as 'a splendid field of work.' Callisthenes is called in Q. Fr. 2, 11 (13), 4 *uolgare et notum negotium*; but the author, as frequently, is identified with his book; and the words which follow, *quem ad modum aliquot Graeci locuti sunt*, are an obvious gloss, betrayed by *aliquot*, if by nothing else. There only remains In Senat. 14, where the text is greatly open to suspicion. Teucris, it seems to me, is 'the tale of Troy,' proverbially 'a long job,' as detailed in the epics. The use of *Ilias* in this sense is frequent. That Cicero had this in his mind seems to be indicated by *Teucris promissa patrauit*, which is in the mock-epic vein, and has a hexameter rhythm. Elsewhere in Cicero's works *patrare* only occurs in an archaic formula in Leg. 2, 19; and in one MS. of Diuin. in Caec. 38 (*patraret* in Lg. 42 for *peccarit*). For *promissa*, to denote the theme of an epic, cp. Hor. Ep. 2, 1, 52. I have only to add that the words *nihil illa impudentius* cannot be taken to prove that Τεύκρις is a person. Such a passage as Fin. 2, 1 Leontinus Gorgias . . . audax negotium, dicerem impudens, shows that the inference is unnecessary.

Ep. 12. § 1. A Caecilio propinqui minore centesimis nummum mouere non possunt.

Surely *minoris*, with which Seneca quoted the passage, is necessarily right. The absence of parallel is fatal, in a case like this, to the supposition that such MSS. as we have are correct. It is true that Charisius vouched for *minore* in Cicero as an ablative of price; but he also vouched for *plure*, which is even less credible. The

explanation of Boot that *fenore* or *usura* is to be supplied with *minore*, as *usuris* with *centesimis*, is most unacceptable. [E. Wölfflin (the champion of many abnormalities), in his valuable article in 'Archiv' 9, p. 100 sq., on the gen. and abl. of price, quotes Charisius, but gives no reference to our passage.]

Ep. 12. § 3. eumque per manus *seruulae* seruatum.

The codd. have *Seprulae* or *Seprullae*. Probably *seruolarum* should be read. The words *per manus* accord better with the plural, and in Har. resp. 44, Cicero says that Clodius escaped *ancillarum beneficio*. This is consistent with the statement of Plutarch and Schol. Bob. that he took refuge in the *cella* of an *ancilla*.

Ep. 13. § 1. quam (*sc. epistulam*), ut scribis, ancora soluta de phaselo dedisti.

It is with reluctance that I refer to this old crux. But some current ideas about it are untenable. Purser refers to Schmalz, *Antibarbarus* 2, p. 535; but the opinion of Schmalz depends partly on the mistaken assumption that by *ut scribis* Cicero indicates that Atticus used in his letter the phrase *ancora soluta*. The notion that *ancoram soluere* could mean *ancora sublata nauem soluere* seems to demand more support than the commentators find for it. The two operations required for starting a vessel were to cast off the shore hawsers, and to lift the anchor. The Latin for the first operation is *oras soluere*, and this makes it most improbable that for the second *ancoram soluere* could be used. The natural sense of that expression would be 'to slip anchor.' Our MSS. here come into conflict with fact, and are not strong enough to overbear it. The force of Peerlkamp's criticisms and of his references is still undiminished.

Ep. 13. § 1. Accedit eo quod mihi non †, ut quisque in Epirum proficiscitur.

This corrupt passage is part of Cicero's defence of himself for not writing to Atticus. Just before, he speaks about the difficulty of finding a trustworthy letter-carrier. Just after, he expresses his uncertainty as to the whereabouts of his friend. He may be in Epirus, he may have gone to Sicyon, he may be on a visit to Antonius. It is clear that emendations such as *non usui est ut quisque* (Tyrrell), or *non utilis est ut quisque* (C. F. W. Müller), are insufficient. They make Cicero repeat what he has just said, whereas, by *accedit eo*, he shows that he turns to something fresh. And these emendations, which yield the meaning "It is not every man setting out for Epirus whom I can use," are most inapplicable to the sentence which follows. Some old readings, such as that of the editio Jensoniana of 1470, *non notum est ut quisque*, are still worse. Something like *non de te liquet ut quisque*, "Whenever someone sets out for Epirus, I find myself in doubt as to where you are," would at least express in a natural manner the sense of what must have been in the original text, even if these be not the *ipsissima uerba*.

Ep. 13. § 2. Consul . . . nihil agens cum re publica.

The corrector M^a wrote *in re publica*; and many scholars have followed him in his suspicion, even if they do not adopt his remedy. The defences of the text in the commentaries are not so cogent as they might be made. In the personification of *patria* and *res publica*, Cicero goes considerable lengths. If the *res publica* can be said *agere* or *loqui cum aliquo* (Planc. 92, and In Cat. 1, 18), a man may surely be said *agere cum re publica*. Compare, too, *redire in gratiam cum re publica* (Phil. 2, 118, and 8, 32). The old correction *cum populo* (favoured by C. F. W. Müller) is

much worse than that of M³. Cicero wants to stamp this consul as useless in *all* public business. So in Ep. 14. § 6, heis ἀπρακτότατος without qualification.

Ep. 13. § 3. Postea rem ex senatus consulto ad uirgines atque ad pontifices relatum, idque ab iis nefas esse decretum.

Neither O. E. Schmidt (to whom Purser refers) nor any other writer whom I have consulted has made it in the least degree probable that the Senate would formally refer a religious matter to the Vestals, either alone or in conjunction with the Pontifices. Nor is it likely that the Pontifices would be explicitly directed to consult the Vestals in the matter of the Bona Dea. The necessity for a consultation was obvious. It still remains highly probable that *ad uirgines* was a gloss suggested by the context; when it wandered into the text, it was naturally linked to it by *atque* (cp. n. above on Ep. 1. § 1). The precedence given to the *uirgines* over the *pontifices* betrays the error.

Ep. 13. § 3. Lycurgei.

It is extraordinary that the old error of referring this to the Attic orator, Lycurgus, should continually spring up afresh. So, recently, Otto in his "Sprichwörter," s. u.

Ep. 13. § 3. Vereor ne haec (*sc. causa*) neglecta a bonis, defensa ab improbis magnorum rei publicae malorum causa sit.

Here *neglecta* is from I; M has *iniecta*. [Lehmann's *infecta* is hardly Latin.] I should prefer *abiecta*: cp. Clu. 94. Owing, probably, to the use of the open form of *a*, the preposition *ab* has often been curiously corrupted; thus M has *cum* for *ab* in Att. 12, 25, 2.

Ep. 13. § 5. Τοποθεσίαν quam postulas Miseni et Puteolorum includam orationi meae.

The absence from Cicero's writings of any other

example of the dative after *includere*, speaks loudly against the correctness of the text. Either *oratione mea* or *in orationem meam* must have been written by Cicero. I find Tyrrell's *incudam*, ingenious as it is, no easier to accept than *accuderim*, of which I have written above.

Ep. 14. § 2. Pompeius . . . senatus auctoritatem sibi omnibus in rebus maximam uideri . . . respondit.

The reading *maximam* of Rav. is less forcible than *maximi* (I), which is very near *maxime* of M.

Ep. 14. § 2. dixit se putare satis esse ab se etiam 'de istis rebus' esse responsum.

I cannot agree that Pompeius claimed to have praised sufficiently Cicero's Catilinarian achievements. The inverted commas are wrong. Two questions had been put to P., and he had answered both. Neither question contained any reference to Cicero's exploits. That P. referred to them indirectly is of course true. But what he said to Cicero was that he had sufficiently answered the second question as well as the first (*etiam*). On the interpretation of Tyrrell and Purser, *responsum* is meaningless. The word *istis* merely (as in a hundred other places) indicates that Cicero was specially *interested* in the business; not necessarily that it was *his* business. Cp. (*si tanti est*) *istae res* in § 7, and *ista rixa auguratus* addressed to Atticus in 2, 7, 3.

Ep. 14. § 3. Crassus postea quam uidit illum excepsisse laudem ex eo quod ^{huius} suspicarentur homines ei meum consulatum placere, surrexit ornatissimeque de meo consulatu locutus est, ut ita diceret . . .

C. F. W. Müller, in Rhein. Mus. for 1898, turns *excepsisse laudem* into *excidisse laude* (reading also *minus* for *hi*), because Pompeius "non exceperat laudem." This he concludes from what is said below, that Crassus won *gratiam quam ipse (Pompeius) praetermisisset*. But does not Müller

(in company with most editors) misinterpret *excepisse*? It is not the exact equivalent of *cepisse*. The sense is not that P. won praise, but that he angled for it (a common use of *excipere*). He failed to secure it because he was vague and cautious. When Crassus spoke out clearly and extravagantly, the Senate applauded, and P. knew that he had missed an opportunity. As to *hi*, it is the outcome of a mark in some ancestral MS., which indicated where an omitted word written on the margin should be inserted. See my note on Att. 13, 33, 2 (HERMATHENA, No. 25, p. 351); also on Acad. 2, 126; and Marx on Ad Herenn. 4, 20. In many cases small words which have been intruded on the text, such as *in*, *et*, *ut*, have a similar origin. See Otto in Rhein. Mus. xli. As to *ut ita*, it is difficult to lay down the limits within which *ut* may stand for *ita ut*; this instance seems to fall within them; but the ex. in § 1, *distinebar ut . . .* (so M against Σs), hardly does.

Ep. 14. § 3. proximus Pompeium sedebam.

Too much honour is done to Diomedes by assuming that the support he gives to this reading is decisive. There is no evidence to show that Cicero would have used either *proximus* or *proxime* (which Z has here) with the accusative of a personal name. The reading of M (*Pompeio*) is the true one.

Ep. 14. § 3. Intellexi hominem moueri [uerum] Crassum inire eam gratiam quam ipse praetermisisset an esse . . .

Verum is in M Rav.; but *utrum* is on the margin of M. If *uerum* be expelled as an intrusive word, the question still remains whether *moueri* could be followed directly by an accusative] with infinitive. It seems to me more likely that *uerum* is a remnant of some present participle (deeply corrupted) on which the subsequent construction

depended. The variant *utrum* shows that the script was of a nature to make *r* and *t* easy to confuse : cp. the variants *paret* and *patet* in Mil. 15 ; *ignatam* and *ignaram* in Fam. 10, 3, 1. Perhaps Cicero wrote *putantem*, and the corruption began with the loss of the initial letter (see note on Ep. 11. § 1).

Ep. 14. § 3. litteris.

See HERMATHENA, No. 25, p. 251 (where correct an error, *omnibus* instead of *orationibus*, and add to the illustrations Plin. n. h. 2, 13 and 9, 25).

Ep. 14. § 4. hic dies me ualde Crasso adiunxit, et tamen ab illo (*sc.* Pompeio) aperte tecte quidquid est datum, libenter accepi.

Purser's interpretation (accepted by Tyrrell), "with obvious caution," fits in excellently with the facts. But would any Roman reader familiar with many asyndetic expressions where two opposites were linked together (such as *dicenda tacenda*) be likely to catch the sense? The facts of the Latin language render this most improbable. I find no difficulty in the natural meaning, *sive aperte sive tecte*. Pompey's praise was, on the whole, too covert to satisfy Cicero or (according to Cicero) the Senate; but some good things may have been said openly. C. F. W. Müller reverts to the old idea that *aperte* is to be taken with *accepi*. To this *libenter* opposes an absolute bar.

Ep. 14. § 6. Bonis utimur tribunis pl., Cornuto uero Pseudocatone. quid quaeris? [At the end of a paragraph.]

Two critics so eminent as Lehmann and C. F. W. Müller have cast suspicion on the phrase *quid quaeris?* here, mainly (I think) because it ends the paragraph abruptly. In Ep. 16. § 4, Müller wants to transfer the expression, and meets with Purser's approval. The sense

is, "need I say more?" and it is true that a brief summary of the whole subject often comes after the phrase, as, e.g., in 2, 4, 5 and 13, 52, 2. But this is not a necessity; it often follows some strong word, and has immediate reference to it; so here it refers to *Pseudocatone*; in Ep. 16. § 4, to *triumphabat*.

Ep. 16. § 3. ludus talarius.

Tyrrell summarily rejects the view of Boot, that this expression indicates dancing and not dicing. Yet the fact is striking that, in every other passage where the phrase occurs, there is mention of dancing or singing or both, and none of dice. So in Off. 1, 150; Quint. 11, 3, 58 (MSS. *talaris*), and Fronto, ed. Naber, p. 160, 3. The exact sense of *talarius* (which only occurs in connexion with *ludus*) I do not discuss here.

Ep. 16. § 5. o di boni, rem perditam.

As to Müller's punctuation, o, di boni: see HERMATHENA, No. 25, p. 333.

Ep. 16. § 5. xxv iudices ita fortes tamen fuerunt ut summo proposito periculo uel perire maluerint quam perdere omnia. xxxi fuerunt quos fames magis quam fama commouerit.

The fragments of the speech in Clod. et Cur. §§ 27, 30, and the Schol. Bob. confirm the numbers 25 and 31 against 25 and 30 in Plut. Cic. 29. It is commonly supposed that the whole jury (including the president of the court) was 57 in number. Mommsen thinks that the number was intended to be 51 (as in Milo's case), but that the parties did not exhaust their rights of challenge. The passage of Plutarch is curious: τὰς δέλτους οἱ πλείστοι συγκεχυμένας τοῖς γράμμασιν ἤνεγκαν. ὁμῶς δὲ πλείονες ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπολύοντες. If there is any truth at all in this, the number of the jury

must have exceeded 57; but in any case *οἱ πλείστοι* must be a gross exaggeration. Can it be supposed that the judge interpreted each juror's vote to mean something, even when the scratches on the *tabella* were in themselves meaningless? Most likely Plutarch's story is apocryphal.

Ep. 16. § 6. *Talnam et Plautum et Spongiam.*

It is commonly assumed that these names are fictitious. If so, the choice of *Talna* is strange; and one would be driven to suppose that it is here corrupt; and this might be the case even if Cicero quoted real names; for he would naturally select those which would sound ridiculous. So with Caesar's centurions *Cafo*, *Saxa* (Phil. 8, 26), and Antony's gang, *Tirones Numisios Mustelas Seios* (ib. 2, 8), and the *conclusores Antoni* (ib. 13, 3).

Ep. 16. § 11. *commissatores coniurationis.*

"Those who conspire only over their wine cups" (Tyrrell). The sense is right, but is not naturally to be got out of the Latin. Probably Cicero wrote *coniurati*.

Ep. 17. § 5. *ingenuitas et magnitudo animi tui.*

Here *Σ*, *C*, and *M* marg. give *ingenuitas*, while *M* has *integritas*. Cicero just before says it was unnecessary for Atticus to lay stress on his self-renunciation in friendship. The question as to the appropriateness of one word or the other is to some extent a matter of taste; but it seems to me that *integritas* is more likely to be right here; 'purity' rather than 'openness' suits the passage. Of course, *integritas* is common enough in Cicero: so is *ingenuus*, both in the literal and moral sense; but *ingenuitas* for the moral characteristic is rare; perhaps only in Acad. 1. 33, and De Or. 2, 242.

Ep. 17. § 9. ut frequentissimo senatu et liberalissimo uterentur.

So Purser with C; but M has *libentissimo*; one of the most striking examples of difference between the two. Here M is greatly to be preferred; *liberalissimo* seems to have been prompted by the context, which has to do with the question of money.

Ep. 17. § 11. Luceium scito consulatum habere in animo statim petere. Duo enim soli dicuntur petitori; Caesar cum eo coire per Arrium cogitat et Bibulus cum hoc se putat per C. Pisonem posse coniungi.

Soli can hardly be right by itself. Possibly *alii* has fallen out after *soli*; or (more probably) *cum eo* has been displaced, having been originally in front of *petitori*, and by its change of position has displaced *cum hoc*, which preceded *coire*. This suggestion gets rid of the extremely awkward use of the pronouns, whereby *eo* and *hoc* both refer to the same man. If *hoc* had come first and *eo* second, the use would have been normal.

Ep. 18. § 1. Nihil mihi nunc scito tam deesse quam hominem eum quocum omnia . . . uno communicem, qui me amet, qui sapiat, quicum ego cum loquar, nihil fingam.

The change from *una* to *uno* (Müller, Purser) seems, like an older proposal for the ejection of *una*, to rest on the idea that *una* with *communicem* is superfluous. In not a few passages where *mecum una simul* and like expressions are given in the MSS., *una* has been similarly treated by editors. I have no doubt that the text here is sound; and I am not moved by the contemptuous treatment which Müller accords to Boot ("uno vix credibile a quoquam repudiari potuisse, etiam a Bootio"), nor by the array of passages to prove what no one doubts, that Cicero *might* here have written *uno*. The quotations given by Vahlen (Rhein. Mus. for

1898) in defence of *una* are more effective. *Cum* before *loquar* is due to Orelli; M has *ēto*, the *et* being in *rasura*. Obviously, the original of M was hard to read. I have proposed (ap. Purser) *intime* (*ītie*), which will account more easily for the lection of M. Compare Qu. Fr. 1, 2, 2, 4, and *sermo intimus* in Tusc. 2, 51.

Ep. 18. § 1. ut tantum requietis habeam quantum . . . cum uxore . . . consumitur.

The connexion of *tantum requietis* with *consumere* has often been treated as suspicious; but *requies* does not lie farther away from the idea of time than *otium*, *uigiliae*, and some other words which are used with *consumere*.

Ep. 18. § 2. in re publica uero, quamquam animus est praesens, tamen voluntas etiam atque etiam ipsa medicina efficit.

Brilliant as is the correction (at which Sternkopf and Leo arrived independently) *uulnus* . . . *ipsa etiam medicina efficit* in its general effect, yet the expression *uolnus efficere* here seems weak and improbable. I should accept *uolnus*, and read *refricat*, which lost its initial letter (see nn. on Ep. 11. § 1 and 14. § 3), and then passed into *efficit* to make sense.

Ep. 18. § 3. *suspíritu*.

This reading is surely due to the mediaeval copyist, and to the frequency with which he had to write *spiritus*. The influence of Christian phraseology on readings is of course notorious. *Suspirio* (RI) may be an emendation, but it is a true one.

Ep. 18. § 4. C. Herennius . . . ad plebem P. Clodium traducit idemque fert ut uniuersus populus in campo Martio suffragium de re Clodi ferat . . . Metellus . . . imminuit auctoritatem suam quod habet dicis causa promulgatum illud idem de Clodio.

Purser's *apparatus criticus* does not reflect the doubts

which scholars have often raised about the text of this passage, owing to the obscurity of the subject-matter. It must be considered along with Ep. 19. § 5 (written a few weeks later): Herennium . . . saepe iam de P. Clodio ad plebem traducendo agere corepisse. Huic frequenter interceditur. The veto must have been directed against a measure intended to be brought before the *concilium plebis* by the tribune. This must be different from the bill to open the tribunate to patricians, which Clodius failed to induce the tribunes to bring forward (Cael. 60; Har. resp. 45; Dio C. 37, 51, 2). The scheme of Herennius mentioned in Ep. 19. § 5 can hardly have been the same as the one described in Ep. 18. § 4, to the effect that the centuries should decide the question of Clodius' transference to the plebs. Yet *illud idem* can refer to nothing else; and the only natural interpretation of the words *habet promulgatum dicis causa* is to suppose that Metellus himself is "keeping on the order book," as his own proposal, but only as a matter of form, the scheme that Herennius had sketched. As Herennius could bring no proposal himself before the centuries, *fert . . . ut ferat* must loosely indicate a demand that someone properly authorised should bring the bill forward.

Although it is strange that Metellus, even as a form, should undertake to do this, thinking that nothing would come of it, yet *auctoritatem imminuit* points to some lapse in conduct that seemed serious to the optimates. Another difficulty is that the veto might have been expected to be applied to Metellus as speedily as to Herennius. The authorities show that Metellus was later on extremely hostile to his brother-in-law in his attempts to divest himself of his patrician quality. It is not surprising that scholars have tried to avoid these rocks, some by emendation, some by giving a non-natural sense to *habet promulgatum*, as though the parallel in Vat. 16 did not hold good. The passage, after all that can be done to explain it, remains

obscure; but, on the whole, there is no sound reason for suspecting the text.

Ep. 18. § 8. ex eis quae scripsimus tanta.

Since I proposed to read *antea* for *tanta*, I have noticed a few passages in Cicero and elsewhere, which may serve to defend the text. *Tantus* is sometimes thrown in as a kind of afterthought in addition to a noun in agreement with a pronoun or adjective, as in Cael. 52 huic facinori tanto; Marc. 28 ciuile bellum tantum; Sull. 68 istorum facinorum tantorum; Har. resp. 11 in hac urbe tanta; Planc. 74 huius officii tanti; Leg. agr. 2, 47, also Phil. 11, 14; Quinct. 82; S. Rosc. 97; Verr. 5, 179; Att. 7, 1, 9 rationibus quas meas tractat is somewhat similar, and 6, 9, 1 quae solent tuae (*quia*, Purser with Klotz). Cp. also Tusc. 1, 16.

Ep. 19. § 1. nullam a me uolo epistulam ad te absque argumento ac sententia peruenire.

Here the codd. have *solo* for *uolo*, and *sino* (or *sine*) *absque*. Even the great authority of E. Wölfflin cannot induce me to accept *absque* as having proceeded from Cicero. One of the *idola specus* that haunt the lexicographer is the desire to accept what is unusual in old texts. The limitations on the use of *absque* in Plautus and Terence are familiar; it never was employed by them as a preposition pure and simple. And for any certain example of this *absque* in after-time, one must go to Gellius and Fronto, unless we allow *et absque sententia* in Quint. 7, 2, 44 to be genuine. With Jordan, I think the words patently spurious. [A comic line attributed by some to Publilius Syrus is too doubtful to be considered.] Even if the passage in Quintilian is correct, how inexplicable it is that Cicero should have devised this innovation in language, should have employed it in just one out of hundreds of possible places, and yet have found no follower in it for a century and a half. On the other hand, what a natural

innovation for the archaists of the second century! It is easy to understand how the corruption in the MSS. came about. *Sine* was accidentally written as *sino*. This left *uolo* without a function, and it was turned into *solo*. The MSS. which had *sino* were of necessity emended by the insertion of *absque*, the sense of which was clearly required; and this *absque* was imported into the MSS. which still preserved *sine*.

Ep. 20. § 2. fuit ratio mihi . . . non inutilis.

The context is too long to quote; but *ratio* here *nude positum* is harsh, as Cicero is contrasting the view of Atticus (*ratio tua*) with a different one; hence, *illa* or *altera* seems to have fallen out between *fuit* and *ratio*.

Ep. 20. § 2. nullam rem tanti existimassem.

Even C. F. W. Müller reads *aestimassem*, impugning the credit of four passages which present parallels. Why should the genitive of price with *existimare* be thought any stranger than the same construction with *putare*, which is common enough?

Ep. 20. § 3. ut ait Rhinton.

As M has *Phinton*, Hilberg proposed to read *Philton* from the Trinummus of Plautus. It was objected by Lehmann in the Zeitschr. für d. Gymnasialw. (1898) that Cicero would not have omitted a reference to the author as well as to the character, as in Fin. 1, 3 Terentianus Chremes. That he had no such rule may be seen by a glance at the following passages, viz.:—Off. 1, 97; Tusc. 2, §§ 19, 33 38; ib. 5, 52; Acad. 2, 52; Diu. 1, §§ 42, 67; ib. 2, 112; Planc. 59.

J. S. REID.

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.

FEW dicta in the history of ethics are more celebrated than the maxim of Aristotle that virtue is a mean ; yet there are few the interpretation and the value of which have been more widely disputed. For the purpose of convenience the different theories which have been put forward on this subject may be classified under four heads, viz. :—that which regards this principle of Aristotle (1) as being, without further qualification, an adequate account of the moral standard ; (2) as totally inadequate and of no practical value for the guidance of those who seek to discover the unity underlying the various forms of the good ; (3) as accurate as far as it goes (subject to the explanations and limitations added by the author), but incomplete ; and (4) as a symbolic expression of essentially the same views as are to be found in the works of the majority of the greatest moralists of modern days. I hope to make it clear in the course of the subsequent discussion that a special extension of this last theory is undoubtedly the true interpretation.

The first view is undoubtedly the most superficial of all, and scarcely deserving of serious consideration. Those who hold it have been misled by the number of similar adages in ordinary language, and forget that the mean, as such, is a purely quantitative determination (of space, or time, or the derivative conceptions of number or degree). Commentators who have reflected on the matter quote

many instances of this type of thought from the literature of Greece before Aristotle's age. Thus Grant refers to the praise of μέτρια ἔργα by Hesiod, the proverbial μηδὲν ἄγαν, and the saying of Phocylides, πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα, μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι; and Stewart remarks that Hippocrates laid down the maxim that medical treatment should aim at the mean. Theognis uses μέτριος practically as equivalent to ἀγαθός (οὐδένα παμπήδην ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέτριον ἄνδρα—τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων ἡέλιος καθορᾷ. Aeschylus (Eumen. 529) declares that παντὶ μέσῳ τὸ κράτος θεὸς ὤπασεν. Pindar advises κατ' αὐτὸν παντὸς δρᾶν μέτρον; and Sophocles (Oed. Col. 1212) uses τὸ μέτριον in the sense of the *aurea mediocritas* of Horace. These instances are sufficient to show how completely the popular consciousness which underlay the Greek language had come to feel this quantitative metaphor to be an adequate representative of that moral state to which the approbation of all was due. It should be noticed, however, that this circumstance is by no means a feature peculiar to the Greek language, but has its counterpart in many others. It will be sufficient to refer to the Latin 'modestus,' the French 'juste milieu,' the German expressions 'die goldene Mittelstrasse,' and 'einen mittleren Weg einschlagen,' or our own 'moderation in all things,' to indicate the universality of this mode of thinking. No better proof can be given that a particular type of thought is natural to mankind, or any large section of mankind, than that a famous literary expression should be constantly applied in a sense altogether different from that in which it was originally used, but in accordance with this type, as is the case with the *medio tutissimus ibis* of Ovid, which is part of the advice given to Phaethon by his father Apollo, and has no reference to any theory of morals, but is so frequently quoted in this sense. The well-known criticism of Kant on the doctrine of the mean, the value of which will be

discussed later on, has at least had this merit, that it has compelled the apologists of Aristotle to look for a deeper meaning in his words to be discovered in the light of the explanations by which his doctrine is accompanied and elucidated.

Less superficial than the former, though, I think, equally erroneous, is the extremely opposite view which represents this Aristotelian principle as incapable of conveying any moral truth whatsoever. It is probable that those who hold it paid very much attention to the statement that ἀρετή is a μεσότης or ἐν μεσότητι, and very little to the limitations and qualifications by which that statement is accompanied. From the point of view of the Stoic philosophy, however, which regarded the absence of all affection (ἀπάθεια) as the ideal moral state, such unqualified condemnation was only to be expected. Thus Cicero, whose ethical writings are little more than a popular exposition of that or the Academic system, refers sarcastically to the doctrine of the mean in these words: "quae philosophia non interitum affert pravitatis sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum." This comment obviously assumes a premiss (viz. : that all natural propensions are in themselves evil) which Aristotle would by no means have admitted; in fact, his criticism of the Cynic definition of virtue as consisting in ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας implies that he would have assumed exactly the opposite, i.e. that all those appetites and affections which are found in all normal human beings have, in so far as they exist, a certain justification, and must serve some useful purpose, and play some part in the development of the faculties of those beings.

It is very remarkable that this same author, who has so condemned the Aristotelian principle in the passage quoted above, should, in at least two other passages, have borne witness to its universality and practical utility.

In the first (*De Off.*, i. 89) Cicero cautions against inflicting punishment while under the influence of anger, on the ground that "nunquam, iratus qui accedet ad poenam, mediocritatem illam tenebit quae est inter nimium et parum quae placet Peripateticis et recte placet." In the second (*De Off.*, ii. 59) he is discussing the proper course to adopt in the matter of expenditure; and his conclusion is expressed in the words: "mediocritatis regula optima est."

In conclusion, it may be noticed that Bishop Butler in his discussion of the passion of resentment, and Kant in his preliminary inquiry into the office of the Practical Reason, both assume a proposition, viz.: that nature makes nothing in vain, which is directly opposed to the premiss on which Cicero's criticism is founded.

The mention of Kant recalls to mind the fact that a more penetrating thinker than Cicero has expressed his condemnation of the Aristotelian principle in not unsimilar language.

In his *Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* Kant¹ devotes several paragraphs to the consideration of the value of the doctrine of the mean regarded as an ethical principle, and refers to the question again in the *Tugendlehre*. In these passages he brings forward various objections to justify his verdict, which objections may be reduced to four:—(1) the principle of Aristotle is false because the difference between virtue and vice is not one of degree (quantity) but of kind (quality); (2) the standard proposed (that of the mean between two extremes) is so vague as to offer no practical guidance; (3) the principle that we should do nothing either too little or too much is tautological; (4) this precept is one of prudence, not of morality.

The first and most important charge is a more scientific statement of the objection implied by Cicero when he

¹ Abbott's translation, p. 314.

stigmatised the doctrine as 'mediocritas vitiorum,' as quoted above; and may be partly answered in the same way, i. e. by reference to the various limitations and qualifications of the principle added by the author, to which those who altogether condemn it appear to have paid little attention. Thus Aristotle remarks, as noticed by the commentators (Grant, Stewart, &c.) that the μέσον of which he speaks is not the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος, or absolute mean, but the μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς or relative mean; that the same μεσότης is in the scale of the good an ἀκρότης or an extreme state; that there are some classes of action which are absolutely bad, to which therefore the notions of mean, excess, and defect are inapplicable, as there are others (e. g. σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία) which are absolutely good, in which there can be no defect or excess: the mean (cp. *supra*) being in another sense an extreme; that there are some mean states and some extreme states which are so rare that no name is to be found for them in popular language; that sometimes the one extreme, and sometimes the other extreme, is nearer to the mean; and that in all cases the mean is difficult to ascertain (almost as difficult as *Euclid* iii. prop. 1), so that the decision must be left to the σπουδαῖος. The truest, as well as the most natural, inference to be drawn from these very numerous and very important qualifications would seem to be that Aristotle himself felt that the essence of morality could not be *adequately expressed by any quantitative symbol*. He recognised, nevertheless, that all our phenomena being subject to quantity, moral truth must also be capable of quantitative expression; and hence he hoped by discovering the most appropriate quantitative expression to afford some guidance to seekers after virtue. A quantitative determination, as being the abstraction which is nearest to the senses, is more readily apprehended, as well as more universal, than any other. His selection of the μέσον for this purpose was determined by the fact that the genius

of the Greek language had already worked out this notion to a considerable extent, as well as by other reasons to be explained afterwards. The mean, then, is to be regarded not as virtue itself, but rather as an empirical criterion of virtue; and its ethical value is not to be found in the μέσον as such, but in the fulfilment of those conditions implied by its attainment.

The first and most obvious of these conditions is that control should be exercised over the inclinations; the second, that this control should be exercised with a view to the attainment of an end which possesses intrinsic value, which end is to determine the relative satisfaction to be accorded to the various propensions of human nature (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς: cp. Green, *Prolegomena*, p. 271).

The second objection advanced by Kant is the vagueness of the standard proposed: "This mean, who will assign it for me?" Undoubtedly this represents a real difficulty; but it is one which applies more or less to all formulæ of the moral principle, whether the criterion offered be Reason or Conscience or Moral Sense or Perfection, or the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number, or Self-Realization. As remarked by Stewart, no moral system can altogether dispense with the aid of examples, or Reason within must be guided by the work of Reason without; hence it is not to be wondered at that Aristotle should appeal to the σπουδαῖος or conscientious man to determine the mean in doubtful cases. If pressed further to say who is the σπουδαῖος, Aristotle could only reply 'the man who is ordinarily recognised as such' (cp. his reply to the Ascetic view that Pleasure is not a good: ὁ πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι φαιμεν). His precepts to those who are confronted with an apparent conflict of duties should be remembered in this connexion, especially as they indicate so clearly the fact that he

regarded the mean as arrived at by controlling the inclinations, and, above all, by guarding against the seductive influence of Pleasure (cp. Kant, *Practical Dialectic*, Abbott, pp. 212-215).

The first formula of Kant's own 'Categorical Imperative' expresses the moral law under a quantitative symbol (universality being the empirical expression of the *a priori* law of Reason, cp. *Typic of Pure Practical Reason*, Abbott, pp. 159 *seqq.*), and contains precisely that truth which, according to this view, is implied in the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. The practical form of the *Achtung* for the moral law is *Verachtung* for the inclinations; and this control of the inclinations is exercised with a view to the attainment of an end possessing intrinsic value, viz. the dignity of a rational being, which is Kant's equivalent for the *τὸ καλόν* of Aristotle. Not only is this true, but, in order to give any content to the Categorical Imperative, the same postulate is necessary which we have seen to be involved in the principle of *μεσότης*, viz. that the gratification of the various desires of human nature is legitimate, subject to the conditions aforesaid. If the end aimed at is a state of the Self (depending on a man's own actions), which it is with Aristotle as well as with Kant, it must be a common good capable of being equally shared by all, and the pursuit of it by one man cannot conflict with the pursuit of the same by another; and this is the most important implication contained in the Categorical Imperative.

With regard to the objection that the principle that both excess and defect are to be avoided is tautological, it may be remarked in the first instance that this seems hardly consistent with a former objection which declared the doctrine of the mean to be false, for an analytical proposition, though it may be meaningless, cannot at least be false. And secondly, it not infrequently happens

that a proposition which is analytical in form really implies the truth of one or more synthetical propositions. This is, undoubtedly, the case with the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, to which Kant here refers, and the correlative precept which warns against defect: for they involve the two important postulates already mentioned—(1) that all the natural affections have a certain degree of legitimate exercise; (2) that a limit is set to the gratification of the same which is determined by the end of human nature regarded as a system.

It is not surprising that Kant's last objection against the precept of the mean, namely, that it is a precept of prudence rather than of morality, should be urged by the author of the ascetic dictum, that in all action from duty a 'moment' of pain is involved; yet prudence, as necessitating the subordination of narrower to wider considerations, of temporary to permanent interests, implies the exercise of self-control, the condition *sine qua non* of any moral development whatsoever. It was, doubtless, in the prudential form that the principle of the mean first took root; but as elaborated by Aristotle it is by no means a principle of mere prudence, if we are to judge by the canons provided for us by Kant himself, for the *εὐδαιμονία* to which the observance of the *μέτρον* in action leads, is in the main an active state of character, not a passive state of feeling; something objective and permanent, not subjective and temporary; a common, not a private good.

The next theory which claims our attention, and which is altogether opposed to the view just criticised, is that of Grant, who has given a much fuller treatment of the subject, devoting a special Essay to the consideration of the questions here discussed. He has not failed to observe the close connexion of the doctrine of the mean with the proverbial *μηδὲν ἄγαν* and the sayings of Hesiod and Phocylides already quoted. While claiming for the

principle of μεσότης all the truth contained in these popular and prudential sayings, he is not satisfied to regard it as "a mere application of the doctrine of moderation to the subject-matter of the various virtues," but seems to think it necessary to discover a more subtle origin for the notion. Hence he advances a peculiar theory of his own, in which he was probably influenced partly by his conviction of the great debt which Aristotle owed to Plato, but mainly by the desire to discover some positive conception for the standard implied in the μέσον. This theory supposes the Pythagorean categories of the πέρας and ἄπειρον to have been the originals of Aristotle's mean, which represents the result of the combination of the two or of the control of the latter by the former.

In support of this he quotes a passage in the *Philebus* of Plato, in which Socrates represents health, strength, beauty, musical harmony, and even spiritual goods, as the result of the introduction of the πέρας into the ἄπειρον. In this passage Plato identifies the πέρας on the one hand with νόμος and τάξις, and on the other hand with τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ μέτριον; and it is this μέτριον which Grant conceives to have been the prototype of the Aristotelian μέσον. And he further accuses Aristotle as well as Plato of having resolved virtue into a kind of moral beauty; and this feature of virtuous actions, their beautiful character, he considers to be perfectly expressed by the quantitative symbol of the μέσον. In so far, then, as virtue involves this element, the Aristotelian formula is adequate, and no whit inferior to the Kantian 'law'; it is inadequate only in so far as it fails to express the second element, the chief characteristic of moral action, which Grant considers to be best described as 'self-abnegation.'

Having given a brief summary of the conclusions arrived at by this interpreter, it may be well in the next place to examine the evidence adduced from the *Ethics*

in support of them ; and at the same time to consider what other evidence, if any, can be produced from the same work to establish a different conclusion.

The evidence quoted in favour of this theory appears to be chiefly of two kinds—first, those passages in which *either* a direct reference is made to the Pythagorean doctrine, that the good is *πεπερασμένον*, while the evil is *ἄπειρον*, or in which moral qualities are described, according to the prevailing habit of that philosophy, in mathematical language ; and secondly, those in which an artistic conception of virtue seems to be presented. In order to understand fully the connexion between these two lines of argument, it is necessary to observe that Grant seems to think that the essential nature of beauty can be expressed in numerical language, while that of virtue cannot ; and he concludes, therefore, that when Aristotle used mathematical terms to express moral conceptions, he could not have had in his mind any other standard than that of beauty ; and this conclusion is confirmed according to his view by those passages in which Aristotle illustrates virtue by reference to the arts.

The direct reference to the Pythagorean doctrine on which Grant lays so much stress (*ἰσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί*) need not, and, I feel convinced, does not, imply any deeper meaning than that which appears on the surface ; in other words, Aristotle, having remarked beforehand that in all quantity there is a more and a less and an equal or mean, confirms his identification of virtue, already arrived at on other grounds, so far as virtue can be expressed by a quantitative determination, with the mean by the reflection that, as there is only one way of acting rightly and only one mean, this latter (*μεσότης*) must be a more fitting representative of *ἀρετή* than either of the other two quantitative determinations, the more or

the less, which are indefinite, and of which there may be more than one.

That Aristotle laid little stress on the Pythagorean identification of the *ὠρισμένον* (or *πεπερασμένον*) and the *ἀόριστον* (or *ἄπειρον*) with the good and bad, respectively, appears from his reply to the objection of the ascetics against Pleasure (*τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὠρίσθαι τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον*), in which he maintains that exactly the same thing may be said of the *ἀρεαί*, and implies that, on the assumption that whatever admits of degrees is of the nature of the infinite (*ἀόριστος, ἄπειρος*), virtue must be *ἀόριστος* also. The fact that he classes the *ἀγαθόν* as *ὠρισμένον* or *πεπερασμένον* at all probably means no more than this, that he recognised this traditional symbol of the good as possessing a certain justification by analogy, i. e. inasmuch as the attainment of the good demands that a man should not follow any particular desire which may be present to him without limit, that act of numeration which terminates at a definite point is a better symbol of the good than the act of numeration which ceases at no definite point. It is also possible that when he spoke of the good as *πεπερασμένον*, his meaning was the same as that expressed elsewhere by the proposition that the good was not a *γένεσις*, i. e. not a process which could be distinguished into means and end, but that each good act was *τέλειον*, or an end in itself, which no increase of time could make more of a good.

It is a common habit with Aristotle when introducing a theory of his own to quote in its support such evidence as may be derived from current maxims, whether popular or philosophical. So also in this case he confirms his theory that virtue (so far as it can be expressed quantitatively) is a *μέσον*, by pointing out that the *μέσον* possesses at least one characteristic which the Pythagoreans ascribed to the good, namely, that it is *πεπερασμένον*.

Those passages in which Aristotle speaks of the good in numerical terms are susceptible of another interpretation, altogether different from that put upon them by Grant. It is no peculiarity of the notion of the beautiful that it admits of quantitative expression; the same is equally true of the idea of the moral: and in fact, as Hegel remarks, all spiritual facts may be regarded from a quantitative point of view. In no case, however, can these quantitative expressions completely explain the nature of the conceptions which they represent; they are always more or less arbitrary; and their philosophical importance depends altogether on the theory implied in the scale, and the unit assumed in each case.

Of the arbitrary character of all such symbols it would be difficult to find a better example than that supplied by Aristotle himself, when he says that the same ἀρετή which is in one (quantitative) aspect a μεσότης or mean, is in another (quantitative) aspect an ἀκρότης or extreme. Obviously the scale is different in the two cases: when ἀρετή is described as μεσότης, the unit is the degree in which some natural impulse is gratified, i. e. more than when it does not receive its due, and less than when it is gratified to the exclusion of other equally important tendencies; when the same moral state is described as ἀκρότης, the unit is the degree in which that state realizes the end or purpose of human existence, i. e. the degree in which it contributes to εὐδαιμονία, which of course it does in the highest possible degree. It appears, therefore, that Grant seeks to discover more in the idea of μέσον than it really contains, for it is impossible to deduce the specific character of Aristotle's moral theory from the mere fact that he adopts this symbol almost exclusively; the latter is rather to be found in the description which he gives of the end to which the mean is relative, and which alone gives it any significance.

The tendency on the part of writers on other subjects to use mathematical language is partly inevitable, inasmuch as all quality possesses intensive quantity; it is partly also due to the natural desire to secure for the less exact sciences something of the clearness, accuracy, and certainty which are the peculiar attributes of mathematical knowledge. The mean, then, is to be regarded, as already remarked in the discussion of the criticisms of Kant, rather as an empirical criterion of the good than as the good itself; it was intended to be a mark by which the good might be recognised in the concrete, Aristotle's object being, as he himself declares, practical (*ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα*) rather than speculative (*τί ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή*), and was chosen, as stated above, largely because popular experience and language had already worked out the notion of excess, mean, defect in such considerable detail that Aristotle was only obliged to supplement it in a few instances. As designed for practical guidance this criterion had the further advantage that it not only showed what was to be aimed at positively, by pointing, e.g., to the recognised type of the *ἄνδρειος*, but it also indicated negatively what was to be avoided in both directions by pointing to the equally well-defined types of the *θρασύς* and the *δειλός*.

The remaining argument advanced by Grant to prove his thesis that Aristotle resolved virtue into a kind of moral beauty, is based on the fact that he uses the language of the arts to explain his principle of the *μέσον*, and draws his illustrations of its working from the same analogy. But, in the first place, the use of such language is in no way peculiar to Aristotle, but might be found in the writings of many other moralists. Thus even Kant, who certainly could not be accused of resolving the good into the beautiful, shows that relationship exists between the two in more than one way. The beautiful as well as the good is, according to him, the object of a disinterested

satisfaction ; and for the attainment of the beautiful in art a certain control is required, for taste is more necessary than genius, and beauty may be regarded, he says, as the symbol of morality. We read of 'the beauty of holiness'; and language contains words related as much to one of these conceptions as to the other.

In the next place, the frequent references to the analogy of the arts do not really support Grant's conclusion at all, as a closer investigation will show. It is important in this connexion to distinguish two senses of the word *τέχνη*, or two kinds of arts, viz. those which rest in themselves as ends (fine art, painting, music, poetry, etc.), and those which aim at an end external to themselves. Only references to the former class of arts would in any way countenance Grant's theory, while Aristotle's illustrations are drawn almost exclusively from instances of the latter type, e. g. the art of the pilot, the medical art, the trainer's art, no one of which is practised on its own account. The mean in each of these cases is, of course, determined not by any abstract standard of the beautiful, but by the end subserved, the safety of the ship, or the health or activity of the body. Further, one cannot help remarking that in his paraphrase of one passage (*Ethics* II., 6, 9), Grant strains the sense of the original to bear out his theory.

I do not think it is quite fair to Aristotle to say, with Grant, that he "took up and adopted the Platonic principle of *μερίδης*, changing slightly the formula to *μεσότης*," or, with Stewart, that "Plato anticipates all that is valuable in Aristotle's doctrine." It seems to me more correct to say that Aristotle drew his inspiration from the same source from which Plato drew his—namely, from the general tone of Greek thought and the influence of the Greek language—for the notion, as both these authors point out, is much older than Plato. The theory attributed by Grant to Aristotle (viz., that he regarded

virtue as a kind of moral beauty) is far more congenial to the highly imaginative and poetical philosophy of Plato, whose influence upon his great successor is somewhat exaggerated by Grant. Three reasons may perhaps be assigned for the change from μέτριον to μέσον (πρὸς ἡμᾶς). Aristotle probably recognised more clearly than his predecessors (including Plato, who was deeply influenced by the Pythagorean philosophy) the purely metaphorical character of all such quantitative expressions for the good, and therefore deliberately preferred an unmistakably quantitative term, in which this metaphor could no longer be hidden. The μέσον too, as Grant himself suggests, was more easily applied to the individual virtues. But the chief reason was, I think, that he wished to emphasize the fact that the morally wrong might just as well be on the side of the ἑλλειψις as on the side of the ὑπερβολή; and this truth is by no means so clearly suggested by the terms μετρίότης and μέτριον as by the terms μεσότης and μέσον.

The fact adverted to by Grant, that Aristotle speaks of a 'moral sense' as something analogous to a musical ear, implies no more than that the moral perceptions are immediate, that they are accompanied by a certain pleasure or pain, and that a certain subjective capacity must be presupposed in both cases, the difference being that the moral sense can be presupposed much more universally than the artistic sense. Hence such language in no way supports his peculiar interpretation of the μεσότης.

The only remaining points in his Essay that seem to call for criticism are the statements that the principle of μεσότης leaves something unexpressed in the goodness of action which may best be described as 'self-abnegation,' and that the theory of duty cannot be said to exist in Aristotle; and the implication that an adequate theory of

morals can hardly be expected from an author who predicates ἀρετή of a horse.

We have already seen that if there is one element which is implied in the μεσότης, it is this very one of 'self-abnegation,' so far as such a state is really desirable—i. e. suppression of particular inclinations for the sake of securing the end of our being. This is especially clear from the precept given in the case of an apparent conflict of duties—that those who desire to attain the mean must avoid the seductive influence of pleasure—and from Aristotle's explanation of the fact that sometimes the defect, and at other times the excess, is most opposed to the mean, viz. that direction is most opposed to the mean in which our inclinations and our pleasures lead us most strongly and therefore to the greatest 'extreme.'

The notion of 'duty' implies no more than that an action should be performed for its own sake, that is, because it realizes or contributes to the realization of the end of our being, and that certain subjective hindrances have to be overcome. It has already been shown that both these conditions are fulfilled by Aristotle's moral theory.

There is no real force in the objection that ἀρετή is applied to a lower order of beings than the human, in so far as they fulfil the purpose for which they are conceived to exist, for the term thus preserves a uniform and consistent meaning throughout.

In his concluding remark, that the deficiency of Aristotle's moral theory is supplied to a certain extent by the doctrine of the τέλος, Grant himself suggests the interpretation of the μεσότης implied above and now to be briefly recapitulated.

Many writers have noticed the obvious fact that language frequently denotes mental or moral conceptions by expressions of material origin. All three dimensions.

of space, as well as the one dimension of time, have been employed for this purpose. Thus a man may be said to have a 'long' head or a 'short' temper, to be 'broad'-minded or 'narrow'-minded, 'deep' or 'shallow,' or to have a 'high' or 'low' character. Horace describes the *sapiens* as *teres atque rotundus*, and Aristotle the truly good man as τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. In all such cases the selection of the particular metaphor chosen was probably determined by physical analogies. So also the μέσον may have originally involved a reference to space. What the particular physical analogies were in this case is matter for conjecture; but experience of a narrow strait, or river ford, or mountain path, or pass, may well have suggested the precept to follow a 'middle' course. A far higher degree of abstraction has been reached in the μέτρον ἄριστον of Cleobulus, in the use of the adjective μέτριος as nearly equivalent to ἀγαθός by Theognis and indeed by the Greeks generally, and in the proverbial μηδὲν ἄγαν. Here the original reference to space has disappeared, and its place has been taken by the conception of degree or intensive magnitude. It is in this sense almost exclusively that the term μέσον or μεσότης is used by Aristotle, though perhaps a glimpse of the original reference to space may be seen in the precept ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, and in the statement that since there is no name for the man who is a mean between the φιλότιμος and the ἀφιλότιμος, both extremes ἐπιδικάζονται τῆς μέσης χώρας. In the works of the poets the notion of the mean as a desirable state may have been influenced by the religious idea that exceeding ambition or prosperity excited the jealousy of the gods, as well as by their observation that it usually produced ὕβρις in men. I do not deny that the conception of the mean state as more in harmony with the standards of beauty or taste, to which Grant attributes so much, may have

played a large part in the development of the notion in the popular mind, just as the morality of so many persons now is determined chiefly by their idea of what is 'good form.' But I do deny that it was the predominant element in Aristotle's principle of *μεσότης*, and that it was to this element that the latter owed its objective character. That the *μεσότης* is to be understood rather by the end to which it is relative is clearly pointed out by Stewart, whose interpretation is very satisfactory on the whole, though he seems to me occasionally to follow Grant too far in his estimate of the influence of the notion of the beautiful in Aristotle's moral theory, and of the obligations of the latter to Plato.

As a matter of detail, I do not quite agree with his explanation that when *ἀρετή* is described as a *μεσότης* or *μέσον*, the *μέσον* is quantitative, but that 'an *ἄκρον* is a quality, not a quantity'; but prefer to say that the *μέσον* and the *ἄκρον* are both quantitative, both degrees of a particular quality, but that the quality is different in each case: i.e. the quality referred to when *ἀρετή* is described as a *μέσον* is the quality of acting according to impulse or following nature; when it is described as *ἄκρον*, the quality is that of attaining the end of our being. Virtue may well occupy a different position in two different scales. His interpretation of Aristotle's general ethical principle or 'the rule of *φρόνησις*' as reducible to 'so act that you heighten your power of acting well,' brings Aristotle's teaching into line with that of Butler, of Kant, and of Green. No one of the four can be described as a Hedonist; yet with all Pleasure is an Element in the 'Complete Good,' though not in the 'Supreme Good.' Stewart rightly remarks also that Aristotle's principle is 'autonomy,' not 'heteronomy.' The end, to which the self-control, or the negative and always the most obvious side of virtue, is relative, is, with all the authors above

mentioned, a state of character, a state of activity, a social and common good.

Aristotle did not set so high a value on the end of man in the economy of the universe as these other authors. He did not regard it as the final purpose of creation, as Kant did, as we may see from his account of the superiority of σοφία to φρόνησις; but the general difference between the Greek and modern conceptions of virtue is, no doubt, rightly given by Green (*Prolegomena to Ethics*). According to him, the ethical principle of Aristotle is as pure as that of the most distinguished moralists of modern days; but society was not sufficiently far advanced in his day to enable him to carry out this principle to its full logical consequences. Whatever variation there may be, as humanity progresses, in the description of the proper end of human effort, the principle of μεσότης—that this end must determine the degree to which the various tendencies of human nature are to be indulged—will always hold good.

G. A. EXHAM.

THE FORM AND PROSODY OF THE COMPOUNDS OF *IACIO* IN THE PRESENT STEM.

THE forms *abicio*, *inicio*, etc. (as it is now the fashion to spell the compounds of *iacio*), are usually said by comparative philologists to have arisen from **abjaciō*, etc., by what is called *samprusāraṇa*, that is to say, by syncope of *ā* and change of consonantal *i* into vowel *i*. That is the explanation of Brugmann¹ and Sommer²; and it is approved by Stolz³ and Skutsch.⁴ The forms thus produced would, of course, have their first syllable short, *ābicio*, and the classical scansion *ābicio*, etc., is accounted for by supposing reintroduction of *j* from the simple verb; *ābicio* thus becoming *abjicio*, with its first syllable long by position (Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 522). It is consequently assumed that the scansion with short first syllable is earlier than the classical scansion *ābicio*, etc. Sommer expressly declares that the occurrence of the scansion *ābicio*, etc., in the early dramatists is the fact which indicates that these forms arose by *samprāsaraṇa*. Speaking (*op. cit.*, p. 522) of syncope in *pergo* from **perregō*, he adds: "Auch bei den Kompositis von *jacio* weist die Messung *ābicio* u. s. w. bei den älteren Szenikern darauf hin, dass das *ā* von *ābiciō*

¹ *Grundr.* i.², p. 213 ff.; *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik*, p. 251.

² *Lat. Gr.*³, p. 105.

⁴ *Vollm. Jahresb. f. roman. Phil.*

³ *Lat. Laut- und Formenl.*, pp. 148, v., p. 63.
522.

u. s. w. synkopiert und das vorhergehende *i* silbisch geworden war." Even more definite is Professor Lindsay: "*abicio* has the first syllable short in the old dramatic poets" (*Lat. Lang.* iii. 25); and "*ābicio* (the scansion of the Dramatists)" (*ib.* viii. 4). Unfortunately for the theory of *samprasāraṇa* in *abicio*, etc., these statements are not borne out by the facts. When we turn to the old dramatists, it is truly surprising to find that in all Plautus and Terence there is only one single line (*Asin.* 814) in which the metre indicates—or seems to indicate—that the first syllable is short in a word like *abicio*—that is, in a compound of *iacio* whose preposition ends in a consonant¹;—while in all the other instances in which such compounds occur, the metre either definitely proves long quantity in the first syllable, or leaves it undecided. Details will be more conveniently given below, but the following will serve as examples of the long scansion in Plautus and Terence:—

ūbi manum *īnīcīt* benīgne, || ibi ōnerat āliquam zāmiām.

Aul. 197.

itaque ādeo māgnam mi *īnīcīt* || sua cōmmoditāte cūram.

Adel. 710.

sed hunc quēm uideō? quis hic ēst qui oculīs || meis ōbuiam
Ignōbilis ōbicitūr?

Pseud. 592.

iussīn colūmnis dēict || operās arāneōrum?

As. 425.

sóleas mīhi dedūce, pāllium || *īnice* īn me huc, Ārchilīs.

Truc. 479.

Cp. *Merc.* 339, *Pers.* 88, *Poen.* 1174, *As.* 127, *Cist.* 618, *Ep.* 194, et al. Against numerous examples such as these there are in all the remains of republican verse only two examples in which the metre seems to indicate short

¹ I do not include among compounds whose preposition ends in a consonant the compound of *iacio* with *com*. The

preposition in that case had a vowel-ending, as will be shown below.

quantity in the first syllable of a word like *abicio* (Plaut. *As.* 814; Naev. *Com.* 94 R.); and even these two instances are not, as will be seen below, conclusive.

It is true that, when the prefix ends in a vowel, there is occasionally in Plautus and Terence, as there is even in Vergil and Horace, some sort of a shortened pronunciation, in which the prefix and the root-syllable together have the value of two moræ (e. g., *deicere* de saxo ciues, Hor. *S.* i. 6, 39; a flumine *reice* capellas, Verg. *B.* 3. 96; *tráctas átque eids* domó, Plaut. *As.* 161). But even in this case the full pronunciation is, in the old dramatists as in the classical poets, normal; so that, if we except the two verses referred to above, in which a scansion *ābicio* seems to be found, but cannot be proved, the practice of the old dramatists exactly agrees with that of the classical poets. Consequently, the theory which is admittedly based on a supposed difference must be rejected.

It is hardly necessary to examine any other objections to the theory that *abicio*, etc., arose by *samprasāraṇa*. But a word or two may be said about *concutio*, etc., which are supposed to have arisen from **cónquatiō* in the same way—by syncope of *ā*, and change of consonantal *u* to vowel *u*. The cases are not as parallel as they appear at first sight. The compounds of *quatio* make *concussus*, etc. (from **cónquattos*). If that is due to *samprasāraṇa*, why do we find no trace of **abictus*, etc., from **ābjactos*? Moreover, so far is it from being certain that *concutio* arose by *samprasāraṇa*, that so careful an inquirer as Solmsen (*Studien zur lat. Lautgeschichte*, 31 ff.) declares, following Joh. Schmidt, that *concussus* must be explained as arising from **cónquattos* through **cónquettos*, by the change of *que-* to *co-* (later *cu-*) seen, apparently, in *coxim*, 'squatting,' and *incoxare*, 'squat,' beside *conquiniscō*, 'squat' (perf. *conquexi*); and certainly seen in *coquo* from **quequō* (for **pequō*). The present *concutio* is supposed to have arisen either directly from

**cónquetio* by the same change of *que-* to *co-*, or to have been influenced by the analogy of *concussus*.

A very full and valuable collection of the facts regarding the different spellings and varying prosody of the compounds of *iacio* is to be found in M. W. Mather's monograph in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. vi. The present writer must acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Mather's very complete *Index* (pp. 127 sqq.), particularly to those parts of it which deal with the post-Augustan poets, and with the variations of spelling in the MSS. But valuable as this *Index* is and must continue to be, it is unfortunately not free from errors. For example, Mr. Mather cites *proicito* from C. I. L. i. 577, as evidence that that spelling of the word was known in the year 105 B.C. Undoubtedly the *Lex Parieti Faciundo*, of which this inscription is a copy, was passed in the year 105 B.C. But according to Mommsen *ad loc.*, it is certain, and universally admitted, that the inscription that we see was cut in the imperial period. It has been assigned by some authorities, we are told, to the age of Constantine! Again, *inicere* and *reiciantur*, in C. I. L. ii. *Supplem.* 5439 lxi. 1, are cited as evidence that those forms were used in 44 B.C. The inscription is a copy of the *Lex Ursoniensis* (Spain) of the year 44 B.C.; but Hübner shows, on the evidence of the fashion of the letters, of modifications of old phrases evidently due to misunderstanding, and of interpolations impossible before the Flavian era, that the inscription we see cannot have been cut earlier than the time of Vespasian (see Hübner *ad loc.*). In an inquiry of this kind, where chronological questions are important, such errors are serious.

Mr. Mather's object is to determine, on the evidence of the inscriptions, of the metrical treatment of these words, of the various spellings found in the manuscripts, and of the statements of the grammarians, what actually

were the forms used at different periods, and how they were pronounced. That is to say, Mr. Mather's is an attempt to solve this problem empirically, as it were—with the aid of the facts only. The results obtained are not, in the present writer's judgment, satisfactory. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, the facts are not always quite correctly represented, whereby the results also are to some extent vitiated; and, in the second place, it is not possible to solve this problem by even a careful collection and examination of the facts, unless the principles and methods of the best linguistic science be applied, any more than it is possible to solve it by applying the principles and methods of linguistic science without a complete and critical consideration of the facts. The conclusions reached by Mr. Mather are very briefly these. There were in the republican period, it is said, two forms, *abiecio* and *abicio*, the former being the more correct and the usual form, the latter being a vulgarism. In the imperial period the same two forms were used; but their relationship was exactly reversed, *abicio* now being the normal form, and *abiecio* a vulgarism occasionally used in the provinces. It is not explained why *iacio* took in composition the unusual form *-iecio*. The forms *abicio*, etc., are said to be derived from *abiecio*, etc., by change of *e* to *i*, and the consequent loss of *j* before *i*; but in order that the contemporaneous existence of forms in *-icio* and forms in *-iecio* may be accounted for, the action of the sound-law by which *e* in *abiecio* became *i* is said to have been incipient as early as the time of Plautus ('*incipiebat hæc verba afficere*'). But the incipient action of a sound-law cannot show itself in the production of sporadic effects. As soon as its action appears in one form, it must appear simultaneously in all forms liable to it, unless another sound-law or analogy reverse the change. But in spite of these and other blemishes, Mr. Mather's conclusions

seem to come nearer to a solution of the problem than the theory first examined. Where and how the present writer regards those conclusions as unsatisfactory will appear best from the sequel.

II.

In the Augustan poets, as is well known, the prefix and the root-syllable of the form, whatever it may have been, that *iactō* then assumed in its compounds, have together normally the value of three moræ; as in

ādiciam faciamque omnis uno ore Latinos.

Verg. *A.* 12. 837.

Rarely the prefix and the root-syllable together have the value of only two moræ; as in

Tityre, pascentes a flumine *reice* capellas.

Id. *B.* 3. 96.

In such a case as this, probably most, if not all, modern editors would declare unhesitatingly that *reice* was a dissyllable, and that we have an instance of so-called *synizesis*; but, in order not to prejudge any question in the slightest degree, it is better to keep to what is absolutely certain, and to say that the prefix and root-syllable together are dimoric. Priscian, at any rate, declares that Vergil has here used a proceleusmatic in the place of a dactyl (*K.* ii. 14). This scansion in which the prefix and the root-syllable together have the value of two moræ is found, in Augustan verse, only when the prefix ends in a vowel; but even in that case the longer scansion is normal, as in

rēce, ne maculis infuscet uellera pullis.

Id. *G.* 3. 389.

The scansion in which the prefix and the root-syllable.

together fail to make three moræ may conveniently be called the shortened scansion.

As it appears that in the Augustan poets (and in Lucretius) the shortened scansion of the compounds of *iacio* is found only when the prefix ends in a vowel, it is desirable to inquire how far that is true of republican verse generally, including the dramatists. And first it is necessary to determine quite definitely which are the prefixes which end in a vowel. They are these: *com*, *dē*, *pro*, *re*, *trā*. (As compounds of *iacio* with *prae* occur only in late Latin, and rarely, that prefix may be disregarded.) The only one of these as to which there could be any controversy is *com*. Mather (p. 121 f.), on unsatisfactory, and indeed arbitrary, grounds, decides that in poetry generally, and in Plautus always, it had a consonantal ending, while in prose generally, and in spoken Latin always, it had a vowel ending. It is arbitrary, for instance, to begin by assuming, as needing no proof, two original forms of this prefix, *com* (sic) and *co*. In the imperial inscriptions (Mather, pp. 127 ff.), *coicio* is the only spelling found. What the pronunciation of the prefix was in the time of Trajan is clearly indicated by Velius Longus (K. vii., p. 54, 20). After mentioning that Cicero preferred such spellings as *Maiia*, *Troia*, he continues: "inde crescit ista geminatio, et incipit per tria *i* scribi *coiicit*, ut prima syllaba sit *coi*, sequentes duae *iicit*." The evidence seems to show that, in internal as in external *sandi*, final *m* before *j* caused doubling of the *j* and nasalisation of the preceding vowel.¹ Thus such a compound as **com-jeciō* would have been sounded *cōjjeciō*, as *pilam jaci* would have been sounded *pilājjacit*. The republican inscriptions have one form containing *n*, the CONIECIANT of C.I.L. i. 198. 50, where *n* must have been sounded like the first *n* of *coniunx*.

¹ Cp. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.*, p. 63; Sweet, *Primer of Phonetics*, p. 104 f.

How that was sounded may be inferred from the fact that the spelling *coiunx* is much commoner in the inscriptions than the spelling *coniunx*.¹ But as the opinion of the best authorities in Latin phonetics, that *com* before *j* was sounded as if it ended in a nasal vowel, is not seriously contested, it is unnecessary perhaps to argue the point further, and we may return from this slight digression.

We have already seen that in the Augustan poets and Lucretius a shortened pronunciation (*i.e.* a pronunciation in which prefix and root-syllable together have dimoric value) is found only in those compounds of *iacio* whose prefix ends in a vowel; and we were inquiring how far that is true of republican verse generally, including the dramatists. In all the existing works of Plautus, Terence, the other dramatists, Lucretius, Horace, Vergil, and Ovid there are fourteen instances of a shortened pronunciation. Of these fourteen instances twelve are found in compounds whose prefix ends in a vowel, two only in compounds whose prefix ends in a consonant.² Taking first the twelve instances in which the compound showing a shortened

¹ See Neue-Wagener *Formenl.* ³ ii. 865, where references are given to fifty-eight instances in the inscriptions of the spelling *coiunx*, with the statement that there are many more. Instances are also given of such spellings as *coiectura* in the mss. of Plautus and Terence. The use of the spelling *con* before *j* was analogous to the use of the spelling *com* before *v* (*e.g.* *COMVOVISSE* in C.I.L. i. 196. 13); but that neither *n* nor *m* was in such cases consonantal seems to be indicated by the fact that whenever, owing to changes in the language, the *j* or *v* disappeared, then the *n* or *m* seems to disappear also. For example, we find in i. 196, *coventionid* beside *comuouisse*, and the explanation may, perhaps, be

that the former word was really pronounced *cōtionid* (for **cō-ōntiōnid*). In this way also might be explained an imperial *coicio* beside a republican *coniecio* (pron. *cōjjeiō*), the disappearance of the unconsontantal *n* from the spelling being consequent on the disappearance of *j* in *-icio*.

² For statistics, cp. Mather's Index, *op. cit.*, pp. 127 sqq. The index, however, sometimes needs correction. For instance, on p. 132 it is said that *eticiam* may have been pronounced as a cretic word in the iambic verse-ending *ōmnis ēicidm* forās. Plant. *Truc.* 659. But such a pronunciation is excluded by the metre. Consequently my figures do not exactly agree with Mather's.

scansion has a prefix ending in a vowel, the details are as follows. Plautus has four such shortenings:—

quóm tu méd ut méritus súm non || tráctas átque *eicís* domó.

As. 161.

sánus nón es.—quín pedés uos || ín currículum *coicítis* (*lib.*
conicitis).

Merc. 932.

enim métno ut póssim *réicere* ín || búbbie, né uagéntur.

Pers. 319.

iam hércle ego té centínuo bárba || arrípiam, ín ígnem *coicídím*.

Rud. 769.

(*coiciam* C, D: *coniciam* A, B.)

Terence has two such shortenings: *réicere*, *Ph.* 18; *réiciat*, *ib.* 717. In the fragments of the other dramatists we have one instance: *déicís*, *Laber.* 119 *Rib.* Lucretius has two instances: *éicit*, 3. 877; 4. 1272. Horace has one instance: *deicere*, *S. i.* 6. 39. Vergil has one instance, quoted above, and Ovid has no instance.

In all these poets, from Plautus to Ovid, the shortened pronunciation when the prefix ends in a vowel is unusual. Normally we find the full pronunciation, that is, the prefix by itself is dimoric, and the prefix and root-syllable together are trimoric; as in

sícine hoc fít ? foras || áedibus me *ēici*.

Plaut. As. 127.

Cp. Id. ib. 425, *Cist.* 618, *Ep.* 194, *Mil.* 112, *Trin.* 237 *b*, *Truc.* 659, *et al.* For classical poets and early dramatists alike, therefore, the compounds of *iacio*, whose prefix ends in a vowel, have normally the full pronunciation, in which the prefix and root-syllable together have the value of three moræ. Much more rarely—in twelve instances altogether—they have a shortened pronunciation.

When the prefix ends in a consonant, there are only two apparent instances of shortened pronunciation in all

Latin literature from Livius Andronicus to Ovid. They are these :—

praerípías scórtum amánti atque árgentum *óbícias*.

Plaut. *As.* 814.

immó quos scícidí in iús conscíndam atque *dbíciam*.

Naev. *Com.* 94 R.

(*lib.* scicidi minus *uel* scicidimus.)

As these two instances are so isolated, we are justified in raising the question how far they are conclusive.

Both instances occur under identical metrical conditions, in the last foot of an iambic senarius. If the rule requiring a pure iambus in that foot is absolute, these instances are conclusive in favour of a scansion *ábicio* in two passages of early Latin literature ; if, on the other hand, the early dramatists sometimes ended an iambic senarius with an anapæst, they are not conclusive. There is a large number of instances, in our text of Plautus, of anapæstic endings where the rule requires an iambic ending ; and there are some instances in the fragments of the other dramatists. Naturally they are usually corrected away by editors.

The instances which offer the closest parallel to the two instances under discussion are those of compounds of *uenio*. In Plaut. *Rud.* 626, we have

praëtorquéte iniúriæ prius || cóllum quam ád nos *pérueñid*
(*lib.* = P.).

Similar forms occur in Plautus at the end of a verse or colon, requiring normally an iambic ending, in : *Curc.* 39, *éuenid* ; *Ep.* 290, *éuenid* ; *ib.* 321, *éuenidnt* ; *Mil.* 1010, *éuenid* ; *Trin.* 41, *éuenid*. In all these places the manuscripts are unanimous in reading the forms as they are here given. In two other Plautine places where similar forms occur under similar metrical conditions, there is a slight discrepancy in the readings. In *Trin.* 93, the Ambrosian

(third or fourth century) has *PERVENIANT*, C and D have *perueniat*, B has *peruenat*; the sense requires the 3rd pers. pl. pres. subj. Again, in *Pseud.* 1030, C has *adueniat*, B and D have *aduenat*, A *non l.* Editors avail themselves of this slight variation in two places in the minuscule MSS. to postulate verbs **eueno*, **perueno*, etc., for which there is no better manuscript authority than that just mentioned, which are admitted not to be required in any part of a verse except the last foot, which are found in no inscription, which are mentioned by no grammarian. They are explained as aorist forms, though it is admitted that an aorist form of *uenio* ought normally to show *m*, and not *n*: **uemo*.¹ The evidence of the MSS. is worthless. The omission of *i* in minuscule script after *n*, *m*, or *u* is common: e.g. in *Men.* 1047, B has *somna* for *somnia* in C and D; in *Mil.* 865, B, C, D have *infortunum* for *infortunium*. In *Trin.* 93, the only place where we can check the evidence of the minuscule MSS. for such a form by the far older majuscule A, it contradicts them.

A sound critical method will consider such instances as those just cited, not by themselves, but in connexion with other similar phenomena. In *Plaut. Capt.* 8, 760, 1011, we find *súrrupuit* at the end of verses that normally require an iambic ending. Here editors postulate syncope, of which there is not a trace in the MSS.; nor is a syncopated form of that verb required in Plautus in any other part of the line.²

Again, in *Capt.* 170, *Poen.* 60, *Rud.* 542, *Trin.* 682, we find *diuitiis*, or the like, at the end of a line requiring an iambic ending. Editors again postulate syncope, though, again, there is no trace of syncopated forms in the MSS. of Plautus, and though in a large number of other lines they would be inadmissible.³ The Plautine pronunciation of

¹ Cp. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.* ch. viii. §4.

³ See Lindsay, *ad Capt.* 170.

² See Lindsay, *ad Capt.* 8.

this word and of the adjective *diues* is clearly seen in such a line as

sibi sua hábeant régna réges || sibi *diuitias diuitis*.

Curc. 178.

Even more significant are the following instances :—

pró certo árbitrábar sórtis, || óracla, aditus, *aúgurid*.

Acc. Trag. 624 R.

nimis aégre rísum *cótinuít* || ubi hóspitem ínclamáuit.

Plaut. As. 582.

qui sáepe ante ín nostrás *scapulds* || etc.

Id. *ib.* 552.

et práedicábo quó *modo uós* || etc.

Id. *Poen.* 1245.

dolis égo deprénsus sum : ille mendícanis páene inuéntus

interiit (A, P)

Id. *Bacch.* 950.

Here various desperate remedies have been adopted or proposed by editors. It is a light matter perhaps for an editor, having postulated verbs **perueno* and **eueno*, to call into existence a form **augura*,¹ a perfect **contini*,¹ and so forth. But whatever be done with these anapæstic endings—whether they be left as they have been handed down, or whether they be corrected away—their occurrence in the texts deprives the two verses, in which *óbicias* and *óbiciam* respectively occur at the end of iambic lines, of the power of proving conclusively short quantity in the first syllable of those words. We have to choose between two alternatives. Either the early dramatists admitted an occasional anapæstic ending in verses normally requiring an iambic ending, or they admitted to that part of the line forms strange and monstrous, unknown and unrecorded elsewhere in Roman literature. If the former alternative be preferred, our point is granted; if the latter, then it is

¹ See Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.* ch. ii. 582 in the smaller Teubner edition, and § 50; viii, § 4. *Contini* is read in *As.* in Prof. Lindsay's new Text (Oxford).

open to us to summon into existence new forms **obicas* and **abicam*: those strangers need not be abashed beside **augura*, and **peruenat*, and they would be at home in the sixth foot of an iambic senarius, the chosen receptacle, it would seem, of their kind. But it is better to leave the text unaltered, and to admit that, the facts being what they are, the rule, that the sixth foot of an iambic senarius must be a pure iambus, is not so absolutely established for Plautus and Naevius as to serve for a conclusive test of quantity. Both Plautus and Naevius observed the rule, without a doubt. But the point is this, that, having regard to certain facts, we cannot prove that the rule in their practice had no exceptions; and that being so, the rule cannot serve as a conclusive test of quantity. Consequently the two sole instances in which compounds of *iacio* whose prefix ends in a consonant seemed to occur in the early dramatists with short first syllable, disappear as conclusive proofs of that short quantity; and the metrical treatment of these words by the early dramatists is shown to agree in all respects with their metrical treatment by all other Roman poets down to the death of Augustus. That is to say, when the prefix ended in a consonant, the first syllable of a word like *abicio* was invariably long from Livius Andronicus to Ovid; when, however, the prefix ended in a vowel, a shortened pronunciation was sometimes used, in which the prefix and the root-syllable together were only dimoric; though even in this case the full pronunciation was normal.

If we turn to the imperial period, the statistics give a very different result. According to Mather (p. 146), Seneca uses compounds of *iacio* sixteen times¹ (including the *Octavia*). He only once uses a compound of *iacio* with a prefix ending

¹ Compounds of *iacio* with *dis-* are the spelling *dissicit*. See Priscian, not counted, as they were influenced K. iii. 56, 18. by being associated with *seco*, whence

in a vowel (*proiciet* in *Phoen.* 426, Leo). The metre never indicates that the first syllable was scanned long; in thirteen instances it definitely proves short quantity in the first syllable. Examples in the *Medea* (Leo's edition) are: *obici*, 237; *adice*, 277, 471; *obicit*, 496; *adice*, 527, 783. Seneca's scansion of these words thus shows a remarkable divergence from that of the republican period.¹ In the republican period the scansion *ābicio* is invariable; in Seneca, the scansion *ābicio* is invariable.

With Seneca agree Lucan, Martial, and Juvenal. They never use a compound of *iacio* with long quantity in the first syllable. They use these words less often than Seneca, and much less often than the republican poets. They never use a compound of *iacio* whose prefix ends in a vowel. All three together have only eight instances of compounds of *iacio*.

Valerius Flaccus and Statius, however, follow the prosody of Vergil. Between them they use compounds of *iacio* no less than forty times (Mather, pp. 147 ff.). In thirty-seven of those instances the first syllable is long: in three instances the shortened pronunciation appears, in two of which the prefix ends in a vowel (Val. Flacc. 7. 514; Stat. *Th.* 4. 574). Flaccus and Statius together use compounds of *iacio* whose prefix ends in a vowel no less than sixteen times; whereas, in all the poetical works of Seneca, Lucan, Martial, and Juvenal, as we have seen, there is only one single instance of the use of such a compound.

What is the interpretation of these facts? That Flaccus and Statius were using an artificial prosody, the prosody of the past classical age, is clear; and it is proved by the frequent attempts of the grammarians to apologise for and explain the classical prosody of words like *abicio* (e. g. Gellius 4. 17). In spoken Latin of the imperial period,

¹ For the sake of convenience, the republican period is here, and in the sequel, made to include the Augustan age.

abicio, etc., must always have had the first syllable short. But as contemporary usage differed from the literary tradition fixed in the time of Vergil, poets either simply followed the classical practice (Val. Flaccus and Statius), or, following contemporary pronunciation, nevertheless used these forms very sparingly, not feeling quite sure which practice was the better—uneasy at not conforming to the standard fixed once for all by Vergil, yet not understanding how they could disregard the only pronunciation known to them. Above all, the latter class avoided using those compounds of *iacio* whose prefix ended in a vowel. It is perhaps no mere accident that the poets who most contentedly followed a purely conventional prosody were the men of least original genius.

To sum up the prosody of these forms. In spoken Latin of the imperial period the first syllable was invariably short; in the republican period, the same syllable was invariably long when it had a consonantal ending, but showed variable prosody when it had a vowel ending—being normally long, but being sometimes so treated by the poets that it (the first syllable) and the root-syllable together had dimoric value. Whether in this last case the prefix and root-syllable together formed two short syllables or one long one, remains, with other questions of spelling and pronunciation, to be determined.

III.

In seeking to discover the actual ancient spelling of these forms, it is perhaps the most natural proceeding to interrogate at once the inscriptions and the manuscripts. That is the method followed by Mather. Yet, when he arrives at the conclusion that the spelling *abjecio* was usual in the republican period, the result is not generally received. It is, for example, briefly dismissed by Stolz

(*Lat. Gr.*, p. 105, footnote) with the remark: "Doch spricht die Wahrscheinlichkeit keineswegs dafür." It may be better, therefore, to begin by asking what forms probability, according to the best-established principles of linguistic science, would lead us to expect. The result can easily be tested afterwards by the evidence of inscriptions and manuscripts.

All the facts of scansion already noticed can be explained—nay, rather they necessarily follow—if we begin by assuming that Latin *j* disappeared before the homorganic vowel *i*. That it should have done so is *a priori* probable, from the fact that Latin *v* disappeared before the homorganic vowel *u*. That either *j* or *jj* did actually disappear before *i* is proved by the fact that early *eiiei*, *hoiieice*, etc., became classical *ēi*, *huic*, etc. According to Sommer (*Handb.*, p. 171), and recently Brugmann (*Kurze v. Gr.*, p. 95), it was *jj* that disappeared before *i*; and although that supposition involves difficulties (e.g. the Lucretian scansion *ēi*—i.e. *ejjī*—in ii. 1136, and six other places), it may be the more readily granted here, because, if *jj* disappeared before *i*, it is on physiological grounds hard to see why a single *j* should not equally have disappeared under the same circumstances.¹ On this assumption, a primitive *abjaciō* would become successively *abjecio*, *abjicio*, and *ābicio*, the last of these stages being reached at the same point of time at which **confecio* became *conficio*, which change had taken place before the time of Plautus. The form *abicio* would then fall under the operation of a principle of wide application in Latin, and probably in other languages, which can be better explained in connexion with the persistence of *o* in final syllables after *u* or *v*; because in the latter case the facts are not disputed.

¹ That *j* went out before *i* is assumed the author in *Herm.* xxviii., p. 219. also by Mather, *op. cit.*, p. 93; and by

The change from *o* to *u* in final syllables took place probably in the third century B.C. But *servus* (nom.), *coquunt*, etc. (beside *erūs*, *regunt*, etc.), continued to be the correct spellings to about the end of the reign of Augustus. That is usually accounted for by saying that '*o* remained after *u* and *v*'; but that is a mere statement of fact, by no means an explanation of the fact. We must still ask, 'Why?' The cause must have been either physiological or psychological, that is, we must have here an effect of a sound-law or of analogy. It would probably be universally admitted that the cause of the persistence of *o* after *u* or *v* was psychological. If *paruos* had become *paruus* (*parvus*) in the third century B.C., a further change to **pārus* must have taken place, and the connexion of the nom. masc. with other inflexions of the same word—*parua*, *parū*—would have been obscured. Evidently, then, the persistence of *o* in *paruos* is an effect, direct or indirect, of analogy, and, to be precise, of that particular kind of it which is called Logical Analogy. That it actually was the effect of analogy will be definitely proved by another case of the same phenomenon, to be presently considered.

But how did analogy act? Either it prevented the change from *paruos* to *paruus*, or it reversed it. It did not prevent it. The change from *paruos* to *paruus* (*parvus*) must certainly have taken place in the third century B.C., however short may have been the time during which it endured; because the sense of analogy is without prevision. It cannot look forward and say to itself that such and such further changes will be consequent on a first change, and that then the symmetry will be broken, the connexion obscured. Not till the symmetry has been broken, not till the connexion has been obscured, does that psychological factor in the life of language, which we, with convenient brevity, call analogy, awake and begin to operate. It is not possible, therefore, that speakers of Latin could have

avoided saying *paruus*, because they foresaw that, if they did so, a further change must take place, which would obscure the connexion of some inflexions of the word with the rest of the paradigm. They could not know that *paruus* would become **pārus* until they had actually made the experiment. Therefore, the change from *paruos* to *paruus*, and the change from *paruus* to **pārus* actually occurred in the third century B.C.; and then, but not till then, the sense of analogy was aroused and became active. The forms *paruus* and **pārus* need not have had a long life at that time. All that is postulated is their existence. They may never have had national currency, and may have existed only in the consciousness of the individual speakers. Hence they would not be recorded.

Therefore, analogy was without direct effect in preventing the change of *o* to *u* in forms like *paruos*. What direct effect analogy did have on such forms acted in the same direction as the sound-law changing *o* to *u*; for that sort of analogy which is called Formal Analogy (as distinct from logical analogy) tended to assimilate the form *paruos* to *bonus*, *magnus*, and the whole class of adjectives in *-us*.

But when the change to *paruus*, and the consequent change to **pārus*, had taken place, analogy began to act; that is, the logical analogy associating **pārus* with *parua*, *parui*, etc. The *v* of the latter forms was reintroduced. Men made an effort to say *paruus* in order to satisfy a psychological need. But the blind physical law which, at that time and in that place, required the disappearance of *v* before *u*, was still in force. Why should it not be still in force? Where the same cause or causes are operating, the same effects must follow. A sound-law in itself is as much a mere physical law as is the law of gravitation. The sound-law again removes the *v* which analogy had reintroduced, and which analogy will again introduce. We have

now a direct conflict between a sound-law and analogy. Each nullifies the action of the other. We are *ad incitas redacti*.

What happens? We know what did happen in this particular case: the *u* of *paruus* changed to *o* by a special sound-law. The conflict ends in a victory for both sides. Logical analogy is satisfied, because the *v* of *parua*, *parui*, etc., is now heard throughout the paradigm: the sound-law requiring the loss of *v* before *u* is not broken. (Formal analogy, however, is thwarted, the connexion between the new *paruos* and adjectives like *bonus*, *magnus*, etc., being obscured. It appears, then, that, in case of conflict between logical and formal analogy, the former is præpollent.

But surely, it may be said, it was possible for a Roman in the third century B.C. to say *paruus* if he wished? Not so. It was no more possible than it is possible for a man to will that a stone liberated in mid-air should fall upwards. In order to satisfy a psychological need, the Latin-speaker tried to say *paruus*; and his effort resulted in the birth of a special sound-law, a *priuilegium*, in virtue of which *u* became *o* after *v*. That is to say, the Latin-speaker, willing to prevent what was a physical effect of a physical cause, did really, though he knew it not, modify the cause of that effect. After all, it is very simple. Much is possible to the will of man; but he must always use means: to prevent a certain effect, he must remove or modify its cause. But there is this fact to be carefully noticed, when it is a question of preventing the effect of a sound-law: the speaker knows nothing whatever about the causes of sound-laws, and so cannot consciously modify them. But it appears that, in speech, when man struggles against the effect of a sound-law in order to satisfy a psychological need, nature herself discovers its cause; and man's effort, guided by nature, unconsciously modifies that cause.

This indirect effect of analogy is thus minutely examined because it has produced wide-spread effects in the Latin language. Even were it not so, no apology would be needed for minute examination into the forces at work in any form of life and growth. It may be formulated, in legal shape, as follows:—

Whenever Analogy, coming into direct conflict with a Sound-law, reverses its effect, it is a necessary condition that a new special sound-law shall arise, modifying at least one of the conditions existing in the word when the state of conflict began.

The word 'conditions' is used in order to include accent, which is liable to modification under these circumstances, both as regards incidence and character. The exact mode of genesis of the 'new special sound-law' cannot be here investigated. The word 'direct' is necessary before 'conflict,' because the law, if I may so call it, does not operate when there is a distinct interval of time between the producing of an effect by a sound-law, and the reversing of that effect by analogy. By way of general illustration, the stages through which, it is claimed, *paruos* passed in the third century were these:

1. *paruos* became *paruus*, by sound-law, when *maguos* became *magnus*;
2. *paruus* became **pārus*, by sound-law;
3. *pārus* became *paruus*, by analogy (logical), and the state of direct conflict begins;
4. *paruus* becomes *paruos*, by a special sound-law.¹

This may seem a needlessly elaborate explanation of a simple fact, namely, that when *o* changed to *u*, it remained

¹ It is to be observed also that the *o* thus introduced must have been open (wide), while the *o* which became *u* in the third century must have been,

at the moment of becoming *u*, close (narrow). This is naturally incapable of direct empirical proof, but it is none the less, I think, evident.

after *v* and *u*. But it is intended to be an explanation, not of one fact only, but of a number of facts. One or two further examples will justify it.

The nominative plural of *deus* is, in classical prose, *dī* from *dīi*. The latter form is usually explained as derived from *dei* by 'assimilation' (so Sommer, *op. cit.* pp. 73, 379), though it is hard to see how that could be an explanation. But this cannot be an instance of assimilation, because—(1) there is no trace of it in the gen. singular *dei*; and (2) the change from *e* to *i* took place in the voc. singular, e.g. *mī* from **mie*, vocative of *meus*. Evidently the change from *e* to *i* in words ending in *-eus* took place in early Latin whenever there was an *e*-sound in the case-ending. The nom. plural of *deus* will serve as a type of all such forms. The case-ending of the nom. plural of the second declension was in the time of Plautus *-ei*, sounded as a very close *ē*. A sound-law then operative required contraction of qualitatively similar vowels in contact, whence *nēmō* from **nehemō*, *cōpia* from **coopīā*, etc. Consequently, **deei* became **dē*. The analogy of *deōs*, etc., restored **deei*, and a state of direct conflict between sound-law and analogy began. Thereupon a special sound-law came into existence, changing the *e* to *i* before an *e*-sound, that is, in the nom.-voc. plural *diei*, and the dat.-abl. plural *dieis*. The vocative singular **die*, later **dī* (cp. classical *mī* from **mie*) had probably an earlier origin than *diei*, *dieis*. All other words ending in *-eus* were declined in the same way. Traces in the inscriptions are ABIEGNIĒIS, AESCVLNIEĒIS Ī. 577; MIEĒIS Ī. 38; IEĒIS Ī. 204 (passim); and *diei* is often to be restored in Plautus on metrical grounds; e.g., in *Most.* 222:

diei me faciānt quód uolūnt || etc. (*lib.* di).

When final *-ei*, *-eis* became *-ī*, *īs*, respectively, *diei*, *dieis*

became *diī*, *diīs*, whence *dī*, *dīs*; just as Plautine *gratieis* became classical *grātīs*.¹

A very striking example of the working of this principle is to be seen in the forms *alienus*, *laniena*, etc. The Latin for a barber's shop is *tōstrīna* (sc. *taberna*); the Latin for a butcher's shop is *laniēna*. Of the latter, and similar forms, Prof. Skutsch² has given the absolutely convincing explanation that they are for **laniīna*, **aliīna*, etc. If so—and it is certain—the manner in which the change took place must have been this: **Aliīnus* became **alīnus* by the law of contraction; the analogy of *alius*, etc., restored *i*, **aliīnus*. We have now direct conflict between sound-law and analogy, and our principle operates: a special sound-law changes *i* into *ē*. Here there can be no question of the preservation from change of an original sound by the influence of analogy, as there may possibly be in the case of the persistence of *paruos*. This case absolutely proves the power of analogy to cause, indirectly and unconsciously, changes not thought of or willed by the speaker, in order that a change thought of and willed by the speaker may become possible. The change willed was from **alīnus* to **aliīnus*. But that was impossible without another unwilled change, because forbidden by the then law of contraction. But out of the effort came forth the necessary change, *natura duce*; and the willed, but impossible, **aliīnus* became the possible, but not willed, *aliēnus*. It is to be observed, too, that here the sense of formal analogy is markedly sacrificed in order that logical analogy may be satisfied.³

¹ The changes that took place in *diei* were of the nature of a compromise. By the change from *e* to *i* the connexion between *diei* and *deus* was to some extent obscured; but it was less obscured than it would have been if original **deei* had become a monosyllable.

² *De nomin. lat. suff. -no-ope formatis*, pp. 13 sqq., cp. Lindsay, *L. L.* iv. 12.

³ The "*Indogermanisten*," with their persistent disinclination to take into consideration the laws and facts of the particular language, the right knowledge of which demands intimate and

By the operation of this law are also to be explained *petiei* beside *genui* in C. I. L. i. 38:—

progenie mi *genui* facta patris *petiei*;

with which should be compared ADIESET (for *adiisset*), and ADIESE (for *adiisse*) of i. 196. The classical scansion *abiit*, *petiit* can also be explained by the same principle. Again, the dative of *dies* was in Plautine Latin *diei* (a dissyllable, pronounced *diē*). This should have made later *diī* (cp. *tibi* from *tibi*). Under this law it again became *diē*, whence, by analogy, *fidē* (dat.), etc.¹

It is, perhaps, more than time to return to the compounds of *iacio*. An original **ābjaciō* became **ābjeciō*, and (probably early in the third century B.C.) *abjicio*, which passed to *abicio*, by the sound-law that *j* disappeared before *i*. But the analogy of *iacio* restored the *j*, *abicio* again becoming *abjicio*, an unstable form; whereupon a state of direct conflict between sound-law and analogy was produced. The law postulated above operating, *abjicio* became *abjecio* by a special sound-law.

We can apply here, what we cannot always apply in these cases, an empirical test of the accuracy of this theory. If the form *abiecio* shows the influence of the analogy of *iacio*, then any compound of *iacio*, whose meaning no longer suggested the simple verb, would not show that influence. There was one such compound, *amicio*, and that compound, and that only, was scanned with a short first syllable from the earliest times, and never varied. *Amicio*, with its infinitive *amīcīre*, shows us the

constant familiarity with the literature of the particular language, reject Skutsch's certain and convincing explanation of *alienus*, *laniena*. Niedermann calls into existence a form **alies*-, whence *aliēnus* through **aliesmos*. But, as Skutsch wittily remarks (*Voll. J.*,

v. i. 60), he lacked the courage to create a *lanies*-! Brugmann derives *alienus* from a locative *alii-*, but is silent as to a locative *lanii-*!

¹ For *diei*, *die*, etc., see Lindsay in *Class. Rev.* x. 424.

form that all compounds of *iacio* would have taken had it not been for the action of analogy, its short first syllable and its infinitive in *-ire* being both due to the fact that this particular compound was not associated with the simple verb, and so escaped its influence.¹ The form *amicio* proves, therefore, that the (apparent) persistence of the forms *abiecio*, etc., is due to analogy, and is not, for instance, to be accounted for by saying that 'in the third century B.C. unaccented *e* changed to *i*, except after *j* or *i*.' The form *amicio* proves that the change did take place after *j*, and justifies the assumption that in such phenomena as the apparent persistence of *paruos*, the successive changes and reversals postulated above actually took place.

The republican scansion of the forms whose prefix ended in a consonant is now explained. They were spelt *abiecio*, *iniecio*, etc., from the time of Plautus to the time of Ovid. Their scansion in imperial times is also what we should expect. The *e* of *abiecio* was in Plautus' time open (or wide). It became continuously closer (or narrower), until, in the time of Augustus, a critical point was reached, at which it passed to *i*; whereupon the preceding *j* disappeared, and was not this time restored by analogy. The imperial spelling was *abiciò*, etc., and the first syllable was henceforward short.

IV.

It remains to explain the republican scansion of those compounds of *iacio* whose prefix ends in a vowel. In that case we find variable scansion. We have to answer such questions as, Why the compound of *rē* and *iacio* was usually scanned with a long first syllable in republican Latin?—a question that exercised Servius (*ad Verg. A.* 10. 473). Why, again, the same compound, and compounds with *dē*, *ē*, etc.,

¹ For the infinitive in *-ire*, see author in *Herm.* xxvii., p. 394.

were sometimes scanned in such a manner that prefix and root-syllable together had the value of only two moræ? The latter question is the more difficult. How, for example, did Plautus intend the word *eicis* to be pronounced when in *As.* 161 he wrote :

quóm tu méd ut méritus súm non|| tráctas átque *eicis* domó?

Some scholars may think it a sufficient answer to say that *eicis* is here a dissyllable, the result of a contraction. But of exactly what two syllables is it a contraction? Of *ē-jēcis*, or of *ē-īcis*? If of *ē-jēcis*, we must prove the existence of a sound-law, under which vowel-syncope in a root-syllable could take place against the influence of analogy. If, on the other hand, *eicis* was a contraction of *ē-īcis*, why, in Plautus and other republican poets, did *iacio* take the form *-īcio* only after a prefix with a vowel ending? And why, again, was *eicis* normally a dactylic word, as in Plaut. *As.* 127? Nor can we escape the necessity of meeting these objections by using the vague term *synizesis*, by which the ancient grammarians meant a certain artificial device—such as placing *aureo* in the place of a spondee. If the term *synizesis* is used at all in linguistic discussions, it should be strictly defined. Until the theory of contracted forms, *eicis*, etc., has been freed from the objections here suggested, it must be regarded as impossible.

To take first a prefix ending in a short vowel, *re-jacio* would become **réjjaciō*, intervocalic *j* having always become double in historical Latin, as is clearly explained by Terentianus Maurus.¹ **Rejjaciō* became *rejjecio*, which was the republican form. Hence the normal scansion of *reiiēcio* with long first syllable: *rě-* was long by position before *jj*.

¹ *De Syll.* 618, K. vi. 343: cp. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.* ii. 55; Brug. *Kurse v. Gr.*, p. 95.

Taking a prefix ending in a long vowel, **dē-jaciō* would become **dējjaciō*, intervocalic *j* being always double. The *ē* of *dē* then became short by a recognised law¹ of the Latin language, whereby diphthongs whose first element was long were changed before consonants into diphthongs whose first element was short (whether the long diphthong was original, or whether it arose during the separate existence of the language); e.g. *gāudium* from **gāuidium*. The result (with the change from *-iaciō* to *-ieciō*) was a form *dejjecio*, quantitatively indistinguishable from *rejjecio*. That is to say, the vowel of *de-* was now short by nature, long by position.

The six compounds of *iaciō* whose prefix had a vowel ending, took, therefore, the following forms for the republican period (from Livius Andronicus to Ovid): *cotieciō*, *deieciō*, *eiieciō*, *proieciō*, *reieciō*, *traieciō*. In each form the first vowel must have been short by nature, long by position; and that explains the normal scansion, as in

sicīne hoc fīt foras || āedibus me ēiēcī? Plaut. *As.* 127.

But the less usual scansion, in which one mora was lost? The phenomenon is obviously identical with that presented by the old Latin pronominal genitives and datives: *eiūs*, *eiēi*; *hoiūs*, *hoiēice*; *quoiūs*, *quoiēi*. Just as *eiūs* might be trimoric or dimoric, so might the first two syllables of *eiēcis*. Just as *eiūs* was normally trimoric, less often dimoric, so were the first two syllables of *eiēcis* normally trimoric, less often dimoric.² If, therefore, an explanation

¹ See examples in Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

² Lindsay (*Capt.*, p. 28; *Plaut. Com.* Oxford, *Praefatio*, p. 4) and Sommer (*Handb.*, p. 472) are mistaken in stating that 'monosyllabic scansion of *huius*, *cuius* and the dissyllabic of *illius*, *istius* are normal,' unless the terms 'normal'

and 'häufig' can be rightly applied to that which is less often found. Statistics are given by A. Ahlberg, *De Corr. Iamb.*, pp. 82 sqq. The proportion of the 'dissyllabic' forms of *eiūs*, etc., in Plautus to the 'monosyllabic' forms is 170 : 68, if the combinations *quoimodi*, etc., be excluded; and 170 : 91, if

can be found which is applicable to both cases, there will be a very strong probability in its favour.

The present writer has (in *Hermathena*, xxviii., pp. 208 ff.) sought to prove that the variable scansion of the forms *eius*, *eiei*, *hoius*, *hoieice*, *quoius*, *quoeiei* is to be explained by the phenomenon, familiar in Greek verse, of variable quantity in antevocalic *i*-diphthongs. In Greek, as is well known, a word like *τοῖος* can be scanned as a trochee or as a pyrrhic; that is, it could be pronounced *toijos* or *tōjos*. We find, for instance, in Homer:

τοῖος δὲν οἷός ἐσσι, τὰ τε φρονέων ἄ τ' ἐγὼ περ. *Od.* 7, 312.

The physiological conditions being, apparently, precisely similar in the early Latin *quoius*, etc., it is *a priori* probable that the same variation in quantity existed in early Latin also. If it did, then we have an explanation, not only of dimoric *eius*, etc., but also of that scansion of *eiecio* in which the first two syllables were dimoric. I suggest, therefore, that, whenever we meet in early Latin a shortened pronunciation of a word like *eicis* (i. e. *eieicis*), we are to explain the fact by supposing, not that a contraction, syncope, or 'synizesis' took place, but that the first syllable could be short as well as long; just as the first syllable of *eius*, *hoius*, etc., could be short as well as long. The shortening would be due in both cases, as it was in Greek, to simplification of intervocalic *jj*. Thus the full or normal pronunciation of *τοῖος*, *eius*, *eieicis* may be represented by *tojjos*, *ejjus*, *ejjēcis*, respectively; and the shortened pronunciation by *tōjos*, *ējus*, *ējēcis*, respectively.

I will set down, by way of illustration, some typical

they be included. 'Dissyllabic' *istius*, *ipsius*, said to be 'normal,' do not occur at all (if *istimodi*, etc., be excluded). 'Dissyllabic' *illius* occurs

nine times (excluding prologues); but was not confusion likely to arise in later times between Plautine *ILIVS* and *ELIVS*?

instances of varying scansion of *eiēcio*, etc., from Plautus, restoring the republican form, but again adopting the device of indicating the variation in the quantity by a double spelling, using *ii* when the first syllable is long, *i* when it is short.¹ Both fashions in spelling were known in republican times, the fuller spelling with *ii* being, as is well known, preferred by Cicero and Julius Cæsar. And in order to illustrate the exact correspondence between the forms *eiūs*, etc., and the compounds *eiēcio*, etc., as regards their metrical treatment by Plautus, I will place an example of the former after each example of the latter :

- iussín colúmni*s* *dēiēc*i || operás aráneórum ? *As.* 425.
 ís Summán*u*m sé uocári || díxít : *eiēc*i réddidí. *Curc.* 544.
 quóm tu mé*d* ut méritus s*u*m non || tráctas átque *ēiēc*i*s* domó.
As. 161.
 salútem nt nuntiáret átque *ēiēc*i út dícerét. *Stich.* 653.
 age nún*ci*am ór*na* te, Épidice, ét || pallífol*u*m in cóllum *cōiēc*í.
Ep. 194.
 nam nón condúci*t* hó*iēc*i*s* sýcophántia*e*. *Bacch.* 764.
 sánus nón es.—quín, pedés, uos || ín currículum *cōiēc*i*tis* ?
Merc. 932.
 íta uero hó*iēc*i*e* itém Menaéchmo || nómen ést in Síciliá.
Men. 930.
 nuncíne me *dēiēc*i*s* ? quó ? quid á*d* scenam á*d*feró ? Laber. 119 R.
 nimis paéne inépta átque ódiosa *ēiēc*us amátíost.
Plaut. Rud. 1204.

Plautus makes the penultimate of the Greek adjective Πελλαῖος long in *As.* 397, short in *ib.* 333. The shortening has been said to be due to the rule 'vocalis ante vocatem corripitur'; but in other cases in which naturalised Greek words show shortening of long vowels under that rule, there is no variation; we do not find *balinēum*, for instance, or *platēa*, in Plautus. It seems more probable, therefore,

¹ This device has now been adopted by Prof. Lindsay in the new Oxford text of Plautus, 1904.

that Plautus spelt the word with *ai*, and that the varying scansion may be represented thus :—

qui pró istuc ?—ásinos uéndidít || *Pelláio* mércatóri.
méministín asinós Arcádicos || mércatóri *Pelláio*.

But there seems to be a serious objection to the theory that words like *deiicio* (*deicio*) had variable quantity in the first syllable. It is the fact that 'shortened' pronunciation of such words is occasionally found in dactylic verse, where contraction of the first two syllables, rather than shortening of the first syllable, would seem to be definitely required by the metre. Horace and Vergil have one instance each :

deicere de saxo ciues aut tradere Cadmo.

Hor., S. i. 6. 39.

Tityre, pascentes a flumine *reice* capellas.

Verg., B. 3. 96.

Either these were contracted forms, or these Augustan poets used resolution of the arsis in dactylic verse. Now the belief that resolution of the arsis was never used in dactylic poetry is so firmly established that it may seem wilful, or worse, to question it. But at least there can be no harm in consenting to consider three facts.

The first fact is that Priscian (K.ii. 14) expressly declares that, in the verse cited above, Vergil put a proceleusmatic for a dactyl: "Virgilius in bucolico proceleusmaticum posuit pro dactylo" (B. 3. 96 f.). Priscian's statement does not prove the fact, it is true; but it proves this, that to an ancient scholar of great learning, acquainted with the entire range of Latin literature—consequently, with much dactylic verse that has now perished—to Priscian there was nothing incredible in the supposition that the arsis was sometimes resolved in dactylic verse.

The second fact is, that in the scanty remains of the earlier republican dactylic poetry, resolution of the arsis

is comparatively common (as it is also in the few remaining early inscriptions in that metre). For example, Ennius has :

capitibus nutantis pinos rectosque cupressos.—374 B.
 hic *insidiantes*¹ uigilant, partim requiescunt.—283 B.
mēlānūrum, turdum merulamque umbramque marinam.

Ap. Apul. *Mag.* 39.

Is it incredible, then, that Vergil, so familiar with Ennius, should have admitted one or two Ennian echoes ?

The third fact is, that Vergil himself wrote the following hexameter :

flūuīōrum rex Eridanus, camposque per omnis.—G. i. 482.

Of course, this is explained as a case of synizesis. It matters nothing. If Vergil intended the first foot to be recited as a spondee (*flūuīōrum*), it cannot be proved that that was the actual popular pronunciation in the time of Augustus. On the contrary, there is evidence that even in the fourth century p. Ch. n. *fluuiorum* began with two short syllables ; for Marius Victorinus (K. vi. 67) calls this verse ἀκέφαλος. It follows, therefore, that the practice of the classical poets is not necessarily a guide to the contemporary popular pronunciation ; and in particular, that the evidence of these two verses for a popular pronunciation of *deicere* as a dactylic word, and of *reice* as an iambic word, is not conclusive.

¹ That the older scholars got rid of all these and similar instances by assuming syncope, synizesis, and so forth, is not surprising. But even Sommer (*Handb.*, p. 144) assumes 'synizesis' in the case of *insidiantes* (i.e. *insidjantes*). But on what evidence ? That seems to be deductive reasoning from the axiom that resolution of the arsis is impossible. Sommer supposes *insidjantes*, *medjus*, et sim.,

to have been the pronunciation "beim schnellen Redetempo." The employment of the principle of *Redetempo* is always suspicious, for those who use it do not define the limits of its action or even prove its reality as a factor in language-growth ; and in this case facts are against it. For instance, *gratieis* is always a trisyllable in Plautus ; *relicuos* is always a quadrisyllable.

Possibly, then, Priscian may have been right, and Vergil may have used *reice* as a tribrach-word, forming part of a proceleusmatic. Or—more probably, perhaps—an artificial pronunciation may have been used. But yet it should not be overlooked that the Augustan age was the very turning-point in the pronunciation of these forms. It was the time when the narrowness of the *e* of *abiecio*, increasing continually from the third century B.C., reached the critical point at which it passed to *ī*. Exactly when the change took place in popular pronunciation, it is impossible to determine. The spelling *abicio* occurs for the first time in 13 B.C. (C.I.L. vi. ii. 9290). Therefore, it may possibly be that in the isolated dactylic *deicere* of Horace, and trochaic *reice* of Vergil, and in two similar scansiones in Lucretius, we have the first examples in literature of the later pronunciation of these forms, appearing first in words like *deicio* because there it was particularly convenient metrically. In that case (it is suggested as a mere possibility) the dactylic scansion in Vergil of the same word *reice*, seen in *G.* 3. 389, would represent not the current pronunciation, but a literary adherence to the older, though very recently obsolete, fashion.

It has been said that the fact that antevocalic *i*-diphthongs had variable quantity in Greek renders it *a priori* probable that the same phenomenon existed in Latin. But I do not claim that it constitutes a positive proof. The strongest proof of the theory lies, perhaps, in the fact that it is impossible to explain the early prosody of the pronominal genitives and datives, and of the compounds of *iacio*, on any other hypothesis. There is, in fact, only one alternative. Either the first syllables of the twelve forms *eius*, *quoīei*, etc., *deīecio*, *coīecio*, etc., had variable quantity, or those forms sometimes lost their second syllable by vowel-syncope (the syncopated vowel being

interconsonantal). Such an hypothesis is full of improbabilities, nay, of impossibilities. Can it be an accident, a mere coincidence, that the supposed vowel-syncope occurred only when an antevocalic *i*-diphthong preceded? Is it even possible that the root-syllable of a verb should have disappeared by syncope? The root-syllable of a compound verb can disappear in Latin by syncope only when the meaning of the compound no longer suggests the simple verb. Hence *pergo*, *surgo* beside *arrigo*, *erigo*, etc.; hence, *usurpare* from **ūsū-rapāre*. But it is when we attempt to go further, and to apply the theory of syncope to the facts as we find them in the early dramatists, that its practical imperfections appear. It involves impossibilities. Long vowels and diphthongs are elided before a monosyllabic *huius* (i.e. **huīs*, to be pronounced, presumably, something like the English 'wheeze'); the same word *eiei* is in one line a spondaic word, in another a long monosyllable, in another disappears in total elision. If the old working hypothesis is to be maintained, such objections must be squarely met. We must be told, for instance, how the scansion of the following five verses can be explained, on the theory of syncope, without contradiction:—

is summānum sé uocāri dīxit <i>ēi</i> réddidī.	Plaut. <i>Curc.</i> 544.
salūtem ut nūntiāret átque <i>ei</i> ut dīceret.	Id. <i>Stich.</i> 653.
necāuit ?—aūrumque <i>ēi</i> ademīt hōspitī.	Id. <i>Most.</i> 481.
sīcine hoc fīt? foras aēdibus me <i>ēici</i> ?	Id. <i>As.</i> 127.
quóm tu mēd ut méritus sūm non tráctas átque <i>eicis</i> domo.	

Ib. 161.

Such difficulties (these are not isolated cases) have usually been passed over in silence.

V.

This theoretical reconstruction of the forms taken by the compounds of *iactō* agrees, as has been shown, with

the metrical practice of the poets. It agrees also with the evidence of inscriptions and manuscripts. Very full details are given by Mather (*op. cit.*). In the inscriptions cut during the republican period there are only two instances, CONIECIANT (i. 198. 50) and PROIECITAD (ix. 782), the latter showing Oscan influence. From 13 B.C. onwards, only forms in *-icio* appear. In the manuscripts the republican spelling *-iecio* is generally replaced by the imperial spelling, as was to be expected; but it has left significant traces. Where the older spelling has been preserved, the fact is generally due to one of two causes. Either an old present form has been mistaken for the perfect, or it has been corrupted into a different word. There are two good instances of the preservation of the old spelling due to the first cause in Terence. In *Ad.* 710 the manuscripts have *iniecit*, mistaken by copyists for *iniēcit*, but proved to be present by metre and syntax: in *Heaut.* 277 the manuscripts have *coniecit*, mistaken for *coniēcit*, but proved to be present by the same tests. Cp. *Lucr.* 2. 951; 3. 513; *Verg. Aen.* 5. 776; 8. 428; 10. 753; and a large number of similar instances given by Mather (pp. 97 ff., 110 ff.). A probable example of the preservation of the old spelling as a corruption is to be seen in *Plaut. Truc.* 298, where A has INLECIATIS for the *iniciatis* of B, C, D. There can be little doubt that Plautus wrote *inieciatis*. Schoell reads *inleciatis*, but there are several objections to that reading. In the time of Plautus, *lacio* would have taken the form *-licio* in composition, not *lecio*; then similar corruptions of compounds of *iacio* into compounds of *lacio* occur elsewhere: e. g. in *Lucr.* 3. 58, 497, the MSS. have *eliciuntur* for *eieciuntur*; and in 4. 945, they have *eliciatur* for *eieciatur*. It is true that in *Plaut. Mil.* 1435, where a similar phrase occurs, the Palatines have *is me in hanc inlexit fraudem*; but it is curious that A has INIEXIT for *inlexit*: possibly the original reading was *iniēcit*. Again, in *Plaut. Mil.* 112, C and D have *contegit*

for *coniēcit*. A comparatively small number of instances in which a spelling like *iniēcit* has either been preserved or has left traces, are more significant than hundreds of instances of a spelling like *inicio* in the manuscripts of the older literature. If *iniēcio* was the republican spelling, the reason why it has been generally replaced in the manuscripts by the imperial spelling *inicio* is obvious; but if *inicio* was the republican spelling, then the instances or traces still remaining in the manuscripts of a spelling *iniēcio*, isolated though they be, are hard to explain.

Here this somewhat lengthy inquiry comes to an end. It has involved questions of prosody, of metric, of linguistic science, of textual criticism, of epigraphy. Yet I am convinced that the problem cannot be successfully solved with a less minute investigation.

CHARLES EXON.

A CHAPTER ON THE RHYTHMS OF BACCHYLIDES.

ANYTHING connected with Greek metres or Greek rhythms is by most students regarded as not easy to understand, with the exception, perhaps, of hexameters and trimeters, and suchlike metres, as long as the theory given is not extended beyond the elements. As for the more complicated rhythms of the Greek lyric poets, there is a still more serious difficulty than that consisting in the student's incapacity or unwillingness. For who may justly claim to have a thorough understanding of this subject? What would be required is no less than the complete manual by Aristoxenus, a few fragments of which only survive; Oxyrhynchus has not yet yielded enough of it. Until that time, which possibly may arrive, when we shall possess a good deal more of it, we must confine ourselves to the easier parts of the subject, and leave the rest in darkness.

In the first place, it is to be understood that the term 'metres' (*μέτρα*), if we duly prefer to follow the use of the poets and musicians, and not that of later grammarians, does not apply to anything in Pindar or Bacchylides, nor to anything in Sophocles, except the trimeters and tetrameters. Rhythm (*ῥυθμός*) is both the general notion, comprising all kinds of versification, and the special term for what versification is left, when the so-called *μέτρα* have been deducted. If the dactylic rhythm, for instance, continues throughout a whole poem, and if there are

marked sections of six dactyls (or spondees) each, then these sections form a *measure* for the whole poem, and are therefore called μέτρον. Wherever there are no such sections, or τμήματα ῥυθμῶν, as Plato calls them, though the poem throughout may consist of dactyls, we are nevertheless restricted to the general term ῥυθμός. The case is like that of Demosthenes' public speeches, the συμβουλευτικοί: those directed against Philip bear the special name Φιλιππικοί, but for the rest the general name συμβουλευτικοί must suffice.

Now, there are many different rhythms, both of a simple and of a more complicated description. The dactyl, for instance, in its simplest form, is the combination of one long and two short syllables, the latter being frequently replaced by one long; the initial long syllable forms the thesis, or βάσις, or the κάτω μέρος of the rhythm, to be marked, in music, by a point below; the succeeding two short syllables form the arsis, or the ἄνω μέρος, to be marked by a point above. But in order to avoid a multiplication of signs, the thesis generally was not marked at all, the absence of the point clearly indicating its nature.

Properly one had to write μηνὶν ἀειδὲ θεῶν, and so on; but to write μηνὶν ἀειδὲ θεῶν was deemed sufficient. It is the same thing with accents: properly each syllable had to bear its accent, as πολέμοις, λεγόμενά; but for practical use the βαρεῖα (*gravis*) might be spared. Or else the ὀξεῖα (*acutus*, sc. *accentus*), as in Greek προσῳδία, or in former times ἁρμονία) might be omitted; for we find in the papyrus-manuscript of Bacchylides, and in many MSS. of Homer, a system of accentuation by which, in the case of oxytona, and even of perispomena, the accentuated syllable is not marked, but only the preceding ones: e. g. πάνθαλης, that is, πανθαλής or (in connexion with a following word) πανθαλής; οβριμόδεκκι, that is, ὀβριμοδεκκί.

The name of dactyl is extended by the rhythmicians to other forms, which equally consist of a thesis and an arsis, both of the same measure, and in the relation of one to one, or two to two, or three to three, and so on. So the diiambus $\cup\text{---}\cup\text{---}$ was called δάκτυλος κατὰ ἱαμβον: $\cup\text{---}|\cup\text{---}$ or $\cup\text{---}|\cup\text{---}$. The δακτυλικοὶ πόδες in this sense, to be divided into two equal parts—one the thesis, and one the arsis—go to the maximum of sixteen χρόνοι πρῶτοι, or *morae*: $\text{---}\cup\text{---}\cup\text{---}\cup\text{---}|\cup\text{---}\cup\text{---}\cup\text{---}$. In this way, the hexameter is excluded from being one πούς, or κῶλον, the number of its χρόνοι πρῶτοι being ($6 \times 4 =$) 24, and must necessarily be divided. This may be done in different ways; but the ordinary division is that into two parts, or cola, each of which comprises three δάκτυλοι. But when we proceed to a further division of each of these cola, we are compelled, as it seems, to fall into another kind of rhythm, the relation of the parts being one to two, and not one to one, nor two to two. This rhythm is called the iambic rhythm, its simplest form being the ἱαμβος $\cup\text{---}|\text{---}$; while again the name of iambic rhythm comprises the trochee, in which the order of arsis and thesis is inverted: $\text{---}|\cup\text{---}$, just as the general term of dactylic rhythm includes the anapæst, which differs from the δάκτυλος by the same inversion. Now when we in this way divide the dactylic colon, μῆνιν ἀΐειδε θεὸς Πη-, we may begin with the thesis of two feet, or else with the arsis of one foot. We have not here to discuss in which of these two ways the ancients divided the cola of their hexameters, our principal concern being with the ῥυθμοὶ of the lyric poets, and not with the μέτρα of the epic. The former also frequently employed dactyls. There was a kind of composition called κατὰ δάκτυλον εἶδος, one of the elements of which was the dactylic tetrameter (so called by the grammarians), or, what was much the same, the anapæstic dimeter, consisting of four anapæsts.

There is a curious contradiction in counting the feet of the different *ῥυθμοί*: in some cases the element is one foot, in other cases a couple of feet, a *διποδία*: thus we call trimeter what consists of six *ἱαμβοί*, but hexameter what amounts to six dactyls. We find the *κατὰ δάκτυλον εἶδος* in Alcman, and in Simonides, and in other poets; but Bacchylides has it only in one ode, the *Ἡρακλῆς* (xv. of my edition; xvi. of Kenyon's), and not even there free from admixture of other rhythms. As these compositions are still involved in obscurity, I decline to discuss them here, not being bound to say more than I know.

I have referred to the iambic division of *μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πη-* as being apparently the only one possible. In reality this is not the case. We may divide the same colon, which consists of $(3 \times 4 =) 12$ *moræ*, into two equal parts of six *moræ* each, but not of the same description: *μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πη-*. One of these parts has the form of a choriamb, $- \cup \cup -$, the other that of an ionicus, $\cup \cup - -$. The second colon of the opening verse of the *Iliad* may be divided in the same way: *-ληϊάδεω | Ἀχιλῆος*.

Now, it so happens that the first verse of Pindar's ninth Nemean ode—*κωμάσομεν παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος Σικωνόθε Μοῖσαι*—exactly coincides with the first verse of the *Iliad*, consisting, as it may seem, of two dactyls, then one spondee, and again two dactyls and one spondee. Of course, this cannot be a real heroic hexameter; the coincidence must be fortuitous. How, then, is it to be called? Homer's first verse is termed by the metricians an *ἔπος κατ' ἐνόπλιον*,¹ exactly because of that coincidence, as it must seem; and then it follows that Pindar's verse is a real *ἐνόπλιος*, or a couple of *ἐνόπλιοι*. The name of *ἐνόπλιος* rather frequently occurs, both in earlier writers and in later; the earliest

¹ Schol. in Hephaestionem, p. 167, ἔχον δύο δακτύλους καὶ ἓνα σπονδεῖον. Westphal: κατ' ἐνόπλιον (ἔπος) ἐστὶ τὸ

instance is in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, v. 649 ff., where the poet makes Socrates say that the knowledge of rhythms enables a man to answer such questions as, Which rhythm is *κατὰ δάκτυλον*,¹ which *κατ' ἐνόπλιον*? It clearly appears that there was a similarity between these two kinds of rhythm, by which anybody not properly instructed might be betrayed into error.

Such similarity does exist between the *ῥῶμος* (the hexameter), the *κατὰ δάκτυλον* (*μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος*, a tetrameter and a dimeter), and lastly the rhythm called *κατ' ἐνόπλιον*, if it be that which I understand by the name; and hence, for a good reason, Plato, also, in a very brief sketch of the rhythmic discipline, combines the three names: *ἐνόπλιόν τινα ξύνθετον, δάκτυλον, ῥῶμον*.² But what does he mean by *ξύνθετος*? Is not any colon, or metre, necessarily composite? We are compelled, therefore, to give the word *ξύνθετος* a more restricted sense, as composed of various and different parts; and in this sense it applies to the kind of rhythm I have described: - υ υ - ι υ υ - -. But I return to Aristophanes' question: Which rhythm is *κατὰ δάκτυλον*, which *κατ' ἐνόπλιον*? The poet himself, in the same comedy, furnishes good instances of both kinds. He speaks of two old songs which boys were formerly taught to sing: ἡ "Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινάν," ἡ "Τηλέπορόν τι βόαμα"; and the scholiast supplies us with some more of them: Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινὰν θεὸν ἐγρεκύδοιμον, and Τηλέπορόν τι βόαμα λύρας. In the former instance, the third and again the sixth foot are spondees, therefore *κατ' ἐνόπλιον*; the latter began with three dactyls, therefore *κατὰ δάκτυλον*. The *ῥῶμος*, not being a lyric rhythm, is not contemplated in Aristophanes.

¹ Πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι κομψὸν ἐν συνουσίᾳ,
ἐπαύονθ' ὁποῖός ἐστι τῶν ῥυθμῶν
κατὰ δάκτυλον, χάποῖος αὖ κατ' ἐνόπλιον.

² De Rep. III., 400 B.

But the reader may say: All this is purely hypothetical reasoning: if the dactylic tripod, with a spondee in the last place, was the ἐνόπλιος, and if it was to be divided in that way, both Plato's and Aristophanes' passages become intelligible; but is there no direct evidence? Certainly there is, although not so much as we should wish to have. In the first place, there is, as I have already stated, the name ἔπος κατ' ἐνόπλιον; secondly, Bacchius, the author of a very short rhythmical treatise, gives as an instance of the ἐνόπλιος the colon ὦ τὸν πίτυος στέφανον, dissecting it into a spondee (ὦ τὸν), a pyrrhic (πίτυ-), a trochee (-ος στέ-), and an iamb (-φانون). Here I beg to remind my readers that there is no fundamental difference between dactyls and anapæsts, nor between trochees and iambs; thus --υυ--υυ-- is materially the same with --υυ--υυ--; one spondee and two anapæsts = two dactyls and one spondee. But this is by no means the division prescribed. Neither dactyls nor anapæsts enter into the ἐνόπλιος, but either choriambes and ionics: --υυ (ionicus a maiore) | --υυ-, or if you again subdivide these, spondees and pyrrhics and iambs and trochees. The scholiasts of Pindar and other metricians analyse --υυ--υυ-- and --υυ--υυ- in exactly the same ways as Bacchius does, and as I do, wholly excluding the dactyl and the anapæst; only they use other names for the rhythm thus constituted: προσοδιακός (Schol. of Pindar), and δίμετρον προσοδιακόν for --υυυ|--υυ- or --υυ-|υυ---, and *quadrupes* δωδεκάσημος περίοδος (Marius Victorinus), which is rather a description than a name. What consists of two different feet is called συζυγία; what of more than two is called περίοδος; and it is clear that a great variety of *quadrupedes* δωδεκάσημοι περίοδοι may be formed, each of which required a special name. For instance: υ-, -υ, υ-, υ-, or -υ, υ-, υ-, υ-, and so on, and if *quadrupes* is to be understood of four different feet: υυ, --, -υ, υ-, or υυ, -υ, --, υ-. Προσοδιακός is a real name, which was employed

by some, as it seems, for the same rhythm which was called *ἐνόπλιος* by others; but as there are other forms of *προσοδιακοί* besides this, especially one frequent in Aristophanes: *--υυ--υυ*, consisting of only seven syllables, it is better to reserve this name for that form, having such excellent authority for calling *--υυ--υυ--* and *--υυ--υυ--* *ἐνόπλιος*.

This, then, is the rhythm so prominent both in Pindar and in Bacchylides, that about half the odes are composed in it; but in order to be used for such composition, it must undergo more than one important modification. A poem written in these two forms, without any further variety, would be monotonous in the extreme; for the hexameter has at least its spondees, which may be substituted for the dactyls in many different ways, whilst the *ἐνόπλιος*, as we have seen, has all its syllables fixed. It is true that a trochee may enter instead of the spondee, and in the other form an iamb instead of the same; but this modification does not go very far. Then you may use the catalectic form *--υυ--υυ--*, lengthening the last syllable in compensation for the wanting *moræ*; but the other form has no catalectic at its side, but only an hypercatalectic *υ--υυ--υυ--υ*. Another modification is even more important. These same rhythms, as everybody knows, are called by the modern theorists *dactylo-epitritic*, a name of quite modern coinage, but originating from a peculiarity which we have not yet touched upon, the combination of seeming dactyls and seeming epitrites. The name epitrite denotes a foot composed of three long syllables and one short; four species of it are distinguished, according to the various positions of the short syllable. Now, as we have seen that the scholiast of Pindar calls *--υυ*, *υυ--* a *δίμετρον προσοδιακόν*, we shall not wonder at his calling *--υυ*, *υυ--*, *--υυ* a *τρίμετρον προσοδιακόν*. The last syllable, of course, is *anceps*; that makes the whole difference. But *--υ--* is

an epitrite (of the third species); and the fact is, however astonishing one may find it, that this foot may be substituted also in the first place of the *τρίμετρον*, by lengthening the fourth syllable, and likewise in the second place, by lengthening the second. As in Pindar's third Olympian ode: Ἰππων ἄω|τον Μοῖσα δ' οὕ|τω τοι παρέ||στα μοι νεο|σίγαλον εὐ|ρόντι τρόπον: a combination of two *τρίμετρα*, the latter of them having undergone no change but the lengthening of the last syllable, but the former having been modified throughout. Pindar's next colon is this: Δωρίω φω|νὰν ἐναρμό|ξαι πεδίλῳ, which brings the strophe to an end. Here are three epitrites of another species, the second. The colon ought to be, according to the first rule: - - - -, - - - -, - - - -; but all the three feet have been modified, the first and the third by lengthening the third syllable, the second by lengthening the first.

Now, if all this be possible, it is quite enough for varying the rhythm as much as can be required; but the question arises: How is this possible? and still another question: Where are the proofs for this being the true analysis of these rhythms? Let me answer the second question first.

The first proof is, that this is the very best way of bringing the discordant elements which we see, the seeming dactyls and the seeming epitrites, into the harmony justly desired. All attempts have been made to establish that harmony: shortening the dactyls, in order that they might be equal in measure to the trochees composing the epitrite; lengthening the trochees, that they might equal the spondees and the dactyls; shortening the epitrites down to the measure of a dactyl, or nearly so. The way indicated by the ancients themselves—to give up the dactyls, and to introduce feet of six *moræ* throughout—has been long despised, and nevertheless

it is the only practicable one. A little lengthening and shortening is still required; for --υ-, and -υ-- , are seven *mora* and not six, counting exactly; but then we must bring down the spondee to nearly the measure of a trochee or an iamb, nor do we find any difficulty in this, being accustomed to such irregularities in iambic and trochaic verses, where that spondee is freely employed. The ancient rhythicians call the thing ἀλογία, and the half-long syllables ἄλογοι, that is to say irrational, because there is no proportion between them and the other syllables. Again, υ--υυ, and υυ--υ, are five syllables and not six, and the short syllable requires some lengthening, which forms another kind of ἀλογία. But I return to my proofs.

The strongest proof—which indeed could not be firmly given before the great discovery of Bacchylides—consists in this, that the different forms of the ἐξάσημος ποῦς (the foot of six times): --υυ and --υ-, or -υυ- and --υ-, or -υυ- and -υ-, or υυ-- and -υ-, are interchangeable in strophic responsion. In the fifth ode of Bacchylides the beginning verses of the five epodes are these: τῶς νῦν καὶ ἐ|μοὶ μυρία | πάντα κέλευ|θος, --υυ, --υ-, --υ-, υ (α); τὸν δ' ὥς ἴδεν| 'Αλκμήνιος|θαυμαστὸς ἦ|ρωας (β, like form); τῷ δὲ στυγε|ρὰν δῆριν 'Ελ|λάνων ἄρι|στοι (γ, like form); Πλευρῶνα μί|νυνθα δέ μοι | ψυχὰ γλυκεῖ|α (δ, --υυ, -υυ-, --υ-|υ); Βοιωτὸς ἀ|νὴρ τάδε φῶ|ν[ησεν γλυκεῖ|αν] (ε, the same as in δ). The last two epodes have the regular form of this very frequent trimetron (cp. str. α, v. 4 Μοισᾶν γλυκύ|δωρον ἄγαλ|μα τῶν γε νῦν; v. 9 ἡ σὺν Χαρί|τεσσι βαθυ|ζώνοις ὑφά|νας, hypercatalectic as epod. v. 1; ep. α, v. 3 (33) ὕμνεῖν κυά|νοπλοκάμου|θ' ἔκατι Νί|κας); but in ep. α β γ the second foot has the second syllable lengthened, --υ- = -υυ-.

Again, the last verse of the epode ordinarily has the form -υ--|-υ-υ|-υ-, as (epode α, v. 40) εἶδε νικά|σαντα

χρυσό|παχυς 'Αώς. But in one epode, the fourth (v. 160), the first syllable is short: τάδ' ἔφα θνα|τοῖσι μὴ φῦ|ναι φέριστον, $\cup\cup-- = -\cup--$.

In the first ode, inscribed to Argeios of Ceos, the third verse of the epode is either $-\cup--$, $-\cup\cup-$, $\cup\cup--$, θῆκεν ἀντ' εὐ|εργεσιᾶν | λιπαρῶν τ' ἄλ- (ζ, v. 157), or $-\cup--$, $-\cup--$, $\cup\cup--$, ὄσσον ἀν ζώ|η χρόνον τόν|δ' ἔλαχεν τί (η, 180).

It follows that $-\cup--$ equals $-\cup\cup-$.

There are more instances of the interchangeable nature of these feet, both in Bacchylides and in Pindar, whose latest editor, O. Schröder, has fully acknowledged the fact, and abstained from arbitrary corrections which former editors too freely indulged in. Another fact of a similar nature, and very frequent in both poets, is this. The usual order of the feet in the dimeter $-\cup\cup-$, $\cup\cup--$ may be inverted, so that we have $\cup\cup--$, $-\cup\cup-$. See Bacch. I. str. ε, vv. 1, 2: Διὸς Εὐκλεί|ον δὲ Φέκα|τι βαθύζω|νον κόραν (115 f.), the second verse showing the catalectic form, not excluded by the inversion. It seems that in the first verse the last syllable but one was sometimes lengthened, ant. α, v. 9. f. πόλιν εἰ νά|σοιό τ' Εὐ|ξαν|τιαδ|ᾶν | ξν|θεν μολών, and ant. η, v. 170 f. ἔπεται νό|σφιν γε νούσων πένι|ας τ' ἀ|μαχάνου, where νόσων may be written easily, but not necessarily. This makes a partial transition into the epitritic form, the total being $-\cup--$, $-\cup--$. Cp. Pind. Ol. vii. str. 1 φιάλαν ὥς | εἴ τις ἀφνει|ᾶς ἀπὸ χει|ρὸς ἐλών. Again, there is the contrary partial transition, the first foot becoming an epitrite, the second remaining a choriamb, $-\cup--$, $-\cup\cup-$, as in Bacch. x. [xi.] str. v. 7 -σίν τε καὶ θνα|τοῖς ἀρετᾶς, and in Pindar, Nem. xi. str. 5 οἷ σε γεραί|ροντες ὀρ|θὰν φυλάσσοι|σιν Τένεδον. In this verse, composed of two cola, the first colon is catalectic, $=-\cup\cup-$, $-\cup--$, $=-\cup--$, $-\cup--$ with two epitrites, or $-\cup\cup-$, $\cup\cup--$ without epitrites.

I have still to recur to the catalectic forms and to the

variety already spoken of. There is one sort of catalexis at the end of the colon, as is generally known; but there is besides another in the former part, or in *a* former part, at the end of the first foot of the dimeter, and at that of the first or second of the trimeter. This is called *προκαταληξία*, and if the latter part also is catalectic *δικαταληξία*. The catalectic forms of the feet are: - υ - of - υ - υ or - υ υ -, and υ υ - of υ υ - -, whilst - - υ - and - - υ υ (as I already stated) admit no catalexis. Besides, there exists, as in other rhythms, the so-called *βραχυκαταληξία*, when not one but two syllables are detracted. In this way - υ - - becomes - - -. As the number of the *moræ* must remain the same, each of these syllables must be of three *moræ*, a *τρίσημος*. Pindar abounds in all these kinds of shortening, whilst Bacchylides is more moderate. Still we find in him the following instances of *προκαταληξία* and *δικαταληξία*. V. str. α, v. 8 δεῦρ' ἄθρη|σον νόψ, - υ ⊥, - υ ⊥ (the sign ⊥ denoting the *τρίσημος*), but in this strophe only; whilst in the others the form is - υ - υ, - υ ⊥. VII. [VIII.] v. 51 [13] γλαυκὸν Αἰ|τωλίδος. IX. [X.] str. β, v. 38 τεύξεται | μυρία δ' ἄν||δρῶν ἐπιστᾶ|μαι πέλονται. Of this verse the second foot is an ionic in the first strophe (10): νασιῶ|τῖν ἐκίνη|σεν λιγύφθογ|γον μέλισσαν, provided that this is the right restoration. Cp. (without procatalexia) I. 180 (δοσον ἄν ζώ)η χρόνον τόνδ' | ἔλαχεν τί, - υ - -, υ υ - -, = νασιῶ|τιν| (τιν') ἐκίνη-. We find a still more curious form in the sixth verse of the strophes in the same ode: v. 16 (antistr. α) ἄνθειςιν ξαν|θὰν ἀναδη|σάμενος | κεφαλάν. This is, in Bacchylides, the only instance of a seeming dactylic tetrapody, which is rather frequent in Pindar. As the verse is a tetrameter, and exceeds the number of *moræ* allowed for a single colon, it must be divided; and the only division must be this: ἄνθειςιν ξανθὰν ἀναδη- (= -σίν τε καὶ θνατοῖς ἀρετᾶς in X., see above) ||-σάμενος | κεφαλάν, where υ υ ⊥ (⊥ denotes a *τετράσημος*) twice = υ υ - - .

Cp. - ∪ ∪, - ∪ ∪ in two other instances. Brachycatalexy never occurs; but we have it in Pindar's first Pythian ode, v. 2 f. σύνδικον Μοι|σᾶν κτέανον || τᾶς ἀκούει | μὲν βάσις ἀ|γλαΐας | ἀρχά, ∪ ∪ ∪ | ∪ ∪, or better perhaps in two trimeters: σύνδικον Μοισᾶν κτέανον|τᾶς ἀκούει || μὲν βάσις ἀ|γλαΐας | ἀρχά; then, v. 3 πείθον|ται δ' αἰοῖδοι | σάμασιν, ∪ ∪, - ∪ - -, - ∪ ∪.

As an instance of the composition of a whole strophe, I choose that of the VIII. [IX.] ode, which has quite an architectonical structure of four (or six) parts, as I shall presently show:—

Δύξαν, ὦ χρυσαλάκατοι Χάριτες,
 πεισίμβροτον δοίητ', ἐπεὶ
 Μουσᾶν τοι ἰοβλεφάρων θεῖος προφάτας
 εὖτυκος Φλειοῦντά τε καὶ Νεμεαίου
 5 Ζηνὸς εὐθαλὲς πέδον
 ὑμνεῖν, ὅθι μηλοδαϊκτὰν
 θρέψεν ἄ λευκώλενος
 Ἥρα περικλειτῶν ἀέθλων
 πρῶτον Ἡρακλεῖ βαρύφθογγον λέοντα.

There are nine cola, of which four are trimeters: 1, 3, 4, 9; the rest dimeters. After the second, the fifth, and the seventh there are marked incisions, both the hiatus and the lengthening of a naturally short syllable (by dint of its being the last) being admissible in these places. See v. 5, f. πέδον || ὑμνεῖν ∪ - || - -; 7, f. λευκώλενος || Ἥρα - - ∪ - || - -; v. 11, f. (ant. α, 2, f.), κριτοὶ || ἄθλησαν ∪ - || - - ∪; 14, f. (ant. α, 5, f.), φόνου||ῶ; 33, f. (str. β, 7, f.), κλάδον || ἀκτέας; 40 (ant. β, 5), χθόνα || ἦλθεν; 42 (ant. β, 7), πόρω || οἰκεῦσι, and so on. It is by observing these incisions, that Boeckh constituted in Pindar his long verses, instead of the traditional short cola. In the same we may write, if we choose, this strophe of Bacchylides in four verses: 1-2, 3-5, 6-7, 8-9. But I, for one, do not choose to write it

thus; the division into cola seems to me much more important, and in no way to be obscured; and, moreover, we cannot be sure that at the end of the other cola (1, 3, 4, 6, 8) no such incision existed, there being no instance of a word divided between two cola, which formed Boeckh's other and corresponding criterion. For wherever the hiatus is not possible, the continuance of a word is possible; wherever this is not possible, that is possible. But we cannot say that, where no hiatus actually occurs, the continuance of a word is excluded, nor that where there never is division of a word, a hiatus may occur. For the one and the other may always be fortuitous, especially in such poems as this, a great part of which is very ill-preserved. But as for the nine cola, these seem to be pretty well established; and they are given so in the manuscript itself. However, we see that the architectonical structure of the strophe is somewhat in contradiction with this division. If we regard the strophe as a whole, disregarding even the manifest incisions, we find four parts, the former two being longer and exactly equal to each other, and the latter being short and alike equal among themselves. Δόξαν ὦ χρυσαλάκατοι Χάριτες πεισίμβροτον δοίητ' ἐπεὶ Μουσᾶν γε Φιοβλεφάρων θεῖος προφάτας = εὐτυκος Φλειοῦντά τε καὶ Νεμεαίου Ζηνὸς εὐθαλὲς πίδον ὑμνεῖν ὄθι μηλοδαῖκτὰν θρέψεν ἅ λειν-; then -κώλενός Ἡρα περικλειτῶν ἀέθλων = πρῶτον Ἡρακλεῖ βαρύφθογγον λέοντα. Moreover, the first two parts may again be subdivided into two equal halves: δόξαν ὦ χρυσαλάκατοι Χάριτες πεισίμβροτον δοί- = -ητ' ἐπεὶ Μουσᾶν γε Φιοβλεφάρων θεῖος προφάτας, - - - -, - - - -, - - - -, - - - -. But this structure has been intentionally, as it seems, in part obscured by the incisions. The reason we should, perhaps, more clearly see if the music were preserved.

I by no means say that a similar architecture may be discovered everywhere in Bacchylides. Trying to

discover it for the epode of the same poem, we totally fail. But I shall give one instance more, the epode of XII. [XIII.], inscribed to Pytheas of Aegina:—

- 190 Νίκαν τ' ἐρικυδέα μέλπετ' ὦ νέοι ἐπ. 5'.
 Πυθέε μελέταν τε βροτω-
 φελέε Μενάνδρου,
 τὰν ἐπ' Ἀλφειοῦ τε ῥοαῖς θαμὰ δὴ
 τίμασεν ἃ χρυσάρματος 5
 195 σεμνὰ μεγάθυμος Ἀθάνα
 μυρίων τ' ἤδη μίτραισιν ἀνέρων
 ἑσπεφάνωσεν ἰθείρας
 ἐν Πανελλάνων ἀέθλοις.

Incisions are indicated (by hiatus or *syllaba anceps*) after 5 and 7; continuance of words is between 2 and 3, 4 and 5, 8 and 9; so there seem to be five verses: 1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9; and I have denoted that by the kind of writing, the adnected cola beginning a little further to the right. But the structure is again independent of this division. There are, indeed, five parts, not exactly alike among themselves, but similar. Νίκαν τ' ἐρι|κυδέα μέλ|πετ' ὦ νέοι: one enhoplious of the anapæstic form and one epitrite of the iambic. Πυθέε μελέ|ταν τε βροτω|φελέε Μενάν|δρου τὰν ἐπ' Ἀλ-: one enhoplious of the same form, and two epitrites, alike of the iambic. Next (3): -φειοῦ τε ῥο|αῖς θαμὰ δὴ|τίμασεν ἃ|χρυσάρματος: the same. Then (4), σεμνὰ μεγá|θυμος Ἀθά|να μυρίων|τ' ἤδη μίτραι|σιν ἀνέρων, nearly the same, but three epitrites. Lastly, (5): ἑσπεφάνω|σεν ἰθείρας|ἐν Πανελλά|νων ἀέθλοις| = 2. 3, except that we here have the dactylic and trochaic forms. The first part (as is quite natural) is the shortest of all; then the scheme is developed into greater length; then (4) it is again increased; and the end is marked by a return to the middle length, and more distinctly by assuming the forms which have in themselves more calmness: -υ-υ-υ- and -υ- -υ- -υ- -υ-.

There are many more questions which may be put; but the answers will be deficient, owing to our scanty information, as I stated in the beginning. Which are the seats of what we call *ictus*? Naturally we are inclined to put the ictuses in this way: Νικάν τ' ἐρικύδεα μέλπετ' ὦ νεοί, and ἔστεφανώσεν ἑθείρας ἐν Πανελλανῶν ἀεθλοῖς. But thus in the first part of the former verse the ictus falls upon the third *mora*, and in the second on the first, and in the third on the second; similarly, in the latter verse, the places are either the first or the third; and this constitutes so great and so shocking an irregularity, that it seems hardly probable. So it might seem that the ictuses are rather to be put thus: Νικάν τ' ἐρικυδέα μελ|πετ' ὦ νεοί, and ἔστεφανω|σέν ἑθείρας | ἐν Πανελλα|νῶν ἀεθλοῖς, and that the feet are to be divided in this way: -1200, -100-, an arsis of two *mora* and a thesis of four; and again: 2001-, 00-1-. This, too, looks a little strange; and we cannot divide the epitrites in the same way: 0|_0_ would give one syllable to five, although in -100- there is the same proportion as in -100-. However, in the well-known anacreontic verse, 00-01-00-, the difficulty of division is still greater, not even the principal parts being equal: five to seven; and nevertheless this verse, in its structure, admits of no doubt: 00--100--=00-01-00-, with transposition of the fourth and fifth syllables, and 00--100-- itself = -00-01-00-0, ionic = trochee, as choriamb = diiambus. But this belongs to another order of facts and to another kind of rhythms, the so-called βακχιακοί (in rhythmic and music), which we have not here to deal with.

F. BLASS.

HALLE.

THE BOOK OF ENOCH IN THE EGYPTIAN CHURCH.

IT has been said that the Troubadours filled for the twelfth century the place which is now occupied by the daily paper. But eight hundred years earlier an important functionary of the modern newspaper—the interviewer—had his representative in that remarkable writer Cassianus of Marseilles. Towards the end of the fourth century Cassianus, accompanied by his friend Germanus, spent some years in visiting the more renowned solitaries who had their abode in the desert of Scete in Egypt. With each of them the travellers engaged in conversation on topics which to the Church of that day seemed to be of much importance. The record of these conversations was afterwards published by Cassianus in the twenty-four books of his *Collationes*.

Among the hermits visited by Cassianus and Germanus was the Abbot Serenus, of whom instruction was desired on many subjects, and in particular on the narrative about the apostate angels related in the sixth chapter of Genesis.¹ Is this story, asked Germanus, to be understood in its literal sense? If so, it was full of difficulty. The answer of Serenus to the question of Germanus was simple enough.² The passage must not be interpreted, he affirmed, in its literal sense. The “angels of God” were the descendants

¹ *Coll.* vii. 20.

² *Ib.* 21.

of Seth; "the daughters of men" were of the posterity of Cain. The offspring of the pious sons of Seth and the wicked daughters of Cain were "mighty hunters, men of ferocity and violence, who, from the size of their bodies, or from the greatness of their cruelty and wickedness, were called 'giants.'"

Apart from proofs of the correctness of the exegesis, one would have supposed that there was no need to add anything to the simple statement of the theory. Its application to the passage in question is apparently obvious. Serenus, however, thought otherwise. He deemed it needful to work out his interpretation in detail; and it is to the remarks which he makes with this end in view that I now wish to direct attention. The first consequence of the intermarriage of the Sethites and the Cainites, he tells us, was the corruption of the former from the "holiness and simplicity" which they had inherited from their forefathers. They learned wickedness from their wives. But this had a further result; for among the Sethites there was much knowledge of the secrets of nature, which had been handed down from generation to generation. Among the rest they understood "the virtues of herbs and trees, and the nature of stones, and the vicissitudes of the future." In earlier times this knowledge had been used for good purposes; but now that its possessors had swerved from their primitive piety, all was changed. The Divinely-imparted knowledge was directed to profane and hurtful ends. The immediate outcome was the invention of evil arts and tricks and superstitions resting on magic. In later days the apostasy waxed worse; the progeny of the renegade Sethites, taught by their parents, abandoned the service of God, and worshipped "the elements of fire or the demons of the air." The "giants," moreover, were those who introduced predatory warfare among men, "choosing rather to live by robbery than by labour." To such

a pitch was wickedness at length carried that a flood was the only means by which the world could be purified.

It is evident that in all this Serenus has wandered away from the text which he professes to expound. There is nothing in the Biblical story, however interpreted, about the introduction of unlawful arts or magic, or about increased knowledge of physical phenomena, or even about idolatrous worship, as consequent on the intercourse of the sons of God and the daughters of men. Serenus clearly has in view a myth which had been superadded to the narrative of Genesis, and which he regarded as in some measure illustrating the Mosaic story, or, at least, as something that ought not to be passed over without notice. But from what source did the myth come? Serenus himself carries us one step on our way to the solution of this question when he tells us that his exposition of Genesis vi. displays the foundation of truth on which rests the "*popular belief* [*illa vulgi opinio*] that angels taught men sinful practices and various arts." The additions to the story of the sons of God as told in Genesis, which Serenus included in his exegesis, were therefore commonly accepted as true by Christians of the fourth century in at least part of Egypt. If we go back a little further, I believe the result will be that we shall be convinced that the Book of Enoch is the ultimate source of the myth. Let us compare with the extracts from Cassianus which have been given above the following from Dr. Charles's translation of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch. They are taken from the early chapters, which are evidently an expansion of Genesis vi. :—

VII., 1. And they [the angels] took unto them wives, . . . and taught them charms and enchantments, and made them acquainted with the cutting of roots and woods 3. And these [the giants] consumed all the acquisitions of men. . . . 4. Then the giants turned them against mankind in order to devour them. . . . VIII., 1. And Azâzêl [one of the angels] taught men to

make swords . . . and made known to them metals and the art of working them, bracelets, and the use of antimony . . . and the most costly and choicest stones. . . . 2. And there arose great godlessness. . . . 3. Amézárák taught all the enchanters and root-cutters, Armârôs the resolving of enchantments, Baraq'al [taught] the astrologers, Kôkabêl the signs, and Temêl taught astrology, and Asrâdêl the course of the moon. . . . IX., 9. The women have borne giants, and the whole earth has thereby been filled with blood and unrighteousness. . . . X., 1. Then spake the Most High. . . . 2. A deluge will presently come upon the whole earth, and all that is on it will be destroyed. . . . XVI., 3. You knew worthless mysteries, and these in the hardness of your hearts you have recounted to the women, and through these mysteries women and men work much evil on earth. . . . XIX., 1. And Uriel said to me, Here will stand the angels who have connected themselves with women, and their spirits assuming many different forms have defiled mankind and will lead them astray into sacrificing to demons as gods.

Whether Serenus was aware or not that the legend which is the real basis of his discourse came from the Book of Enoch, we are probably warranted in concluding that he entertained no very great reverence for that book, but that its influence was nevertheless considerable with a large number in his district of Egypt, and that he consequently aimed at reconciling as best he might statements derived from it with what he believed to be the facts underlying the Scriptural narrative.

Let us see now how this conclusion fits in with and throws light upon the general history of the Book of Enoch in Egypt. In early days it was there held in high honour. The Epistle of Barnabas cites it as Scripture. Origen, while he lived at Alexandria, followed this precedent, and set the book on a level with the Psalms and the Shepherd of Hermas. But subsequently "Enoch" fell into discredit throughout the whole Church. In Egypt,

indeed, it continued to be quoted as Scripture by Gnostic writers like the author of *Pistis Sophia*, in the third century, and Zosimus Panopolites, perhaps somewhat later; but, so far as I know, no orthodox Egyptian writer later than Origen refers to it, with the exception of the author of the *Book of Adam and Eve* in the fifth or sixth century. And his position with regard to it is exactly that which we gather to have been the position of Serenus.¹ Now what is the hypothesis to which these facts naturally lead us? Something, I take it, like this. In the second and early third centuries the Book of Enoch was held in high esteem, and valued as on a par with the Scriptures by Egyptian Christians generally. But at a date subsequent to the publication of Origen's *De Principiis* it began to be regarded with disfavour by leading orthodox divines. Meanwhile its credit was as high as ever among the heretical sects, and its popularity with the general body of less learned orthodox Churchmen diminished but little. The attitude of the teachers of orthodoxy towards it came at length to be one of compromise. In general terms they condemned the book, and branded it as without authority. But they could not altogether ignore the mass of popular beliefs which had their origin in its pages. Accordingly they reconciled them as far as possible with their own teaching, and so made the latter more acceptable to the bulk of their hearers or readers. It is by some such theory as this—that the Book of Enoch retained its place in popular esteem in Egypt for hundreds of years after theologians had begun to look askance at it—that we may explain the fact, otherwise puzzling enough, that it continued to be transcribed in Egypt up to at least the eighth century, and that the fragment of that or a later date recently found at Ahkmīm is almost our only authority for such parts of the Greek text as are now extant.

¹ See *Journal of Philology*, vol. xxv., p. 205.

If I conclude this paper with an appeal for information to any who may glance at it, I shall probably lay myself open to a charge of gross ignorance. I shall gladly plead guilty if I thereby acquire the knowledge which I desire to have. Cassianus represents Serenus as undertaking to solve the problem of the survival of the knowledge of the evil arts through the Flood. Ham, he asserted (claiming the support of "ancient traditions"), was acquainted with these arts. It was impossible for him to bring a book containing a record of them into the Ark. Accordingly he inscribed it on metal plates and stone. Letters cut on such materials could not be obliterated by a deluge, and so the black arts were preserved for future ages. Can any reader trace this story to its oldest extant source? Malan (*Book of Adam and Eve*, p. 245) mentions that similar legends are to be found in *Kufale*, c. 8, p. 34, and Josephus, *Antt.* i. 2, though he does not refer to our passage of Cassianus. But he gives no other authority for the tale. Can it be that Serenus' "ancient traditions" were contained in a recension of the Book of Enoch different from that now extant, but current in his day in Egypt?

H. J. LAWLOR.

DANTE'S QUEST OF LIBERTY.

EVEN those who refuse to accept the letter to Can Grande as authentic need be in no doubt as to the aim which was before the spirit of Dante in his journey through the three kingdoms of the *immortale secolo* (*Inf.* ii. 14, 15). The famous description of the anagogical or spiritual sense of the *Commedia* contained in the above-named letter—viz., that it is “the exodus of the holy soul from the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of eternal glory”—is fully borne out by clear statements in the *Commedia* itself. In *Purg.* i. 71, Virgil, in his reply to the challenge of Cato, says of Dante: “Libertà va cercando”¹; and in his farewell address to Dante (*Purg.* xxvii. 127–142), summing up what has been attained, Virgil says to him: “Libero, dritto, sano è tuo arbitrio”²; while in *Par.* xxxi. 85, Dante, in his utterance of thanks to Beatrice, says:

Tu m'hai di servo tratto a libertate.³

Liberty, then, was Dante's aim; the gradual attainment of liberty is what is pictured in his journey.

But what was the liberty at which he was aiming? Was it political or spiritual?

We all know how animated has been the controversy as to whether the dominant meaning and purpose of the

¹ “He is engaged in the search for health is thy will.”
liberty.”

² “From being a slave thou hast

³ “Free, upright, and in perfect drawn me to liberty.”

poem is spiritual, as it was held to be by all the early commentators, and as it has been and is held to be by many modern commentators, or political, as first suggested in the last century.

The former opinion seems undoubtedly the right one; but it would be an error to exclude the political from the scope of the poem. Dante was too thorough an Aristotelian not to recognise that man is by nature social (*πολιτικὸς φύσει ἄνθρωπος*), that his moral and spiritual nature implied his membership in a social organism. This he regarded as axiomatic :—

Or di', sarebbe il peggio
Per l'uomo in terra se non fosse cive ?
Sì, rispos' io, e qui ragion non cheggio¹

(*Par.* viii. 115-117)—

while his view of the divine government of the world was far too wide and deep, and his whole *êthos* was far too Hellenic, to allow of his regarding "the things which are Cæsar's" as belonging to a class outside of "the things which are God's," or limiting the latter to matters ecclesiastical. His views on the close relation of the moral and the political are very clearly expressed in *Purg.* xvi. 85-102, and throughout the *De Monarchia*.

The political aim and the spiritual aim of the poem are not two different, still less two discordant, aims, but two aims which are organically connected, and of which one, the political, is subordinated to the other, the spiritual, and forms an important and necessary means towards its attainment. The spiritual is the final cause of the political and the ultimate aim of the poem.

And this which characterises the whole of Dante's great poem characterises his Quest of Liberty.

¹ "Now say, would it be the worst thing for man on the earth if he were not a citizen?" "Yes," answered I, "and here I demand no reason."

It is proposed in the present essay to endeavour to trace out through the poem the development of liberty and its relation to love.

Dante, himself the protagonist of the poem, represents humanity, or rather each human being, regarded *sub specie æterni*. He first is unconscious of his slavery to sin and ignorance, and then he wakens to the consciousness of it:—"Mi ritrovai per una selva oscura"¹ [where the 'ri' in 'ritrovai' implies that the 'selva oscura' is not man's original or ideal state] (*Inf.* i. 2); and he seeks to advance to a hill which is lit by the rays of the sun. This hill, in the vagueness with which it is drawn, would seem to symbolise the vague idea of εὐδαιμονία (happiness), which Aristotle alludes to in the opening of the *Nicom. Ethics* (i. 2 (4)) :—"Both the common herd and the cultivated say that the highest good is happiness, . . . but they disagree as to what happiness is." The hill is lit by the rays of the sun, for happiness, so far as it is happiness, comes from God:

. . . ciascun ben che fuor di lei si trova

Altro non è ch' un lume di suo raggio.² (*Par.* xxvi. 32, 33.)

And again—

Quel dolce pome, che per tantí rami

Cercando va la cura dei mortali.³

(*Purg.* xxvii. 115, 116.)

From this hill Dante is driven back by three beasts—lust, pride, and avarice—according to most commentators; or, according to Msgr. Poletto, envy, pride, and desire (*cupidigia*), which latter includes lust, gluttony, and avarice. Virgil, the human understanding, sent by the three heavenly ladies—the Blessed Virgin, S. Lucia, and

¹ "I found myself again [I came to myself] in a dark wood."

² "Each good which is found outside of it [the divine essence] is

nothing but a light from its ray."

³ "That sweet apple, which through so many branches the care of mortals goes seeking."

Beatrice—symbolising Divine Grace, Divine Enlightenment, and Divine Inspiration, or possibly *gratia praeveniens, cooperans, and perficiens* (though I think the former is the better interpretation)—shows him that the hurt is not to be so lightly healed, that there is no short and direct road to happiness, that a long and weary journey must be undertaken, while afterwards he is to learn that the true *εὐδαιμονία* (self-realization), which is one with true liberty, is something far higher and more glorious than that at which he had been aiming when driven back by the three beasts.

Liberty in one of its moments is recognised by Dante as part of the original endowment of each man. In *Purg.* XVI. 70, he introduces Marco Lombardo as condemning the opinion that everything was subject to the motions of the heavens, and giving as his reason:—

Se così fosse, in voi fora distrutto
 Libero arbitrio, e non fora giustizia,
 Per ben letizia, e per male aver lutto.¹

Again, in *Par.* v. 19–24, Beatrice says:—

Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza
 Fesse creando, ed alla sua bontate
 Più conformato, e quel ch'ei più apprezza,
 Fu della volontà la libertate,
 Di che le creature intelligenti,
 E tutte e sole furo e son dotate.²

But this liberty is only the initial pre-condition of the true highest liberty which Dante is in search of; this

¹ "If it were so, free will would be destroyed in you, and it would not be justice to have joy for goodness and ill for evil."

² "The greatest good which God of His bounty wrought in creating, and that which is most conformed to His

goodness, and that which He most prizes, was the liberty of the will, with which intelligent creatures, all of them and they alone, were and are endowed." These last words show that Dante did not regard free will as lost by "the Fall."

latter must be sought after by painful effort, and can only thus be attained—in the words of Goethe:—

Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
Der täglich sie erobern muss.¹

(*Faust*, II., Aufz. v., 539, 540.)

This highest spiritual liberty is rightly represented as something which is not only not part of man's original endowment, but which, in its very nature, could not be so.

In the words of Hegel, *Philosophie des Geistes* (*Encycl.* § 382):—"In seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist der Geist aber nur an sich, dem Begriffe oder der Möglichkeit nach, noch nicht der Wirklichkeit nach frei: die wirkliche Freiheit ist also nicht etwas unmittelbar im Geiste Seyendes, sondern etwas durch seine Thätigkeit Hervorzubringendes."²

This spiritual liberty has two elements, which are closely connected together—moral liberty and intellectual, ethical and noëtic, active and contemplative. Each of these has two moments—*amor* and *libero arbitrio*, *amor* being, in scholastic language, the matter; *libero arbitrio*, giving the form.

In *Conv.* III. 3, Dante writes as follows:—

È da sapere che ciascuna cosa ha 'l suo speziale amore, come le corpora semplici hanno amore naturato in sè al loro loco proprio, e però la terra sempre discende al centro; il fuoco alla circonferenza di sopra lungo 'l cielo della luna, e però sempre sale a quello.³

¹ "He only earns liberty, as he only earns life, who has to win it by daily conflict."

² "In its immediacy spirit is only in itself (or virtually, potentially) according to the notion or possibility, free, not according to reality: real freedom is thus not something immediately *being* (*Seyendes*) in the spirit, but something to be produced through its activity."

³ "We must know that each thing has its special love, as simple bodies have implanted in them by nature a love to their own proper place, and therefore earth always descends towards the centre; fire has love implanted by nature towards the upper circumference next to the heaven of the moon, and therefore it always rises towards that heaven."

After indicating the loves of compound bodies, of plants, and of brutes, he says men have the love proper to them, love to perfect and honourable things, and adds : " because man (although his whole 'form' is one single substance, sc. the soul) through his nobility has in himself something of the nature of each of these things (viz. of inorganic bodies, and of plants and animals), he can have, and has, all these loves."

Amor in Dante has a far wider meaning than in ordinary language. It includes not only on the one hand God's love, and on the other human affection in its higher and lower forms, but also every tendency in nature, in the animal and vegetable worlds and in the inorganic world. The order of the whole universe is an inbreathing, and a partaking, of the divine love—"l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle"¹ (*Par.* xxxiii. 145)—and this *amor* it is which in fire causes its ascent and in earth causes its gravitation and cohesion, or rather which *is* the force of ascent, which *is* the force of gravitation, or of cohesion.

Le cose tutte e quante
Hann' ordine tra loro ; e questo è forma
Che l' universo a Dio fa simigliante—

Nell' ordine ch'io dico sono accline
Tutte nature, per diverse sorti,
Più al principio loro e men vicine ;
Onde si movono a diversi porti
Per lo gran mar dell'essere, e ciascuna
Con istinto a lei dato che la porti.

Questi ne porta il fuoco in ver la luna,
Questi nei cor mortali è permotore,
Questi la terra in sè stringe ed aduna.

¹ " The love which moves the sun and the other stars."

Nè pur le creature, che son fuore
 D'intelligenza quest' arco saetta,
 Ma quelle ch'hanno intelletto ed amore.¹
 (Par. i. 103-120.)

The 'love' which is spoken of in the last line is the *amor dell' animo* (Purg. xvii. 93), which is peculiar to spiritual beings, and not, like the *amor naturale* (ib.), common to all beings :—

Nè Creator nè creatura mai
 . . . fu senza amore. (Purg. xvii. 91, 92.)

I have spoken above of *amor* being the *matter* of the moral life in the passage just quoted ; the universal order expressing itself as instinct (a phase of *amor*) in all creation is spoken of as *form*. We shall find, as we trace out Dante's thought, that when that, which, for a lower stage, is form, has exercised its formative activity upon the matter submitted to it, and produced an *ἐντελέχεια* (formed matter), this *ἐντελέχεια* in its turn becomes the matter for a higher stage upon which higher form is to impress itself.² This seems almost like an anticipation of Herbert Spencer's definition of evolution : "The passage from a state of indefinite incoherent homogeneity to one of definite coherent heterogeneity through successive differentiations and integrations."

¹ "All things have order among themselves ; and this is form which makes the universe like to God. . . . In the order of which I speak, all natures, through their various lots, are inclined more or less nearly to their first principle ; whence they move to diverse ports through the Great Sea of Being, and each with *instinct* given it to bear it along. This bears fire

towards the moon ; this is mover (motive principle) in the hearts of perishable beings ; this binds and unites the earth in itself. Nor is it only the creatures who are devoid of intelligence that this bow strikes with its arrow, but those also which have intellect and love."

² See Note I. at end.

The *amor* of Dante has the full extension of the ὁρεξις (propension) of Aristotle and reaches beyond it, the latter being confined to ἐμψυχα (things having life), sc. animals and plants, while Dante's *amor* extends to the inanimate. In this Dante follows in the steps of St. Augustine: "Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive enim deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur" (*De Civ. Dei*, xi., quoted by Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*).

In this Dante also follows St. Bonaventura with his 'Amor pondus' (quoted by Signor Pasqualigo in his Comm. on Guido Cavalcanti's Canzone *Donna mi prega*) and Boëthius in *De Cons. Phil.*, Lib. II., Metr. viii.; while he anticipates, though on a far higher plane, the teaching of Schopenhauer in the above-mentioned work *passim*. There is, of course, this wide difference, that, while Schopenhauer's *Wille* is a blind unconscious *nisus*, Dante's *amor* is essentially conscious. The same teaching is also reproduced by Lotze in the concluding chapter of his *Microcosmos*, where the derivation of all the laws of nature from the divine love is put forward as the ideal aim of philosophy.

It was no fanciful connexion of the unconnected, nor was it a pedantic desire to express in a roundabout way the age of Beatrice when he first saw her, that led Dante to dwell upon the special position of the heavens on that day; rather it was eminently fitting that he should connect the first vision of "la gloriosa donna della [sua] mente" (*Vita Nuova*, ii.), of her in whom was revealed to him, and through whom there was kindled in him, love to God—that he should connect that vision with another great expression of the divine love, "l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle" (*Par.* xxxiii. 145).

Dante's teaching, then, is that there is one universal

force pervading the universe, material and spiritual, including God himself, namely God's *amor* :

'Nè Creator, nè creatura mai,'

Cominciò ei, 'figliuol, fu senza amore

O natural, o d'animo; e tu il sai.'

(*Purg.* xvii. 91-93.)

But at the two extremities of the scale of Being, God, Who is *actus purus* (pure actuality), and all sub-human animate nature and all inanimate nature which, in relation to all above it, may be regarded as *pura potentia* (pure potentiality), *amor* is '*a riva*,' has no further goal to attain to; and this is true of all nature below man considered in itself.

But in man *amor* is '*in via*'; it has a development before it, a goal to attain to. In man "*amor naturale*" is the *materia* to which his "*libero arbitrio*" is to impart *forma*, the "*cera*" (wax) on which "*libero arbitrio*" is to impress the "*suggello*" (seal), and thus raise it to the condition of "*amor d'animo*," in which alone it can have any moral character.

'*L'amor naturale*' is good, not in the sense of moral goodness, but in the sense in which all the creatures are spoken of in Genesis as "good":

L'animo è creato ad amor presto¹ (*Purg.* xviii. 19);

L'animo non va con altro piede² (*Purg.* xviii. 44).

Love is the motive power in the mind—

Lo natural è sempre senza errore³ (*Purg.* xvii. 94).

. . . questa prima voglia

Merto di lode o di biasmo non cape;⁴

(*Purg.* xviii. 59, 60)

it is quite unmoral.

¹ "The mind (or rational soul) is created prone to love."

² "The mind goes with no other foot."

³ "Natural love is always without error."

⁴ "This first will is not capable of desert of praise or blame."

L'amor naturale is the potentiality of *l'amor dell' animo*; and, by the exercise of the *libero arbitrio*, this potentiality is brought to actuality, form is given to this matter, and, according to the form, the *amor* is good or bad, the man becomes good or bad in the moral sense of these words. For the form of goodness to be impressed upon the *amor naturale* a twofold operation of the *libero arbitrio* is necessary, the choice of a fit object and the maintenance of a due measure, while moral evil arises from the choice either of an unfit object or of an undue measure:—

.... l' altro puote errar per malo obbietto,
 O per poco, o per troppo di vigore.
 Mentre ch'egli è ne' primi ben diretto,
 E ne' secondi sè stesso misura,
 Esser non può cagion di mal diletto;
 Ma quando al mal si torce, o con più cura
 O con men che non dee corre nel bene,
 Contra il Fattore adopra sua fattura.¹

(*Purg.* xvii. 94–102.)

The interpretation given of this passage differs from that of nearly all modern commentators and of some of the chief early ones (Benvenuto, Buti, Landino, Vellutello), these taking *ben* as a substantive and interpreting ll. 97, 98 as referring to the direction of love towards God and virtue or towards God (according as the reading *ne' primi ben* or *nel primo Ben* is accepted), and to the due measuring of affection in its exercise upon earthly things ("ne' secondi"); but, beside the fact that such a reading, with the interpre-

¹ "The other (sc. the love of the mind) can err through having a bad object, or through little or too much vigour; while in the first (in the matter of object) it is well directed, and in the second (in the matter of vigour) it measures itself (maintains itself in due measure), it cannot be cause of evil

enjoyment; but when it turns to the evil (i.e. when it directs itself to a bad object), or when it hastens to the good object with more or less zeal than it ought, against the Creator it employs His creation." (Cf. Malebranche: 'Faire servir à l'iniquité le juste Vengeur des crimes.')

tation which it entails, involves the asymmetry of taking the *in* (in *nei* or *nel*) in l. 97 as equivalent to the Latin "*in*" with the accusative, and the "*in*" in l. 98 as equivalent to the Latin "*in*" with the ablative, the interpretation in question is not so harmonious with ll. 101, 102; and further (with the reading *ne' primi*), it would hardly be worthy of Dante, in discussing how love may become morally good or morally bad, to represent as a condition of the former that it should be directed to virtue, i.e. to the morally good.¹

It is hardly necessary to point out how thoroughly in this passage Dante reproduces the doctrine of the *Nicomachean Ethics* concerning the two great elements of moral choice—the *τέλος*, the end or aim, and the measure to be observed in following it, virtue consisting in making τὸ καλόν (the good) the end—*ben diretto* (l. 97) and in observing a due measure, namely, τὸ μέσον (the mean), between ὑπερβολή (excess) and ἑλλειψις (defect), and so being a μεσότης (a habit of conforming to the mean)—*se stesso misura* (l. 98); while vice consists in having a bad aim, or not aiming at the good—*quando al mal si torce* (l. 100), *per malo obietto* (l. 95)—or by following what is in itself good with either excess or defect—*per poco, o per troppo di vigore* (l. 96), *o con più cura o con men che non dee corre nel bene* (ll. 100, 101).

The lines which follow:—

Quinci comprender puoi ch'esser conviene

Amor sementa in voi d'ogni virtute

E d'ogni operazion che merta pene²

(*Purg.* xvii. 103-105)—

may either express the truth that "l'amor naturale" is the

¹ See Note II. at end.

² "Hence thou mayest understand that love must be (or must have been)

the seed in you of every virtue and of every conduct which merits punishment."

potentiality of all good or bad "amor," or that good and bad "amori dell' animo" are the seeds respectively of good and bad actions; I think the former is the more probable meaning.

But Dante does not represent the matter to which the "libero arbitrio" has to give form as a perfectly passive subject; on the contrary, he seems to recognise an element of opposition in it to the impression of the form of good:—

Lo cielo i vostri movimenti inizia,
Non dico tutti: ma, posto ch' io il dica,
Lume v' è dato a bene ed a malizia,
E libero voler, che, se fatica
Nelle prime battaglie col cielo dura,
Poi vince tutto, se ben si nutrica.¹

(*Purg.* xvi. 73–78.)

This supposed influence of the heavens may be regarded as occupying in the thought of Dante a position similar to that of heredity in modern thought; indeed, if the expression (in *Par.* xxvii. 137) "la bella figlia Di quei ch' apporta mane e lascia sera,"² refers to human nature, and indicates an acceptance by Dante of the principle *homo generat hominem et sol*,³ the connexion is still closer.

Man, then, according to Dante, starts with an initial gift of "libero arbitrio" and an initial "amor naturale," which is partly passive to the action of the "libero arbitrio," and has partly an element of opposition to the latter derived from the influence of the heavens or, as we should say, from heredity.

The first stage in the development of man is that in

¹ "The heavens initiate your movements—I do not say all of them; but supposing I did say so, there is light given to you for good and evil and free will which, if it endures toil in the first conflicts with the heavens, then

is completely victorious, if it is well nourished (or: nourishes itself well)."

² "The fair daughter of him who brings day and leaves night."

³ "Man and the sun generate man."

which these are both present, but have not yet entered into conflict or into mutual action and reaction, the stage of *thesis*; the next stage, the beginning and carrying on of the formative work of the "libero arbitrio," and of its conflict with tendencies opposed to good, whether original and derived from the influence of the heavens or acquired through wrong exercise of the "libero arbitrio," is the stage of *antithesis*; the final stage, that of *synthesis*, is reached when the "libero arbitrio" has accomplished its formative work and fully gained its victory: *poi vince tutto*. We shall see presently how completely, in Dante's view, this final stage was a synthesis.

In *Purg.* xvi. 79-81 Dante describes how the nourishment, which is the condition of victory, is effected:—

A maggior forza ed a miglior natura
 Liberi soggiacete, e quella cria
 La mente in voi, che il ciel non ha in sua cura.¹

It is by free yielding to the grace of God—to that grace which is omnipotent on the side of those who freely yield to it—that the victory is won. And as it was by this gracious power that the rational soul of each man was originally created and infused, so by it is created in those who freely yield to it ("liberi soggiacete") that moral character ("la mente") which rises superior to all lower influences.

Dante finds the same process of thesis, antithesis, synthesis in both spheres of the spiritual life, the moral and intellectual, the active and the contemplative. These two spheres are, in Dante, very closely connected; his "speculazione" (contemplation) is far higher and deeper than Aristotle's *θεωρία* (contemplation), and has a far closer and deeper relation to the moral virtues than this

¹ "To greater power and to better nature freely are ye subject, and that creates in you the mind which the heavens have not in their charge."

has. With Aristotle the moral virtues were regarded as having their highest importance as means for the production of a *milieu* favourable to the exercise of *θεωρία*: Dante, looking upon these virtues as inspirations of divine grace and as rays of the divine love, regarded them as elements in the object of contemplation (*speculazione*), and also as producing in the subject of contemplation the condition of spirit requisite for that contemplation.

The first stage, as being antecedent to the exercise of choice, may be regarded, even as such, as a state of non-liberty and so as a state of bondage; but the bondage to which man is subject is not only of this negative character, but becomes positive, and is deepened by the wrong exercise of the "libero arbitrio," as, on the other hand, by the right exercise of the "libero arbitrio" the right tendency becomes strengthened: "di nuovo si lega":—

Vostra apprensiva da esser verace
 Tragge intenzione, e dentro a voi la spiega,
 Sì, che l' animo ad essa volger face.
 E se, rivolto, in ver di lei si piega,
 Quel piegare è amor, quello è natura,
 Che per piacer di nuovo in voi si lega.¹
(Purg. xviii. 22-27.)

To raise the "amor naturale" to the good "amor dell' animo" by imparting to it the form of the Good, and to gain the victory over every tendency which is opposed to the Good, is the due part of the "libero arbitrio" in this second stage.

But was the liberty which Dante was seeking only a continual and unimpeded communication of the form of the Good to the matter of the moral life, a continual

¹ "Your faculty of apprehension derives a concept from real being and unfolds it within you so that it makes the mind turn to it; and if, when it is

thus turned, it inclines towards it, this inclining is love, this is nature which through pleasure is bound afresh in you."

victory over opposed tendencies? No; he was seeking to approach to an ideal of liberty beyond this, and one which is in complete harmony with the peace of *θεωπία*. This ideal he expresses in *Purg.* xviii. 59-66, a passage which has been a stumbling-block to a considerable number of commentators on account of the—on a superficial view—apparent falsity of the teaching that every will should be brought to one of which Dante had just said that it had “no desert of praise or blame,” and which thence some (as Daniello and Biagioli) have interpreted, in defiance of the use of the language, by taking “questa” (l. 61) to refer to “la virtù che consiglia,” instead of to “questa prima voglia,” or (as Lubin), in defiance of grammar, by taking “raccoglie” as indicative. But we are not driven to any such non-natural interpretation of the passage in question; rather, taking it in its natural meaning, we can find in it a statement of the final cause of the gift of “libero arbitrio” and a characterisation of the highest ideal of moral liberty.

The passage runs thus:—

... là onde vegna lo intelletto
 Delle prime notizie, uomo non sape,
 Nè de' primi appetibili l'affetto,
 Che sono in voi, sì come studio in ape
 Di far lo mele; e questa prima voglia
 Merto di lode o di biasmo non cape.
 Or, perchè a questa ogni altra si raccoglie,
 Innata v' è la virtù che consiglia,
 E dell' assenso de' tener la soglia.
 Quest' è il principio, là onde si piglia
 Ration di meritare in voi, secondo
 Che buoni e rei amori accoglie e viglia.¹

Purg. xviii. 59-66.

¹ “We know not whence comes the intuition of the first principles of knowledge, nor the appetite for the first

objects of appetite, which are in you as the desire in a bee for making honey; and this first will is not capable of

As the first principles, the fundamental laws, of thought, so the inclination to the primal objects of appetite, are original in man, and, being purely instinctive, have no moral character. But there is also innate and original in man "la virtù che consiglia," not "the faculty which gives counsel," as usually interpreted, but "the faculty which deliberates," the βουλή of Aristotle (*E. N.* III. iii.). In the *Vetus Translatio* of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which, according to Dr. Moore, is that which was used by Dante, βουλή or βούλευσις and βουλευέσθαι are translated, respectively, by "consilium" and "consiliari." Dante evidently had this chapter of the *Ethics* in his mind in the passage before us; and we are justified in regarding "consiglia" as a reproduction of the "consiliatur" of the *Vetus Translatio*, the βουλεύεται of the *Ethics*.

Line 61 gives the final cause of this deliberative faculty, namely, that every other will should be brought to the instinctive will of which Dante had just spoken. This is what has constituted the difficulty of the passage to so many commentators; for it seems at first sight almost absurd that Dante should represent the final cause of the "libero arbitrio" to be the reduction of all acts of will to the condition of the unmoral will.

But it is not to this will *qua unmoral*, but to it *qua instinctive* that all other will is to be brought; and Dante's teaching is that the "libero arbitrio" has realised the purpose for which it was given, that the highest moral liberty has been attained, only when holy action has become as instinctive as the making of honey is with bees.¹

As Virgil says to Dante in his farewell address, when desert of praise or blame. Now, in order that to this first will every other may be brought, there is innate in you the faculty which deliberates, and which ought to hold the threshold of assent. This is the principle whence

is derived reason of desert in you, according as it accepts and rejects (literally, winnows) good and bad loves."

¹ See Note III. at end.

he has led him through all the circles of Hell, and up through all the cornices of Purgatory :—

.... ' Il temporal foco e l' eterno
Veduto hai, figlio, e sei venuto in parte
Dov' io per me più oltre non discerno.
Tratto t' ho qui con ingegno e con arte ;
Lo tuo piacere omai prendi per duce :
Fuor sei dell' erte vie, fuor sei dell' arte.

Non aspettar mio dir più, nè mio cenno,
Libero, dritto, sano è tuo arbitrio,
E fallo fora non fare a suo senno ;
Perch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio.¹

(*Purg.* xxvii. 127-132, 139-141.)

Here, as on so many other points, we find the greatest of poets at one with the greatest of philosophers; here we find anticipated Hegel's teaching that the highest liberty and the highest necessity are one; while both thinkers carry out to its full development the teaching of Aristotle as to the test of the formation of habits, viz., that when a habit is fully formed, the exercise of its corresponding activity is accompanied with pleasure. *Par. v.* 19-24 describes Man as free *an sich*; all passages which speak of his conflict and upward striving describe him as free *für sich*; the last cited passage describes him as become free *an-und-für sich*.

This end has been gradually reached by Dante: as he passes from one cornice to another in Purgatory, he feels lighter and more free; he feels the ascent more easy, through the successive erasure of each sinful habit.

¹ "The temporal fire and the eternal thou hast seen, my son; and thou hast come to a region where I by myself discern no further. I have drawn thee hither with wisdom and art; henceforth take thy pleasure for guide; thou hast left the steep ways, thou hast left the narrow. . . . Await no more my

utterance nor my signal; free, upright and healthy is thy will, and it would be wrong not to act according to its thought; wherefore I crown thee with the crown of empire* over thyself."

* The imperial mitred crown: cf. Pinturicchio's fresco in Siena cathedral.

In two senses liberty is innate: in that of the innateness of the "libero arbitrio"—"innata v' è la virtù che consiglia"—and in that of the innateness of the upward tendency, which tendency is only kept from acting by the downward-tending force of sin, original or actual. We see the counter-working of this upward tendency by original sin in the case of the virtuous heathen in Limbo, whom Dante speaks of as "sospesi" (*Inf.* ii. 52, iv. 45), i.e. held in equilibrium by the action of two equal and opposite forces, viz., the "gravity" of sin and the "levity" of this innate upward tendency.

The presence of this tendency and of the opposing hindrance is very clearly expressed in *Par.* i. 124-141:—

Ed ora lì, com' a sito decreto,
 Cen porta la virtù di quella corda,
 Che ciò che scocca drizza in segno lieto.
 Ver' è che, come forma non s'accorda
 Molte fiate alla intenzion dell' arte,
 Perch' a risponder la materia è sorda;
 Così da questo corso si diparte
 Talor la creatura, ch' ha potere
 Di piegar, così pinta, in altra parte,
 (E sì come veder si può cadere
 Foco di nube) se l' impeto primo
 L' atterra, torto da falso piacere.
 Non dei più ammirar, se bene estimo,
 Lo tuo salir, se non come d' un rivo
 Se d' alto monte scende giuso ad imo.
 Maraviglia sarebbe in te, se privo
 D' impedimento giù ti fossi assiso,
 Come a terra quiete in foco vivo.¹

¹ "And now hither, as to a destined site, the power of that bow-string bears us, which directs to joyful mark that which it shoots. True it is that, as the figure often does not accord to the intention of the art, because the material

is dull to respond; so the creature sometimes leaves this course, since it has power to turn, though thus urged forward, in another direction (just as we can see fire fall from a cloud) if the primal impulse, turned aside by false

These words are part of Beatrice's answer to Dante's unexpressed astonishment at their ascent to the sphere of the moon.

Dante's journey through Purgatory represents the sustained effort of the "libero arbitrio," God's best gift to him—

Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza
Fesse creando, e alla sua bontate
Più conformato¹ (Par. v. 19-21)—

aided by the Understanding, itself a gift of divine grace, to remove the hindrances, original and acquired, to the advance to perfect moral liberty, to strengthen the upward tendency, and to impart fully the form of moral liberty to the matter of "amor": "libero amor" characterises all in Paradise.

At the conclusion of the purgatorial journey this form has been fully imparted to the matter; the seal has left its perfect impression on the wax; purity of heart has been attained; but the full vision of God has yet to come: here we pass to the progress to perfect intellectual liberty, the perfect *θεωρία* in the Paradise.

We have seen how closely Dante associated the moral and the intellectual, as in *Purg.* xviii. 19 *et seq.* already quoted. And as in the case of the moral life perfect liberty is represented as attained in the return on a higher level to the instinctive character of the "amor naturale," so perfect intellectual liberty is represented as attained when the whole infinite circle of truth is apprehended with as direct

pleasure, casts it to the earth. If I judge aright, thou oughtest to wonder no more at thy rising upwards, than thou would'st at a river which from a lofty mountain descends to the vale below. It would be a wondrous thing in thee if, freed from impediment, thou hadst remained seated below, as would

be on earth rest in living flame." (Notice in these last words how Dante remembers that he is above the sphere of fire to which fire tends, and so he says "on earth.")

¹ "The greatest gift which God of His bounty gave in creating, and the most conformable to His goodness."

and intuitive a certainty as that with which we apprehend the "prime notizie," the "ver primo" (the fundamental laws of thought) or the elementary truths of mathematics :—

Lì si vedrà ciò che tenem per fede,
Non dimostrato, ma fia per sè noto,
A guisa del ver primo che l' uom crede.¹
(*Par.* ii. 43-45.)

. . . ciò che in sua fede era
Veggio ora chiaro, sì come tu vedi
Ogni contraddizione e falsa e vera.²
(*Par.* vi. 19-21.) .

O cara piota mia, che sì t' insusi
Che, come veggion le terrene menti
Non capere in triangolo due ottusi,
Così vedi le cose contingenti,
Anzi che sieno in sè, mirando il punto
A cui tutti li tempi son presenti.³ (*Par.* xvii. 13-18.)⁴

As moral liberty is won through the prolonged effort and conflict of the "libero arbitrio," but when perfectly won involves the cessation of conflict and effort in the instinctive practice of holiness, so intellectual liberty is won through the slow and often painful effort of the "ragione," the *Verstand*, the Understanding, the faculty of discourse, which can only "know in part" and not grasp the whole; but when perfectly won it consists in the direct, immediate, and all-embracing apprehension of absolute and universal truth by the "intelletto," the

¹ "Here will be seen that which we hold by faith, not demonstrated, but it will be known of itself, in the manner of the primal truths which we believe."

² "That which was in his faith I now see clearly, just as thou seest every contradiction to be false and true." (Nothing can be A and not-A: the Principle of Contradiction.)

"O dear sod from which I sprang, who art so exalted that as minds on

earth see that two obtuse angles are not capable of co-existing in a triangle, so thou seest contingent things before they come into existence in themselves, looking upon the Point to which all times are present" (God in His eternity—the *Punctum Stans* of *Par.* xxviii. 16-22, quoted below).

⁴ Cf. Kant's desideratum "ein anschauender Verstand."

Vernunft, the Reason. The "intelletto" attains this its "ben" (cf. *Inf.* iii. 18), the Good for which it was created and in which alone it finds liberty and peace, in the vision of God, "il ben dell' intelletto"—

. mirando il punto
A cui tutti li tempi son presenti—

in the vision of that point of light which is described in *Par.* xxviii. 16-22 :—

Un punto vidi che raggiava lume
Acuto sì, che il viso ch' egli affoca
Chiuder conviensi per lo forte acume :
E quale stella par quinci più poca,
Parrebbe luna locata con esso,
Come stella con stella si colloca.¹

But Dante does not rest content with the general truth, which he held in common with so many of the Fathers and Schoolmen, that the intellect finds its full satisfaction in the vision of God ; he further gives us pregnant hints as to why it must be so ; and in the passages in which he does so, he anticipates in much the teaching of Hegel, and that of Kant as interpreted in the light of Hegel. Dante regarded space and time as forms of thought, not of mere subjective thinking (as some have interpreted Kant as teaching), but of Absolute Thought. With reference to space, *Par.* xxvii. 109-111 teaches of the *primum mobile*, which contains within it all the other heavens, and so all the space of the universe, that its place is the mind of God :—

E questo cielo non ha altro dove
Che la mente divina, in che s' accende
L' amor chil volge e la virtù ch' ei piove.²

¹ "I saw a point which radiated light so piercing, that the eye which it shines upon must close through the powerful brilliance, and whatever star appears smallest here would appear a moon if placed with it as star is placed

side by side with star."

² "And this heaven has no other *where* than the divine mind in which is kindled the love which causes it to revolve and the virtue which it pours down."

With respect to time, *ibid.*, 115-120, teaches:—

Non è suo moto per altro distinto ;
 Ma gli altri son misurati da questo,
 Si come dieci da mezzo e da quinto.
 E come il tempo tenga in cotal testo
 Le sue radici e negli altri le fronde,
 Omai a te puot' esser manifesto.¹

With respect to both time and space *Par.* xxix. 8-12 is very clear:—

Si tacque Beatrice, riguardando
 Fisso nel punto che m'aveva vinto :
 Poi cominciò : " Io dico, non domando
 Quel che tu vuoi udir, perch' io l' ho visto
 Dove s'appunta ogni *ubi* ed ogni *quando*."²

And as Dante found space and time, the universal forms, to be elements of the Divine Mind, so in that Mind, in that Eternal Thought, he finds, not only the efficient cause, but also the Absolute Substance of all the Universe spiritual and material:—

Non per avere a sè di bene acquisto,
 Ch'esser non può, ma perchè suo splendore
 Potesse risplendendo dir : *Subsisto*.³

(*Par.* xxix. 13-15.)

¹ "Its motion is not distinguished by any other, but the others are measured by this as ten by its half and its fifth. And henceforth it can be manifest to you how time has its roots in such a vase (the *Primum mobile*) and in the other heavens its leaves."

² "Beatrice was silent, gazing fixedly upon the point which had overpowered me: then she began: 'I speak, I do not ask what thou wishest to hear,

because I have seen it there where every *where* and every *when* meet in a point.'"

³ "Not to have good acquired to itself, which is impossible, but in order that its splendour shining afresh might say: 'I subsist'" (i.e. in order that God might make Himself the substance or ground of a Universe—the *Ausser-sichwerden*, or *Ausser-sichkommen*, of the *Idee*).

O abbondante grazia, ond' io presunsi
 Ficar lo viso per la luce eterna
 Tanto, che la veduta vi consunsi !
 Nel suo profondo vidi che s' interna,
 Legato con amore in un volume,
 Ciò che per l'universo si squaderna ;
 Sustanzia ed accidente e lor costume,
 Quasi conflati insieme per tal modo,
 Che ciò ch' io dico è un semplice lume.
 La forma universal di questo nodo
 Credo ch' io vidi, perchè più di largo,
 Dicendo questo, mi sento ch' io godo.¹

(*Par.* xxxiii. 83-93.)

Anyone at all acquainted with Hegel's writings will at once see the harmony of these passages with his philosophy.²

The same truth, that the substance and ground of the whole universe, material and spiritual, is in the divine mind, is beautifully expressed in *Par.* xiii. 52 *et seq.*

"Ciò che non more, e ciò che può morire
 Non è se non splendor di quella idea
 Che partorisce, amando, il nostro Sire ;
 Chè quella viva luce che sì mea
 Dal suo lucente, che non si disuna
 Da lui, nè dall' amor che a lor s' intrea,
 Per sua bontate il suo raggiare aduna,
 Quasi specchiato, in nove sussistenze,
 Eternalmente rimanendosi una."³

¹ "O abundant grace, through which I presumed so to fix my eyes on the eternal light that I there consumed my vision! In its depth I saw, bound with love in one volume, the inwardness of that which is spread throughout the universe; substance and accident and their laws, as it were breathed together in such a manner that that which I relate is an unmixed light. I believe that I saw the universal form

of this knot, because, saying this, I feel an ampler joy."

² See Note IV. at end.

³ "That which dies not and that which can die is naught but the shining forth* of that idea which our Lord produces in loving; since that living

* This expression recalls the words of Plato: "The Beautiful is the Splendour of the True."

In all knowing and thinking in this world there is an unresolved residuum, a datum, something which thought does not receive from itself, something answering to the *Ding an sich* of Kant, something which has indeed to be subjected to the forms of intuition and to the categories of the understanding ere it can become an object, but which yet is given to the thinker from beyond his thought even in the widest sense in which this may be taken, as including sensible intuition; and so there is something which is, as it were, imposed upon thought, and which thus does not leave it perfectly free. But the knowledge of the blessed in Paradise Dante represents as constituted by a perfect partaking of the divine Thought, and so as springing up from within, and as thus being knowledge in which thought is perfectly free.

Authority is needed in the moral life as a step towards moral liberty; and in the intellectual life as a step towards intellectual liberty; but as in moral life liberty is fully attained to only when submission to command from without is transfigured into moral impulse, so intellectual liberty is fully attained to only when nought is any longer accepted merely on authority (of any kind), when eternal truth is apprehended directly and intuitively.

The progress in moral liberty was the advancing impartation of form to the matter—"amor naturale"; the progress in intellectual liberty is the advancing impartation of the form of *intelletto* (Reason) to the matter of apprehension, first through the exercise of *ragione* (Understanding), symbolised by Virgil, and then through the teaching of the Divine Wisdom, symbolised by Beatrice; now the form is envisaged as that which is the ground of

light which so proceeds from its radiant source that it does not separate itself from it, nor from the love which makes a third to them, through its goodness

unites, as though reflected, its radiance in nine subsistences, itself eternally remaining one."

the matter in both cases, and in both the same, the eternal Light, Life, Love :—

Luce intellettuale piena d' amore,
 Amor di vero ben pien di letizia,
 Letizia che trascende ogni dolzore.¹

(*Par. xxx. 40-42.*)

All knowledge here below is “in part”—*nunc cognosco ex parte*—not merely that there is much which to even the most learned and the deepest thinkers is unknown, but that none know all the relations of that which is known; whence it is only known “in part” and not fully, not in the deepest sense, or really, known. Thus there is not full intellectual liberty: thought is still in bondage to the unknown; but in the beatific vision, in the vision of the Eternal Thought which is, to use Dr. Hutchinson Stirling’s beautiful expression, “the diamond net which holds the universe,” thought will have come full circle. In one sublime intuition all the relations of everything in the universe—“*Sustanzia ed accidente e lor costume*”—will be envisaged, being looked at from the Centre, from the point of perfect union with Him “Whose centre is everywhere, and Whose circumference is nowhere.”

Then knowledge will be no longer “*ex parte*,” but complete and absolute: “*tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.*”

So we find Dante’s long and toilsome quest of liberty ending in the vision of God: “*tunc autem facie ad faciem.*”

And, as he gazes, his power of vision becomes strengthened; no longer blinded by that piercing light, he sees that the root-Thought from which springs, and

¹ “Light intellectual full of love, which transcendeth every sweetness.”
 love of true Good, full of joy, joy

which contains, the whole universe is a threefold circle and is one with the Thought which thinks in him :—

... per la vista che s'avvalorava
 In me, guardando, una sola parvenza,
 Mutandom' io, a me si travagliava :
 Nella profonda e chiara sussistenza
 Dell' alto Lume parvemi tre giri
 Di tre colori e d' una continenza ;
 E l' un dall' altro, come Iri da Iri,
 Pareva riflesso, e il terzo pareva foco
 Che quinci e quindi egualmente si spiri.

O luce eterna, che sola in te sidi,
 Sola t' intendi, e, da te intelletta
 Ed intendente, te ami ed arridi !
 Quella circolazion, che sì concetta
 Pareva in te come lume riflesso,
 Dagli occhi miei alquanto circonspecta,
 Dentro da sè del suo colore stesso
 Mi parve pinta della nostra effige.¹

(*Par.* xxxiii. 112-131.)

Here Dante looks on the mystery of the Incarnation, not as merely an event taking place in time, but as having its eternal archetype, Idea, in God, as being the revelation of the oneness of the Thought which thinks in us with the eternal Thought.

¹ "Through my eyes which gained strength as I looked, a single appearance wrought itself upon me. In the profound and bright Essence of the lofty light there appeared to me three circles [*parvemi* in the singular in allusion to the oneness of the Substance] of three colours and of one content ; and One from the Other, as rainbow from rainbow, appeared reflected, and the third appeared fire which from this and from that is equally breathed. . . . O Light eternal Who dwellest in Thyself alone, alone

knowest Thyself, and, by Thyself known and knowing, lovest Thyself and smilest on Thyself.* That circle, which so begotten appeared in Thee, as reflected light,† contemplated somewhat by my eyes, appeared to me within itself painted in its own colour with our image.'

* The Father, the eternal *Δεσυν* or Thinker, knowing Himself in [the eternal] *Δογός* for Thought, by Whom He is known ; and the Thought of their oneness, the Spirit of love proceeding from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the Father (cf. ll. 118, 119).

† *Θῶς ἐν Θῶτός.*

But this vision is no mere cold contemplation of an abstract truth. Rather, as the intuition of the absolute concrete whole of Thought, it is filled and quickened with the divine Love; in it Thought, Will, Affection are one:—

Ma già volgeva il mio disiro e il *velle*
 Si come rota ch' egualmente è mossa,
 L'Amor che move il sole e l' altre stelle.¹

(*Par.* xxxiii. 143-145.)

Here Dante had at last attained in vision to perfect liberty: perfect liberty of the intellect in the vision of the Absolute Truth, in the partaking of the Eternal Thought; perfect liberty of the affections—*libero amore*—in the full partaking of the Eternal Love; perfect liberty of the will in the movement of that will by the Eternal Love.

Thus was ended that quest of liberty on which, forgotten and neglected as it had been for those ten dark years after the death of Beatrice, Dante had entered when he came to himself in the 'selva selvaggia,' but of which he did not then have his first thought. The thought of it first came to him at the moment when he said: "*Incipit Vita Nova.*" Then, in the first vision of his beloved, that liberty became his in germ, which was to be explicitly attained to only through the long and toilsome journey through the Inferno and the Purgatorio, through the contemplation of sin "*sub specie aeterni*," and the painful though joyful² process of purification, and the ascent through the heavenly spheres; and was at last to attain its fulness in the vision of that sacred Trinity whose mystic number was the root of the number which represented

¹ "But already there was turning [causing to move in the circle of perfection] my affection and my will, as a wheel which is moved with regular motion, the Love which moves the sun and other stars."

² *Dolce assensio* (sweet wormwood) —*Io dico pena, e douria dir sollazzo* (I say punishment; I ought to say consolation (or happiness)).

(*Purg.* xxiii. 86, 72.)

the age of his beloved when he first saw and loved her, and which accompanied her through life,¹ her through whom God had given him the first inspiration of love for holiness and his love for whom he fully realised to be "from God" (1 S. John iv. 7). Thus did his love, first kindled long ago in the fair city in his early boyhood, blossom into eternal fulness in union with his beloved in the vision of God.

Thus, too, was fulfilled to him that wish with which he closed his *Vita Nuova*: "E poi piaccia a colui ch'è sire della cortesia, che la mia anima se ne possa gire a vedere la gloria della sua donna, cioè di quella benedetta Beatrice che gloriosamente mira nella faccia di Colui, *Qui est per omnia saecula benedictus*."²

"Eine solche Liebe," says Witte, "brauche nicht erst eine Allegorie der Frommigkeit zu nennen, sie ist selbst das Anschauen Gottes auf Erden."³

¹ "Questa donna fu accompagnata dal numero del nove, a dare ad intendere che ella era un nove, cioè un miracolo la cui radice è solamente la mirabile Trinitade." This lady was accompanied by the number nine, to cause it to be understood that she was a nine, that is a miracle whose root is nought but the wondrous Trinity.—*Vita Nuova*, XXX.

² "And then may it please Him,

Who is the Lord of courtesy (or bounty), that my soul may depart to see the glory of its lady, that is of that blessed Beatrice who gloriously gazes upon the face of Him, *Qui est per omnia saecula benedictus*!"

³ "Such a love should not be regarded as merely an allegory of piety; it is itself the intuition of God upon earth."

H. S. VERSCHOYLE.

NOTE I. TO PAGE 190.

Since concluding this paper I have read the late Professor Green's essay on the Philosophy of Aristotle, contained in vol. iii. of his collected works, and am glad to be able to cite the following words (p. 75):—

"The terms *δύναμις* [potentiality] and *ἐνέργεια* [actuality], as used by Aristotle, are only to be understood in the strictest relativity to each other. The *δύναμις* is to the *ἐνέργεια*, for instance, as the shapen block to the finished statue. The

shapen block, in turn, would itself be an 'actuality' relatively to the unshapen, which again would be one relatively to its constituent elements. The 'potentiality,' as such, is indeterminate. The sculptor's block is relatively to the statue indeterminate, for it may be fashioned to the likeness of this man or that. As compared with the rock, on the other hand, from which it was hewn, it is itself determinate. This conception of 'potentiality' Aristotle distinctly identifies with that of matter, which thus becomes relative in the same sense."

NOTE II. TO PAGE 194.

Since writing this essay I have looked at Cary's and Dr. Butler's translations, and carefully read the notes to the latter; and I am much gratified to find that the view taken in the text is that taken by so distinguished a scholar and critic as Dr. Butler, and also that it is that of Cary's translation. Dr. Butler accepts the reading of the second Aldine edition, "*nel primo*," in l. 97, and "*ne' secondi*," in l. 98, and explains the plural in the latter case as arising from the "*poco*" and "*tropo*."

The readings of those early editions and commentaries which I have are as follows:—

Foligno (1472), Mantova (1472), Jesi (1472), Napoli (1475), 1st Aldine (1502), 1st Crusca (1595), Landino (text of 1596 edition), all read "*primi*" and "*secondi*"; Benvenuto (1379), Vellutello (1544), Daniello (1568), Lione (1575), read "*primo*" and "*secondi*," a reading cited by Dr. Butler from the 2nd Aldine (1519); Buti (1385-1406) and Landino in his commentary (1481) read "*primo*" and "*secondo*" ("*segondo*" in Buti).

I incline to think that a misunderstanding of the meaning of the passage, combined with the true idea that there is only one *primo Ben*, led to an alteration of the reading.

Among the early commentators, Lana, Ottimo, Pietro Allighieri, Anonimo, and Daniello give comments which, though their meaning is not clear, and though they admit of the other interpretation, yet seem to indicate that in the text. I should take *ne' primi* as meaning *ne' primi casi*, sc. actions, so far as their object is concerned, and *ne' secondi* as the same energies of 'amor' so far as their degree of vigour is concerned.

NOTE III. TO PAGE 199.

In view of Dante's close sympathy with S. Thomas, the following teachings of the *Sum. Theol.* (1a LXXXIII. 4c & LXXIX. 8c) may afford support to the above interpretation: *voluntas* is to *liberum arbitrium* as *intellectus* to *ratio*, and *ratio* leads from *intellecta* to *intellecta*; whence the conclusion seems near that *liberum arbitrium* leads from *voluntas* to *voluntas*.

NOTE IV. TO PAGE 206.

Cf. specially his characterisation of the content of logic as "die Darstellung Gottes, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur undeines endlichen Geistes ist" (the presentation of God as He is in His eternal Essence before the creation of Nature and of a finite spirit).—*Logik* i., p. 36 (ed. 1833).

H. S. V.

GOD AND THE SPIRIT OF MAN :
A TRANSCENDENTAL CASE FOR THEISM.

WITH the recognition of "Spirit" as an integral part of man's nature we are brought face to face with certain problems which it is impossible for any reasonable being to pass by without attempting to answer. These problems, too, are so inextricably connected with the whole question as to the reality and nature of noumenal existence that it is not going too far to say that the whole of our thoughts and beliefs as to everything which lies beyond phenomena must be deeply affected by the answers we give to them. On their solution depend our beliefs as to Metaphysical, Ethical, Theological Reality.

We have seen¹ that by Spirit we mean that underlying element in man's nature in which the discords between the conclusions of "Pure Reason" and "Practical Reason" find their harmony and reconciliation. What is the nature of the knowledge we possess as to this element? Does this knowledge help us to any further development and definition of its true nature?

To the first of these questions there seems to be but one possible answer. We are compelled to identify this "Spirit" with the Ego; and I think it can be shown that our knowledge of the Ego differs in kind from our

¹ "The Spirit of Man," *Hermathena*, 1903, pp. 309-321.

knowledge of its sensations, states, or conditions, whether these be regarded as subjective or objective.

According to Kant, we know the Ego as phenomenon only. In other words, the Subject in every act of cognition appears, as the Object appears, simply as a part of the cognition, conditioned, phenomenal. From this there follows naturally the conclusion which other thinkers have drawn from the same premisses—that what each of us calls his “self” is simply a series of states, comprising the subjective side of all that he has perceived, known, felt, and done. One has to say “he” to make the statement intelligible; but, with those who hold this doctrine, the “he” is simply a word expressing the unity of the successive states in time, the consecutiveness of these successive states as parts of one “experience.” Thus the Ego appears as a string of pearls—without the string,—or a chain of jewels—without the setting. If this be a true account of our knowledge of the Ego, it is hard to understand how men came to have any belief at all in the unity of a Self as to which each man’s experience gives him no knowledge save that of its perpetual diversity.

We need not allow this phantom of reasoning to trouble us. It is perfectly true that, in each act of cognition, the Ego is known as phenomenon; but it by no means follows that we have no knowledge of it as something higher. Our whole experience does not consist of cognition; and, even if it did, it does not necessarily follow that a series of cognitions brings us no more knowledge than a single cognition. A single momentary cognition would not, so far as I can see, give us anything more than a confused perception of the Subject and Object, undifferentiated, in the Unity of Apperception. It could give us no idea of Space or Time, or of intelligible Unity as distinguished from diversity. These concepts come to us as the universal elements underlying all perception and cognition. Is there any reason

why we should refuse to admit, under a similar category, the knowledge of a Subject? It, too, is present in all our cognitions; and the belief in its unity shapes itself out of the whole series, just because this is the only way in which we can account for a unity of which we are certainly conscious. Just as certainly as the perception of mathematical truths compels us to believe in the Space and Time to which these truths belong, and obliges us to carry our judgments as to these facts beyond our experience, because we cannot imagine ourselves as conscious of any phenomena without imagining at the same time the universal laws of our experience as shaping these phenomena, so certainly we cannot imagine either phenomena or laws of cognition without at the same time imagining the Ego as perceiving, cognising, these phenomena under these laws. Even, then, on the purely intellectual side of our nature, our knowledge of the Ego differs from our knowledge of its perceptions and cognitions, because it is the one thing that we find in all cognition. The laws of our being oblige us to treat it as a reality and a unity; in fact, unless we were irresistibly compelled to treat Self as *one* and *real*, we should have no idea of unity or reality at all.

But we may go further. The Ego appears in our knowledge as something more than a series of subject-sides in a chain of cognitions, as something beyond even a single and real "Subject" in intellectual states. In human consciousness at least—perhaps in the consciousness of all reasonable beings—the Ego appears not only as personal (i.e., as conscious and self-conscious in a consciousness realised as single), but in a higher form. To a reasonable being, the sense of pleasure and pain, the whole field of emotion, the whole of volition, is inseparable from the sense of the Ego. It has been perfectly truly said that neither emotion nor the dicta of "moral law" give us "knowledge," so far as knowledge can be identified with cognition;

but they bring with them the sense of the Ego. The emotions that come in the series of my experiences cannot be realised except as *my* emotions: the volitions must be *my* volitions. Apart from the Ego, we not only cannot believe anything to be real, but we cannot form an idea as to what reality means. Thus we have a knowledge of the Ego, not only in cognition, but also in every part of our experience; and we may say that our knowledge of the Ego differs in kind from our knowledge of everything else, including all states of the Ego itself, because we necessarily recognise it as present in every part—cognition, emotion, or volition—of any experience that is possible for us. "*Cogito, ergo sum*," expresses only a part of the truth: *all* experience brings the belief in the Ego as a necessary inference. "*Cogito, ergo sum*," expresses the logical order in which the inference comes to us: but no human being can escape from turning the sequence in the opposite direction. The first step in all practical Ontology must take the form, "I think, feel, love, hate, know, remember, will, because I exist." There may be really existent things that do not think, feel, or will; but thought, feeling, will, are consequences of my existence. Thus the reality of the Ego is the primary postulate of all rational Ontology. Even in denying this postulate an Ego distinct from its own states must be assumed—else what is it that denies? Therefore the recognition of the Ego as an entity continuing through all my consciousness is the only basis on which I can think, feel, or act without "permanent intellectual confusion." To put it in another form—"Ego cogito," "Ego amo," "Ego volo," &c., all imply "Ego sum" as their basis; and "Ego sum" means exactly the same as "*Ego sum ego*." This is not a building of Ontology on Logic—a digging out of thoughts from words: it is the assumption that necessarily underlies all conscious existence.

I must then begin all forms of my consciousness with

the assumption of the existence of my Ego. But the laws of my experience go further than that. (a) Experience forces me to believe in the continuity of my Ego. This is, intellectually, the primary postulate of memory; but it is also, from the point of view of emotion, assumed as the foundation of my sense of personal "rights," and, ethically, as the foundation of responsibility. Moreover, I cannot escape from the belief that the Ego that knows, the Ego that feels, the Ego that acts, are all the same Ego. Even in the abnormal phenomena of "double consciousness," the patient does not separate his being into personalities functionally distinguished as intellectual, volitional, &c., but rather into different or apparently different personalities, each of which more or less performs the full functions of a person. Just as acts of cognition are conjoined and interdependent, so that we cannot help referring them to an intellectual unity as their cause, so, too, cognition, feeling, volition, &c., are so conjoined and interdependent as to make experience unintelligible, unless we refer them also to a unity that is a common basis for feeling and volition as well as for cognition. I have already given a definition of what I mean by "Spirit." Another may now be added: "Spirit is the one permanent element in all the phenomena of an individual experience." (β) Again, no human being has ever been able to escape from a belief in the existence of other consciousnesses, personalities, continuous experiences, besides his own. The distinction between "me" and "mine" seems, as I have said, to be forced on me by my very nature; and this distinction would be sufficient in itself to make my belief in my own personality clear. But all experience of which any of us has any knowledge distinguishes also between "me" and "thee." Without going into the whole question as to the reasonable grounds of this belief, two chief causes of it may be briefly stated. It results in part from the fact that

there are elements in the individual experience which cannot be explained, except as the results of the action of causes resembling the cause I necessarily assume as the basis of the self-contributed parts of my experience—a continuous Ego, Spirit, or Personality. Under the same head we may class the evidence for the action of the same subjective laws that govern my experience in what cannot but be regarded as experiences outside my own. But there is also a second ground for this belief. (γ) I cannot help dividing my experience into a subjective and objective side; and, since the latter does not submit itself to my will, or depend on any specific cognition, but, on the contrary, maintains a permanent character, in constant contrast to my “Ego,” I am obliged to differentiate it as in some way my “Non-ego.” Now, I cannot help perceiving that this “Non-ego” has a character not depending on my Ego; and, just as I perceive in my experience what I am compelled to regard as the results of other subjective lines of consciousness, so, too, I find facts that I cannot help believing to be the results of the action of an objective element in these chains of consciousness. Thus I am obliged to believe in other experiences, and to believe that these—like my own—have a subjective and an objective side. And I am obliged to go a step further. Certain parts of my experience compel me to believe that the objective sides of my experience and that of others are, at least to a great extent, identical; and I am obliged to posit as a condition of my present conscious existence, not merely something that is not my Ego, but something that is, for myself and the “others” in whose existence I have been already compelled to believe, a Non-ego—the Non-ego.

Starting from these premisses, we pass naturally to the question of Theism. Analysing the common form of this question, “Is there a God?” we find that it resolves itself

into this form : "Is there or is there not evidence that the experiences of myself and others are results of the action of an Ego, a Person, a transcendental Experience?" There are other forms of the question, and there are many other lines of evidence ; but my object in this paper is to confine myself to this one point—Does my experience give me ground for believing that it is acted on by a cause resembling in any way my own Ego, not as I am acted on by and react on other limited Egos, but in an absolutely different manner ?

I will concede one point at starting. If I could believe myself to be the only "Spirit," my own experience to be the only experience, I might feel justified in assuming a line of philosophic *αὐτάρκεια*, and treating my whole Ego and Non-ego as the results of personal laws contained within myself. But if I am obliged to believe in other personalities like my own, and in a Non-ego that is in some way common to them and me, the state of the case is altogether different. As I am obliged to accept this belief, I cannot ignore the resemblance between my own personality and "others," or the common elements in the Non-ego that enters into all experience. So the question, in part, assumes this shape—Is there anything in the nature of the Non-ego from which we may reasonably infer that it is the objective side of an Experience transcending my experience and that of what I may now call my fellow-men ? Again (since all limited personalities must reasonably be regarded as belonging to the Non-ego of this great Ego), we may put the question in this form—Are there any characters belonging to both the Ego and the Non-ego, from which we are justified in inferring that both come from a common source possessing these characters ? In popular rather than scientific language, the same question assumes this shape—Is there evidence of the existence of mental laws in the physical world ?

To this question I can give but one answer. To me, experience is absolutely unintelligible, unless there be a common ground from which the Ego and Non-ego spring. All experience begins in undifferentiated unity. All things perceived come, first, each as an undistinguished whole in the "Unity of Apperception." The separation between "Subject" and "Object" is the second stage, not the first. Experience necessarily divides itself into two series of experienced facts—the spiritual or mental, and what we call the physical. And though (as we have seen) one is obliged to believe in an Ego, a Person, as the basis of the whole subjective side of one's experience, and to carry this belief on to the recognition of Egos other than oneself, it is also true that no explanation which leaves one's own Ego or any other Ego in an isolated and independent condition will in any way satisfy the complicated facts of experience itself. In my article on "The Spirit of Man," I suggested that all limited spirits were developed from a more or less undifferentiated spirit-world: my present object is to show that there is distinct evidence for such a common basis of all Spirits or Egos. So, too, I believe it is possible to show that the Non-ego has a distinct common basis, and—which is really the critical point—that the Non-ego has a mental or spiritual character that can be understood only by supposing that its basis is *at least* spiritual.

To make this clear, let us look at certain points connected with the nature of Space and Time. There is no use in traversing again the ground covered by Kant as to these elements in our knowledge: we may assume that the power of making "synthetic *a priori* universal judgments" in matters mathematical is good evidence that Space and Time are "forms" of consciousness—that, in other words, they are distinctly connected with its Ego or spiritual side. We may also take for granted—as we necessarily do in thought—that Space has a stronger relation to the objective,

and Time to the subjective, side of experience. But there are certain further developments of this doctrine that, so far as I know, have never received full consideration.

(1.) Space and Time are forms belonging to something more than *my* Ego. As a matter of fact, one of the strongest reasons for belief in other Egos is this, that we cannot help believing Space and Time to be common to our own and other lines of "experience." Now, it is worth noting that, whatever may be the true relations of phenomena on their objective side to one another and to the subject, our concept of an external world is rendered possible only by the existence of what we call "dimensions" in Space; and that there is a real science of geometry dealing with this space-world in the three dimensions that we can grasp and understand. Side by side with this fact we may place another. Geometry is not a mere derivative from our knowledge of Space. It extends far beyond even the *possible* bounds of that knowledge. Its conclusions can be carried on so as to apply to Space—whether it be real or imaginary—of more than three dimensions. In such matters, again, as the formula of a curve, we find, say, a point entirely outside that curve which satisfies the whole of the formula. This distinctly suggests that at such a point we come into contact, as it were, with an extension of the curve in a dimension outside our powers of perception. From such considerations we find at least the possibility of Space being more than a "form" of *our* perception, and conclude that, not Space itself, but our perceptive power, is limited to three dimensions. When we look at the matter more carefully, we see that this may well be the case. The chief perceptive sense is sight; but we can see only two dimensions. We infer a third: how far we could do so if we had no sense but sight is a very doubtful matter. If, then, our most important sense is limited to

the perception of two dimensions, there seems to be no reason why our whole perceptive powers may not be so limited as to "condition" our percept of Space. Yet again, we can trace out the laws of space-figures that we cannot represent in Space—of curves, for example, that have never been drawn by human hand or seen by human sight. Surd quantities—which are not only impossible to realise, but are contrary to the laws that bound our mathematics—enter into our calculations, and actually yield results.

We cannot escape from the force of these facts by calling such geometrical extensions "ideal" or "imaginary"—a word which seems to mean unimaginable. It is true that we can extend our theories as to the purely object-world, so as to produce the concepts of fairies, gryphons, wyverns, and such-like non-existent monsters. We might even assign them places and specific characters in an ideal Natural History. But, after all was done, one could produce nothing from such a world: one could not ride a wyvern, or milk a gryphon. But the so-called ideal or imaginary mathematic *is* productive: ω and ω^3 are both "imaginary"—yet mathematical law assures us of their existence; and when multiplied together, they do actually result in Unity. To put it as a formula: ($\omega \times \omega^3 = 1$) is as certainly true as ($2 \times 4 = 8$).

Thus we reach the conclusion that the laws of Space are mental laws; but that a portion only of them can be apprehended by *our* minds. If, then, we can know that certain facts as to Space are true, and that these facts are what we may call mental facts, while we cannot understand even the nature of their truth, is it not most reasonable to conclude that we are in touch with a mentality higher and fuller than our own, which can comprehend these facts? Again, since the nature of our limited Space-laws shows that they are not dependent on physical facts, but are the

“form” of our perception, is it not reasonable to believe that Space, with all its laws, is the result of the existence of such a Mentality, Person, Spirit?

(2.) From the consideration of Space we naturally pass to that of Time. Taken by itself, and without contents, Time has been declared to be “lengths and lengths of nothing at all”; and it is, of course, impossible to conceive Time without contents. These contents, too, cannot be imagined by us as anything but the successive states of “Spirit” in its various shapes; and there is no state of Spirit with which we cannot imagine Time to be filled. It is, for example, possible to conceive an experience in which there is nothing but sights, sounds, scents, volitions, thoughts, or any other affections of the Ego, and the Ego itself perceiving them. From this, probably, has resulted a very curious misapprehension as to the nature of Time—the misapprehension of believing it to have only one “dimension.” This error—as I must call it—is confirmed by the fact that what we call “simultaneity” in any *single* experience is (at least probably) simply a name for very rapid succession. I can look at a picture and at the same time enjoy music; but when I come to analyse my mental state, I find that it really consists of two separate series, the moments of each rapidly succeeding those of the other. And in hard thinking or close observation the mind resents this interruption. But it does not follow, because *my* experience occupies only one dimension in Time, that Time itself has but one dimension. Time with but one dimension could contain only one line of experience; and if we are obliged to admit the existence of other experiences—persons, spirits—we must admit that simultaneity between them is a second dimension of Time. Here, too, we perceive one dimension, and are obliged to infer another; and the inference gives a new and fuller

meaning to our concept of Time. We may lawfully go further, on the analogy of Space, and say that, in all probability, the fact that we can realise these two dimensions only is due, not to the nature of Time itself, but to the manner in which we are conditioned; and thus the thought of Time as a whole leads to that of Eternity. For Eternity is not simply Time without beginning or end, but Time unconditioned; and if Time be the "form" of the Subject in experience, Time unconditioned ought to be the "form" of an unconditioned Subject—in other words, of God. Therefore, putting together the facts concerning Space and Time as forms of consciousness, so far as we know these facts, we find ourselves obliged to recognise Space and Time as forms of some consciousness much vaster and deeper than that of any individual. So far as the Spirit of Man is concerned, Man's own experience bears all the marks of being outcomprehended by a greater Spiritual Existence; and it seems to me impossible to apprehend the unities of life, of thought, and of "form" that give to man his sense of *personality*, without regarding these unities as really belonging to something that must itself be real, spiritual, personal, and one. J. S. Mill has left on record his opinion that the argument from design—"He that made the eye, shall He not see?"—is "eminently calculated to satisfy a fair mind." I cannot myself help feeling that the inference from thought as a part of experience to thought as a cause of experience, from a unity of spirits in Space and Time to a Spirit holding Space and Time in Unity, is eminently calculated to satisfy the metaphysical conditions of our being.

(3.) We may now take one further step. We are all familiar with ancient ontological puzzles, such as that concerning the inconceivability of motion, "the occupation

of successive spaces in successive times." This is, of course, only a particular case of a much greater difficulty; and this difficulty is inseparable from any view of Being that treats the "forms" of consciousness as purely subjective. Just as certain facts in my own experience compel me to recognise experiences other than my own, and to accept certain laws and facts as really common to different experiences, so there are also certain facts that compel me to recognise the forms of all experiences known to me as having an existence beyond the purely subjective side of any conditioned experience. I am obliged to confess that my experience is not an absolute unity, because it is unintelligible if I do not recognise other experiences as combined with and affecting it; so too I am obliged to confess that even the sum of all subjectivity in Space and Time is not an absolute unity, because experience is unintelligible unless Space and Time are regarded as affecting the Non-ego otherwise than through my consciousness.

A simple analysis will make this plain. Whatsoever may be the origin of our belief in an "external" world—a Non-ego in Space¹—the belief itself cannot be avoided; and the belief in this Non-ego compels us to regard the laws of Space as working in the Non-ego itself. In *all* our

¹ Mr. P. Conyngham Glubb, of Liskeard—a careful thinker in Metaphysics—called my attention, some years ago, to what he believes to be the cause of our persistent belief in a Space-world external to us. It arises, he thinks, from the fact that everyone carries as a part of his consciousness a perpetual sense of the existence of his own body. So far as I can judge, laying aside as irrelevant the question as to how this sense comes into being, there is a great deal to confirm Mr.

Glubb's view; and the belief in a Non-ego in Space may be said to arise from the impossibility of escaping from belief in that debatable land between Ego and Non-ego which each man calls his own body. This belief, of course, is not absolutely primitive or theoretically ineradicable, as one could easily show by examination of many common phenomena; it is simply an unavoidable necessity of experience. It does not affect my argument in any way.

experience we find certain geometrical laws; there is no department of knowledge in which two right lines, real or imaginary, can be supposed to enclose a space, or in which the angles of a triangle can be more or less than equal to two right angles. Such facts as these show that geometrical laws do not rest on the casual presentations of a crude Non-ego; and if this were a complete account of the relation of Space-laws to our knowledge, it might be allowable to say that Space was purely subjective. But there is another side. In certain departments of our experience Space-laws are involved in specific and peculiar ways; and these peculiarities are obviously not due to any differences in the subjective point of view, but to something in the "given" or objective element. In Chemistry, for example, a given salt crystallises in tetrahedrons, while another crystallises in cubes. The tetrahedrons obey all the geometrical laws of tetrahedrons, and the cubes obey all the laws of cubes; all these laws may be regarded as subjective, and they are obviously equally true of all kinds of cubes and tetrahedrons, given in experience or imagined. But the fact that one geometrical figure is given in one case and another in the other is not subjective. It rests on some uniformity in the Non-ego or "given" element, and obviously points to a common source for the Non-ego and geometrical law.

(4.) So, too, within an experience, we cannot help observing that the Non-ego has a relation to Time-laws. The remembering mind, as it grasps its "past" experience, realises *some* reality in what we call the flight of years, the ravages of Time. But it perforce grasps a greater truth than this. After taking away everything that can possibly be classed as purely subjective, it is obliged to recognise a distinct relation between Time and the objective element

in its experience.¹ "Motion" is, of course, a case in point. It is impossible to describe it except in terms that involve, not merely the joint existence, but the continuous unity of Space and Time. It is impossible to say that motion is subjectively in Time and the Ego, and objectively in Space and the Non-ego, for each impact of the motion relates with exact equality to Time and to Space. And if it be said that the impossibility of making even a momentary separation between the smallest conceivable moment of Space and the smallest conceivable moment of Time, when both are involved in the smallest conceivable moment of Motion, results from the laws of our Perception, the inference becomes even more irresistible. If the law of our experience welds the Ego and Non-ego firmly together in the concept of Motion—if the very same spiritual constitution under which we are obliged to receive all our experience as related to Space and Time also makes it impossible to separate them—if motion (whatever it may really be) be as much a part of our experience as any other part of it, and if it be wholly unthinkable except as not merely involving

¹ It will be remembered that I class as "objective" in the individual experience two kinds of phenomena—(1) Those which are not merely similar in, but common to, different experiences; (2) Those which can be understood only by regarding them as "given" elements in any experience. If A, knowing his own existence, has just grounds for inferring that his friend B exists and has experience too, he is obviously justified in going a little further. The same reasoning leads him to infer that the "blue" sky, the "green" grass, the odours of spring daffodils, the murmuring of summer bees, enter into B's experience "simultaneously" with his own. The *cause* of these perceptions is (1) a common

element. Again, either A or B has "a new sensation"—a colour unseen before, music of a more ethereal kind than he ever heard before, the overmastering misery of a recently developed disease. The *cause* of this he cannot but regard as (2) "given"—as Non-ego. Now, if a Space or objective element belonging to either of these classes—and many belong at the same time to both—can be shown to be unthinkable except in direct relation to the Time-world, I contend that we have as much ground for believing that the objective world is definitely related to Time as for any other necessary inference. And experience cannot be purged from inferences.

but consisting in this unity,—is not this unity (whatever may be its noumenal reality) a deliverance of our experience as much as Space and Time themselves? And if we have to refer Space and Time to unknown noumena as their cause, it must be granted that these noumena are at least *real*. How, then, can we possibly believe in an ultimate real, without granting that it must contain in itself the possibility, not only of Space and Time, but also of their unity?

(5.) But there are phenomena that show still more strongly the necessity of a relation between Time and the Non-ego, because they involve not merely a common basis for Time and Space facts, but a distinct operation of that which cannot be separated from Time on that which cannot be separated from Space. Such phenomena are Change, Growth, Decay. The contents of my experience, *quâ* my experience, change in Time. With Time my Ego passes through a change that I call Growth; with Time its powers decay. This riping and rotting of the phenomenal Subject in Time is easily understood, if we regard Time as the "form" of the Subject in thought. It is, of course, correlated with other phenomena which we are obliged to regard as representative of processes taking place in that debatable ground, the body; but it does not follow that the true and fundamental processes belong to the Non-ego. A man, however, who sees no relation beyond this between Time and the Non-ego must shut his eyes to plain facts. As I write, day after day, before the same window, the course of the year—the lapse of a certain period in Time—brings before me change, growth, decay, in shapes for which I cannot (so to speak) hold my Ego responsible; and, though it would be going too far to say that these changes exist independently of a Subject, it is stating only an evident fact to say that no conditioned

Ego, no human subject, can be held wholly responsible for them. The same evidence on which I believe in the existence of Egos other than myself convinces me that their relation to certain phenomena is *passive*, like my own. Be the reality of a tree, a cloud, a stone, what you will—the growth and decay of the tree, the formation and breaking-up of the cloud, the wearing away of the stone (1) belong to the *objective* side of my experience; (2) are common factors in a number of conditioned experiences, where the conditions are not relations between the experiences themselves; (3) have no meaning except through relation to Time; and (4) are yet as absolutely objective as what we call physical phenomena, like colours, sounds, or scents. But, unlike the latter, they are not merely accidentally related to Time. It is easy to abstract colour, sound, even shape, from the thought of Time, and to imagine an Ego absolutely and without sense of succession conscious of any of these latter concepts or perceptions in an unchanging state; but it is impossible to imagine Growth, Change, Decay, “Becoming” in any form, as perceived or thought of apart from Time—for the simple reason that in all these cases Time is an essential part of the thought or perception itself. Take Time away from the changing colours of sunset, and what remains? The colours? What colours? Thus succession and simultaneity in Time are parts of my Object-world; and, by parity of reasoning, they are parts of all the Object-worlds that I am obliged to infer as belonging to other “lines of experience”; and I am obliged to believe in a common Object-world, possessing both Time and Space in common, as a part of the Nature of Things.

(6.) From the common basis thus established for all the parts of my Object-world—for the individual Subject and the sum of these parts—for all Subject-Egos taken together—for all determined Object-worlds taken with

each other and with the Subject-Egos that perceive them—I am driven to one more inference. I may not be justified in saying, “The sum and unity of these things *is* the real”; but I must say, “The real must account for the unity and sum of all these things.” Their sum and unity bring them all into position as parts of a great Object-world. Can I find intellectual satisfaction without a belief in a common Subject-side for this common Object? And can I be satisfied with a Subject that is not a Subject at all, because it is not One, perceiving, knowing? In other words, “*The Existence of God is a natural and unavoidable inference from the laws that govern our Experience.*” He may be *more* than a Person; but if Experience is to be “transcendentally determined” at all, He cannot be less.

ALEX. R. EAGAR.

NOTE.—I have avoided incorporating in the body of this article one thought (which nevertheless ought not to be altogether omitted), because it may seem to trench somewhat on the domain of dogmatic theology. It is this. On the lines of my argument, one passes from the idea of a limited, conditioned being who is Spirit and Person—from the thinker’s realisation of his own self, in fact—to the idea of God. Now here (obviously) one must think of God as Spirit and as Person—at least. Can we go further? And what is the relation of this general idea of God to the Christian concept of a triple personality in a single Deity?

It will, I think, be found that the following points are involved in the idea of the Trinity:—(1) “Spirit” is personal. We call the Third Person “the Holy Spirit”; but this is really only a method of saying that we have no distinct name for that Person. Working strictly theologically—i.e., deducing our results from the New Testament

revelation—we find that expressed which, working ontologically, we find other good reasons for asserting—i.e., that the Father is a Holy Spirit, the Son a Holy Spirit, and the Third Person a Holy Spirit. Without following this doctrine into its theological consequences, we see (2) that it opens, for those who hold Christianity, the possibility of full belief in a full personal relation between God and Man and between God and His World, and also in personal relations within the Godhead, without in any way interfering with the fulness of our belief in the complete Unity of God. For (3) this Unity has its basis in those depths of God's nature with which we are not fully correlated. We may express this by saying that God is a Being who is as naturally multipersonal as Man is naturally unipersonal. This is intelligible, self-consistent, and in no way contrary to our necessary ontological assumptions; and it is guarded, in dogmatic theology, by the doctrine of the "Monarchy" of the Everlasting Father.

The same thought underlies the fundamental theory of the Kabbala; but it must be admitted that this theory is probably not independent. Just as the Kabbalistic doctrine of the *Sephiroth* seems to have been adapted from Gnosticism, so the theory of the Threefold Nature of God seems to have been introduced from a Christian source.

A. R. E.

BERKELEY AND KANT.

OWING to the unsympathetic criticisms of Kant and T. H. Green, the importance of Berkeley's position in the history of philosophy has been much underestimated. The merits of Locke's theories are doubtful; but we may safely admit that the *Essay* is a great 'store-house of ideas' upon which his successors drew freely. Berkeley, however, was the first trained thinker who constructed a complete positive system out of the variety of incomplete problems and inconsistent solutions suggested by Locke. The epistemological part of Hume's *Treatise* is really a detailed exposition of the empirical side of Berkeley's philosophy; and it contains no central doctrine that cannot be found explicitly discussed by Berkeley. Further, without in any way wishing to depreciate the work of the great German *a priori* school, I desire to draw attention to three facts—first, that Berkeley anticipated Kant in giving a correct statement to the *problem* of knowledge; secondly, that he was the first to point out that the *method* of attacking this problem must be transcendental; thirdly, that the solution given by Berkeley, if less exact, takes a far more comprehensive view of the facts of human experience than the *Kritik of Pure Reason*.

A philosophy has very little meaning when it is regarded merely as a static edifice; but when viewed as a dynamical system, it interprets itself by its own movement, and is seen to be capable of consistent and more exact

development. Such a development is a true interpretation if the system is treated as a system, and not as a mere aggregate of isolated statements. Berkeley's philosophy taken piece-meal may lead to Hume or Hades; but taken *in toto* it leads to the belief—not that sensation alone is real, but that Thought alone is creative (spirit is active), and that the truth of experience implies the existence of a concrete universal—the free activity of God, to Whom finite spirits as finite are subordinate, but with Whom as Spirit they are essentially one—for they are made in the image of God.

Both Berkeley and Kant start with the assumption that individual experience gives real knowledge. Berkeley was the first to draw attention to the problem, 'How is knowledge possible when all that appears to me is a sensation or collection of sensations?' Like Kant, he saw clearly that the answer to this question must be transcendental, an inference to something intelligible lying beyond the things of senses. Also he anticipated Kant in reversing the order; that is, he noticed that, to justify experience, we must show that objects must be made by the mind, not the mind by objects. But Berkeley's starting-point differs from Kant's in this respect, that he assumed, as we all do, that experience is a knowledge of *το ὄν*—i.e. of things in themselves. For Kant, on the other hand, experience gives only conditioned knowledge, relative to the subject and to a limited complex of things; but as the entire complex may be illusory, the problem is only pushed back further. For the problem is not to discover the connexion between things whose very existence as a totality may be contingent; but to justify the ordinary belief that things in Space, and events in Time, are so to speak firmly embedded in the universe of things; cannot be non-existent, and possess a meaning *per se* conveyed to us by their actual appearance.

For both of these thinkers the matter of experience is

sensations in Space and Time. Kant was content to infer that sensations must be definitely quantified and qualified and connected by necessary laws in Space and Time. This necessity creates what he calls objectivity. Berkeley did not *explicitly* make this inference, which is of great importance especially for Science, but his transcendental argument goes far deeper, and gives an answer not only to the question, How is Science possible? but also to the question, How are objective Art and objective Religion possible? These questions are just as much as the other problems for Transcendental philosophy to answer, for objective Art and objective Religion form part of the experience of many. I shall return to "necessity."

Berkeley would not have admitted that sensations become real by being referred to the formal unity of the Understanding. He saw that they must be recognised as springing from a Universal *Concrete* intelligible cause, other than the individual mind, and revealing itself to all minds alike. Now, lifeless matter is unintelligible. To say, then, that this objective cause is lifeless matter is to surrender the problem of Knowledge. Therefore, if experience is true, if knowledge is possible, the direct source of all its elements—not being an idea—must be Spirit, which alone is an intelligible cause, *i.e.*, active or creative. The cause must be universal, revealing itself in one system of Nature common to all different beings; it must be concrete, not formal; for nature expresses concrete universal truth, and form is the cause of nothing. The cause is, therefore, Concrete Universal Mind or God. As Spirit God reveals Himself in man, who knows God because man is himself Spirit. As cause and source of activity, He reveals Himself in Nature. The permanence and reality of outer objects are now secured: for objects (*i.e.*, perceptions) may exist for ever in the Eternal Mind. They possess, therefore, a supra-temporal unconditioned mean-

ing, and are not—as with Kant—parts of an explicitly limited whole, which may in its totality have only a contingent existence.

A great philosopher may be proved to be anything, if exclusive stress is laid on one part of his system; he is all things to all men; this is a test of the comprehensiveness of his view. Aristotle, according to Schwegler, was an empiricist; but, according to Aristotle, objective mind rules the world! Plato was sometimes a hedonist, sometimes an absolute idealist in Ethics. In truth he was both, and so was Berkeley. Those who would prove the empiricism of Berkeley, and sink his glory in that of Hume, refer to the fact that Berkeley, like Hume, expressly stated that he could see no ‘necessary connexion’ between our ideas. Kant likewise admitted this; but he added that, since experience is objective, we must *infer* a ‘necessary connexion’ (by the transcendental argument). Now, Berkeley infers by the same method that God is the cause of our sensations, and the necessary connexion, though not explicitly stated, is implied, and follows logically from the true conception of God which Berkeley undoubtedly possessed. Perceptions are caused by God, and therefore arise in our minds with the same necessity as God’s existence and action are necessary—as Spinoza would say. The necessity is, moreover, absolute; hence not only the *order*, but also the subjective *tone* of the sensations is absolutely necessary. Now, this is really involved in all true perception of objects. For Kant, on the other hand, the necessity is conditioned; and, moreover, it refers to the order only, and not to the ‘subjective’ tone of the sensations (Locke’s secondary qualities). But if the necessity is only conditional, all experience may be a huge systematic illusion. Kant’s transcendental argument is therefore incomplete; it does not show how knowledge is possible; but, given that experience *as a whole* expresses

unconditioned truth, it professes to show only how it is possible that the units of experience should bring us into touch with that truth. Berkeley, on the other hand, answers as well the question: How is it possible for experience as a totality to yield truth?

For Kant the 'necessity' is not in the perceptions, but in the understanding which unites them. This, however, is talking in abstractions (an error of which Berkeley would not have been guilty). It means, at least, that the perceiving mind perceives necessarily, and in perceiving is conscious of this necessity, or it means nothing. But (Kant would argue) it is impossible for the sentient mind to be conscious of necessity. Hence the non-sentient mind, the understanding, conceives the necessity. This can only be inferred from sense-experience, for the understanding does not feel, and is therefore incapable of consciousness in Time; therefore the understanding is a mere abstract unity. If, in order to give a concrete meaning to the understanding, we suppose that it is the individual himself, experience becomes subjective; for since the understanding makes Nature, there will be a different Nature for each individual, and the issue will be absurd solipsism. If the understanding is universal, it is either purely formal, and therefore nothing but the unity and necessity of Law—which raises the question, what is the knowable source of the Law?—or (and this answers the last question) it is a concrete Intelligible unity—God, the Objective Spirit, outside Time, and knowable in degree by all finite Spirits in Time. The formal objective unity of the understanding is either Hume's 'bundle of impressions,' without the impressions, or else it is an abstract expression for its concrete basis—God, whose Spirit is given to the Spirit of each individual man. God exists outside Time, and manifests Himself to us through time-experience. The general principles of Green's idealism

are the same as those of the 'boyish idealist,' though he arrives at his conclusion by a more minute analysis (learnt from Kant) of the relational aspects of knowledge. The essence is in Berkeley—that experience requires an objective, universal, concrete unity; that this unity must be spiritual, for it is intelligible—that this unity being concrete, universal Spirit is God; and that in Him we live, and move, and have our being.

Though Berkeley may have failed to notice all the difficulties of the problem, though he may have arrived at a solution by intuition, yet he has a right to be called the first philosopher who ever gave a perfectly consistent answer to the problem, How is knowledge possible? *Spirit alone is active, knowledge implies the activity of One Spirit immanent in the Universe.* Other idealists have made a more thorough analysis of the data—Kant of Science, Hegel of the other branches of human experience—but, from the nature of the case, the solution given by Berkeley can never be transcended, though it may be developed.

It may be added that Berkeley's omission to lay stress on the special point evolved by Kant—that knowledge implies a necessary connexion of perceptions—was from one point of view a merit rather than a defect. It shows that Berkeley was free from that great snare of philosophy, scientific abstraction. Necessity is a purely formal concept; things are necessary because they have a concrete existence, not conversely. Everything is necessary *in its place*, including subjective feelings and 'fictions' of the imagination. Berkeley lived in social and intellectual surroundings, which made him see things in their totality, not as abstract conceptions or expressions of abstract laws. Had Kant changed places with Berkeley, it is probable that the criticisms of his colleagues would have deterred him from believing, or at least from publishing the theory,

that beauty dwells only in geometrical form and abstract qualitative relations; and certainly no one who, like Berkeley, took an intelligent interest in the public affairs of our distressful country, could possibly believe that pleasure and pain are merely 'subjective.' Yet if Kant's Ethics are to be taken literally, the ideal man is he who, unmoved by pain or pleasure (as pain or pleasure), whether his own *or another's*, acts solely from obedience to the Law of Duty. Pleasure is only in the way of the Moral Law, and a rational being must necessarily desire to be rid of all inclinations that can have practical effects. No doubt this is a most stimulating point of view; but it becomes a false abstraction if it is taken as a complete representation of a good life,¹ and it is a psychological absurdity.

In the order of abstract thought, Duty, like Space and Time, comes first; but in concrete existence, Happiness and the Good are inseparable, just as the forms of Space and Time are in fact inseparable from the objects which they contain.

These considerations suggest another—the great merit of Berkeley—that he clearly recognised the *objectivity of sensations and feelings* as actually given. For the empiricist sensations and feelings are everything; but just for this reason they pass into nothing, and cease to be objective. For the *a priori* school—and here Kant himself, deceived by Hume, is the greatest offender—sensations and feelings are quite subjective and individual; knowledge and objective experience of nature is of laws, concepts, and relations; virtue is to neglect inclinations, and to obey extra-individual law. Yet sensations and feelings *are*;

¹ A classical friend of mine observes that the 'All-crusher of Königsberg' bears a certain resemblance to his namesake in Greek mythology. Procrustes lopped the limbs of those who

were too big for his bed. Kant calmly lops off all our feelings, etc., and lays the lifeless remnants to sleep in the couch of his abstract forms.

and they have an ethical value in themselves, though not in isolation. Not only has Berkeley recognised this, but he has given the only possible explanation. Let us suppose that Locke, Kant, and Hume are standing on the summit of the Greystones golf-links on a sunny day in early June. They look down and see the fields and woods with all their varied tints of green, the yellow gorse, the fields beyond crowded with golden buttercups, the softly-coloured hills and blue sky. They shut their eyes; for Locke all this is gone; the woods are no longer green, the gorse has lost its yellow, the sky its tender blue, the hills have turned into a barren steepness, and the buttercups are nothing more than hemispherical shells attached to thin cylinders. In place of diversity of colour there is left nothing but the minute motions of insensible primary qualities. This is more desolating than a change to blackest winter! For Kant, these colours are mere 'charm,' and devoid of true beauty or permanence; when he shuts his eyes, he can see more clearly that they are really different intensive qualities, localised and differing in degree, but, as with Locke, possessing no *tone*; they have only a formal meaning expressing possibilities. For Hume, when he shuts his eyes, there is nothing there at all! Yet all three—Hume not least—will continue to believe that these colours exist just as they saw them when their eyes were open. What justifies us in imagining that the colours and their arrangements are still there—though we see them not—without our having the lurking sense that we are suffering from an illusion? Berkeley could reply that the objectivity and permanence of the immediately-given *tone*, as distinct from the quantity and quality of the sensations, is to be explained by the principle that they are always perceived by the mind of God, in so far as they are real, that is, beautiful. They have a real and not merely a formal

permanence. Their existence consists in their being perceived; being things of beauty, they are joys *for ever*. It is only because our sense and imagination are weak that we cannot revive them at will in their completeness. They are always there in the mind of God, whose immanence in Nature is revealed to us by glimpses of Eternal Beauty. Ideally the tone of a sensation has an absolutely non-temporal existence (Aristotle makes a similar remark with regard to the feeling of pleasure), and is therefore capable of an actual permanence, an existence *sub specie aeternitatis*, in the mind of God.

There is always a conflict between poetry—which deals with sensations, passions, and images as immediately given—and reflective philosophy. According to some poets, the philosopher murders to dissect. According to some reflective philosophers, the ideas of poetry are merely symbolic of virtue, or some other abstraction, and possess no objectivity. This conflict is abolished for Berkeley, if you will read him truly. Berkeley sides with the poor, neglected ‘man in the street’ in holding that sensations, passions, and images *are*. They express an actual objective existence, and are therefore capable—though immediate—of uttering eternal truth. The very existence of classic monuments of poetry, music, and the fine arts is in each case a proof from fact that there are certain images, emotions, and sensations which are, in their nature, possessed of a permanence and reality in the same sense in which we say outer objects are permanent and real.¹ This teaching is as old as Plato; but there is this great difference, that while Plato tries to fly beyond sense, Berkeley takes sense, and feeling, and matter as they

¹ It does not follow that *all* feelings are immortal (e.g. the toothache), but they are all capable of immortality.

Will, however, is required to turn this possibility into an actuality; this is the creative power of genius.

are, and declares their real part to be the language of God. For him, but not for Hume or Kant, it is possible for Art to give—

“To one brief moment caught from fleeting time
The appropriate calm of blest eternity.”

From this it will be clear that the teaching of Berkeley, if fully developed, would lead to a Philosophy which would include Poetry and Art, as well as Science. It is, therefore, more comprehensive than Kant's. For Berkeley, not only the Eternal Laws of Nature, but also the sensible appearances of Nature (if the latter deserve to survive), exist *sub specie aeternitatis*. The former are the subject-matter of Science, the latter of Poetry and Art. But for Kant it is sophistical trifling to say that beauty is truth; truth is only to be found in Science.

Berkeley's view of Nature is entirely concrete; he passes over the formal elements which, in some places, he hastily judges to be worthless abstractions. Yet, in other passages, he admits that, though abstractions, they have meaning, for 'vaticination' is possible by means of them, just as sentences can be constructed by knowing the rules of Grammar. It is misleading, certainly, to talk of Space and Time and intellectual forms as if they preceded objects in virtue of an inherent superiority to the sense-data which they are said to mould. The fact is that the moulded thing (το σὺνολον) is given first, both in Time and in existence. But because we can think of form without matter—though not of matter without form—Kant was tempted to regard abstract forms as presupposed and creative of things. The power—noticed by Aristotle—which the mind has of conceiving form apart from matter, does not, as Kant supposed, indicate that *only* the form is *a priori*, but suggests rather that nature—form and matter united—has a complete spiritual meaning. For the apprehension of form

(in Mathematics and Physical Science) is really 'vaticination,' and indicates that the mind itself is assimilated to Nature in such a way that it can anticipate events in different parts of Time and Space. Now, this conception of form is only a means towards an end; the anticipation of concrete natural phenomena. Berkeley's instinct was therefore a true one when he recognised that the end of Science is the production of concrete effects—not the knowledge of general laws, for this is but the means to such production.

For Berkeley, then, the real objects of Science are not laws, but things inseparably compounded of matter and form. Nature is the language of God, and Science is the interpretation of that language. Just as Grammar is an abstraction by which language is learnt, so the laws of Nature are abstractions from the concrete given totality of Nature. The words in the language of Nature are time-phases of consciousness; the things signified are the approach of different phases which may be possible or actual experiences of self or other people in different moments of time and parts of space. In this language, it may be noticed, words have a meaning in themselves. Phases of consciousness have an immediate meaning: they also represent other phases. This view of Science as a language is not circular; it is meant to bring out the *formal* element in experience: Nature is an ideal language in which the words have their own meaning—(the *matter* of experience); and also a meaning in relation to each other (the *form*). Kant's doctrine, that experience is only possible through a necessary connexion of perceptions, is contained in this (though Berkeley goes much further); each phase of consciousness exists in itself and in relation to others. The universality of an immediate perception consists in its relation to other perceptions, and is therefore concrete. *The language of God flows from His Eternal*

*Being, and its Grammar, therefore, indicates a necessary connexion, though we cannot see the necessity in particular cases.*¹ As man is made in the image of God, the necessity is not, as for Kant, mechanical and conditioned,—for this is inconceivable; it is based on *το ἀπύροτον*, which flows from the very Being of God.

It must be admitted that Berkeley's treatment of Space and Time is unsatisfactory, because incomplete. Space and Time are merely collections of *minima sensibilia*; from which it seems to follow that there is a different Space and Time for each person, since the unit of measurement is subjective. Yet even here he remembered, what Kant often forgot, that concrete reality creates its own form, which, apart from the reality, is meaningless. Only in the order of subjective abstract thought—not in the order of existence—can we say that experience presupposes Space and Time; for experience is a concrete totality, and Space and Time are abstractions from this totality. In the solution of the second antinomy, Kant takes the same view as Berkeley, that concrete Space and Time are divisible only in so far as they are actually divided by the percipient mind. That Berkeley had not a clear conception of continuous quantities was due partly to his eagerness to show that the *end* of Geometry is practical, not theoretical, and partly to the obscure language used by the pioneers of the infinitesimal calculus, which was then in its birth. It is false to say, as Cavalieri did, that a line is composed of an infinite number of points, unless we understand it as meaning

¹ It may be objected that Berkeley explicitly denies that there is a necessary connexion between our perceptions, and speaks of the order as depending on 'rules' created by the 'arbitrary' Will of God. The meaning, however, is—not that God acts according to freaks of unreason, but that we cannot fully understand the reasons why things

are connected as they are connected—in other words, we are not omniscient as regards the details of phenomena. Hume usually gets credit for having discovered this self-evident truth. By Nature, Berkeley means the complex of possible or actual perceptions connected by the immutable laws of God.

that a line is composed of an indefinitely large number of indefinitely small lines of the same length, or as meaning that a line is generated by the time-movement of a point (as Kant held). In the practical application of the calculus, we have to suppose that a curved line is composed of a definite number of small lines. The accuracy of our results will be proportional to the number we take. Berkeley had also an imperfect conception of objective Time as a subject for mathematical measurement. He thought, as most of us do, that the actual events in Time are more important than an ideal measurement. Berkeley failed in his treatment of Space and Time from want of a genuine interest in Geometry and Physical Science for their own sakes. The scientific requirements of permanence and the objectivity of Time are merged by him into the supra-temporal unity and power of God.

Berkeley's revolt against abstraction accounts for his opposition to all attempts at a mechanical explanation of Nature. He had grasped the fruitful truth that elements have no independent existence, and have a meaning only through combination. Had he applied this to his psychology, he would have been the first to recognise that sensations cannot exist in isolation. He saw that scientific analysis, including theories of the ultimate constitution of matter (such as the corpuscular theory), however useful, is an inversion of the true order of explanation. The part can be explained by a reference to a wider totality; but a totality cannot be explained by breaking it into abstract elements. A 'theory of matter' is really a schematic representation of the formal unity and simplicity of natural laws; it is thus a mental instrument which may suggest new discoveries, being a picture of laws already known; but it can never be an 'explanation.' If we could apprehend the totality of things and events, this apprehen-

sion would give a perfect explanation of the totality, and therefore of the parts of this totality. "We may be said to account for a thing," says Berkeley, "when we show that it is best so"; and this implies a reference to the completed system of which the thing or event is a part.

The point of contact between Kant and Berkeley is where the latter says "Spirit alone is active," and the former that "The Understanding makes Nature." The difference is that for Berkeley the creative mind is concrete, for Kant it is merely formal. For this reason, as I have tried to show, Berkeley's system is able to take a more comprehensive view of things; it contains the germs of a transcendental philosophy of human experience, including Religion, Art, and Poetry, as well as Science, including also the unquenchable belief of ordinary men that the things we see and handle are objects of possible experience for all other men. *The Kritik of Pure Reason* is only a transcendental philosophy of Science.

Berkeley is not to be ranked with empiricists or dreamers or formalists. He starts with the reality of sensible experience; he recognises that concrete Spirit alone is active and creative. His derivation of our notion of God, by analogy, from the notion of self, shows that he recognised that man is made in the image of God. Man's sensible experience, therefore, implies the possession of creative thought; he is *νοῦς ποιητικός*, as well as *νοῦς παθητικός*. But if Berkeley is to be appreciated, he must be read apart from the unfair criticisms of Kant and Green. The final conclusion of the latter does not essentially differ from that of the 'boyish idealist.' "There is a consciousness for which the relations of fact, that form the object of our gradually attained knowledge, already and eternally exist."¹ For 'the relations of fact,' Berkeley would substi-

¹ Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 75.

tute 'the complex of our sensible experience possible or actual,' for 'relations' alone are merely formal.

It may be objected that I have forced into Berkeley what he never wrote. I answer that it is the business of philosophical criticism to develop logically the positive elements in any system (considered in its entirety) which starts from the recognition of the facts of normal human experience.

REGINALD A. P. ROGERS.

There is a point perhaps worth adding, though it is an *argumentum ad hominem*. Towards the end of the *Æsthetic* Kant remarks that God's cognition is "intellectual intuition." This means that He creates the object of knowledge by the very act of knowing (Fichte's *Thathandlung*). For Him, phenomenon and "thing *per se*" are the same; or, more correctly, phenomena vanish into absolute realities—what *appears* to Him *is*. Now Kant admits that the phenomena of human knowledge refer to things *per se* which are unknown to us. Either these things *per se* are in no relation to God—a materialistic doctrine which was beneath the piety and intellect of Kant—or they exist only in and for His Mind. Plainly Kant is between the devil of materialism and the deep sea of Berkeley.

R. A. P. R.

CICERO, 'RHETORICA.'

AFTER a lapse of two years the Clarendon Press has issued the second volume of Cicero's 'Rhetorica.' Prof. Wilkins, of Manchester, certainly the foremost English authority on Cicero's rhetorical works, as he is one of the foremost among England's scholars, has again been chosen editor. Although this second volume lacks the importance in subject-matter which attaches to the first, it in no way falls behind the first in point of editorial care, scholarly acumen, and sound judgment. We welcome it both for its intrinsic merits and as the completion (if we except the 'Ad Herennium' and 'De Inventione') of the first entire edition of Cicero's 'Rhetorica' published in England.

The volume does honour to that great University under whose auspices it has been produced, and adds yet another to the many laurels of its illustrious editor.

With the exception of the 'Orator,' none of the treatises in this volume, so far as we are aware, has before been touched by any English editor. We are glad that such a skilful pioneer has undertaken the work, and trust that as he has given the world a monumental edition of the 'De Oratore,' he may, in the same way, edit the 'Brutus,' 'Partitiones,' and 'Topica.' In England the 'Orator' has already found a worthy editor in Mr. Sandys, to whom Prof. Wilkins pays a well-merited tribute in his preface.

¹M. Tulli Ciceronis Rhetorica Recognovit Brevique Adnotatione Critica Instruxit A. S. Wilkins. Tomus ii. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

Of Continental scholars, Friedrich, Stangl, and Martha are most frequently mentioned in the Apparatus Criticus.

In the present volume the text of the 'Brutus' comes first. Owing to the loss of the Codex Laudensis, discovered at Lodi by Bishop Gherardo Landriano, in the year 1422, and sent to Barziza, a scholar of Milan, for transcription, only inferior MSS. of the 'Brutus' remain. Several copies of this valuable MS. exist; but the original has never been seen since the year 1428. These constitute the only authority which we have for the text of the 'Brutus.' Unfortunately, we are forced to infer from the text of the 'De Oratore,' where we possess, in addition to the transcriptions of Codex Laudensis, older and better MSS., that these copies have been altered in accordance with the caprice of the individual scribe. Under these circumstances an editor ought to feel less hesitation in altering the text of an author. Prof. Wilkins, however, seems to make no distinction, in the matter of adherence to the MSS., between the 'Brutus' and the other texts where there is sounder MS. authority. The alternative title of the 'Brutus,' 'De Claris Oratoribus,' which is not even mentioned in the present edition, has, however, found its way into some modern books, but is inappropriate to the subject-matter, contradicts Cicero's express statement in the book itself, and is absolutely unsupported by good MS. authority, being first found in the 'Italia Illustrata' of Flavius Blondus.

To come to particular points in the text of the 'Brutus.' At chapter 12. 46, where *controversia natura* is evidently corrupt, I should suggest (1) *controversiae nara*. Cicero himself spells the latter word so in 'Orator' 47. 158; and it is easy to see how, spelled so, it might have been here mistaken for a contraction of *natura*. Or (2), possibly, even *nara*, owing to its similarity to *natura*, may have fallen out of the text, the original reading being *controversiae nara nara*.

Again, in the ancient verses quoted by Cicero at 18. 71, Mr. Wilkins marks the second line as imperfect, though *quisquam superarat*, read by Victorius (1536), completes the line satisfactorily, and is adopted by Piderit. Surely, there is as good reason for inserting this as there is for adopting Bergk's insertion of *doctis* before *dictis* in the next line. Bergk's method of filling up the second line is such as any schoolboy with moderate practice in versification might adopt. He supplies, without any MS. authority that I am aware of, *metasque tenerent*. Why not *arcesque tenerent*, or any other 'tag'?

In 22. 86, *atrocior*, the emendation of Triller, is adopted for the MS. reading *adhortor*. So far as the sense of the passage goes the reading is admirable. I am not, however, satisfied as to the possibility of corrupting *atrocior* into *adhortor*. If we take contractions into account, I think it is more likely that *adhortor* is a corruption of *attentior*. The sense required is 'one who puts more soul into his speech.' I think this is a possible meaning of *attentior*. Cf. 'De Or.,' 3. 5. 17, where it is moreover, as here, joined with *acer*.

The corrupt words, *defensione juncta*, in 44. 162, are emended by Piderit to *defensio*, which he supports in a most ingenious way. He says that a scribe wrote *defensione* by mistake in the first instance. A redactor, or the scribe himself, underpunctuated the *ne*, and, to call attention to this fact, wrote in the margin *ne puncta*. Another scribe incorporated this in the text, and afterwards it was readily changed to *defensione juncta*. The hypothesis is too elaborate to be convincing; but it is at least the best attempt that has been made to restore this difficult corruption.

Kayser is followed in the reading 'sic in istam domum multorum insitam [atque inluminatam] sapientiam' at 57. 213. Why is *inluminatam* regarded as a gloss? Either the word is corrupt and should be marked so, or some such

emendation as Stangl's *inseminatam* must be accepted. I think *atque inluminatam* is (1) a corruption of *ac quasi in limen latam*, or (2) *quasi in limen latam* was a gloss on *insitam*, which became incorporated in the text and corrupted. In the latter case it would have been designed to explain the harsh metaphor in *insitam*.

In 91. 315, 'Post a me Asia tota peragrata est †cum summis quidem oratoribus, quibuscum exercebar ipsis libentibus' is Mr. Wilkins's reading. Either (1) *cum summis . . . oratoribus* is correct as it stands, and a rather harsh zeugma has been introduced by Cicero; or (2) I should suggest '*dum* summis quidem oratoribus *assum*.' This latter is not such a violent change as Piderit's '*et* summis quidem oratoribus *usus sum*,' which has besides the fault of anticipating in sense the following relative clause.

After the 'Brutus' comes the 'Orator,' which portrays the living embodiment of all oratorical excellences, as distinguished from the 'De Oratore,' which is the orator's armoury. Then follows the short and incomplete treatise entitled, 'De Optimo Genere Oratorum,' intended to serve as an introduction to Cicero's translation of Aeschines and Demosthenes *Dè Corona*. Next in order comes the 'Partitiones Oratoriae,' the title by which Quintilian cites the treatise, and the only title admitted in the present edition. It is a Catechism of Rhetoric, written by Cicero for his son, and possibly even intended for pupils, which forms a useful, if uninteresting, introduction to all his rhetorical works. Of this there are only two good MSS. in existence. Two passages deserve attention. In 21. 72, Friedrich's reading, 'utendum erit *in eis ornata* oratione, et singulorum verborum insignibus,' is adopted by Mr. Wilkins, on the supposition that *ornata* dropped out before *oratione*, owing to their similarity. On the other hand, I think it is much more likely that the common reading, *eis*

in oratione . . ., is correct, and that *exornatione* has dropped out immediately after *oratione*, owing to the similarity between the two words, and the confusion caused by the two ablatives with like terminations. If this reading is adopted, the antithesis will be preserved better, *in oratione* answering to *singulorum verborum*, and *exornatione* to *insignibus*. For the use of *exornatio* cf. 'Part. Orat.,' *supra*, 4. 11, and 'De Inv.,' ii. 3 fin.

In 36. 125, 'Nititur *aequitate utilitate quasi* scribenda lex sit, quaeque tum complecteretur in judiciis corruptis ea verbo uno praevaricationis comprehendisse dicit' is read, but can hardly stand. If *utilitate* is meant to be taken as completing the sense of the following clause, surely Cicero would not have put it in such an awkward position, even for the sake of securing a doubtful emphasis. Further, with this reading is *utilitate* an equivalent for *aequitate*? In other words, are *aequitas* and *utilitas* convertible terms? If so, would not this be 'begging the question'? Even granting, however, that such logic is sometimes admissible in the mouth of an accuser, we shall have to alter the position of *utilitate*.

I am persuaded, on the other hand, that Cicero did not write the text as it is here printed, but rather 'nititur *aequitate et utilitate qua sic* scribenda lex sit.' The sense will then be that the accuser supports his plea on the ground of (a) equity, and (b) because the way recorded was the best way in which the law could be written for practical purposes. Laws must be written in general terms; otherwise endless labour would be involved to provide for every possible contingency. Therefore the law regarding 'praevaricatio' had to be written in broad general terms, as recorded, on grounds of practical utility. The *et* could easily have dropped out after *-te*, and before *ut*; whilst *qua sic* might easily be mistaken for *quasi*, especially before *sc* in *scribenda*.

The last treatise in this volume is the 'Topica.' Owing to its subject-matter, its close and methodical arrangement, and occasional obscure passages, it presents few attractions to the modern reader; and yet it is well worth perusal, if for no other reason than as showing the erudition of the man who could dash off on ship-board a reproduction of Aristotle's 'Topica.' Inasmuch as this is just such a treatise as was dear to the heart of the schoolmen, it is abundantly represented by MSS. In this there are also two passages where I dispute the reading given by Mr. Wilkins. In iv. 24, there is a passage which as it stands is barely intelligible: 'si ita respondeas "Quoniam P. Scaevola id solum esse ambitus aedium dixerit, quod parietis communis tegendi causa tectum proiceretur, ex quo tecto in ejus aedis qui protexisset aqua deflueret, id tibi jus videri."' As I take this reading, *ambitus* is understood after *id* and before *tibi jus videri*; whilst to complete the sense, we must understand *esse* with *jus*, and *esse* (= 'belong to') with *ambitus*. This is very violent; but I confess I cannot translate the passage as it stands in any other way. If, on the other hand, we read *ambitus* instead of *tibi jus*, the sense becomes absolutely clear, and no violence need be done to the passage to extort a meaning from it. *Ambitus* might conceivably have been corrupted to *tibi jus*, neither of which words is required by the sense.

Again, in x. 44 there is a passage which I feel sure Cicero never wrote as it stands. Surely 'exemplis plurimis usus est, qui . . . instituisset' in the sense, 'gave examples of the man who had appointed,' &c., is strange Latin. If the plural *instituissent* were used, the construction would be less harsh; but *eorum* ought then to have been expressed. The meaning manifestly is: 'Crassus gave numerous examples to show how persons appointed heirs in the event of the birth of a son within ten months

after the testator's death, and his dying before coming of age, had got the inheritance.' A very slight alteration will practically give this sense, and produce good Latin. If we read *instituti essent*, and, putting a comma after *ut* before *si*, translate it *how*, we shall get the sense required. The sentence will then be translated thus: 'gave numerous examples to show how persons who had been appointed heirs on such condition (i.e., *si filius natus esset . . . isque mortuus, &c.*), had got the inheritance *in-cases-where* a son had been born within ten months, and died before coming of age.' The position of the *ut* is accounted for by the fact that Cicero wished to emphasize the clause to which it belongs, and the clause beginning with *si*.

Another possible emendation, which would involve less change than either Friedrich's or Madvig's, would be to delete the *ut*, and read *instituti essent* for *instituisset*, and *obtinuisse* for *obtinuissent*. The acc. and infin. construction would then be quite admissible after *exemplis usus est*. If this be right, *ut* may have crept into the text in the following way. A scribe wrote *institi essent* for *instituti essent*, afterwards writing *ut* as a marginal correction for insertion in the word. A succeeding scribe, mistaking *institi essent* for *instituisset*, when he had written the latter word, observed the marginal *ut*, and thought it ought to be inserted before *si*, in the sense of *as if*. Hence its place in the text.

This completes my criticisms on the second volume of the 'Rhetorica.' I offer them with extreme diffidence, when I remember the great learning and mature judgment of Prof. Wilkins. As to minor points, I noticed three misprints in the 'Brutus.' On p. 65, l. 23, *locus* should be read for *locos*; on p. 79, l. 16, *ta* should be *ita*; and on p. 86, l. 27, surely *nec*, not *nam*, is the reading.

W. PARKER.

REVIEWS.

ΗΡΩΙΔΟΥ ΜΙΜΙΑΜΒΟΙ.

The Mimes of Herodas. Edited, with Introduction, Critical Notes, Commentary, and Excursus, by J. ARBUTHNOT NAIRN, M.A., Headmaster of Merchant Taylors' School, and sometime Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; together with facsimiles of the recently discovered fragments and other illustrations. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1904.

WE regret that want of space prevents us from dealing fully in a review with this very useful book, the first of its kind in English. The Editor aims at giving us a correct and readable text, faithful to the Papyrus as far as may be, explaining the sense everywhere, and illustrating the matter of his author from every source. His Introduction, historical, literary, and grammatical, is full and interesting. We shall merely note here some points in the Commentary on the successive Mimes on which, perhaps, opinions may differ, and on which Mr. Nairn's statements do not always seem quite acceptable.

I., ver. 8. *στρέψον τι δούλη*, 'keep stirring a little,' the interpretation to which Mr. Nairn inclines, is inconsistent with the tense of the verb. 'Stir yourself,' or 'be nimble,' without any effort to render *τι*, would be better.

Ver. 11. 'Virtual negative,' says Mr. Nairn. We should have thought *οὐδ' ὄναρ* is sufficient to make the construction *actually* negative: Herondas has a habit of scanting the number of negatives: see I. 32.

Ver. 18. *οἷη τ' . . . ἄγχειν*. It appears that *ἄγχειν* would be a bad word (even with all possible allowance for grim irony) to express 'embrace a lover.' *χῆτέρους ἄγχειν* = 'to choke off others' is equivalent to the vulgarity 'to bury,' i.e. to *outlive*.

Ver. 28. Why *εὐδίη* should be merely 'Alexandrian' for *peace* is

not easy to say. *παρευδιάζομαι* is found in Polyb. iv. 32, 5 = 'live at peace with one's neighbours.' But does 'Alexandrian' here = 'belonging to post-Alexandrine Greek'?

Ver. 30. ὁ βασιλεὺς χρηστός. Cf. Call. *H. in lav. Pall.* 51 τὸ λοετρὸν καλόν: where Ἰναχος will conduct 'the fair ceremony of the λοετρὸν' not so conduct the λ. as to make it καλόν. There is no help for it but to admit that grammatical rules are not universal. So in the *Ajax* ὁ λυμεὼν ἐμὸς admits of no explanation except that founded on anomaly. So too Eurip. *Hērō.* ὁ γεννῆτωρ ἐμὸς. Sir R. Jebb finds analogy for such expressions in the construction τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρ' ἄθλιον, where he thinks the ἄθλιον from its position should be a predicate. Such a demand would involve an undue extension of the rule relating to the attributive use of the article. This rule is fully satisfied if, when two adjectives are used with the noun, the article is prefixed to one of them. The other may come either before or after the noun indifferently to the question of its being predicative. Thus in the latter phrase the Greek may, without the least grammatical scruple, be rendered 'my poor father.' In our passage we can only accept the anomaly. To regard βασιλεὺς χρηστός as a 'virtual compound' is needless, and by its analogy would lead to difficulties.

Ver. 40. Crit. note. Mr. Nairn attributes πλοῦν to Crusius; but the latter has given this up, with the words 'sed *II legi non potest.*' It is not fair to ascribe his old opinions to Crusius, instead of those contained in his edition of 1900. This our editor, however, often does.

Ver. 54. To render ἄθικτος ἐς K., 'heart-whole,' here is rather inconsistent with ver. 60 ποθέων ἀποθνήσκει.

Ver. 56. ἐκύμηνε. This seems to be not 'transitive' but intransitive, with τὰ σπ. as accus. of part affected.

Ver. 61. ἀλλ' ὦ τέκνον μοι Μητρίχῃ μίαν ταύτην ἁμαρτίην δός. Here Mr. Nairn refers to Wackernagel 'on the possessive use of the pers. pron.' But this misses the sense and construction of μοι altogether, which means, 'I pray you,' 'for my sake,' or 'to please me.' It does not go with τέκνον, but with δός. Cf. ἀλλ' εὐτύχει μοι, τέκνον, ver. 88, *infra*.

Ver. 84. ὠνάθης, Mr. Nairn's conjecture, would be good enough in Doric: cf. Theoc. xv. 55.

II., ver. 10. Mr. Nairn reads νέμειν, inf. for imp.; Crusius νέμει. But now was not the time for them to *select* (the word is Mr. Nairn's) προστάται; nor is νέμειν *pr.* = 'to *select* a patron.' It is idiomatic for *πρ.* ἔχειν.

Ver. 27. τὴν αὐτονομίην. Not the relation of Cos to other states is meant—not the 'independence of the state'—but its freedom from the evils of ὀλιγαρχία, the tyranny of class or individual. Cos was democratic, and Thales would fain play the tyrant.

Ver. 44. He (sc. Crusius) 'takes φησι (*sic*) as conjunctive.' So

Mr. Nairn says. But Crusius' note in his MCM edition begins:—"44. φῆσι, φῆ τι? cf. ἰδωμι, III. 43," κ.τ.λ. We repeat that it is not fair to quote from an editor's old views when he has published others which supersede them. Even Crusius' text here has φῆσι.

Ver. 47. Mr. Nairn rightly reads ἐπίσπη, but renders it as if = ἐπακολουθήσῃ: as if ἐπειν, or rather -σπεῖν, were = Attic ἐπεσθαι. This would indeed be strange. In an Ionic writer it would be more natural to find a trace of the 'Homeric' ἐπέσπεν. Cf. περιέσπειν τρηχέως in Herodotus. Thales had maltreated, or tried to maltreat, the girl; if he had merely 'followed' her, the offence would not be regarded so gravely. She was not a lady.

Ver. 87. "Crusius reads ὅλον, only." He did so in his first edition. In his third and last he reads as Mr. Nairn.

III., ver. 36. ἦν δὲ δὴ τι καὶ μείζον γρύξαι θέλωμεν = "if we wish him to raise his voice": so Mr. Nairn renders. The sense is rather 'if we presume to speak up,' i.e. 'to rebuke him.' The subject could scarcely be omitted if Mr. Nairn's construction were intended. "Wenn wir aber mal deutlicher werden" (Cr.).

Ver. 49. ὥστε μὴδ' ὀδόντα κινήσαι = 'so that one gets nothing to eat,' Nairn. It = rather 'so that one can't open one's lips to deny it.'

Ver. 71. μὴ μὴ ἱκετεύω. Here Mr. Nairn scans εῦ, and elides μὴ before ἱκ-, leaving the syllable short. He treats Crusius' ἱκετεύω with little regard, saying, "I see no reason to doubt that -εῦ- could be scanned as short before a vowel." Of course. But the point is missed; and he says, without any feeling of difficulty, "we must elide the vowel of the second μὴ," notwithstanding that it is in arsis, unlike the αἰ of ἀνείται in IV. 56, which is in thesis.

IV., ver. 69. μέζον ἢ γύνη πρήσσειν. "The construction μείζον ἢ γυνή (for ἢ γυναῖκα χρὴ, ἢ κατὰ γ.) is not found elsewhere"; for which dictum Mr. Nairn quotes Mr. Headlam. It recurs, however, in VI. 34, μέζον ἢ γύνη γρύξω, where Mr. Nairn refers back to this place.

Ver. 75. ἀλλ' ὅ ἐπὶ νοῦν γένοιτο καὶ θεῶν ψαύειν ἠπείγεθ'. Mr. Nairn renders "Even if it were a god that he bethought him to touch, he pressed ardently on." This does not sound satisfactory. The thought is rather that Apelles aimed at perfection in his art. Whatever he undertook to paint, he strove to reach perfection. Crusius (trans. 1893) renders *Was ihm nur in den Sinn kam, darin konnte 'er sich selbst mit Göttern messen.* To "touch the gods" was to reach perfection. Cf. Sappho's ψαύην ὀράνω, Horace's 'ferire sidera' for achieving the summit of happiness, or of one's ambition. Could ὅ ἐπὶ (sic) νοῦν γένοιτο be construed so as to mean 'whatever he set his mind to,' 'applied himself to'? Cf. (for the thought) Hdt. I. 27 ποιήσαιαν ἐπὶ νοῦν νησιώτησι, 'put it into the heads of islanders.' If we could suppose a construction ἐπιγενέσθαι τι, with νοῦν as 'accus. of ref.,' the required sense, of applying oneself

mentally to something, would emerge. It appears certain that the apodosis begins with *καὶ*, which is intensive, not copulative.

Ver. 80. On *λῶρον* Mr. Nairn quotes from Dr. Starkie's *Wasps* (p. 425), which says: "Van Leeuwen's *λῶρονα* is unfortunate, as this word survived only in the language of oracles and ancient laws." The word is, however, a very good word, occurring in Plato, Sophocles, and Æschylus; and Dr. Starkie's dictum was intended to be restricted to a conjecture on Aristophanes: of that we have the best assurance. Mr. Nairn unfortunately quotes him as if he were minded to banish *λῶρον* and its parts from classical Greek.

V., ver. 19. We might have expected some notice of the construction *σε δεῦμαι*, instead of being merely told (as if Herondas were an author to be read by schoolboys) that the verb = "Attic *δέομαι*."

VI., ver. 9. "On the spelling of *ποιεῖς* for *ποιεῖς*, cf. Jebb, *Soph. Phil.* 120, with Appendix." So Mr. Nairn. But there Jebb, as well as Meisterhans to whom he refers, confines himself to Attic usage; and Herondas is not, like Sophocles, an Attic poet.

Ver. 54. Mr. Nairn quotes *Juv. i. 74*, as '*si vis esse aliquis*' to illustrate the use of *τις* = 'somebody.' But the Latin in that passage is *aliquid*.

VII., ver. 55. *ἰνθείσας*, which Mr. Nairn reads (attributing it to Crusius, though the latter has rightly given it up), and explains as 'emptied,' is part of a verb used by Hippocrates in the peculiar medical sense of 'to evacuate.' Well may Mr. Nairn say that it is here used 'tropically.' What indeed the smiling Kerdôn could gain, in the way of business, by addressing his lady customers with the words *δεῖ μάλιστα ἰνθείσας ὑμέας ἀπελθεῖν, ὦ γυναῖκες, εἰς οἶκον*, is hard to conjecture. But it seems that any possible reading—e.g., *ἰανθείσας* or *δινθείσας*—would be better than this. P. has *ΑΙΙΝΗΘΕΙCΑC*.

Catulli Carmina: recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit
ROBINSON ELLIS, litterarum Latinarum Professor Publicus
apud Oxonienses. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

It is needless to say that this work is well done. We have for many years been accustomed to regard Professor Robinson Ellis as far the greatest English authority on Catullus. In his Introduction he briefly recapitulates the facts (so familiar to readers of his larger edition) of the recovery by a Veronese in the fourteenth century, before the year 1323, of a MS. containing the long-lost poems of Catullus, the interest which these aroused, and their stimulating effect upon Italian poets of the fourteenth century. But he does much more than repeat himself. Reviewing the characteristics of the surviving MSS., on which rests our knowledge of the again lost

archetype, he notices the singular fate by which the copies of the latter, which must have been made in considerable numbers during the half century succeeding its recovery, have vanished from the knowledge of scholars from that day to this. He comments on the assertion of the writer of G (date 1375) *non enim quodpiam aliud (exemplar) extabat unde posset libelli huius habere copiam exemplandi*; and points out that this person could not have actually known the truth of the universal negative which he thus enunciated; that, accordingly, the fact of G being entitled to our chief regard rests upon its age and proximity to the archetype, not upon its having been, as alleged, transcribed from the only exemplar then existing. Professor Robinson Ellis then passes under review the other mss., the Oxford Codex (O), the Codex Romanus (R): mentioning or discussing their dates and relationship to G and to each other. But he thinks that the Codex B (*Bononiensis*) would be better than all others later than G, were it not that it is so much disfigured by corrections, which render it often difficult to distinguish the work of the emendator from that of the original scribe. Here, however, valuable aid is rendered by two mss. closely allied to B, Laurentianus I and Vaticanus 1630. The value of readings found in BLa¹ alone is sometimes very great. The editor adduces specimens of such readings which come closer to the truth than those of GOR; and concludes that BLa¹ was derived from a source different from that of GOR. Moreover, he thinks that the tradition of the archetype is sometimes more faithfully represented in BLa¹ than in the older GOR. These conclusions are developed in a most interesting paragraph. There must have been a recension of Catullus different from that attested by the Codex so strangely found and lost in the fourteenth century; this is proved by the text of LXII given in the Codex Thuanus (ninth century) compared with that given in mss. of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

But, while admiring his general handling of the text and its history, we cannot help regretting that the editor has not mentioned in the notes some conjectures which seem to have a high degree of probability, such as Prof. Bury's *Scelesta, anenti*, viii. 15, and perhaps Palmer's *Cum diva miluorum aves ostendit oscitantes*, xxv. 5. This course, however, is probably forced on him by the method of the edition, which seems to us somewhat too conservative.

Compositions and Translations by the late HENRY CHARLES FINCH MASON. London: Clay & Sons. 1903.

A PATHETIC interest hangs round this little book, the work of a brilliant young scholar, who, after winning the highest distinctions in Cambridge, died at the age of forty-six as a master in Haileybury. The volume clearly proves the taste, learning, and poetic feeling of

the author, but of course can tell us nothing of the real triumph of the young poet's life—his unrivalled skill and success in the teaching and training of English boys and the building up of character at a critical stage of its development.

The editors have made a new departure in affixing an asterisk to the pieces which their author considered to be the best. Another innovation is the printing of alternative versions. Both (especially the latter) we are disposed to question. A translator is bound to make up his mind between two versions; and it is impossible that two versions can be quite equally good unless both are bad.

The exercises which won the Porson Prize and the Browne Medal in 1878 are given, as well as an unsuccessful (but excellent) piece of iambics from *Romeo and Juliet* sent in the previous year for the Porson Prize.

All the versions seem to be of the first class, but his easy-flowing Platonic Greek prose compositions seem to us to come nearest to the very highest specimens of first-class composition, such as those of Shilleto, Sargent, Kennedy, and Jebb.

Kipling's *Recessional* is finely rendered in Latin elegiacs; but we do not care for the studious variation in the refrain. If we began to quote felicities, this notice should be very long. Excellence is the general characteristic; a few expressions here and there may be criticised:

" Never morning wore
To evening but some heart did break "

is not adequately rendered by

" Nam non ulla dies vergit ad Hesperum
Quin cor fregerit unius."

The definitiveness of *unius* spoils the thought, and *unus* is not *some-one*.

Again,

" And in my heart, if calm at all,
If any calm, a calm despair,"

is slurred in

" Et corde sub nostro veterum est,
Spesque vetat renovare torpor."

The position of *que* in

" Tristes Elissaeque exsequias canis,"

in the excellent version of Tennyson's *Ode to Virgil*, needs too much defence for a published model; and *fastidita* active in Kipling's *Blue Roses* is indefensible in verse, if endurable in prose.

Mr. Mason (rightly in our judgment) does not confine himself to the metrical standard of the fourth book, but uses the so-called licences of *Carm.* I.—III.

The renderings from Latin verse and prose are very attractive, especially that from Aulus Gellius (in which, however, we should have liked French for the Greek expressions); and Mr. Mason has contrived to introduce a certain originality into a reply to an invitation from the Senate of the University of Glasgow.

The Greek pieces are much fewer, about one-third of the number of the Latin. They are all admirable. To us the grand speech of *Constance*, ending

“And hang a calf’s skin on those recreant limbs”—

is a perfect piece of Greek iambs. A beautiful *stichomythia* from Mr. Gosse’s *Alcyon* on p. 138 is spoiled by πόσεως (disyll.), which must be an impossible form, since Euripides wrote πόσει in the verse *Med.* 910, which would have run so smoothly as

γάμους παρεμπολῶντος ἀλλοίους πόσεως.

We wish we could quote the whole of the version from Wordsworth on p. 148. It thus begins:—

“All shod with steel
They hissed along the polished ice in games”—

“καὶ πολλάκις πέδιλ’ ἂν ἐξηρτημένοι
σιδηρὲ’ ἔρροιβδούμεν εὖξεστον ῥόον
ψαίροντες”—

which is very vigorous, though we should prefer ἐξηρτυμένοι (with dat.), and σιδηρὲ’ is a doubtful form in Attic. The connexion indicated by ἐξηρτημένοι is far looser than that between skate and boot.

We hope the appearance of this admirable little book may be regarded as evidence of a revival of interest in a charming, and often unjustly discredited, accomplishment.

Homeri Opera: recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt DAVID B. MONRO, Collegii Oriensis apud Oxonienses Praepositus, et THOMAS W. ALLEN, Collegii Reginae apud Oxonienses Socius. Tomus I., Iliadis libros i.-xii. continens; Tomus II., Iliadis libros xiii.-xxiv. continens. Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

IN the production of this edition of Homer, the author of the *Homeric Grammar* has for his colleague one who had already devoted himself to the work of examining more than a hundred Homeric codices. Thus the names of the editors at once inspire

the reader with confidence in the excellence of the text and critical notes. The conservatism which is sometimes objected to as the outstanding feature of the Oxford Library is here, in this member of the series, if anywhere, wholly appropriate. For, briefly, the task of an editor of Homer is to present the text which was in use at Athens in the sixth century B.C. That recension—it is of minor importance whether it be called after Solon, or Peisistratus, or Hipparchus—a survey of the whole Homeric question marks out as the Atlas or pole of the vulgate text. The mists of antiquity will for ever rest on the source of the poems. If we attempt to ascend to Fick's Aeolic fountain, there must needs be a breach of continuity. So we are fain to begin with the broad river of song as it flowed for the Athenians of the sixth century. Even this is far up for the explorer.

The Praefatio gives a compact statement of the history of the text. From the nature of the case the subject falls under three heads. These are—(1) the testimony of the codices; (2) what the ancients, especially the Alexandrines, have to teach; (3) attempts to determine the original language of the epic poets, so far as the modern science of language helps to do so.

1. The Homeric codices cause embarrassment by their multitude. Heyne, La Roche, and Mr. Allen are mentioned for their work upon these. Mr. Leaf has contributed readings from MSS. in Paris and in London. The papyri have also offered something.

2. But as no whole MS. is earlier than the tenth century, we must have recourse to the teaching of the ancients, especially Aristarchus. Aristarchus is such a prince that F. A. Wolf said: "Aristarchea ἀγύρως facta est παράδοσις." But this overstates the case in so far as our codices are descended from an origin earlier than the Alexandrine workshop. The work done, however, in this workshop was of the highest importance. Aristarchus had before him a wealth of MSS., and on these he laboured like a first-rate critic: in short, he gives us the testimony of codices far more ancient than ours. An indication of this is that Aristarchus gives forms that had become obsolete, e.g., the subjunctive *ἔθλωμι*, where most codices have corrupted the old subjunctive into the optative. It is argued that, as other knowledge, such as historical Greek grammar, there was none, Aristarchus must have preserved the good reading just because he trusted good MSS.

Something is said on the value of the fragments lately found in the Egyptian papyri. Their date is earlier than Aristarchus. For the most part they exhibit the vulgate text. Their peculiarities, if known to Aristarchus, may well have been classed with the readings of the many inferior MSS.

3. As to the original dialect of the Homeric poems, this question was raised by Bentley when he called attention to the disappearance of the digamma. Fick, with the aid of the new science of language,

has proceeded farthest on the road then indicated. But the language of the epic poets has more affinity to the Arcadian or Cyprian than to the illustrious Aeolic of Lesbos. In any case, to proceed so far is to leave the main stream as known to the early Athenians. Higher up, sufficient guidance fails.

The end of the Praefatio disposes of certain questions of accent and form in regard to which the authority of the MSS. may securely be disregarded. For example, the form $\tau\tilde{\omega}$, which has come from the article as $\sigma\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\omega$ has come from $\sigma\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\varsigma$, is to be retained in spite of $\tau\tilde{\omega}$, which most codices give. Also the participle $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\upsilon\tilde{\iota}\alpha$, the correct Old-Greek form, is restored, following Aristarchus, except in one place, *Il.* xvii. 5, where $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\upsilon\tilde{\iota}\alpha$ has come in on the analogy of $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omega\varsigma$. (In this place some would condemn the line or the couplet: another way is possible—to infer the comparative lateness of the whole passage). In *Il.* ix. 414, where Leaf departs altogether from tradition, and accepts Nauck's conjecture $\iota\omega\mu\iota$, our editors, rejecting the vulg. $\iota\kappa\omega\mu\alpha\iota$, read and attest $\iota\kappa\omega\mu\iota$.

Altogether, the book may be welcomed as one of the best in the Oxford Series of Classical Authors.

Xenophontis Opera Omnia, Tomus III. *Expediitio Cyri*: recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit E. C. MARCHANT, Collegii Lincolnensis apud Oxoniensis Socius et Tutor. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

WE heartily welcome the appearance in the Oxford series of Mr. Marchant's edition of the *Anabasis*. The work is to us an old friend; and we are glad to see that it has been committed to hands which were sure to treat it well. The editor accepts the classification of the codices of the *Expediitio Cyri*, made by L. Dindorf, into two *genera*, whose characters separately and in relation to one another are described with a quaint humour: *Duo esse genera, quorum alterum concordia satis firma ac stabili sit coniunctum, alterum non modo cum illo bellum gerat inexpiabile, sed etiam ad rixas domesticas, ut ita dicam, proclivius sit*. He discusses the difficult question of the comparative values of the better and the worse class of codices. He expresses surprise that Gemoll should have persuaded himself not only that the *prima manus* of Parisinus C is to be preferred to all other codices, but that the inferior codices do not even deserve to be mentioned, except when a lacuna or a manifest corruption occurs in C. Mr. Marchant, by the help of the Oxyrhynchus Frag. of Book vi., well supports the comparative value of the codices deteriores against the sentence of Gemoll. His argument here is forcible, and his conclusion—*quis igitur ita normam illam Dindorfianam interpretari audeat ut bonas lectiones quae in deterioribus tantum legantur omnes prorsus abiendas arbitretur?*—

is not more rhetorical than just. He gives a detailed account of each of the codices of the better sort, C, B, A, E, stating the material used for writing on, the places where they are kept, and the use made of them severally by successive editors. He adds a slighter account of the less valuable MSS. He has followed C in orthography, unless when it conflicts with the authority of inscriptions, or with the known and regular practice of Attic Greek.

Cornelii Nepotis Vitae: recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit E. O. WINSTEDT. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

THIS text takes full advantage of the critical work of Roth, in his edition of 1841, and in his publications of ten years later, respecting the Codex Parcensis (P). The editor's "preface" describes and appreciates this MS., and briefly notices the other *subsidia* of the text. He refers to Hahn's selection and classification of the less authoritative MSS. Of himself Mr. Winstedt says:—*Nihil novi attuli; codices enim quos inspexi Parisinos, Vaticanos, Chisianos, Bodleianos, Londinensis omnes parvi preti sunt.* He has kept as close as possible to the readings of the MSS. of the best *familia*, not departing from them without cogent reason. He is not misled by the "hariolationes" of learned men, who by their corrections would fain give the work of Nepos a degree of finish and elegance not contemplated by its author.

Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit IOANNES BURNET: in Universitate Andreana Litterarum Graecarum Professor Collegii Mertonensis olim socius. Tomus iii. tetralogias v–vii continens. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

THIS excellent edition of Plato progresses apace under Mr. Burnet's skilful hands. The same width and accuracy which marked the critical apparatus of the former volumes are discoverable also in this. The same sober judgment, which is loth to introduce into the text any except the most rigorously certain emendations, characterises this as well as the parts of Plato hitherto published from the Clarendon Press. The notes record all that ordinary readers require for the knowledge of what scholars have been doing for the text. As we have said before now, no editor could do more than make a selection from the vast multitude of proposals put forward by a host of critics; and it appears to us that the selection here given is as judicious as it could be. Nothing of essential importance, so far as we can observe, seems to have escaped

Mr. Burnet. He is acquainted with the most recent contributions to Platonic study, as well as with the MSS. and oldest commentators. From Stobaeus to the latest Oxyrhynchus fragment, all sources of information have been pressed into the service by him. His preface, as usual, explains precisely the editor's standpoint and intentions. In its last paragraph he takes occasion to correct a misapprehension. Some readers, finding in his preface to the *Republic* the statement respecting Vindobonensis F that, though *deformatus sicut Glaucus ille marinus*, it is nevertheless *sincerus, nec aliunde, ut fit, interpolatus*, mistook his meaning, which was not that F exhibits no traces of interpolation, but that it contains no readings introduced *a prima manu* from other Platonic MSS. It has interpolations, but they are the work of some Byzantine *magistellus*, not of the original copyist, who was no scholar. Mr. Burnet has made good use of this Codex in two places at least, to which he himself calls attention. One is *Gorgias*, 472B; in which, for ἐν Πυθίῳ (doubtful in Plato, but occurring, however, in Herondas i. 51) he reads with F (and illustrates from Thucydides, vi. 54, 7, and C. I. A., i. 189) ἐν Πυθίῳ, for which Thompson had already argued strongly. The other passage is also in the *Gorgias*, 492 B, where, for θεοῖς of BTP, F gives ὄσοις, which, on the face of it, is more probable than the γε οἷς—seemingly a mere correction of θεοῖς—to which we have been accustomed. Of the few changes which Mr. Burnet has independently introduced we have nothing but what is favourable to say. They all appear to contain the intrinsic marks of soundness. We notice that he has recorded the conjectures of Professor Smyly, *Laches*, 189, d.

A. *Persi Flacci et D. Iuni Iuuenalis Saturae* cum additamentis Bodleianis recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit S. G. OWEN, Aedis Christi alumnus. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

MR. OWEN is well known as the scholar who has produced the most exhaustive critical edition of Ovid's *Tristia*; and he has done much other good work in Ovid and Catullus. His critical edition of Persius and Juvenal for the new series of Oxford texts is worthy of his high reputation. A long and careful Introduction deals with the estimate he has formed of the relative value of the MSS., and in this he gives the primacy to the Pithoeanus (P) above A and B—to some extent in Persius, more decidedly in Juvenal. He has also availed himself of the help afforded by other manuscripts; for example, the celebrated MS. of both Persius and Juvenal which is at Trinity College, Cambridge; two MSS. of Juvenal at Milan, and one of Persius at Oxford; and one of Juvenal at Oxford, which contains the lately discovered thirty-six verses in the Sixth Satire. This is the first edition in which these verses are printed in their place; and in dealing with the criticism of them, Mr. Owen has done valuable and

original work, besides giving a satisfactory reason why these verses appear only in this one manuscript. That manuscript, in his opinion, presents the ordinary text as it appeared before the recension of Nicaeus in the fourth century.

Mr. Owen gives several emendations of his own, of which we may mention a few in Juvenal, for Mr. Owen warns the emender off the domain of Persius:—1. 161 *accusator erit qui verbum dixerit "hic est."* The Vienna fragment gives *versu*, whence Mr. Owen conjectures *aversus*. If any change were necessary, perhaps *versus* would be simpler. 6. 415 *externata* for *exortata* or *exorata* of the codices. That there is some contrast indicated in this participle with *alti somni*, which immediately follows, seems probable. This suggests *exorta*, with some word lost before it, perhaps *Mane* or possibly *Sole* (if the latter word, it might easily have dropped out owing to the proximity of *solet*); *exorta* would then have been lengthened into *exortata* or *exorata*, to make the line scan. 7. 222 *dum modo non pereat mediae quod noctis ad horam* (*ab oram* P, but *m* marked for omission: *ab hora* all other mss., and this is the ordinary reading). We are not sure that we can put ourselves at Mr. Owen's point of view. Considering that school began very early in the morning at Rome (cp. Martial ix. 68. 3; xii. 57. 5), the satirist would naturally mention midnight as the time of *commencing* lessons; the exaggeration would be so glaring as to be absurd if midnight was mentioned as the time of *ending* school. 8. 241 *Tantum igitur muros intra toga contulit illi Nominis ac tituli quantum vi* (in P: *non* W: *vix* Hermann) *Leucade, quantum Thesaliae campis Octavius abstulit*. This most attractive emendation is already long known to fame. 9. 14 *Bruttia praestabat calidilata fascia visci*—a good blending of the mss. readings. 10. 54 *Ergo supervacua aut <prope> perniciose petuntur*. Mr. Owen adds

prope. Perhaps *tibi* (*t*) was lost after *aut*. For *tibi* lost at the same place in the verse, cp. 11. 57 *Persice, non praestem vitae <tibi> moribus et re*. Bücheler adds the *tibi* in this latter passage. 10. 90 *Visne salutare sicut Seianus, amari Tantundem* (*haberi* codd., which may have crept in from 92). The vulgate *habere* seems satisfactory enough: if not, we should suggest *haberi Tantidem*. 13. 26 *Rari quippe boni numeranti vix totidem quot Thebarum portae* (*numero vix sunt* P^a ω: *sunt* om. T: *numera*, with an erasure following P¹: *numera, vix sunt* Bücheler)—a good suggestion.

If we are to find any fault with Mr. Owen at all, it is that, at 14. 215, he follows Bücheler in reading *Parcendum est teneris, nondum implevere medullas: Naturae mala nequitia est*. The collocation *mala nequitia* is surely feeble. The vulg. *Maturae mala nequitiae*, omitting the stop after *medullas*, is much better. Conversely, we wish that Mr. Owen had followed Bücheler in reading 16. 20 *tota tamen chors* (and not *tota cohors tamen*): cp. Petronius Fragm. 30. 10 *Et pavidi cernunt inclusum chorte tribunal*, and

Rönsch *Itala und Vulgata*, p. 93. But these are trifling matters. On the whole, the edition is admirable, worthy of the editor and his famous College.

It may perhaps interest the reader if we subjoin two emendations based on the Scholia we found in our note-book as suggested by the late Professor Palmer: 6. 44 Quem toties textit *redituri* cista Latini (*perituri* codd.). The Scholion is 'qui toties *superveniente marito* sub cista celatus est.' 6. 82 comitata est Eppia *ludum* Ad Pharon. So the mss. The Scholion on l. 105 says: 'Sergiolum nomine ex gladiatore amavit qui et *Ludor* dictus est.' Hence he suggested *Ludorem*; but it is not clear that there are any hypermeter lines in Juvenal. Neither of these emendations is very convincing, but both are undoubtedly clever.

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- (1.) *The Poems of Gaius Valerius Catullus*, with an English Translation by FRANCIS WARRE CORNISH, M.A., late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1904.
 - (2.) *Horace for English Readers*; being a translation of the Poems of Quintus Horatius Flaccus into English Prose, by E. C. WICKHAM, D.D., Dean of Lincoln; Hon. Fellow of New College, Oxford. The Clarendon Press, 1903.

MR. CORNISH's book might be considered in two aspects—as a new text of Catullus, and as a translation. But from the former point of view there is no need to take it seriously: the text is merely eclectic, containing little that is new, and still less that is particularly good. Furthermore, it is not even a complete text, for Mr. Cornish has omitted most (though not all) of the lines that the lecturer of a mixed class would not care to encounter; and it is a text useless for purposes of reference, as the lines are (as a rule, but not always!) numbered continuously. We presume that this is intended to conceal from young persons the fact that improprieties have been omitted; but, quite apart from the futility of such an attempt, however skilfully carried out, there is the astonishing practice observed of indicating all omissions to the reader, so that the inconvenience inflicted on classical students is absolutely gratuitous. Turning to the readings adopted in disputed passages, we find that Mr. Cornish prints Munro's inversion in 2. 7f., which is certainly wrong, both for the reasons given by Ellis, and also because it is absurd to say that Lesbia seeks for some slight solace *when the pangs of love abate*. In 12. 9 Mr. Cornish has *desertus*, and apparently knows nothing of Palmer's admonition that every other line in this ode begins with a spondee. Indeed, he seems to be unacquainted with Palmer's edition, for we do not like to believe that he had read the excursus on 17. 3, and yet printed *axulis*. For 29. 24 he mentions several

emendations, but not L. Mueller's *o potissimi*, which is—to say the least—by far the best proposal yet made, the corruption to *opulentissime* having taken place by way of *potentissimi*. We need pursue these considerations no further: the passages adduced are fair examples of Mr. Cornish's editorial procedure throughout. There are not many original emendations, but we have found one at least. In 47. 2

Porci et Socraton, duae sinistrae
Pisonis, scabies famesque mundi,

he both suggests and prints *munda*, translating 'you plague and mere famine,' in support of which he quotes Mart. 3. 58. 45 *at tu sub urbe possides famem mundam*. This is very ingenious, and we are inclined to think *munda* may be right, though, of course, not in the sense of *mera*, but in its invariable meaning.

The translation is uneven. Often it is excellent, reproducing the original with as much effect as we can hope for; but often it falls short, not merely of that high result, but even of correctness in English. As early as the beginning of the second ode we meet such slipshod writing as this: 'Sparrow, my lady's pet, with whom she often plays and holds you in her bosom.' *Ye* and *you* both appear as the vocative in 3. 1. For 8. 6f. we get 'There were given us then those joys, so many, so merry, which you desired *nor did the maiden not desire*.' The ode to Cicero contains this slip: to *thee* his warmest thanks Catullus gives . . . *you* are the best advocate of all. In 22. 10 'Suffenus seems to be *nothing but any* goatherd' is very bad.

Again, there are some inaccuracies. We say nothing of 'whose lips will you press?' for *cui labella mordebis?* (8. 18), or of 'the brazen face of the beast' for *ferreo canis ore* (42. 17). These and the like are due to Britannic modesty. But there is no excuse for translating *disertus* (12. 9) by 'connoisseur,' *abhorret* (22. 11) by 'is absurd,' *vappa* (28. 5) by 'windbag,' *taberna* (36. 15) by 'meeting-place,' *maestius* (38. 8) by 'as moving as,' *reus* (39. 2) by 'prisoner,' *contendunt* (44. 4) by 'will wager,'—and so on. Then there is the unfortunate word *infacetus*: twice it appears as 'clumsy,' once as 'ill-bred,' and nowhere does it mean either!

But, in spite of such defects as these, we should have recommended the work warmly to classical students, if only the text had been given in full. The book is beautifully bound and beautifully printed, with generous margins on both sides of the letterpress; the translation is in the main correct, and rises, in the case of the longer poems, to a very high pitch of excellence; and the price is moderate. It is a lamentable thing that so good a book is rendered of no use to anyone, in the supposed interests of morality—a consideration which does not, be it noticed, prevent Mr. Cornish and his publishers from implying in the title-page that the work is in every respect complete.


To Dean Wickham's translation of Horace we can give cordial praise without reserve. It is true that this work also pays full homage to Mrs. Grundy; but then the title, 'Horace for English Readers,' is in this respect charged with significance. There is a brief Introduction, which deals with the poet's life and writings, and with the latter in a very happy vein. To prove this we give part of the criticism on the Odes:—

"There is no collection of poems which has been so frequently quoted: and this is because there is none which has given such perfect expression to the elementary experiences and universal sentiments of the general readers of literature. The shortness of life, the mutability of fortune, the delights of friendship, the pleasures of ease, mirth, jollity, and wine, the lighter and superficial aspect of love, its caprices, jealousies, quarrels, and reconciliations, the rudimentary lessons of practical philosophy, patience, contentment, moderation—these are all touched again and again in phrases which catch the sense with their music, and dwell in the memory from their terseness, simplicity, and happiness. If the poetry of the Odes is the poetry of art rather than of nature, it is art that has proved inimitable. When Horace ceased to write, 'the mould was broken.'"

Dean Wickham has placed before each piece a brief account of its subject-matter; and there are notes at the foot of each page to explain mythological, historical, and geographical allusions. The style of the translation is excellent: it achieves simplicity without baldness, accuracy with intelligibility. In short, we can recommend it confidently alike to those who know their Horace at first hand, to those who knew him once upon a time, and to those who know him not, and never knew him.

By the kindness of the publishers, and of the School of Irish Learning, we have received a copy of *Ériu*, vol. I., part 1. This publication marks a most important stage in the progress of the movement for the restoration of the language of Ireland to its due place in the knowledge and esteem, not merely of Irishmen, but of all who are interested in linguistic studies. *Ériu*, vol. I., part 1, contains contributions from Messrs. Strachan, E. J. Gwynn, Kuno Meyer, J. G. O'Keeffe, J. H. Lloyd, *Ḷórpna Ó'Áiréarig*, R. I. Best, and T. P. O'Nowlan. This periodical cannot but be of the greatest assistance to a school which aims at training students in the scientific study of the Irish language, and in reading and interpreting Irish manuscripts. The present number contains the first fruits of the studies of several students of the school. We wish all success to the School of Irish Learning, and also to *Ériu*, which represents it so creditably.

EDITOR, *Hermathena*.



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
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ON THE KOMMÓS IN THE *CHOEPHOROE*.

(vv. 306-478.)

AS the long κομμός in the *Choephoroe* presents very great difficulties—the whole of it and many single parts and verses—it may not be useless if I try to contribute something to its understanding, and, perhaps, emendation.

Wilamowitz, in his special edition of this tragedy, has the merit of calling attention to the general plan of the whole κομμός, although he is not always happy in his statements. Let us begin by that. I distinguish four parts, likewise as Wilamowitz (A B C D); but I begin at a different point, and mark different limits of the parts, except in the case of B. Of course we must be guided by the arrangement of the strophes and anapæstic systems. Now the first six strophes have been arranged in one manner, which is rather artificial and uncommon; and the next two in another, less artificial; and the third and last two in a third, the vulgar one. But the arrangement of the first six clearly indicates a bipartition of these, the arrangement being identical in each part—a b a c b c, d e d f e f; so we have the four parts, two of three strophes each, and two of two strophes. The anapæstic systems have been placed at the beginning and in the centre both of A and B, and lastly, at the close of D; besides, there is no system either in C or in D. Wilamowitz has altered, by way of violent transposition, the arrangement of strophes

in C. According to the Mediceus, it is this: g h h g; whilst in D the corresponding strophes immediately follow each other, i i k k. Of course we seek for a progress of thought and feeling in harmony with this external arrangement; and we find it without difficulty, as far as Orestes and Electra are concerned. In A those two do nothing but lament; in B they invoke the gods of heaven and hell to pity their destitute state; in C, to which part the last antistrophe of B forms a transition, Orestes is instigated by his sister and the Chorus to take vengeance; in D, he being firmly resolved, they invoke the aid of Agamemnon and the gods for the instant combat.

Let us now consider the single parts. The beginning system, a combination of three small systems of three cola each (306-314), presents no difficulty; but the first strophe, 315-322, is one of the most difficult in the whole κομμός. The Mediceus gives it thus:

ὦ πάτερ αἰνόπατερ τί σοι
 φάμενος ἢ τί ῥέξας
 τύχοιμ' ἂν ἔκαθεν (first hand καθεν) οὐρίσας
 ἐνθά σ' ἔχουσιν εἶναί
 σκότῳ φάος ἰσοτίμοιρον
 χάριτες δ' ὁμοίως
 κέκληνται γόος εὐκλεῆς
 προσθοδόμοις Ἀτρεΐδαις.

I have abstained from interpunction, this being one of the difficulties. In the rhythmical composition four parts appear, either identical or similar, of two cola each. I do not enter into a discussion on the rhythms, because this would be the subject for a separate treatise, but only note this fact, which does not recur in any of the subsequent strophes. But in the third line one syllable (the fourth) abounds, as is shown by the antistrophe; καθεν (Med. pr.) would do (υ--υυ-υ-). In the sixth either ἰσόμοιρον or

ἀντίμοιρον must be read, the rhythm being υ-υυ-υ-υ. If then this partition of the strophe be evident, and in the antistrophe, also, the sentences are four, in correspondence with the rhythmical periods, it follows that likewise in the strophe the main division, in all probability, will be after the fourth colon, and not after the fifth. Most editors, in fact, give this punctuation, and the scholiast explains in the same manner: ἐναντίον μὲν τὸ φῶς τῷ σκότῳ τυνέστι, πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ζώντων καὶ τεθνεώτων. In the last clause after this he takes γόος for the subject, and χάριτες for the predicate, identifying ὁμοίως with ὁμῶς. But that is inadmissible: ὁμοίως (which recurs at the same place in the antistrophe, according to a fashion widely spread in antistrophical poetry) must be 'likewise,' not 'however,' and between the two clauses there must be parallelism, not opposition. Also, since the verb (κέκληνται) is in the plural, and χάριτες is at the beginning of the sentence, it is probable that this is the subject, and γόος the predicate. "There is a division between the realm of light and the realm of darkness, and likewise, what is favour among the living becomes nothing but lamentation, when belonging to the dead." For κέκλημαι = εἰμί see Pers. 242, οὔτινος δοῦλοι κέκληνται φωτός, and other passages. Εὐκλειῆς προσθόδοις Ἀτρεΐδαις = "with praise of those who *formerly* reigned over this palace." The first four cola are clear in their general sense; the object to οὐρίσας must be the word or deed, not (as Wilamowitz translates) the father; for this would be by far too great a result, of which Orestes cannot even think. There were in the third verse from ancient times two readings, ἂν ἔκαθεν, which is also that of the scholiasts, and ΑΝΚΑΘΕΝ or ΑΓΚΑΘΕΝ. ΑΝΚΑΘΕΝ is, as Dindorf states, ἂν καθ' ἑν, which would be opposite to ἀθρόα; this gives no good sense. ΑΓΚΑΘΕΝ is said by grammarians to be a syncopate form of ἀνέκαθεν; whether this be true or not, we have no means to ascertain. The

sense 'from above' would be good, but we should miss the *άν*. *Άν* *ἐκαθεν* is less good in sense, and there is the metrical difficulty. But since in all the other passages (14. 418 Ag. 1233, in Ag. 622 read *καληθῇ* with Schütz) no other participle follows after *τύχοιμ' άν*, I think we may either correct *καθεν* to *πόθεν*, "whence may I reach thee and pass thee my words?" with a second interrogation, or *οὐρίσας* to *οὐρίας*, with *καθ' ἓν* in the sense of 'for any part' (of my deeds and words).

We go on to the second strophe (323-331), by which the Chorus reminds Orestes that the spirits of the dead have by no means been extinguished, and that therefore invocations of them are not unavailable. In the fourth colon, *ὁτοτύζεται δ' ὁ θνήσκων, ὁτοτύζεται*, of course, is passive, not middle voice; nor is it difficult to reconcile *ὁ θνήσκων* with this sense—he who died then, because he died, and died in this manner. So the Chorus says that lamentation has the power of awakening vengeance: *ἀναφαίνεται δ' ὁ βλάπτων*, therefore do lament, mostly of all in the case of a father. The genitives, in v. 329 f., *πατέρων τε καὶ τεκόντων* are objective, not subjective; instead of *τε*, Hermann's *δε* is preferable. *Ἀμφιλαφῆς* 331 seems to refer to both children, although I do not say that it means from *both* parts; *τὸ πᾶν*, as the Mediceus gives the words, must be the object ("full vengeance"), although it elsewhere, as 434, is like an adverb (*omnino*), and the scholiast understands it thus. Then we must read (with O. Müller) *ἐνδικον*; cp. schol. *ζητεῖ τὸ ἀντιτιμωρεῖσθαι*, and *ζητεῖ . . . τὴν ἐκδίκησιν*. Also *ροπὰν* (Lachmann, cp. 61) is better than *τὸ πᾶν*.

The following first antistrophe gives the lamentation, according to the admonition of the Chorus: *κλυθί νυν ὦ πάτερ ἐν μέρει πολυδάκρυτα πίνθη, audi igitur*. But who is the speaker or singer? Commonly this antistrophe is assigned to Electra; so the scholiast: *ἐν μέρει: κατὰ διαδοχὴν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ*

ἀδελφοῦ. But in the text itself we find quite a different notation: not only the first colon has a paragraphos prefixed, but also the third and the seventh, and besides there are the adscripts ξξω to the first and ξσω to the third, as again ξξω to 345 (3. strophe) and ξσω to 353 (2. antistrophe). This refers to a notation by διπλαῖ, of which there were two species, one ξξω νεύουσα (<) and one ξσω νεύουσα (>); cp. the last chapter of Hephaestion's treatise περὶ ποιήματα, where some explanations on the use of these signs are given, but without possible exact application to the present case. This much is clear, that the signs here refer to alternative speakers; and we may supply the same adscripts to vv. 338 (ξξω) and 340 (ξσω), in accordance with the paragraphi. It follows that in antiquity there existed a division of the antistrophe between two speakers, Orestes and Electra; and we noted before that the rhythmical composition of this strophe does point in the same direction, there being a division into four parts, either equal or similar. According to this and to the paragraphi, the antistrophe is to be written thus:—

OP. κλυθί νυν, ὦ πάτερ, ἐν μέρει
πολυδάκρυτα πένθη.

HA. δίπαις τοί σ' ἐπιτύμβιος
θρήνος ἀναστενάζει.
τάφος δ' ἰκέτας δέδε-
κται φυγάδας θ' ὁμοίως.

OP. τί τῶνδ' εὖ; τί δ' ἄτερ κακῶν;
οὐκ ἀτρίακτος ἄτα;

ἐν μέρει 332 is 'alternately,' from myself and from my sister. It is to be borne in mind that in the strophe Orestes had not lamented his father, but only reflected whether that would be available; but now he does lament, and both do, but Orestes first. That the antistrophe is divided between two speakers, and the strophe is not, has

a parallel in Euripides' *Medea* 1271 ff.: str. 1271-1281, divided between XO. and ΠΑΙΔΕΣ; antistr. 1282-1292, XO. alone. It seems to me much more forcible if both speakers alternate than if Electra speaks alone.

The following anapæsts of the Chorus comforting the children, and showing the hope of coming better times, present no very great difficulty. Νεοκῤῥα φίλον 344 is explained by the scholiast: Ὁρέστην τὸν νεωστὶ συγκεραθέντα ἡμῖν; and the widely-spread metaphorical use of συγκερανύναι is so well in harmony with this, that it is best to refrain from emendation, except for the last word: κομίσειε Porson instead of κομίζει Med. The other interpretation in the scholia, τὸν φίλον νεοκῤῥα scil. κρατῆρα, makes a rather hard ellipsis (there being no mention of wine in the context), and does not suit κομίσειεν.

Next comes the third strophe, sung by Orestes (345-353), an expansion of Homer's *Odyss.* ω 30 ff. = α 237 ff. There is a full stop at the end of 347 (Wilamowitz). He wishes that Agamemnon had fallen at Troy, instead of being murdered at home; the comfort of the Chorus has not yet availed. The latter, in the second antistrophe (354-362), enters, as it seems, into the same strain, and even continues the same sentence: φίλος φίλοισι τοῖς ἐκεῖ καλῶς θανούσιν κατὰ χθονὸς ἐμπρέπων σεμνότιμος ἀνάκτωρ κτέ. But Wilamowitz, following Heimsoeth, has altered ἐμπρέπων to ἐμπρέπει, and in v. 360, with Hermann, ἔζης to ἔζη. So the picture of Agamemnon's reigning among the dead, which this antistrophe gives, becomes real instead of hypothetical, and the Chorus persists in comforting the children. These corrections, indeed, seem necessary. The last verses are infected with manifest corruption: μόριμον λάχος πιμπλάντων χεροῖν πεισίβροτόν τε βάκτρον. Schol.: τὴν ἐκ Μοιρῶν βασιλείαν κεκληρωμένην (cp. λάχος) ἔχων, and τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κτέ.; we see that also the scholiast read the accusative, and not πεισιβρότω

τε βάκτρῳ, as Schuetz corrects. But first of all, the prosody is wrong: *πίπλάντων*, and generally the shortening of the first syllable in *πί(μ)πλημι* or *πί(μ)πρημι*, never occurs. Other considerations are even more obvious; and as the scholiast seems to have read a participle in the nominative, Dindorf's *περαίνων* is very attractive. Cp. Plato, *Laws* XII. 959 (of the dead man): *οἷχισθαι περαίνοντα καὶ ἐμπιπλάντα τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν; περαίνων* might be explained by *ἐμπιπλάς*, and the corruption be the result of the confusion of the two verbs. But if we accept this emendation, we must also accept *πεισιβρότῳ βάκτρῳ*, as Dindorf does; for *βάκτρον* = *σκῆπτρον* = *βασιλεία* is a rather long way.

Electra's third antistrophe (363-371) goes farther than Orestes' strophe in wishes belonging to the past: *γυναικικῶς οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀρέσκειται, ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνερῶσθαι* (Schol.). The first clause is: *μηδ' ὑπὸ Τρωίας τείχεσι φθίμενος πάτερ* (Med.) *μετ' ἄλλων δουρικμητι λαῶ παρὰ Σκαμάνδρου πόρον τεθάφθαι* (Ahrens: *τέθαψαι* Med.). Hermann's *πατήρ* instead of *πάτερ* makes the words less pathetic; besides, *πάτερ* seems to be warranted by 346 (at the corresponding place of the strophe). Also the scholiast has: *λείπει τὸ ὥφειλες* (*ὥφειλες* rightly Blaydes); and: *ἀπέστρεψε τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ* (corr. *αὐτῆς*), a scholion which evidently belongs to the same verses (see Wilamowitz, p. 195, 1). There is no great harm in the returning from the apostrophe in v. 367: *πάρος δ' οἱ κτανόντες νιν οὕτω δαμῆναι* (*λείπει τὸ ὄφελον*, schol.) The closing lines are: *θανατηφόρον αἶσαν πρόσω τινὰ πυνθάνεσθαι τῶνδε πόνων ἄπειρον*, with a gap of two syllables — before the first word, cp. in the strophe *κτίσας πολύχωστον ἂν εἶχες*. One of the scholia, *τοῖς ἐκείνων*, seems to refer to the missing word: <*δόμοις*> *θανατηφόρον αἶσαν κτέ.*, with a third infinitive, the subject of which is Agamemnon (*νιν*). Before *δόμοις* there is either a full stop or at least a colon. Electra thinks of the death of her mother; therefore a stress lies upon

δόμοις, which is to be construed with θανατηφόρον, and τινά with αἶσαν; ἄπειρον, which refers to the subject of πυνθάνεσθαι, may be corrected to -ρος (Blaydes), scil. ὥφελεν. The present πυνθάνεσθαι gives no offence: that he might hear repeatedly, and from more messengers than one, if it happened so; there was no result to be obtained by his hearing this, which would require the aorist.

II. *Second Part.*—The opening anapæsts of the Chorus, 372-379, rebuke Electra for her impossible wishes, and recall her to the cruel reality of facts. Only the last verses have some difficulties: τῶν δὲ κρατούντων χέρες οὐχ ὅσαι στυγερῶν τούτων (τούτω, Bamberger). παισὶ δὲ μᾶλλον γεγένηται (-ηται, Blomfield). Schol. τοῦτο ἰδίᾳ ἀναπεφώνηται, τῶν ἄγαν στυγερῶν τούτων, and cp. *Prom.* 439, θεοῖσι τοῖς νέοις τούτοις. But γεγένηται seems right, although the scholiast also read the singular.

The fourth strophe (380-384) is assigned by the scholiast to Electra; and as the antistrophe (394-399) indeed seems more appropriate for Orestes, I accept this distribution. The admonished one, who is Electra, answers first. The four last verses, containing the invocation of the gods (see above), have not yet been corrected: Ζεῦ Ζεῦ κάτωθεν ἀμπέμπων ὑστερόποιον ἄταν (or ἄτην; the Med. gives both readings)¹ βροτῶν τλήμονι καὶ πανούργῳ χειρὶ, τοκεῦσι δ' ὁμῶς τελεῖται. This has neither construction nor sense. It is easy to write ἀμπέμπειν; but there is also a metrical difficulty, because the antistrophical δαίξας shows the measure $\cup _ _ :$ see Ag. 207, Hik. 680, Ch. 1071. As ἀμπεμπ-, on the other hand, looks genuine, there is only this possibility for an agreement between strophe and antistrophe, that we make δαίξας bisyllable, that is to say δαίξας or δάξας, and correct ἀμπέμπιον to ἄμπεμπ(ε). It is true that a bisyllable δαιζω

¹ The Med. has ἄτην, with a dot on each side of the α, and so it rather frequently gives in other cases, accurately

preserving the old way of noting a traditional *varia lectio*. See my edition of Aristotle's *Πολιτεία*, p. viii⁴ ff.

nowhere occurs; but we may compare *δαιος*, which is in Aeschylus eleven times trisyllable (*δαῖος*), but six times bisyllable (*δαῖος*), and also *αιστος*: five times *ἄιστος*, but once (*Eumen.* 565) *ἄιστος* or rather *αἰστος*.¹ Since the prayer is general, the present *ἄμπεμπε* (not *ἄμπεμψον*) is unobjectionable; and since it is Aeschylus, and not another poet, we have no right to question the appropriateness of *Ζεῦ* — *κάτωθεν ἄμπεμπε* (not *ἄνωθεν κατάμπεμπε*). Aeschylus, at least, knows Zeus (or a Zeus) everywhere: see *Hiket.* 157 f. *τὸν* — *Ζῆνα τῶν κεκμηκότων*; and 231 *Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν*; and especially the well-known fragment of the *Heliads*: *Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθῆρ*, *Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ*, *Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός*, *Ζεὺς τοι τὰ πάντα χῶτι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον*. The last clause *τοκεῦσι δ' ὅμως τελεῖται* is thus explained by the Scholiast: *ἵνα τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ πατρὶ μου φυλαχθῇ*. Both *τοκεῦσι* and *ὅμως* are acknowledged; but instead of the indicative *τελεῖται* he seems to have read the infinitive *τελεῖσθαι* (denoting a wish), which he explains by *ἵνα* with the subjunctive. So Heimsoeth. *Τοκεῦσι* is to be referred (as Blaydes does), like *τεκομένων*, 419, to the mother and not to the father. "Although they are parents": cp. *Pers.* 840 *ὅμεις δὲ, πρέσβεις, χαίρετ' ἐν κακοῖς ὅμως ψυχὴν διδόντες ἡδονῇ καθ' ἡμέραν*.

Fifth strophe, 385-393. The chorus approves Electra's wish and prayer, but expresses a much stronger desire for vengeance: *ἐφθυμῆσαι γένοιτό μοι πευκήεντ' ὀλολυγμὸν ἀνδρὸς θεινομένου γυναικὸς τ' ὀλλυμένας*. What signifies the adjective, and how is the verse to be made agree with the antistrophical (410): *πέπαλται δαυτὲ μοι φίλον κῆαρ (τόνδε κλύουσιν οἴκτον)*? *Πευκήεντα* and *κῆαρ* would do, and *πευκήεις* = *πικρός* is attested; but the scholiast explains by *πανηγυρικόν*, *λαμπρόν*, and *κῆαρ* monosyllabic never occurs. Dindorf's *πυκάεντα* is preferable in sense, if indeed the

¹ I see no way of making out of *ä + i* the diphthong *q* = *ai*.

grammatical doctrine remounting to Herodianus attests the dialectic neuter *πυκάες* in the sense of *ισχυρόν*. But the following verses present more serious difficulties: *Τί γὰρ κεύθω φρενὸς θεῖον ἔμπαρ ποτᾶται πάροιθεν δὲ πρῶρας δριμύς ἄηται καρδίας θυμὸς ἔγκοτον στύγος*. Here is a manifest imitation of Homer, *Il. Φ 386 δίχ' αἰ δὲ σφιν* (the gods) *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἄητο* (Klausen). Hermann's *κραδίας* is required by the antistrophe; the same critic writes *οἶον* instead of *θεῖον*, for the same reason, although *θεῖον* seems to be acknowledged by the scholiast: *δμως (i.e. ἔμπαρ) τὸ εἰμαρμένον περιπίπτται (παρήπτ. cod.) πάντας καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐπιβουλεύθειη παρὰ τὸ μοιρίδιον*. This explanation seems wrong and far-fetched, but *θεῖον* might be a presentiment, cp. *Agam. 1084 μένει τὸ θεῖον δουλίᾳ περ ἐν φρενί*. For the metre also *κεύθω φρενὶ θεῖον ἔμπαρ; ποτᾶται* would do. Cp. v. 102 *μὴ κεύθετ' ἔνδον καρδίας*. But another difficulty lies in *(ποτᾶται) πάροιθεν δὲ πρῶρας*, which has induced Wilamowitz to think of a contrary wind, since the favorable one comes from behind the *πρύμνα* (*κατὰ πρύμναν* *Soph. Phil. 1451*). The scholiast, on the other hand, explains *πρῶρας* by *τῆς ὕψεώς μου*. This indeed is truly Aeschylean: *βλάστημα καλλίπρῳρον*, *Sept. 533; στόματος δὲ καλλιπρῶρον* *Agam. 236*. Then the chorus says: I (inwardly) feel something like a strong wind blowing in my face; and this same feeling may be a presentiment floating in my mind and sent by the gods. It is a *δριμύς θυμὸς*, an *ἔγκοτον στύγος*. We may compare the passage in *Agam. 975 f.*: *τίπτε μοι τόδ' ἐμπέδως δεῖμα προσπατήριον καρδίας τερασκόπον ποτᾶται*.

The following words of Orestes (fourth antistrophe, 394-399) need but one correction, which has been found by Ahrens: *κλυτε δὲ Γᾶ (τα Med.) χθονίων τε τιμαί (Med. pr.; corr. τετιμέναι, cp. the schol.)*. *Ἀμφιθαλὴς Ζεύς 394 f.* may be understood as analogous to 381, of the all-comprehending deity; there is no need of altering the adjective,

although its meaning remains somewhat obscure; see Wilamowitz' commentary. But at any rate the usual accentuation καὶ πότ' ἄν (ἀμφιθαλῆς Ζεὺς ἐπὶ χεῖρα βάλοι) is to be retained, against Wilamowitz' καὶ ποτ' ἄν. Καὶ at the beginning of an interrogative sentence is very common: 179 καὶ πῶς—, 216 καὶ τίνα—, 218 καὶ πρὸς τί—, 528 καὶ πῶς—, and so on; whilst there is no instance of καὶ at the same place followed by an indefinite pronoun. Orestes is still wavering between fear and hope; but he is more decided than his sister, and as a prince claims his rights, also in the name of the land: πιστὰ γένοιτο χώρα (may the land have a surety now). δίκαν δ' ἐξ ἀδίκων ἀπαιτῶ (I claim my right after so much injustice). How these words can be assigned to Electra, I am unable to see.

A brief anapæstic system of the chorus (400–404) asserts that blood will have blood; but since they say ἀλλὰ νόμος μὲν—, without an opposite clause, there is still a doubt left as for the present case. Τῶν πρότερον (Med. -ρων) φθιμένων is an easy correction (by Portus); the traditional reading is harsh, and not to be excused by τῶν προτέρων φάος in Sophocles (Antig. 102), where there is no second genitive as here.

Sixth strophe (405–409). This, too, is more appropriate for Orestes (Schütz, schol. v. 412) than for Electra, to whom the antistrophe (418 ff.) certainly belongs. The sequel OP. XO. OP. is analogous to that in 363 ff. HA. XO. HA. The text has been fairly well preserved, except in two places. In the beginning ποῖ ποῖ δὴ is commonly corrected to ποποῖ δᾶ (Bamberger), cp. τί δ' ἄν φάν(τες) in the antistrophe. But there is no need to change δὴ, by which this strophe is annexed to the preceding anapæsts; in the Persae we have likewise (1070) ἰωὰ δὴ κατ' ἄστυ. Inspired by the words of the Chorus, Electra begins passionately to invoke the gods, although her last verse is again a cry of despair. The other difficulty is in the second verse: (ἴδετε πολυκρατεῖς ἄρα)

φθιμένων (Med.pr. φθειμένων), whilst the antistrophical verse ends in (πρὸς γε τῶν) τεκομένων. Φθινομένων (Ahrens, Weil) has one defect, that the middle form of this verb is without examples; otherwise it suits well the antistrophical τεκομένων, this too being a rather (but not quite) unusual middle form instead of τεκόντων. Φθιμένων comes a few verses before, 403; hence the suspicion that the whole verb (not only the form) has by repetition taken the place of another.

Fifth antistrophe, 410-417, sung by the Chorus like the strophe: πέπαλται (Turnebus: πεπάλατε and -ται Med.) δ' αὐτέ μοι φίλον κέαρ τόνδε κλύουσαν οἶκτον. καὶ τότε μὲν δύσελπις, σπλάγχνα δέ μου κελαινοῦται πρὸς ἔπος κλυούσῃ, ὅταν δ' αὖτ' ἐπαλκὲς θραρέαπέστασεν ἄχος πρὸς τὸ φανεῖσθαι μοι καλῶς. Notwithstanding the corruptions, the general sense is clear: the feelings are still divided. Δαυτε (after πέπαλται) must be δι' αὐτε=δαυτε, not δ(ε) αὐτε: see Wilamowitz. Instead of μου, editors write μοι (Schütz); the anacoluthon μοι . . κλύουσαν (cp. the scholium: ἀντὶ τοῦ κλυούσῃ) is similarly found (among other instances) in Sophocles' *Electra*, 479 f.: ὑπεστί μοι θράσος ἀδυπνώων κλύουσαν ἀρτίως ὀνειράτων. But can κλύουσαν and κλυούσῃ in the next verse but two stand together? There is another scholium to 412 τότε: δτε σε οἰκτιζόμενον ἴδω, Ὅρεστα. Did not this scholiast read ἐσιδοῦσαν οἶκτον? No doubt the preceding strophe had been accompanied by violent gesticulations; so ἐσιδοῦσαν οἶκτον is not incorrect. For κελαινοῦται 413, Hiket. 785 κελαινόχρως δὲ πάλλεται μου καρδία, Pers. 114 ταῦτά μου μεταγχίτων φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ, *Iliad* A 103 f. are rightly compared; πρὸς ἔπος is "in accordance with the word which I hear" (cp. e. gr. πρὸς τὰς παρούσας πημονὰς ὀρθῶς, Prom. 1002). The last words seem hopeless, but in reality the corruption is not quite so bad. Ὅταν δ' αὖτ(ε) wants a verb in the subjunctive, but also the metre wants a bacchius: ὅταν δ' αὖτ' ἐπαλκὲς

(= ἰσχυροποιὸν schol.) <κρατήσῃ> θάρσος (Wecklein; see Agam. 982), ἀπέστασεν ἄχος πρὸς τὸ -υ- καλῶς. For -υ- we have φανεῖσθαί μοι, schol. πρὸς τὸ καλὰ μοι ἔννοεῖν. I should like to cancel μοι, and to alter ΦΑΝΕΙΘΑΙ to ΦΑΜΙCAΙ φάμισαι, indeed a most easy correction. Πρὸς τὸ φάμισαι καλῶς = "so that I speak words of good omen." Cp. 568 ἧ καὶ Λοξίας ἐφήμισεν.

Sixth antistrophe, 418-422: (HΛ.) τί δ' ἂν φάντες τύχοιμεν; ἦ τὰπερ πάθομεν ἄχα πρὸς γε τῶν τεκομένων; Φάντες (εἰπόντες schol.) τύχοιμεν is an evident correction by Bothe, instead of πάντες τύχοιμεν ἄν: cp. above, 315 ff. The scholium is this: τί δεινὸν εἰπόντες κατὰ Κλυταιμῆστρας τύχοιμεν τῆς σῆς συμμαχίας ὧ πάτερ; ἦ ἂ πεπόνθαμεν; Rather τῆς τῶν θεῶν συμμαχίας; for throughout these strophes the gods are invoked, not Agamemnon. With the two interrogative clauses compare Agam. 1114 f. τί τόδε φαίνεται; ἦ δίκτυόν τί γ' "Αἶδου; 'H seems to be preferable also here; γε is 'even.' But what follows is not easy to understand. Πάρεστι σαίνειν τὰ δ' οὔτι θέλγεται λύκος γὰρ ὥστ' ὠμόφρων ἄσαντος ἐκ ματρός ἐστι θυμός. Schol.: πάρεστι σαίνειν: τῇ μητρὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα, and again to θυμός: ὁ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος. I am afraid, lest if we continue to disregard this explanation, we never shall understand either this strophe or the following. The first scholium, it is true, is wrong in so far as it gives σαίνειν an object never mentioned in the context: but there is still another scholium to the same verse: τὰ ἄχα. These are, in the first line, the murder of Agamemnon, and that they are not to be composed nor coaxed away, was stated long before this by the Chorus in the parodos. See 42 ff.: τοιάνδε χάριν ἀχάριτον ἀπότροπον κακῶν ἰὼ γαῖα μαῖα μωμένα μ' ἰάλλει δύσθεος γυνά· - - τί γὰρ λύτρον πεισόντος αἵματος πέδοι; Therefore we may interpret the words of the κομμός thus: πάρεστι τῇ ἐμῇ μητρὶ σαίνειν ταῦτα τὰ ἄχη (or τοῦτο τὸ αἶμα, or even τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα), ἀλλ' οὔποτε θέλγεται, and: θυμός ὑπάρχει δν ἡ μήτηρ μου οὔποτε

σαίνειν δύναται (ἄσαντος ἐκ ματρός, to be taken together). Even this constitutes the hope of the children; and from this strophe the whole κομμός takes a new turn, a firm resolution succeeding more and more instead of doubt and unavailing lamentation. The correction λύκου (Bamberger), instead of λύκος, seems necessary; cp. λύκου ὥστε ὠμόφρων . . . θυμός with Sept. 52 σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμός-λεόντων ὥς.

III. The next strophe (7. 423-433) is divided between XO. and HA. (O. Müller), and the antistrophe (444-455), between HA. and XO., in the same loose manner of correspondence which we met elsewhere in this κομμός. In this strophe alone there is a mixture of trimeters (with the usual license for spondees) and lyric verses, and therefore (as we should call it) not an air, but a recitative (with παρακαταλογή). The Chorus begins: ἔκοψα κομμὸν Ἄριον ἐν τε Κισσίας νόμοις ἰηλεμιστρίας. When? Some say that they do it now; for ἔκοψα can be referred to the present time, as ἐγέλασα, ἤνεσα, ἔδεξάμην, and so on (see Blaydes). But then there ought not to be ἦν in v. 425, which is confined to the past; on the other hand, ἐπιρροθεῖ, 427 (Med.) suits well this explanation. Others say that what was done at the death of Agamemnon is described; so ἐπιρροθεῖ must be altered to ἐπερρόθει (Stanley). But Wilamowitz himself, who advocates this interpretation, owns that it is nowhere indicated by the poet, and that the sudden transition to so remote a scene is neither to be praised nor to be palliated. I think we must abandon both ways, and take a third: ὁ θυμός ἄσαντός ἐστιν, although I myself have employed the most violent means in that direction by order of the queen: see the parodos str. 1 (v. 22 ff., especially 23, ὀξύχειρι σὺν κόπῃ, of which this is an expansion). Of course, then, ἐπερρόθει is the right reading; but there are still other blunders of scribes in these verses. The worst is the tautology ἄνωθεν ἀνέκαθεν (κτύπῃ δ' ἐπιρροθεῖ) 428 (schol. τῷ ἄνωθεν ἐπαγομένῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ κτύπῃ); I should not like to

correct with Bamberger κάτωθεν, but prefer *ἐνερθεν* (Herwerden). In the next verse, *κροτητὸν ἄμὸν καὶ πανάθλιον κάρα*, Enger strikes out the *καὶ*; but a lyric verse of the measure *υ-υ-υ-υ-υ-υ-υ* seems less appropriate than a trimeter; and the antistrophical verse (450), although mutilated, has also the appearance of a trimeter: *τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων ἐν φρεσὶν γράφου*—(see below). The scholiast has the curious remark: *κωμῳδεῖται*, scil. *τὸ ἔπος* or *τὸ λαμβεῖον* ὡς *διθύραμβος* (so Med., not *διθύραμβῶδες*); cp. schol. Eum. 626: *συνεχὲς τὸ ὄνομα* (*τιμαλφεῖν*) *παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ δι' ὃ σκώπτει αὐτὸν Ἐπίχαρμος*, and (Dindorf) Schol. Pers. 65 (*κωμῳδεῖται*), Sept. 345 (*κεκωμῳδῆται*). In 425 Wilamowitz maintains the spelling *ἀπρικτόπληκτα* (*ἄπριγκτοι πληκτὰ* Med.) against Blomfield's *ἀπριγδόπληκτα*, and writes *πολυπάλακτα* (*δ' ἦν ἰδεῖν*), where the Med. gives *πολυπάλαγκται*, and originally had *πολύπλαγκται*; commonly *πολυπλάνητα* is written (Blomfield). The corresponding verse is (446) *μυχῇ δ' ἄφερκτος πολυσινοῦς κυνὸς δίκαν*: this commends either *πολυπλάνητα* or *πολυπάλακτα*, but excludes <δε> *πολύπλαγκτά τ(ε)*, with different collocation of *πολυ-*. But *πολυπλάνητα* seems better for the sense. That the *δέ* comes after two combined adjectives is nothing strange in Aeschylus: see Dindorf, Lex. Aesch., p. 77.

In the second part of this strophe Electra, whose mind is still dwelling on the scene of Agamemnon's murder (419), as apt to secure them now a help from the dead (418), goes on to recall the honourless burial of the murdered king, in contraposition to the false honours now bestowed on him, which were described by the Chorus. To this Orestes replies in the eighth strophe, which Wilamowitz¹ has ventured to transpose after ant. 7 (v. 455), being thereby obliged to mark a gap after the transposed strophe, because in 456 again Orestes is the speaker. Some

¹ Originally Weil, but he has since abandoned his own conjecture.

anapæsts of the Chorus, he thinks, have been omitted. But his principal reason for transposing rests on unstable ground. We see that Orestes is exhorted, in ant. 7, by the Chorus and by his sister, to take vengeance; now he seems to have already come to that resolution in str. 8, 435 f.: πατρὸς δ' ἀτίμωσιν ἄρα τείσει ἕκατι μὲν δαιμόνων, ἕκατι δ' ἁμῶν χειρῶν. I simply answer that the punctuation is wrong, and that ἄρα most certainly indicates an interrogative clause (as Paley): ἄρα τείσει—χειρῶν; as always in Aeschylus.¹ So there is still doubt; not yet resolution. On the other hand, the strophe is indispensable at the place where it stands, because the following antistrophe addresses Orestes, which would be intolerably harsh after the transposition: ἔτλας 433 Clytaemestra, next verse (now 439) εἰδῆς Orestes.

Eighth antistrophe, 439-443, XO.: ἐμασχαλίσθησ δὲ τωστοστείδης (so Med.), ἔπρασσε δ' ἄπερ (Med.) νιν ὧδε θάπτει, μόρον κτίσαι (Stanley, cp. schol.: Med. κτείνει, but pr. κτει. αι) μωμένα ἄφερτον αἰῶνι σῶ. κλύεις (Turnebus, cp. schol.: Med. κλύει) πατρώους δύας ἀτίμους (Stanley: Med. δυσατίμους). The scholiast rightly had ἐμασχαλίσθη (Robortellus); the following words may be corrected in more than one way: δ', ἔθ' (Canter) ὡς τόδ' (Pauw), or δέ γ' (Martin, Hermann), ὡς τόσ' (Klausen) εἰδῆς, or δέ γ', ὡς τόδ', as Blaydes writes. But ἄπερ (the same Clytaemestra, who —) must be retained (Blaydes), not altered to ἄπερ with Portus. On the μασχαλισμός (which was credited with having the power of making the murdered man unable to take vengeance) see Blaydes and Wilamowitz. Μόρον κτίσαι μωμένα ἄφερτον αἰῶνι σῶ is, "trying to make the death unavengable and therefore a lasting infamy and calamity for thee."

¹ One instance more is quoted for an affirmative ἄρα, v. 297: τοιοῦδε χρησμοῖς ἄρα χρὴ πεποιθέναι, καὶ μὴ πέποιθα, τοῦργον ἔστ' ἐργαστέον. I write (as

Paley) τοιοῦδε . . . πεποιθέναι; as Wilamowitz translates ("darf ich bezweifeln was er sagt?").

Seventh antistrophe, 444-455, (a) HA. 444-450. Since *μυχῷ* 446 has been corrected by Stanley to *μυχῶ*, and *χαίρουσα* (*χέρουσα* pr. Med.) 449 by Dobree to *χέουσα*, and in the same verse *κεκρυμμένα* to *κεκρυμμένον* (Dindorf): the only difficulty lies in the last verse (450), in connexion with the following one. The Mediceus thus gives them: *τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων ἐν φρεσίν | γράφου, δι' ὧτων δὲ συν(τέρραινε μῦθον κτέ.)*, the metre being, according to the strophe, one trimeter and one dimeter, the latter of the form $\cup - \cup - - \cup -$, *ἰὼ ἰὼ δαίτα*. But it is very easy to cancel one *ἰὼ*; and I am very much tempted to do so. *Ἰὼ δαίτα* would be either an iambic tripod or a dochmius; now we have in the parodos, just as here, in the strophe (v. 45) *ἰὼ γαῖα μαῖα μωμένα μ' ἰάλλει*, and in the antistrophe (55) *δι' ὧτων φρενός τε δαμίας περαῖνον* (cp. also 469 *ἰὼ*—474 *δι' ὦ(μὰν)*). The v. 55 seems also to afford a good correction for 451 f.: *δι' ὧτων δὲ σῶν* (Blomfield) *πέραινε μῦθον ἡσύχῃ φρενῶν βάσει*, instead of *συντέρραινε*. We have the scholia: *διατόρει*, *διακόμιζε*, and *ἡρεμαῖα τῇ ψυχῇ*; and lastly: *ἀντὶ τοῦ προσέχων καὶ μὴ ἀποπλανώμενος*. *Διατόρει* is an explanation of *τέρραινε*, but no more sufficient than this verb itself; *διακόμιζε* suits *πέραινε* and has the sense required here. In 55 f. *περαῖνον* is 'pervading,' 'penetrating' (cp. Pind. Pyth. x. 28); if we adopt *πέραινε* in 452, it must be in the sense of 'make pervade or penetrate'; and ordinarily *περαίνειν* is a transitive verb, although not quite of this sense, but rather denoting 'to bring to an end.' By writing *σῶν* we not only remove a preposition unfit for this passage, but also the unparalleled combination (by unity of word) of an ordinary trimeter (since it contains a spondee) with a lyric verse: *δι' ὧτων δὲ συν|τέρραινε κτέ*. Now, if *σῶν* be right, the supplement *σαῖσιν* (*σέθεν*) for the preceding verse (Blomfield, Paley, etc.) is almost certainly given: *<σαῖσιν> ἐν φρεσίν* (or *φρασίν*, which was the Attic form attested by th

inscriptions), or ἐν φρεσὶν <σαῖσιν> (Seidler), or ἐν φρεσὶν <σέθεν> (Bothe), or ἐν φρ. γράφου <σέθεν> (Paley).

That the next words (451-455) belong to the Chorus and not to Electra is almost self-evident, not only because of the correspondent partition in the strophe, but chiefly because τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων . . . γράφου and δι' ὧτων . . . βάσει are identical in sense. Ἡσύχῳ φρενῶν (Turneb.: Med. φρονῶν) βάσει is compared with Sophocles O. C. 198 ἐν ἡσυχαίᾳ βάσει and Trach. 967 ἄσφοτον βάσιν. Next comes (453 f.) τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει (schol. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ συμβάντα Ἀγαμέμνονι), τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ὀργαῖ μαθεῖν. These last words are explained by the Scholia in two ways: ἐπιθυμεῖ (ὀργᾶ) δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ γινῶναι ὁ πατήρ, τουτέστι τὴν τιμωρίαν, or μάθει τῷ τρόπῳ σου (τῇ ὀργῇ), with infinitive instead of imperative. But Scaliger is right in correcting ὀργά = ἐπιθύμει,¹ cp. 305 θήλεια γὰρ φρήν' εἰ δὲ μή, τάχ' εἴσομαι (Butler: εἴσεται Med.), or εἰ δ' ἐμή, τάχ' εἴσεται (Rh. Mus. x. 462, scil. Aegisthus). At any rate, the approaching combat is to be understood: 455 πρέπει δ' ἀκάμπτῳ μένει καθήκειν. For the last word the scholiast gives the explanation ὀρμᾶν κατ' αὐτῶν; modern scholars compare 727 νῦν γὰρ ἀκμάζει Πειθὼ δολίαν ξυγκαταβῆναι, scil. ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα. Καθήκειν is, so to say, the perfect of καταβαίνειν, = καταβεβηκέναι, and expresses the same sense more strongly.

IV. Ninth strophe 456-460; ninth antistrophe 461-465, OP. HA. XO. First, three identical cola (υ-υ-υ-υ-υ-υ-υ-) OP. HA. XO.; the following two, which are different, are given by Wilamowitz to all three jointly, which seems impossible for the antistrophe: XO. τρόμος μ' ὑφέρπει κλύουσιν εὐγμάτων. τὸ μόρσιμον μένει πάλαι, εὐχομένοις δ' ἂν ἔλθοι.

¹ A second instance for ὀργᾶν in Aeschylus is the verse quoted by Didymos on Demosth. Phil. (ed. Diels, 1904) col. xiv., 12 ff.: ὀργα τὸ πρᾶγμα

διεμύδαν' ἥδη νέκυς (ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς τῆς Καδμείας νεκρῶν τῶν πρὸς τὴν ταφὴν ἐτοιμῶς ἐχόντων (from the Ἑλευσίνιοι).

The connexion of thought is here very close: why at all *τρόμος*? Because the *μόρσιμον* is approaching now, called by the prayer: ἀλλ' ἔταν σπεύδῃ τις αὐτός, χὼ θεὸς ξυνάπτεται Pers. 742. Fate is unavoidable, but man may accelerate it. In 461 ("Ἀρης" Ἀρει ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίκη Δίκα) it is clear that not the god Ares is thought of, nor the goddess Δίκη, but that the conflict is between force and force, claim and claim; therefore the spelling with minuscules is more appropriate. The Med. has ξυμβάλλει: -βαλεῖ (Pauw) and -βάλοι (Porson) are both possible. After ἰὼ θεοί, κραίνει' ἐνδίκως there is an iambic word missing; many supplements have been proposed; none is certain.

Tenth strophe and antistrophe, 466-470, 471-475. That the Chorus sings the first three verses, is not to be doubted; but I do not think that there is no changing of speaker throughout these strophes and the following anapæsts (475-478), as is commonly supposed. Better thus: XO. ὦ πόνος ἐγγενῆς | καὶ παράμουσος ἄτας | αἱματόεσσα πλαγά. | OP. ἰὼ δύστον' ἄφερτα κήδη. HA. ἰὼ δυσκατάπανστον (-παντον Wecklein) ἄλγος. As the last two cola are identical, there seems to be the same parallelism of analogous and similar words spoken by different speakers, which we saw in the preceding strophe, and which more extensively occurs in the στιχομυθία 489 ff. Then the antistrophe and the anapæsts: XO. δώμασιν ἔμμοτον τῶνδ' ἐκάς, οὐδ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἔκτοθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν. HA. δι' ὧμᾶν ἔριν αἱματηράν. OP. θεῶν <τῶν> κατὰ γᾶς ὅδ' ὕμνος. XO. ἀλλὰ κλύοντες, μάκαρες χθόνιοι | τῇσδε κατευχῆς πέμπει' ἄρωγῇν | παισὶν προφρόνως ἐπὶ νίκη. As for the single words, παράμουσος πλαγά, 467, looks very strange (schol. ἐκτὸς τοῦ καθήκοντος); Heyse proposes κἀπαράμυθος (see Prom. 185), which seems to me nearly convincing. The same thought recurs in the antistrophe, in a more expanded form: for I feel quite sure that ἔμμοτον (scil. φάρμακον) means a remedy infused into charpie (see Dindorf, Thesaurus), and that ἐκάς is by no means to be

altered (ἄκος Schütz). Cutting alone avails. Cp. Agam. 1103 f. (κακὸν) ἄφερτον φίλοισιν, δυσίατον· ἀλκὰ δ' ἐκὰς ἀποστατεῖ. Then : οὐδ' ἀπ' ἄλλων (scil. γέγονε τάδε), ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ; δι' ὧμάν ἔριν is rightly explained by the scholiast : ἦν ἤρισε πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. These last verses from 466 present as it were a brief return to the lamentations by which the κομμός began ; but the resolution is still there, as the anapæsts show, and more clearly the following spoken scene in trimeters, 479-509, which gives the conclusion of the long episode interrupting the course of the action.

F. BLASS.

METRICAL PROSE IN THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CICERO.¹

FOR metrical prose in general we would refer our readers to a very able review of Prof. Zielinski's *Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden* by the well-known Ciceronian scholar, Mr. Albert C. Clarke, in the *Classical Review* for April, 1905 (vol. xix. No. 3), pp. 164-172. We will give a brief *résumé* of a few of his results, and then consider the way in which M. Bornecque has applied the theory to the Correspondence of Cicero.

Metrical prose, like other literary discoveries, is believed to have had its origin in Greece. Thrasymachus, familiar to us as a *persona* in Plato's *Republic*, is said to have been the first to have recourse to this source of rhetorical effect. Demosthenes had favourite rhythms, the ditrochee, disponde, cretic + trochee, choriambic + trochee. Cicero tells us that the Asiatic writers sometimes inserted words merely in the interests of the rhythm—a statement which we can well believe, and which we fancy could be illustrated from the works of Macaulay as well as those of Hegesias. The Asiatic school of rhetoric became popular at Rome. Cicero, *Orator*. § 214, quoting from a speech of C. Carbo which he himself heard, comments on the fine rhythmical effect of the ditrochee at the end of the clause in the words *temeritas filii comprobavit*, adding *quaero nonne*

¹ La Prose Métrique dans la Correspondance de Cicéron, par Henri Bornecque. Paris, 1898.

id numerus effecerit? verborum ordinem immuta: fac sic, comprobavit filii temeritas: iam nihil erit.

We can see, then, that Cicero was a thorough believer in the effect of a certain *clausula* in oratory. How far definite canons were obeyed in his various writings is a question on which different opinions will be formed. Metrical prose, it is agreed, was eschewed by Caesar, Sallust, Tacitus, and hardly appears in Livy. Seneca, Pliny, and Fronto more or less conform to it, and late writers like Symmachus and Ausonius adhere closely to its canons.

Prof. Zielinski's theory, which is based altogether on statistics, is broadly this—In every *clausula* there are two parts, a basis and a cadence: the basis consists of a cretic, or its metrical equivalent; the cadence varies in length, and is trochaic in character. The first class presents three forms:—

Form I. - ∪ - | - ∪ (the last syllable being common, as in verse).

Form II. - ∪ - | - ∪ | ∪.

Form III. - ∪ - | - ∪ | - ∪.

The St. Petersburg Professor claims to have examined all the *clausulae* in all the speeches of Cicero 17,902 in number. According to him, 10,845 or 60·3 per cent. conform to these three forms. Such *clausulae* are called *verae*, and are denoted by *V*.

The second class *L* (= *licitae*) allows resolution of long syllables, and the substitution of an epitrite for the cretic in the base. Classes *V* and *L* account for 15,620 *clausulae* out of the 17,902, that is, 86·8 per cent.

The third class *M* (= *malae*) includes forms so metrical as to resemble poetry.

The fourth *S* (= *selectae*) substitute a spondee for the trochee immediately after the base.

The fifth *P* (= *pessimae*) substitutes a dactyl for a trochee (*a*) in the base, (*b*) in the cadence. The last of these is the *clausula heroica*. *PP* indicates the most licentious clausulae.

Prof. Zielinski deduces from his statistics a canon of authenticity for the speeches of Cicero; the genuine should show *V + L* clausulae in number approximating to 86 per cent. Thus he proves the authenticity of the *pro Marcello* (*V + L* 88·3), *De Domo* (88·8); and the spuriousness of the *Controversia in Sallustium*, in which *V + L* = only 50 per cent., the other 50 being *M + S + P*.

In the same way he takes from Livy xxi. and Pliny's *Panegyricus* portions equal to Cic. *pro Caecina*, the result being:

Cicero, *V + L* = 86·8.

Pliny, *V + L* = 81·16.

Livy, *V + L* = 17.

Other interesting corollaries on his main thesis will be found in the article. For instance, *i* for *ii* is found to be the almost invariable form of the genitive of the second declension in the case of substantives (though in the clausula of Carbo quoted above *fili* is required, and *ii* is frequent in proper names). The spellings *reccido*, *relliquus*, *redduco* are demanded by the evidence of the clausula, *deese* is always dissyllable, and we have *vemens* and *vehemens*, *nil* and *nihil*, *reprendo* and *reprehendo*. The copyists seem to have had a tendency to prefer syncopated forms, as in *volitarunt*, *cumulasti*, *numerasse*, where *volitaverunt*, etc., would make the clausula regular. The clausula establishes *Caecina*, *vindum* not *vinculum*, and *gratius* not *gratis*. The question is greatly complicated by theories as to equivalence in resolution. For instance, it is hard to see why - - - = - ∪ -, unless we take in the consideration of the Latin accent, a large and difficult subject.

Mr. Clarke has examined some modern versions "by a well-known master of the art" of Latin Prose composition, and has found an "alarming number of *M*, *S*, *P* and *PP* clausulae." However, our modern scholars may well be satisfied if they can write as good Latin Prose as Caesar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, even though they do not conform to the standard of Cicero's Orations.

We now come to M. Bornecque's application of the canons of Metrical Prose to the correspondence of Cicero. We will place before our readers the account which the author in his Preface gives of his theory and of the way in which it occurred to him.

Louis Havet, to whom, as well as to Gaston Boissier, he dedicates his work, had found in Symmachus, who flourished in the last half of the fourth century of the Christian era under the emperors Gratian, Maximus, and Theodosius, a tendency to make the closing words of each phrase conform to certain laws. Examination of the letters of Pliny the Younger, Fronto, and Ausonius, led M. Bornecque to a like conclusion with regard to them. Hence it occurred to him that this might be a phenomenon characteristic of the epistolary style. Now, one's first thought would naturally be that the observance of any hard and fast law—beyond that sense of taste which we call "ear," and which makes every good writer observe a kind of rhythm in the arrangement of his clauses—would be singularly alien from the ease and *abandon* which ought to characterise letters worthy of that name, letters which are not rather pamphlets or manifestoes. So we are not surprised to find that it was not long before he discovered that *all* the letters of Cicero are not written in metrical prose. But we confess that we were somewhat astonished when we learned that of the three books of the letters to Quintus only one letter, the first of the first book, could be brought into any resemblance to conformity with the

metrical standard; and still more, when we were told that of the sixteen books from Cicero to Atticus, containing about 450 letters, *all are non-metrical except Att i. 15 and part of Att. iv. 1.* Of the letters *ad Familiares* and *ad Brutum* about half are regarded as metrical.

On the comparative prevalence of metrical prose in the series *ad Fam.* one might, perhaps, found a certain plausible theory. One might say that metrical prose is characteristic of formal, as distinguished from familiar, letter-writing, and hence its absence from the letters to Atticus and its prevalence in the collection so largely made up of formal political pronouncements and ceremonious letters of introduction or congratulation. But faith in the theory is destined to experience some rude shocks, as it is gradually unfolded, and as we are presented with its examples and exceptions. Let us follow M. Bornecque in his pursuit of this task. "A text," he writes, "is said to be written in metrical prose when the metrical form of the last word of each phrase determines the metrical form of the words which precede the final word." His illustrations may be given in his own words:—

L'expérience montre, en outre, que devant un polysyllabe, précédé de un, deux ou trois monosyllabes, les choses se passent généralement comme si l'on remplaçait par un mot unique le groupe métrique formé par le ou les monosyllabes et le polysyllabe. Ainsi un mot du type *esse* ne peut être précédé que d'un mot prosodiquement constitué comme *oris*, comme *diceres*, ou enfin comme *corrigere* qui est la monnaie de *oris* ou de *diceres*. Les mots de même constitution métrique se trouveront aussi devant un mot de type *audirent* par exemple, ou *haec audi*. Un mot comme *uideatur* sera toujours précédé d'un mot prosodiquement constitué comme *esse* ou *corrigere*. Les autres types de mots ou de groupes qui terminent les phrases doivent également être précédés de certains types de mots ou de groupes et de ceux-là seulement.

In trying to test this rule we are met by difficulties which could easily have been avoided. By "a word of

the type of *esse* " does M. Bornecque mean a trochee beginning with a vowel? If not, if he merely means a word forming a trochee (as seems likely), then *posse* is such a word. Now we take up the *oratio pro Milone*—a work which surely ought to be in metrical prose. We have chosen the *Pro Milone* for sufficient reason, as we think. This oration was composed carefully and at leisure as a specimen of what a defence of the most powerful kind could be. The speech actually delivered by Cicero in court was a failure. That which we possess is a masterpiece. It is, indeed, from the logical point of view an elaborate *ignoratio elenchi*, but, as a piece of advocacy addressed to Roman jurors of the time, it is a triumph. Cicero certainly would not have failed to enlist the resources of metrical prose, if it had been generally recognised as a source of effect, so generally as to have been essayed (as M. Bornecque says it was) by illiterate *roués* like Antony and Dolabella. We find § 11 ending with *iure posse*. Now, *iure* is not prosodically constituted like *oris* (a word very ill chosen for a type, as the last syllable may be either short or long according to its meaning); for *oris* must be a spondee if it is "la monnaie de" *corrigere*, though, indeed, we cannot see how -- is equivalent to -○○○ or -○-, while we recognise the mutual equivalence of the two last. But certainly -○ could not be "change for" -○○○, for -○-, or for --, unless we take in the consideration of accent, to the practical exclusion of mere prosody. To proceed to the next type *audirent* (which, we are told, requires the same "metrical constitution before it"), *occidunt*, which is "change for" *audirent* in every respect, is preceded by *raedarium* in § 29. Let us go on to *videatur*, which according to M. Bornecque demands as its vaunt-courier the prosodial equivalent of *esse* or *corrigere*, and we run over the same speech, only to find many marked exceptions.

We do not deny that there are clausulae which are

examples of the rule, like *esse pereundum* § 30, *auspicia veniebat* § 49; but the exceptions are numerous, and the examples may often be accounted for by the fact that the *usus loquendi* dictates the order of the words, as in § 64, where *negligere potuisset* may be quoted as an example of the metric rule. But who will say that this order was observed because a word of the metrical value of *videatur* demanded a foregoing word of the value of *corrigere*, and not because the usage of the language makes the dependent infinitive precede the word on which it depends?

In § 66 Cicero writes *res ipsa loqueretur*, which conforms to the rule; but *res ipsa* is quite as natural an order, if not more so, than *ipsa res*; and there is a good reason (independent of metrical prose à la Symmachus) for the order adopted by Cicero; for *res loqueretur* would be the end of a hexameter verse, and rhythm (which is a real influence) forbids in prose a verse clausula. Yet this very hexametric ending (absolutely violating the metric canon) is by no means always avoided even in the most polished works of Cicero, e. g., to go no further than this speech, it occurs several times: *cum mihi adesset* § 37, *reliquerat morientem* § 48, *Romam properaret* § 49, *sine custodia proiciebat* § 56, *quid vultu extimuitis* § 79, *foro volitarunt* § 91, *exterminabitur proicietur* § 101, *non potuisse* § 102 (bis),—all of which conflict with the rule which requires type *esse* or *corrigere* before type *videatur*, and all of which involve a *clausula heroica*.

Thus we have tested by a speech which certainly should be in metric prose the illustrations which the author himself has adduced in expounding his theory, and have found them inadequate to bear it out.

But we find that the rule is often much more elastic, that sometimes *four or five* metrical types are admissible before the final word; that resolution of long syllables is allowed to make two (or more as in *corrigere = oris*) short syllables equal one long; and that exceptions may be

made to disappear (*a*) by altering the punctuation, (*b*) by altering the text.

Donc, pour savoir si un texte est métrique et connaître les lois que suit l'auteur, il faut relever toutes les fins de phrase, et les classer d'après leur forme métrique. Si le texte est métrique, on ne trouvera, devant un même mot, que quatre ou cinq formes métriques employées : encore se réduisent-elles généralement à une ou deux formes principales, dont les autres ne sont que la monnaie par résolution des longues. Les exceptions, peu nombreuses, disparaissent la plupart du temps après un examen attentif des fins de phrase sur lesquelles elles portent ; elles appartiennent à un passage corrompu, viennent d'un mauvais choix parmi les variantes des manuscrits ou ont été indûment marquées d'une ponctuation forte, alors qu'une faible suffirait. Des corrections s'imposent ; on les fait. Le texte tout entier reçoit un aspect métrique uniforme.

Moreover, it is here laid down that it is not the difference in the *character* of the letters (though this is subsequently used as a criterion) which enables us to class the letters as metric and non-metric. It is not that the *gay*, careless letters are written in defiance of the laws of *la prose métrique*, while the serious and weighty epistles conform to its canons. No ; the non-metrical letters are those in which there are the most numerous exceptions to the rules. "The distinction sometimes is delicate."

On verra, par l'examen des listes, que la plupart des exceptions qui y sont inscrites se trouvent dans les lettres non métriques. Ce sont d'ailleurs ces exceptions même qui m'ont permis de distinguer les lettres métriques et celles qui ne le sont pas. A vrai dire, la distinction est parfois délicate. On trouvera que j'aurais pu tenir pour métriques certaines lettres où l'on rencontre très peu d'irrégularités. Mais comme c'est moi, en somme, qui ai fixé, d'après mes statistiques et mes catalogues d'exemples, les règles qui me permettaient de reconnaître si une lettre est métrique, j'ai mieux aimé pécher par excès de scrupule que par excès de liberté ; je n'ai pas voulu surtout paraître me rendre la tâche trop facile.

Moreover, before certain words of the type of *ferant, ardeo, delectantur* we read that *une grande liberté est laissée à l'écrivain*. On such principles, and if such modifications of them are to be accepted, we can hardly imagine a theory, however fanciful, which could not be defended with some plausibility.

We have seen that in the voluminous correspondence with Atticus there are only two metric missives; the first is i. 15, the second iv. 1. M. Bornecque, apparently forgetting the criterion just referred to, which amounts to this, that letters are metrical when they are metrical and not when they are not, and reverting to the "character" criterion, accounts for the metricality of these two epistles on the theory that, though addressed to Atticus, they really deal with matters of public interest, one (a note of a few lines) with the appointment of Quintus Cicero to the government of Asia, the other with the reception of Cicero himself in Rome after his return from exile. But the latter ceases to be metrical at § 8, and presents some exceptions. For instance, in § 7 *alterum se fore dixit* is an irregularity; but M. Bornecque explains this by pointing out that Cicero is quoting the words of Pompey; we have only to add inverted commas to "*alterum se*," and to refrain from asking the question why Pompey in speaking of himself did not say *alterum me*. In the same section *pontifices responderunt* must be emended by correcting to *responderant*, or must be regarded as part of a tetrameter iambic quoted from some unknown poet, though it is not easy to see how it was that these words, which certainly do not burn with lyrical inspiration, lived in the memory of Cicero as a gem of poesy, or, indeed, how otherwise, had he been contented with the humble vehicle of prose, he could have worded the sentence, "the pontiffs answered."

Could anything put in a stronger light the fanciful

grounds on which letters are denominated as metrical and non-metrical. There are scores of the letters to Atticus which deal with matters of far greater public interest than the appointment of Quintus, but which are regarded as non-metrical. The only reason why Att. i. 15 is called metrical is that in its two short sections, by a very natural accident, there is no violation of the metric canons. In *Quint. Fr.* i. 1 there are seven irregularities, six of which M. Bornecque removes by altering the text, while of the seventh *quam omnino non irasci* § 38 he writes "Je ne vois pas la correction possible."

In proceeding with his attempt to point out how some of Cicero's letters to his various correspondents are metrical and others not, he sometimes confesses that he finds himself in difficulties. Of the three to Fadius Gallus (Fam. vii. 23-25) 23 only is metrical, though there is an "irregularity" in § 3, *delectat habebis*, to be removed by changing the punctuation. He confesses that he sees in the *subject* no satisfactory reason for metricality, but hazards the guess that "perhaps Cicero thinks that Gallus will not keep to himself a letter in which the great orator discusses with him questions of art, and which shows Cicero's intimacy with himself."

We notice that neither the beautiful letter from Servius Sulpicius on the death of Tullia (Fam. iv. 5) nor that in which Matius deals so finely with the character of Caesar (Fam. xi. 28) is regarded as metrical. The exclusion of the former is certainly remarkable, for M. Bornecque himself observes that Cicero's letters of consolation are all metrical. It is strange, then, that Sulpicius should have neglected a source of beauty in a letter on which he evidently expended so much pains. As to most of the epistles, if there are not too many "irregularities," he plays Procrustes with them by means of emendation, transposition, and punctuation. We will examine his

treatment of a few very celebrated missives. The highly interesting account of Caesar's visit to Cicero at Puteoli in 709 (45), which would surely have had a public interest, is non-metrical. There is no attempt to account for this ; but sometimes essays in this direction are somewhat amusing. For instance, Fam. xii. 10 is unmetrical among several metrical epistles "because it announces bad news and therefore is not meant for the public." So, in explaining the fact that a letter from Munatius Plancus (Fam. x. 23) is not metrical, he says "it is rather a diary of military operations than a letter," but adds

Je ne me dissimule pas tout ce que ces explications ont de subjectif, mais je n'en vois pas d'autres, ni surtout de meilleures.

In Cicero's letter to Lucceius (Fam. v. 12) M. Bornecque has to remove five "irregularities," which would, we suspect, have excluded it from the metrical class, were it not that Cicero himself (Att. iv. 6. 2) describes it as *valde bella*.

Among the correspondents of Cicero we find only six who write "partially metrical" letters, M. Antony, Balbus, Vatinius, Munatius Plancus, Lentulus, Asinius Pollio. Six other letters are classed as "wholly metrical." They are by Marcellus, Dolabella, Lucceius, Balbus and Oppius, Plancus, and D. Brutus. There is a metrical *Senatus consultum* (Fam. viii. 8, §§ 5-8).

It is a strange list, which omits writers like Sulpicius and Matus, and includes wastrels like Dolabella and dunces like Antony, one of whose letters (not, however, included among the metrical) is full of bad grammar and helplessly inarticulate and incoherent (Att. xiv. 13A).

The rest of M. Bornecque's treatise is mainly composed of metrical groups or 'fins de phrase.' There are thirty-five final words which are given, together with the prosodiacal combinations which should precede them, and references to examples and exceptions in the corre-

spondence. It would be very tiresome to attempt to go through even one of these; but we will take as a sample the first type *ferant*, and give his conclusion.

Of sentences ending with the type *ferant* there are in the correspondence (according to M. Bornecque, who we have no doubt has behaved with absolute honesty in the performance of his arduous task) 582 examples *plus* 2 doubtful. He deals with the different combinations before this final word. Of the type *oras ferant* there are 416 examples, of which 69 are dismissed as involving a parenthesis which makes the final word doubtful; while the rest are found to exhibit in metrical letters a spondee before the final iambus. They are metrical because they exhibit this result—they exhibit this result because they are metrical. The next clausulae examined are of the types

<i>finger</i>	}	<i>ferant.</i>
<i>amoveant</i>		
<i>ire</i>		
<i>scripserint</i>		
<i>restituerint</i>		
<i>accipere</i>		
<i>et beneficium</i>		
<i>atque beneficium</i>		

The examples added together number 166, of which about 100 occur in metrical letters. We have to give the same account about these. The letters in which the type is found are denominated metrical. Where it is not found, the letters are unmetrical. This is his conclusion:—

Ainsi, devant un mot du type *ferant*, sont métriques: le Spondée, le Trochée, le Crétique et le Choriambé. Il en est probablement de même du péon I (*accipere*) et du groupe formé du péon I suivi d'une longue (*restituerint*); mais il y a trop peu d'exemples de l'un et de l'autre pour que l'on puisse rien affirmer à ce sujet: de même pour le dactyle.

M. Bornecque then proceeds to examine thirty-four other final-word types with from ten to a dozen combinations before some of them. What we have said of the *ferant* type is broadly applicable to each of these. But the vagueness of the result is even more marked. Before *ferantur* with its ten precedent combinations is permitted a long syllable (except when preceded by four short), or a dactyl, or "perhaps" the group *restituere ferantur*. In each case a list of irregularities follows. Before *ferebantur* and its precedents "*semblent licites une syllabe longue ou un dactyle*."

We find on p. 143 a curious conclusion :—

On voit que, devant tous les mots commençant par un iambe, exception faite pour ceux du type *ferant*, on doit trouver certainement une syllabe longue, très probablement un dactyle. Pourquoi ces formes ont été choisies plutôt que d'autres, pourquoi *ferant* est traité de façon différente, c'est ce que j'aurai l'occasion de dire en parlant de la prose métrique en général (§ 419).

Turning to § 419 to find out why type *ferant* is dealt with differently from other iambic types, we learn nothing but the necessity of scientific punctuation in metrical prose, and cannot discover anything bearing on the exceptional treatment of type *ferant*.

The examples which we have already given of M. Bornecque's method and its application will, we think, sufficiently show the arbitrary and fanciful nature of the laws of *La Prose Métrique* as applied to Cicero's correspondence.

Though Prof. Zielinski seems to have shown that Cicero imposed upon himself certain hard and fixed laws in the management of the cadences in his speeches, we maintain that no such case has been made out for the correspondence; and we think it improbable that Cicero ever troubled himself about rhythm in his letters, except in

a few, such as his letter to Lentulus (Fam. I. 9), which is rather a manifesto than a letter. In the others there is no closer conformity to fixed metrical rules than can be accounted for by chance, and by the fact that Cicero, like every great writer, always broadly conforms to the general but unwritten laws of rhythm. The writings of Burke and Macaulay would probably approximate as closely to formulated canons.

We have not so far said anything which could be interpreted as throwing a doubt on Zielinski's results. But are we not right in supposing that he is the author of *Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie*—a work not marked by sanity either of method or of conclusion? One of his discoveries in that work is that the *Pax* of Aristophanes is a kind of installation play to commemorate the unveiling of a statue of *Peace* by Phidias not otherwise known.

In his *Clauselgesetz* we meet equally fanciful speculations. For instance, he compares the version of the letter of Lentulus to Catiline by Cicero (*Cat.* III. 12) with that of Sallust (*Cat.* 44), and arrives at the conclusion that the version in Sallust is the more authentic, as being less rhythmical. In his opinion Cicero has recast the words of Lentulus to bring them into conformity with the *Clauselgesetz*. We give the two versions :—

CIC. *Cat.* III. 12.

Quis sim scies ex eo quem ad te misi : cura ut vir sis et cogita quem in locum sis progressus : vide ecquid tibi iam sit necesse et cura ut omnium tibi auxilia adiungas, etiam infimorum.

SALL. *Cat.* 44.

Quis sim ex eo quem ad te misi cognosces : fac cogites in quanta calamitate sis et memineris te virum esse : consideres quid tuae rationes postulent : auxilium petas ab omnibus etiam ab infimis.

Now, it is at first sight obvious that the Sallustian version is far the more literary. The Ciceronian shows many signs of haste. The repetition of *cura ut* in so short a missive is careless, and a comparison of the turns of phrase in each will at once show the superior finish of the letter in Sallust. And naturally—Cicero probably was reading from the actual missive or a hasty copy of it; Sallust recast it for his History in literary fashion. But it is amusing to observe that even rhythmically, on Zielinski's own showing, there is little to choose between them. The three clauses in Cicero are *S, S, L*; the four in Sall. are *S, L, L, M*. There is not a *V* in either. It is grotesque to suppose that Cicero should thus have tuned up a document to be read in court: but if he had so far forgotten a prosecutor's duty as to garble an important piece of documentary evidence, we might at least expect that he would have made all the clauses *verae*, and somewhat polished the diction.

We are disposed to believe that Cicero in his speeches began with a consciousness of paeons and epitrites, but soon contented himself with a "subliminal" conformity to rhythmical principles, not pronounced enough to justify any tampering with the text of a good MS. or preference for that of an inferior. No doubt Tennyson in his poems was at first conscious of a massing of vowels for rhythmical purposes; but we cannot believe that he habitually fettered himself with certain necessary sequences of vowels, or aimed at anything more than a general effect.

A passage in Mr. L. T. Hobhouse's *Democracy and Reaction* (page 83), though primarily political in its purport, appears to us, however, to have a bearing on the present condition of continental scholarship:—

"It is true German specialism is a power, and the weight of German learning has had an effect on thinking people all the world over. But it is precisely the vice of modern German

thought that it is specialism. It is learning divorced from its social purpose, destitute of large and generous ideas, worse than useless as a guide in the problems of national life, smothering the humanities in cartloads of detail, unavoidable, but fatal to the intellect. In the Germanisation of the intellectual world we see the reason why the advance of knowledge has as yet borne so little fruit or life."

We deem it a fortunate circumstance that none of the really great prose writers among the contemporaries or successors of Cicero shackled themselves with the *Clausalgesetz*, but left to pedants and decadents the fetters under which the consummate artist himself was able to walk with grace.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF INDIA.

STUDENTS of history will welcome the volume which has been given to the world by Vincent Arthur Smith, late of the Indian Civil Service, and a distinguished *alumnus* of Dublin University. The materials of Indian history have hitherto existed in a very scattered form, partly in the works of Continental savants, partly in the transactions of learned societies who dealt with Oriental investigation. In neither form were they easily accessible to the historical student. Elphinstone's admirable History cannot be superseded; but a good deal has come to light since Elphinstone's time, which until the appearance of Mr. Smith's book has only been recorded in scattered and inaccessible forms. Even under the skilful handling of our author, the archives of early India display a total want of what may be described as co-ordination. At almost every page we come across defects in the evidence of alleged facts, or of the reality of persons. The two events on which there is most light are the invasion of Alexander the Great and the reign of Asoka Maurya. These events are closely connected, not by chronological order only. It is possible that if Alexander had lived and had persevered in the project of annexing India, the history of the peninsula might have been something very different from what it actually was. But no sooner had the news of the great conqueror's death reached India than a revolt against Greek ascendancy broke out. The leader of the

movement, Chandragupta, was connected by birth with the Kings of Magadha, the principal state in Northern India. He was in exile at the time of Alexander's invasion, and appears to have had one or more interviews with the Macedonian King. Mr. Smith quotes Plutarch as ascribing to him the opinion that Alexander, if he had advanced, would have made an easy conquest of Magadha, by reason of the extreme unpopularity of the reigning monarch. Chandragupta must certainly have taken the measure of the Greek forces, and of the officers whom Alexander had left in command—for in about a year's time from the conqueror's death, the Indian chieftain had expelled the Macedonian garrison from the Panjāb. He then attacked his former oppressor the King of Magadha, dethroned, and slew him.

In this way Chandragupta Maurya became premier monarch of India, reigning over all that part of the peninsula which is bounded on the north by the Himalayas and the Suleiman Mountains (to call them by their modern titles), on the south by the river Narmada (Nerbudda), and on the east and west by the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. After a reign of about ten years his empire was invaded by Seleucus Nicator, whom, however, the Indian emperor defeated, and forced to cede a large territory roughly corresponding to modern Afghanistan. Mr. Smith gives a full and very interesting description of Chandragupta's court, which will amply repay perusal. Here it is only necessary to remark that in all probability the elaborate ceremonial and gorgeous entertainments were traditional, though the King may have made additions and modifications. Mr. Smith tells us that custom required the King to be shampooed in public, and that Chandragupta heard petitions and administered justice while his massage was going on. This can hardly have been anything but a private usage

of his own. I do not know of any other Indian potentate of whom the like is recorded; yet I should hesitate to deny that it may have been done in compliance with some traditional ritual. No one who has not had close and intimate experience of Indian manners can realise what a large part custom plays in the life of all classes of the Indian people. I shall presently point out the resemblance between early Indian social conditions and the visionary political system known to us as Socialism. Meantime it is worthy of remark that Indian history, viewed from the outside, presents very considerable sameness. The tale is mainly made up of the names and dates of a series of Rajas, and the wars they waged with each other. The late Dr. Maguire once said that outside Greece and Rome, "History might be summed up as a talk, a drink, and a fight." Much the same is true of Indian history, if we leave out of account the social condition of the people, and the religions or philosophies which they evolved.

Mr. Smith's narrative of the various invasions of India by Chinese, Scythian, Tartar, and other nomads, is precise and full—it fits in very well with the description quoted above, since it is for the most part a chronicle of fights, and the reader's imagination may be trusted to take the drink and the talk for granted. It is unfortunate, indeed, that history is so generally a mere congeries of the biographies of kings or statesmen, and of the narratives of wars. One misses, except in a few instances, the picture of social life, which is the true essence of history. Mr. Smith, however, has not neglected his duty as a historian in this respect. His description of the social state of India under the Maurya Kings is admirable in almost every respect. If it lacks anything, it is that he does not set forth quite as fully as he might have done the essentially traditional and customary nature of the institutions he is describing. A cursory reader might, for instance, conclude that the

municipal administration of Pātaliputra (Palibothra in Greek, the modern Patna) had been instituted by Chandragupta by royal decree. It certainly was not.

Whatever may be true of the Maurya monarch's War Office—and I suspect that this department of State may have been traditional as well as others—I feel quite sure that the city administration had been from time immemorial what Megasthenes saw and described. Doubtless, Mr. Smith knows this better than I do; but it may be doubted whether he has brought it out with sufficient clearness. The reader will have no difficulty in discerning the resemblance between Mauryan political institutions and what we now call Socialism. All life was supervised. Espionage was a recognised method of government. Wages and profits of trade were fixed by public authority. But all this was matter of immemorial and universal custom, and was not imposed by royal will. The Raja was the executive official who enforced the law; but he did not make it or declare it. Where custom needed to be interpreted, there were learned Brahmans to expound it; but, as a rule, the custom was sufficiently clear. The infliction of capital punishment for the non-payment of the tax on sales may perhaps have been Chandragupta's personal caprice, as I have intimated that his habit of administering justice while being shampooed may have been. But the tax itself can hardly have been other than traditional; and, indeed, there are still some traces of such an impost in modern Indian markets. When the matter is thought out, the socialism of early India is easily understood. Every social unit, down to the village community, was self-supporting, and almost self-sufficing. Food grew in the fields. For drink the villagers had the water of the wells, and the milk of the cows; if they wanted something stronger, sugarcane sap, or palm-tree sap, or the macerated petals of the *mahua* flower, could be distilled into a more or

less nauseous but intoxicating spirit. Here I may digress to remark that India never was "teetotal," though some English politicians have slanderously said that "England found India sober, and made her drunken." Low-caste natives always drank, and always drank to excess, though intermittently. Rajputs always prepared for fighting by a dose of some such stimulant as opium or bhang. Brahmans as a rule are sober, and so are Vaisyas, the mercantile caste. Even Brahmans and Vaisyas are under no rule of total abstinence. But to return to the self-sufficing village, houses were mostly built of mud or of sun-baked brick, with rafters of bamboo or local timber. The village cotton fields supplied clothing; and so nothing had to be brought in from outside except brass cooking or drinking vessels, and the raw iron from which the blacksmith made horse-shoes or bullock shoes, plough-shares, and the tyres of the cart-wheels. In such conditions there is very little use for money. Wages—so to describe the earnings of the village artisan, the blacksmith, or wheelwright, the weaver, the worker in leather—would be paid by a sort of barter. So much corn for a pair of shoes, so much for a plough- or cart-harness, for the cart or plough itself, and so on. Again, there would be no competition, whether in the quality of goods or their cheapness. One agriculturist might rejoice because his field bore five measures of wheat, whilst his neighbour's produced only three; but he would attribute this to the favour of the gods, and not to any effort or skill of his own. The artisan would have a monopoly of the village trade, his prices, however, being fixed by custom. The elaborate system of supervision described as existing in the cities of the Mauryan empire was a development of the primitive village socialism. Money became necessary, as fast as exchange became complicated; but customary authority continued to enforce the conditions of trade. Mr. Smith

says, "A curious and not easily intelligible regulation prescribed the separation of new from old goods, and imposed a fine for violation of the rule." I venture to think that this was nothing else but the converse of *caveat emptor*, public authority looking after the interest of the purchaser and the honesty of the vendor. In the village, of course, it would be easy to know what goods were old and what were new, and no inspection would be wanted. Not to take up too much space, I need only say that Indian society tended naturally and inevitably to socialism. The population depended almost wholly on the land for support. The village community was self-contained, and it was the social unit. Money was very little wanted, and very little used. Competition was wholly absent from village trade; and existed but little even in the trade of towns or of seaports. The latter, indeed, would naturally be the place where competition would first make itself felt. Where customary regulation of business is predominant, it is only natural that there should be customary supervision to see to its observance. In short, all that Socialism proposes to do for the modern community, natural evolution did for early India, and the results have endured to this day. If I felt at liberty to draw a political moral from this chapter of history, I should suggest that Indian history proves Socialism to have done its work, contributed all it had to contribute to human evolution, and to be now out of date. But this is a digression, more or less irrelevant.

The most interesting epoch with which Mr. Smith deals is the reign of Asoka; and the interest of that reign is mainly caused by Asoka's conversion to Buddhism, and his attempt to convert his subjects. That the attempt to convert the whole Indian people proved a failure is only what might have been anticipated; but it seems to be beyond question that Asoka, by means of the missions he

sent out, propagated Buddhism in China on the north, Burma on the east, and Ceylon on the south, of India. It is a very curious fact that a system of ethics thought out by a philosopher of pure Aryan blood should have taken hold of non-Aryan races such as the Chinese, the Tartars, and the Japanese, while it completely disappeared from among the Aryans of India, and was preserved only among the Singhalese, whose Aryan blood is by no means absolutely pure. In this connexion it must be remarked, however, that the so-called Buddhism of China and Ceylon has very little in common with the true Buddhism of Gautama, which was what Asoka preached *urbi et orbi*, and recorded in his tables of stone. "The leading tenet of Asoka's Buddhism," Mr. Smith tells us, ". . . was a passionate, uncompromising belief in the sanctity of animal life." "The doctrine . . . was based upon the belief that all living creatures, men, animals, gods, and demons, form links in an endless chain of existence, or rather 'of becoming.'" Mr. Smith states this precept of Buddhist ethics very clearly, and discusses its results acutely. He remarks that it is "easy to understand that believers in ideas of this kind may be led logically to regard the life of an insect as entitled to no less respect than that of a man." In practice, he goes on to say, the sanctity of animal life was sometimes counted higher than that of human. Asoka never abolished the death penalty, though he did ordain three days' grace for the criminal to prepare for death. Other Buddhist rulers actually put human beings to death for killing animals, and even for eating flesh.

The second cardinal precept insisted on by Asoka was that of reverence to parents, elders, and preceptors. These and all superiors were, in their turn, required to treat inferiors, children, servants, slaves and all living creatures with kindness and consideration. These are the principal moral

precepts of Buddhism ; and these are what Asoka's Rock Edicts and Pillar Edicts chiefly inculcate. Remarkably enough, the edicts hardly refer at all to the Buddhist dogma of pessimism, and never to the doctrine of Nirvāna. It is an article of the Buddhist creed that all conscious existence is suffering, and that Nirvāna is the only salvation. Nirvāna is etymologically identical with $\mu\eta\ \phi\ddot{u}\nu\alpha\iota$; but the Buddhist would not admit that the etymological meaning is the ontological meaning. It is difficult in the extreme to conjecture what the Buddhist or the orthodox Hindu means by Nirvāna ; the nearest I can go to it is "a perpetual sleep with a perpetual possibility of waking, which is never fulfilled." Even this is hardly consistent with Buddhism, which takes no cognisance of the soul as a Thing in Itself ; but, be that as it may, Asoka's Buddhistic edicts say nothing about Nirvāna. They are, for the most part, ethical ; and wherever they do not contain ethical precepts, they are chronicles.

Mr. Smith thinks that the edicts were "obviously intended to be read and understood by the public generally, and that their existence presupposes a fairly general knowledge of the art of writing." I confess that I cannot go so far. The enormous mass of the natives are even now tillers of the soil, or village artisans, and are wholly ignorant of letters. What must their state have been in the third century B.C. ? Among the higher castes, Kshatriyas or Rajputs (warriors), for the most part, have no more learning than Walter Scott's Deloraine or Douglas. Even Brahmans are not universally learned, and among Vaisyas the Kayastha sub-division is the only one which is necessarily educated. So, then, no one but a Brahman or a Kayastha could read the edicts ; and both Brahmans and Kayasthas are prejudiced against reading sacred writings to the vulgar. Asoka may have intended that those of his subjects who were learned should interpret the tables of

stone to the uneducated, and thus, as it were, preach Buddhist ethics to the laity. It was a beautiful dream; but, as fate had decreed, it was nothing more. Probably the mass of the population was wholly untouched by Asoka's Buddhist propaganda; and the few more learned who did read the edicts went their way as much or as little edified as each man's character and personal equation predisposed him. It would seem as though the most durable effects of Asoka's action were to be found in the hospitals for sick or injured animals, which still exist at Surat and elsewhere. Buddhism as a creed has disappeared from India proper; and in the regions where it does flourish, it exists as a system of relic-worship and superstitious ritual. Of the Buddha's lofty morality, little survives.

Mr. Smith has traced the history of India down to the Muhammadan conquest, with admirable industry and research, and has set it forth in lucid and attractive style. The illustrations are artistically rendered; and the maps are copious and enlightening. The form in which the volume has been published is worthy of the Clarendon Press. On the whole, whether for perusal or for reference, it is a valuable addition to contemporary literature. While fully accepting Mr. Smith's transliteration of Indian words, I venture, with much deference, to protest against his spelling of Greek names. The German practice, introduced into English by Grote, seems to me superfluous, illogical, and grotesque. If we must write Seleukos, Antigonos, and Antiochos, why not Alexandros and Menandros? Nay, why not Antiokhos? Grote writes Chalkis for Chalcis, and by so doing suggests that the city was built of white bicarbonate of lime. I may be wrong, and there may be reasons for the German spelling; but it occurs to me that what was good enough for Cicero, Caesar, Virgil, and Horace, ought to have been good enough for Herr Hermann and Mr. Grote.

However, I will not conclude with captious and fault-finding comment. I have derived pleasure as well as instruction from reading Mr. Smith's work, and I feel sure others also will. If I have in a few matters ventured to suggest a varying opinion, I hope I have done so with all due regard to the author's invaluable industry and research, and with keen admiration for the merits of his style.

EDWARD STANLEY ROBERTSON.

ON THE HISTORY OF SIZARSHIP IN TRINITY COLLEGE.

AS I know of none remaining to whom the antiquities of the College are a matter of study, I think it well to put on record what I have made out concerning Sizarship, in order that it may help some future historian who may succeed in interesting the University public on such questions. The term *sizarius* I have explained in an already forgotten book on the early condition of the College. It means a student who obtains commons free, and only pays for his *sizings*¹; and 'sizings' (a term still in use) mean the supplies from the kitchen which members of the College obtain at less than the market price. Many of the old rents of tenants were in kind, not in money; and so a college might have stores of provisions to dispose of on very moderate terms to its students.

As we have lost the earliest Statutes of the College, and even most of Temple's Statutes, we have no account of the original appointment of Sizars, but can infer that they existed from the commencement, and were nominated by the Provost, and probably the Senior Fellows, for Bedell in his Statutes, which I have printed for the first time in the work above mentioned, ordains that those *quos subsizatores vocant* shall be appointed by the Bursar.² Subsizars attended on the Scholars' table, while the Sizars attended

¹ i.e. the specified rations (assize = assessment, both connected with *ad-sidere*).

² Cf. my *Epoch in Irish History*, p. 359.

on that of the Fellows. It was a tradition up to my youth that they dined off the remains left after the Fellows' dinner, and that they rang the bell, swept the hall, and performed other menial offices. This I used to hear from my father, who was a Scholar in 1821; but I cannot remember whether he described it as existing in his day, or already obsolete. A careful study of the College in the eighteenth century, which I have not made, would probably settle this question.

In Laud's Statutes¹ (cap. 19) there is no mention of Subsizar, and the Provost is given the nomination of eight or more Sizars, while each Senior Fellow appoints one. I have found no further mention of Sizars in any document during the seventeenth century, except in the old Matriculation Book, which begins with 1637, where they are entered sporadically among Fellow Commoners and Pensioners, and without further remark. And in the Registry for 1699 there is, on Feb. 24, "ordered the same day that no person who shall hereafter be admitted in y^e College Pensioner, shall be suffered to become Sizar, or ever admitted into y^e Hall [*sc.* Dining Hall] as such." It is interesting to note that the very same abuse, which grew up in the nineteenth century, and which has only now been redressed at my earnest solicitation, had already laid hold on the College in 1699. Not a word more appears in the Registry; but I have indirect, yet conclusive, evidence from the Matriculation Book that a few years later a further reform took place, and that examination was substituted for nomination. In the year 1708 I find for the first time that Sizars were admitted, not sporadically, as before, but in groups. I find four admitted on June 16-18, apparently the last nominated, and probably a concession to vested rights among the Senior Fellows; and then on the

¹ Cf. *Epoch in Irish History*, p. 361.

following 20–22nd a group of eight, with the hour and minute of their admission added. This tells its own tale to anyone who knows our College formulæ. We have still on our Matriculation document [*minuto*] *post meridiem*, indicating that the best answerer was admitted one minute after noon, the second two minutes after noon, &c. So that this group of eight Sizars was certainly admitted by competitive examination. Henceforth they always appear in groups (if there be more than one), and with the minute of their admission noted, and the day of this admission is never earlier than May 25, and never later than June 25 in each year—in other words, always after Trinity Monday, when the election of Scholars was sure to create vacancies among the existing Sizars by that promotion.

In what the candidates were examined I can only infer from the practice existing in the early nineteenth century, which was probably unchanged since the commencement. According to our first Calendar (1832), the examination must be on Trinity Tuesday in each year, and the course consisted of the Entrance course, and the work of the two terms which had elapsed that year for the Junior Freshman class, with some books of Homer and Virgil added. This means that the Sizar elected in June was required to take his place in the existing Junior Freshman class, and finish his first year in October—an excellent regulation again violated by the vicious relaxations of the last century, when Sizars were allowed to hang back, and compete for Honors against a younger class. Examining for Sizarship seems to have been an irksome duty, and unpaid, for it was the practice to make the new Fellows elected on Trinity Monday, and admitted in the Chapel on Tuesday morning, proceed straight from the Chapel into the Hall, and examine for Sizarship. I have often heard the late Dr. Haughton describe this proud day in his life. But what an absurdity it was! For it assumed that no preparation whatever was

required on the part of the examiner for this important prize, which meant a free education and free dinner for four years, with Scholarship and Fellowship awaiting the foremost among the Sizars. In the present year, after prolonged discussion, an important reform has brought back Sizarship to its original scope and intention, and has produced an enlarged and splendid competition for that prize. It is, therefore, a suitable moment to record these curiosities of its early history.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

TWO COLLECTIONS OF VISITATION REPORTS IN THE LIBRARY OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

OF the two volumes dealt with in this paper one is preserved among the manuscripts of Bishop Stearne, and the other is a recent acquisition. Both are of considerable importance to students of the History and Antiquities of the Irish Church. A somewhat minute description of them may therefore prove useful.

I. *Manuscript* 566 (E. 3. 14).

This manuscript, which seems to have been bound by Bishop Stearne, is made up of fragments of several collections of Visitation Returns which were originally arranged in separate volumes. This is evident from the fact that f. 1 has the old press marks C. 1. 27 and B. 40, while at f. 72 we find the marks C. 2. 29 and BBB. 35. That the number of volumes was originally either two or three seems to be proved by an examination of the old numbering of the leaves, of which, for the most part, sufficient indication still remains. (I.) The leaves which, according to the present numeration, are ff. 27-63, were numbered in the top right-hand corners, 148(?)—183.¹ (II.) Ff. 75-92 are numbered in the top left-hand corners, "pa: 4," &c., and with these ff. 93-95 (unnumbered and written in a different hand) and ff. 96-105 (unnumbered

¹ At least one leaf was passed over, and many of the numbers are now lost.

and blank) seem to be connected, while f. 106 is merely an inserted slip. Thus ff. 72-106 form a second volume. (III.) Ff. 3-11 are numbered 5-13 in the top right-hand corners; ff. 12-14, which are consecutive with these, were left without numbers, as were also the blank leaves, ff. 15-17, and ff. 18-21 are numbered 14-17. The leaves following f. 106 have also numbers, in the same hand, in their top right-hand corners; but at present the numerals are not consecutive. When re-arranged, however, they are found to form a series from 22 to 126, a few numbers being omitted, some pages being without numbers, and two pairs of leaves being numbered in duplicate. It seems, therefore, that when the three original collections were put together to form a single volume, the third was not only divided into two parts, but was also, in its later portion, subjected to a considerable re-arrangement. Possibly I. and III. originally formed parts of a single volume.

Some of the articles in the manuscript are dated by the original scribes, and in all other cases their dates can be determined with considerable precision. In the following table of contents I have marked opposite each item its date, enclosing in brackets those which are not actually found inscribed in the manuscript itself. The reasoning by which they have been arrived at will be explained hereafter. The manuscript contains reports of the state of the following dioceses:—

- | | | |
|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| I. f. 1. | Meath and Clonmacnoise. | [Oct., 1615.] |
| II. f. 18. | Cashel and Emly. | [1607.] |
| III. f. 22. | Cashel and Emly. | [2nd Nov., 1588.] |
| IV. f. 24. | Meath (List of Pluralists). | [1615.] |
| V. f. 27. | Dublin and Glendalough. | |
| | | April-May, 1610. |
| VI. f. 35. | Kildare (Triennial Visitation). | |
| | | 17th July, 1610. |

VII. f. 41. Ossory (Triennial Visitation).

21st July, 1610.

VIII. f. 49. Leighlin (Triennial Visitation).

19th July, 1610.

IX. f. 55^v Ferns (Triennial Visitation).

26th July, 1610.

X. f. 64. Waterford and Lismore.

[2nd November, 1588.]

XI. f. 69. Cashel and Emly.

[1588.]

XII. f. 72. Dublin and Glendalough.¹

1615.

The date of this "*liber regalis visitationis*" is given f. 72.

XIII. f. 107. Kildare.

[1591.]

XIV. f. 109. Leighlin.

[1591.]

XV. f. 111^v Ossory.

[1591.]

XVI. f. 115^v Ferns.

[1591.]

XVII. f. 117. Leighlin.

26th June, 1591.

This date is given in a heading on f. 118^v, which informs us that the report was prepared in connexion with a Regal Visitation, the visitors being Adam Loftus, Archbishop of Dublin, and Ambrose Forth, LL.D.

XVIII. f. 119. Ossory, Limerick, Cashel, and Lismore
(List of Sequestrations). [End of 1591?]

XIX. f. 123. Ossory.

[1591.]

XX. f. 127. Cashel and Emly.

[1607.]

XXI. f. 131. Killaloe (List of Pluralists).

[1591.]

XXII. f. 134. Waterford.

[Earlier writing c. 1586, later writing c. 1589.]

XXIII. f. 136. Waterford and Lismore.

2nd November, 1588.

This return is headed: "Right honorable here ensueth the names of all the spirituall promociions and dignities within our

¹ It may be mentioned that a manuscript in the possession of Blair Smith, Esq., D.L., so closely resembles this report that one of the two was prob-

ably copied from the other, with some slight alterations. A copy of it was presented by Mr. Smith to St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1904.

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diocess of Waterford with the names and surnames of all the incumbents and patrones with the time of vacancy of such as are voide as nere as we can finde taken the second of November, 1588 by us Milerus by the providence of God Archbussopp of Cassell and Commendator of the Dioc. of Lismor and Waterford according to your honor's direction."

XXIV. f. 140. Lismore. 31st July, 1591.

For the date, see f. 143.

XXV. f. 146. Cork. 9th August, 1591.
 XXVI. f. 149. Cork (incomplete return). [1591.]
 XXVII. f. 154. Cloyne. 9th August, 1591.
 XXVIII. f. 158. Cloyne (incomplete return). [1591.]
 XXIX. f. 168. Ross. 9th August, 1591.
 XXX. f. 169. Elphin. [c. 1591.]
 XXXI. f. 174. Limerick. [1591.]
 XXXII. f. 181. Tuam. July, 1591.

For the date, see marginal note f. 181.

XXXIII. f. 187. Kilmacduagh. [1591.]
 XXXIV. f. 188. Clonfert. [1591?]
 XXXV. f. 190. List of persons cited to appear. [1591.]
 XXXVI. f. 194. List of persons deprived in the Dioceses of Kildare (f. 194), Leighlin (f. 194^v), Ossory and Ferns (f. 195), Waterford and Lismore (f. 195^v), Cashel, Cork, Cloyne, and Ross (f. 196^v), Limerick, Tuam, and Kilmacduagh (197^v), Elphin and Clonfert (f. 199). [1591.]
 XXXVII. f. 200. Ossory (List of Citations, &c.). 1591.

The persons cited were to appear "primo die Juri' termini michis [9th October] 1591."

XXXVIII. f. 201. Elphin (List of Deprivations). [1591.]
 XXXIX. f. 202. Clonfert and Elphin (List of Deprivations). [1591.]

Reasons must now be given for the dates which have been enclosed in brackets in the foregoing list. It will be convenient to follow, as far as possible, the order in which the articles are arranged in the volume.

I. When this Report was drawn up, Ralph Barlowe was Archdeacon, and George Montgomery Bishop of Meath. It must, therefore, have been written between the presentation of the former and the death of the latter, *i.e.* between 25th November, 1612,¹ and 1st February, 1621.² But it appears that its date can be determined within narrower limits. For Thomas Kirby (?) is named as Rector of Clonfadforan, though the Regal Visitors of the reign of Charles I. inform us that Milo Pemberton was admitted to that benefice 23rd October, 1615,³ and still held it in 1634. It is true, indeed, that this statement appears at first sight to be irreconcilable with the further assertion of the same visitors that Robert Boonynge, who appears as Rector of Agher in our Report, was instituted to the living so late as 2nd October, 1616.⁴ But we must observe that the Visitors of 1634 also tell us that Boonynge was presented to Agher 26th June, 13 James I. (1615), and ordained Deacon 2nd July, 1615. It is unaccountable that his institution should have been delayed more than a year after the latter event. I suggest, therefore, that 1616 was written instead of 1615 by a clerical error. In confirmation of this hypothesis two facts may be mentioned. In the first place, no mention is made of Boonynge's institution in the earliest report from the Diocese of Meath in the Register of First-Fruit Returns. The first institution recorded in that document is, indeed, dated 5th November, 1616; but it seems to cover the period from Easter, 1616, to Easter, 1617, and almost certainly includes

¹ Calend. of Patent Rolls of James I., p. 238a.

² See T.C.D. MS. 1067, p. 50.

⁴ *Id.* p. 66.

³ Cotton's *Fasti*, iii. 118.

the month of October, 1616. And again, Sir Garrett Moore is mentioned in our Report as the patron of several benefices. But he was created Baron Moore of Mellifont, 20th July, 1616.¹ This points to a date much earlier than October, 1616. Assuming, then, that my suggestion is correct, our Report may be dated between 2nd October and 23rd October, 1615. The only alternative seems to be to suppose that Boonynge was counted Rector of Agher in virtue of his presentation by the Crown, though not yet admitted by the Bishop. In that case the date will be between June and October, 1615.

II., XX. The latter of these is a fair copy of the former. They evidently refer to the same period as a return preserved among the records of the Regal Visitation of 1615, with which they are in part verbally identical. It belongs to the year 1607.²

III., X., XI. The two latter are in the same hand, X. being a transcript from XXIII., and XI. from III. They have the heading which is prefixed to XXIII. (from which, however, the portion containing the date has been torn off). All four documents must, therefore, be of the same date.

IV. A comparison of this document with No. I. shows that it refers to the same period.

XIII.-XVI. These four reports are in the same hand. The date of writing is approximately fixed by the following note at the end of XIV. (f. 111):—

“Since the visitacon which was 1589 the Byshoppe
hathe altered mutche in this dyocesse and you shall
find mutch matter.”

The year 1589 was the year of the Triennial Visitation

¹ *Calend. of Patent Rolls of James I.*,
p. 306a.

² See below, p. 330 (No. v.).

by the Archbishop.¹ The *prima facie* meaning of this note, therefore, is that the Archbishop (for whom presumably the report was made) would find considerable difference between it and the Triennial Return, which was already in his hands. It implies at least that the date of writing was between 1589 and 1592. When it is borne in mind (see above, No. XVII.) that the Archbishop was a Regal Visitor in 1591, it becomes probable that the document was compiled in that year. This conclusion is rendered almost certain by the following facts :—In XVI. William Campyon appears as Dean of Ferns; he was appointed 9th October, 1590.² On the other hand, in XV. William Daniell is Prebendary of Tascoffin, and Barnabye Bulger of Cloneamery; the prebends of both these persons were sequestrated in 1591 (see f. 200).

XVIII. See below, p. 327.

XIX. This document is shown, by comparison, to belong to the same year as XV., though it is obviously an independent report.

XX. See above.

XXI. See below, p. 328.

XXII. This return cannot be far apart in time from XXIII., for in both the same persons are named as Dean, Precentor, and Chancellor; and in both the Archdeaconry is stated to be vacant.

But far beyond this it is not possible to go in fixing its date with absolute confidence. The record has been corrected throughout by a later hand. The simplest hypothesis seems to be that the earlier writing describes the state of affairs a year or two before November, 1588; the corrections belonging to a period slightly after that date. Thus, for example, opposite the prebend of Kilronan was

¹ This is an inference from the fact that there was a Triennial Visitation in 1610 (see above, No. VIII.).

² Calendar of Patent Rolls, Hen. VIII.—Eliz. (Morrin), i. 219.

originally written, "Thomas Purcell, mercator"; while the later hand gives us the information that the benefice was vacant, the sequestrator being one Paul Sherlock. Now the Regal Visitors of 1615 report as follows:—"We finde that the Prebend of Kilronan is leased by one Mr. Clavell who was incumbent thereof to the use of Paule Shearlocke and confirmed by Milerus 10: Archbp.,¹ and Deane and Chapter, who longe sithence wee knowe not." This implies that Clavell was the last prebendary before 1615, and seems to prove that Sherlocke farmed the living for him before he became sequestrator on its avoidance. But in November, 1588, the incumbent was John Middleton (f. 136). Thomas Purcell was perhaps a predecessor of Middleton, though (like Middleton himself) a layman. Again, the Prebend of Corbally was held in November, 1588, by Brian Floyde or Lloyd. His name is given by the reviser in our document; but we are apparently told that he was suspended, and the living sequestrated. In the older writing the name of "Steven Whit" appears. Assuming then that the older hand in this report is earlier than November, 1588, the further remark must be made that it cannot be dated before the latter part of 1585. For, as we learn from f. 136, in November, 1588, the archdeaconry was vacant, and had been vacant "per triennium." It follows that it was occupied in the early part of 1585, and was not then, as our report describes it, vacant. And, again, the later writing must be earlier than the Visitation of 1591, at which a successor of Floyde in the prebend of Corbally—Lancelot Lukar—was deprived (f. 195^v).

XXVI., XXVIII. The lists of names resemble those in XXV. and XXVII. so closely, that the documents cannot be separated by many months. XXVI. is in the same hand as XXVIII.

¹ This confirmation must have been given not later than July, 1589, when Miller Magrath ceased for some years

to hold the Bishopric of Waterford. Cotton's *Fasti* (Ed. 2), i. 124.

XXX. This report is not later than the first half of 1594, for on 5th July in that year Donatus O'Horan succeeded Nicholas O'Kelly as Provost of Elphin,¹ and the latter was still Provost when the report was written. (See f. 172^v). That it belongs to 1591 becomes probable, when it is compared with the list of deprivations for that year, f. 199.

XXXVI., XXXVIII., XXXIX. These three documents are of the same date. For XXXIX. is a rough list from which the portion of XXXVI. relating to Elphin has been copied, with the addition of one name; while the list in XXXVIII. is wholly included in that given in XXXVI. The year to which all three belong is fixed by the heading in XXXVIII. From it we learn that Ambrose Forth, and Justinian Johnson, deputy of Adam Loftus, Archbishop of Dublin, had held a general visitation of the clergy, and that the under-written sentences were pronounced by them. Compare above, No. XVII. This heading is also found *mutatis mutandis* before the list for Kildare in XXXVI., and the first words of it are repeated before each of the succeeding lists in the same document.

XXXI. The marks of time are not many, but they are decisive. Richard Arthure appears (f. 174) as Prebendary of Donoghmore. He is cited to appear before the Commissioners in 1591 (f. 190^v); and his successor, Robert Chaffe, was appointed in August, 1593.² Again, the Prebendary of Disert, George Sexton, is described (f. 175^v) as a layman, and absent: he was deprived for defect of age and orders in 1591 (f. 197^v).

XVIII. There do not appear to be sufficient data for determining with certainty the year to which this list belongs. But it may be remarked that it does not exactly correspond with the state of affairs disclosed by the records of the visitation of 1591 (No. XXXI.). Thus, for

¹ Liber Munerum, part v., p. 101.

² Liber Munerum, v. 101.

example, Croagh, in the Diocese of Limerick, is one of the sequestrated Prebends; but in 1591 it was held (though, it appears, illegally) by the Archdeacon. The phenomena suggest that it was compiled not long after the visitation.

XXXIII., XXXV. That these documents and XXXII. are of the same date as XXXVI. becomes evident when they are compared with it. It will suffice to give one or two instances of the sort of data which such a comparison yields. In XXXII., f. 181, Edward Browne is named both as Dean of Tuam and Dean of Mayo; but his name is crossed out in the second place, and opposite it is written, "Quidam Thomas Ballagh allegat se esse Rectorem." In XXXV., f. 192, Edward Browne, Dean of Tuam, Dean of Enachdune, and Rector of Mayo and Athenry, is cited to appear. And in XXXVI., f. 198, Thomas Ballagh is deprived of the Rectory of Mayo and other livings. Again, in XXXIII., f. 187, the Treasurer of Kilmacduagh is Malachias O'Molona; he is deprived of this office according to XXXVI., f. 197^v.

XXXIV. Judging from the quality and size of the paper used, it is likely that this return was prepared on the same occasion as XXXII. and XXXIII. And we find a note which seems to convey the information that a dispute with regard to the possession of the office of Sacristan was to be decided in Dublin in Michaelmas Term (compare No. XXXVII.). But the only conclusive indications of date which I have noticed are the statements that Donatus O'Horan was Dean, and Thomas Burke Archdeacon. From these facts it follows the report was made between 9th January, 1587,¹ and 26th January, 1598.²

XXI. This is in the same hand as XXXIII.

XXXVI., &c. See above, p. 327.

¹ Cal. of Patent Rolls (Morrin), ii. 229, T.C.D. MS. 1066, p. 473.

² Cal. of Patent Rolls (Morrin), ii. 497.

II. *Manuscript* 1066.

This volume contains a copy of the records of the Regal Visitation of the Provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, held in the year 1615, in the handwriting of the late Bishop Reeves. The originals, which when he transcribed them were in his keeping in the Registry of Armagh, are now in the Public Record Office, Dublin. The greater number of the documents included in the collection give accounts of the state of the dioceses to which they refer in the year of the Visitation. To these it is not necessary to make further reference. But among them are a few which belong to earlier years; and of them I proceed to give a list, with their dates, so far as I have been able to ascertain them.

- I. p. 39. Kildare. [Earlier writing, 1611.]
- II. p. 75. Ossory. [Earlier writing, *c.* 1609.]
- III. p. 135. Ferns and Leighlin. 1st September, 1612.

Bishop Ram's account of his dioceses.

- IV. p. 175. Leighlin. [*c.* 1605.]
- V. p. 211. Cashel and Emly. [1607.]
- VI. p. 225. Cashel and Emly. [Earlier in 1607.]
- VII. p. 279. Lismore. [After May, 1607.]
- VIII. p. 295. Lismore. [After May, 1607.]
- IX. p. 305. Lismore. 15th July, 1607.

The dates of documents I., II., IV.–VIII. may be inferred as follows:—

I. This is an old list of incumbents, brought up to date by successive correction. The latest corrections agree with the report at p. 25, which is dated 3rd July, 1615. The original list is earlier than 11th July, 1612, since William Golbourne, who on that day was appointed Archdeacon,¹

¹ Visitation of 1634, in T.C.D. MS. 1067, p. 204.

still appears as Precentor. In the main this list agrees both as to the earlier writing and the corrections with MS. 566, f. 35, which is dated 17th July, 1610. But it appears to belong to a somewhat later period. Thus, in MS. 566, f. 35^v, William Connor appears as Prebendary of Donadea, the later hand recording that the prebend is sequestrated; but in the earlier writing of our return James Aylmer is the prebendary. He was, however, deprived; and Simon Bolger is named as incumbent by the later scribe. Similarly, for the prebend of Harristown, MS. 566 gives Thomas Walshe as the incumbent in 1610; while our list has John Dalie. In both cases the corrector has Nicholas Walsh. Thus our document seems to belong to 1611.

II. Like the last, this list has been brought up to date by correction. The latest writing gives the state of the diocese shortly before the Visitation of 1615, agreeing in all the names of Dignitaries and Prebendaries, except those of the Precentor and Treasurer, with the list at p. 53. In the original report the Bishop is said to have held the Precentorship in commendam since 1597. This proves that the document is earlier than 13th February, 1610, the date of the death of Bishop Horsfall, who held the See in 1597. A document of 19th March, 1608, is cited (p. 88).

IV. Another corrected list. The Treasurer, both here and p. 159, is Thady Dowling; but here he is said to be "etatis 60 et ultra," there "etatis 71 annorum." Thus, the present list, and that on p. 159, are separated by an interval of about ten years. The latter is dated 1615; consequently, the former belongs to 1605, or a somewhat later year.

V., VI. These reports agree in the names of all dignitaries and prebendaries, with the exception of the Dean of Cashel; but No. v. records that several of them were deprived, while no such notes occur in No. VI. This suggests that the latter is the earlier of the two.

No. VI. gives as Dean of Cashel Andrew O'Donellan, who (we are told) was elected by the Chapter, and confirmed by the Archbishop. As his election took place on 6th January, 1607,¹ the report must have been drawn up after that date. In No. v. a blank space is left where the name of the Dean might be expected to appear, which agrees with the fact that the possession of the Deanery was in dispute in 1607, and for some time before the beginning of that year.² On the other hand, No. v. must be subsequent to 19th April, 1607, as the union of the Prebend of Newchapel and the Rectory of Briwys is referred to as having been effected on that day (p. 213). In both returns Stephen Dowdall is Precentor of Cashel, No. v. noting that he is deprived. As his successor was appointed 28th February, 1608,³ neither can be later than the very beginning of that year.

VII., VIII. Here, again, we have two reports which agree in the names of dignitaries and prebendaries with one slight exception. In both the Treasurer is Richard Osborne. In both also John Roche is Prebendary of Modeligo. But a note in No. VII. states that Osborne "claymes it by patent." Osborne's name appears again as Rector of Tullagharton, while No. VIII. describes that rectory as "vacant in lease." Since it is known that Osborne was appointed by patent to these three preferments 12th May, 1607,⁴ the facts mentioned give us ground for dating both documents in or after May, 1607. It may be added that these two lists agree with No. IX. (which gives only the four dignitaries and the archdeacon), dated 15th July, 1607.

H. J. LAWLOR.

¹ Cotton's *Fasti* (Ed. 2), i. 35.

² *Ibid.*

³ Calendar of Patent Rolls of James I., p. 103b.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104b.

FURTHER NOTES ON CONEYS' IRISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

IN the last number of HERMATHENA I gave some corrections of errors and oversights in Coneys' Dictionary. Many of these errors were due to the assumption that the translator of the New Testament (Archbishop Daniel or O'Donnell) used only the Authorised English Version, whereas, in fact, he worked directly from the Greek. This is not only explicitly stated by the Archbishop himself in the Dedication, in which he says he tied himself to the Greek, "as in duty I ought," but is clearly shown by the work itself.

In the Old Testament the case was different. The biographers of Bedell indeed tell us that he was as familiar with the Hebrew and the Septuagint as with the English, and diligently compared the Irish with both Hebrew and Greek as well as with the Italian of Diodati. I have, however, found not one clear instance of independent use of the Hebrew or of the Septuagint. It is true, the translation often comes closer to the Hebrew than the text of the A.V.; but it will be found that in such cases it simply follows the margin of the A.V. Bedell's use of the Hebrew would seem, then, to have extended no further than to determine his preference for text or margin.

Bedell's translation of the O.T. was completed in 1640; but nearly half a century elapsed before it saw the light. Then the zeal of Provost Marsh (afterwards Archbishop),

aided by the generosity of Robert Boyle, secured the publication. Marsh, we are told, had the Irish translated to him while he had Walton's *Polyglot* before him, and from time to time suggested improved renderings based on the Hebrew or the Versions. As a matter of fact, so far as I can discover, the only parts of Walton of which he made use were the interlinear Latin version and the Vulgate. Two striking examples of the influence of the former are worth quoting. In Is. iii. 22, the Vulgate has "linteramina et acus," the A. V. "the wrinkles and the crimping pins." Mr. Jenkinson, Librarian of the University Library of Cambridge (where this volume of Bedell is preserved), informs me that the original MS. reads "να βυμπλε 7 βεανδον να ccυδαν," agreeing with the A. V. But the printed text has "να παλέρω 7 να ρπαρίων." The last word is correct; but it was suggested to Marsh by the interlinear "crumenas."

Again, in Nahum iii. 6, where the Vulg. has "exemplum," and the A. V., quite correctly, "a gazing-stock," Bedell's MS. has "ῥτοσ να ρόκυροδε," literally rendered from the English, while the printed text has "δοιλεαδ." This agrees with Rashi, but was plainly taken by Marsh from the interlinear "stercus."

It is interesting to note that this passage led Lhuyd to assign δοιλεαδ the signification "gazing-stock," in which he has been followed by O'Neachtan, O'Brien, and O'Reilly. P. O'Connell and Coneys have very properly deleted this.

Sometimes the translator mistakes an English word for another of more or less similar sound. Thus he has more than once mistaken 'travail' for 'travel,' Job xv. 20 (ῥύβλυξ), Exod. xviii. 8 (Διῤοιοῖ);¹ 'pastors' for 'pastures,' Jer. xxii. 22 (ἰῃβιοῖ); 'menstruous' for 'monstrous' (ύαετβαῤαῖς), Lam. i. 17; 'engines' for 'ensigns' (βηαταδα),

¹ The current text of the A. V. has the same error in Lam. iii. 5.

Ezk. xxvi. 9; 'flutter' for 'flatter' (ῥοταλοῖσθαι), Deut. xxxii. 11. These errors would suggest that the translator was having the English read aloud to him. There are also eye-errors, such as 'slay' (μυῖναι) for 'flay,' Lev. i. 6; 'leadeth' (ἐνέορυσθαι) for 'loadeth' Ps. lxviii. 19; 'army' for 'arms' (ῥεύματι ῥορρυσθε), Deut. xxxiii. 27. A curious mistake, too, is that in Is. xlix. 11, where "I will make all my mountains a way" is rendered "οὐρανὸν μου μοι ἵλειθε οὐκ ἀπ."

Since writing the preceding remarks I have read Bedell's version of the Apocrypha, a copy of which is in Marsh's Library (the original being in Cambridge). This copy was never revised for the press. It contains several errors of the kind just mentioned, arising from a confusion of two English words of similar sound or appearance: ex. gr., 'consort' is mistaken for 'comfort' in Ecclus. xiii. 16, 'rased' for 'raised,' 1 Macc. v. 51; 'lighting,' in the sense of 'alighting,' for 'lightning,' Ecclus. xliii. 17; 'eyes' for 'ways,' *ibid.* xxxviii. 11; 'wasp' for 'asp,' Wisdom xii. 8; 'mould' for 'a mould,' 2 Esdras viii. 2; 'prevent' is not unnaturally taken to mean 'hinder,' Wisdom iv. 7, xvi. 28.

Notes on words found in the Apocrypha are inserted in their place in the following list. It is to be observed that what are here called 1 Esdras, 2 Esdras (as in A.V.) are in the Vulgate 3 Esdras and 4 Esdras respectively.

Ἀδυνόν, also "apt (for war)," 2 Kings xiv. 16; "ready (scribe)," Ezra vii. 6; 2 Esdr. xiv. 24.

Ἀξ, "a roe," Prov. v. 19. (O'R. has "a beast of the cow kind.")

Ἀξαιρ: *dele* 'stain,' which is from A.V. Job iii. 5, where marg. has 'challenge,' which the translator follows.

Ἀνὸθειλ. "fierce" is from Ps. lxxxviii. 16; 'fierce wrath,' but it is rather 'very great.'

- Διμήδης, "pomp," Is. v. 14. P. O'Connell gives "great value or esteem" ("disrespect," O'R.).
- Διμήγισιμ. Also "hit," ἀμυράσθαι, 1 Sam. xxxi. 3.
- Διπλοῖς ἐὰν εὐδελίῳ, "sacrilege."
- Διπνῶν, not 'decay,' but 'distress' in *l. c.*
- Διρίδι. The quotation in Dinneen is from 2 Sam. x. 5.
- Διρίδιμ, "I meet," Neh. xiii. 2.
- Διρῆσθαι (-ιον), "a prey," Jer. xxx. 16.
- Διρῶν: *dele* 'travail' from Exod. xviii. 8, which the translator has mistaken for 'travel.'
- Διτμήσθαι, "I recount," Nahum. ii. 5.
- Διτμεύ, "dismay," Is. xxi. 3; "(the feeling of) shame," Tob. ii. 14.
- Διτρεῖδιμ, "I place," Jer. v. 22.
- Διτ, "a valley or glen," Deut. viii. 7. O'Don. Suppl. says: "In the counties of Derry and Donegal it denotes 'the steep side of a glen'; in the county of Down, 'a glen,' and in Carbury, county of Sligo, 'a glen.'"
- Δι, "even, also," Neh. iv. 3.
- Διαιτῶν, "alienation," Ezk. xxiii. 22.
- Διῆραιμῖς, "I am faint," Ezk. iii. 9.
- Διπλοῖς, "harm," Wisd. xi. 19.
- Διπλοῖς, "degeneracy," Jer. ii. 20.
- Διπλοῖς, "stormed," 2 Macc. xiii. 25.
- Διπλοῖς, "I displease," Eccclus. xxi. 5.
- Διπλοῖς; δι τῶν δικαιοσύνην, "the only just," 2 Macc. i. 25 (*δὲ*).
- Διπλοῖς, "to reform," 2 Esdr. xiv. 34. In 1 Pet. i. 14, cited by Coneys for 'fashioning,' probably the translator intended 'fashioning again.' O'R. has "deform, transform."
- Διπλοῖς, "an abridgment," 2 Macc. ii. 23, 26, 31. P. O'Connell has this and also διπλοῖς διπλοῖς.
- Διπλοῖς, "reconciliation," Eccclus. xiv. 16.
- Ἰδιῶν, "an oven," Ps. xxi. 9, P. B. V.

Ծառիբեճ, "gaze (on a woman, ծառիւն)," 1 Esdr. iv. 31,
Ecclus. ix. 5.

Ծառիբեճիօմ (*sic*), "a gazing (on a woman)," Ecclus. xli.
21.

Ծառ : Բ. օրորիք, "a tool," 1 Kings vi. 7.

Ծառիւ, "a wedge," *i.e.* in the old sense of 'a mass of
metal.' See Jos. vii. 21.

Ծառի քեճեճ, "a rest," pl., 1 Kings vi. 6, *i.e.* 'a
support for a beam.' In Tob. xiii. 16, the pl. =
'battlements.'

Ծեռոն, "a cliff," 2 Chr. xx. 16. The references to Ex.
under this word belong to the preceding one.

Ծիւծիւն, "a whispering," Ecclus. xii. 15.

Ծիւծիւնեճ, "whispering," Ecclus. xxi. 28; xxviii. 13.

Ծիւր, "a mess (of food)," Ecclus. xxx. 18.

Ծլւնաջ = "fat," Judg. iii. 22.

Ծոճօւմ (or -տւմ). In Prov. xix. 13, 'calamity' is
ծոճար Բ. The word means 'poverty' or 'misery'
(Judg. x. 16). Ծոճան, 'a poor person' occurs in
Prov. xxviii. 3.

Ծրալիք ճոմուլլ, "hostages," 1 Macc. i. 10.

Ծրբեճ, "an alarm (on trumpets)," 2 Chr. xiii. 12.

Ծրնո, "pain," Micah iv. 10.

Ծւսիծ. Also verb, Ps. xiii. 4; Eccl. iv. 12.

Ծւսիւ. In 2 Chr. xiv. 15, ԲՄԱԼԵԱԾԱ ճիրնիք = 'folds of
cattle'; "caulas ovium," Vulg.

Ծւսիւմ. Add 'belong or pertain to,' Deut. xxix. 29;
Ps. lxviii. 20.

Ծւսոնա, "a hired man," Jer. xlvi. 21.

Ծւսոսիցիւմ, "I establish," Esth. ix. 20.

Ծոծ : Բ. ծեար, "southward," 1 Kings vii. 25; Բ. ժւսից,
"northward," *ibid.*

Ծւրիցեճ, "a throng," 2 Macc. xiv. 45, 46.

Ծւն : ԲԱՐԱՐ Ա ՄԲՈՆ, "were besieged," 2 Kings xxv. 2;
բւրիցե Ա ծւն, "to besiege," Deut. xxviii. 52.

ḡunnán, "a beetle, a bittern." This word is interpreted by Lhuyd (and after him O'B. and O'C.) as 'bittour,' which is the older form of 'bittern.' Perhaps its use for 'beetle' in Lev. xi. 22, is the result of a confusion parallel to that of 'engine' and 'ensign.'

ḡabóḡ, "havock," 1 Macc. vii.

ḡaiorim: ḡo é, "made acquainted," 2 Macc. xiv. 20.

ḡailḡeáḡail, "stinging," 1 Kings xii. 11.

ḡairolóct, "battlement," Deut. xxii. 8.

ḡalad . . . "a porch," pl., John v. 2. This is with reference to the pool of Bethesda, so that the translator may have meant 'creeks.'

ḡaoin, "a plate (of metal)," 1 Kings vii. 36; pl. -eac, *ib.* ver. 30.

ḡaolfail, "the herb heiriff." So the other dictionaries, following Shaw. 'Heiriff' is a local (N. of England) name for goosegrass, *Galium aparine*.

ḡaomáonta, "a confederate," 1 Macc. x. 16, but cf. comáontuḡib, 1 Macc. viii. 24.

ḡaomnadó, *gen.* -anta, "a confederacy," 1 Macc. viii. 17.

ḡaráirte or ḡarráirte, Judg. xviii. 21, not 'a carriage,' but 'carriage,' *i. e.* things carried, baggage. The English word 'carriage' was not used as = vehicle until the middle of the eighteenth century (N.E.D.): cp. "we took up our carriages," Acts xxi. 15; also Is. x. 28; and 1 Sam. xvii. 22. No doubt the Irish word is now used for a vehicle as well as the English one.

ḡarbado, not 'the mouth,' but 'the palate or roof of the mouth.' See c. béil, Prov. xxiv. 13; and cp. Ezk. iii. 26.

ḡaradó, used of the 'turning' of the wall, Neh. iii. 20.

ḡarod, "wrapped (up)," 1 Sam. xxi. 9.

ḡaḡaḡeadóḡeac, "a citizen," 2 Macc. ix. 19.

ḡeadoctur, "a beginning," Deut. xxi. 17.

ḡeannḡála, "top bowls," 1 Kings vii. 42.

- Cnuairteac, "a gatherer," Ecclus. xxxiii. 16.
 Cogairnac, also "act of whispering," 2 Sam. xii. 19.
 Coirdearta, "exercised," 2 Macc. xv. 12.
 Coimhdearraio airgic, "a collection of money," Baruch i. 6.
 Coinne, "an appointment," 1 Sam. xx. 35.
 Coirigim, in *l. c.*, Luke xviii. 3, is 'righten, do right to,'
 not properly 'avenge.' In Ezk. xvii. 19, it is 'requite.'
 Coirigim, "I walk," Amos ii. 15.
 Colldair, "a young heifer," Jer. xlvi. 20.
 Comhcoirgim, "I conspire," 1 Kings xv. 27.
 Comhairciorac, "conspicuous," 1 Macc. xi. 37.
 Comgair, "kinsfolk," 2 Macc. xv. 18.
 Comgair, "harmony," 1 Chr. xv. 28.
 Comla, not simply 'a sluice,' which is *c. uirce*, Is. xix.
 10.
 Complex, "(bodily) constitution," Ecclus. xxx. 14.
 Comhairre, "compassion," Ps. xix. 20.
 Connac, "wood for fuel."
 Coir, "pl. ranges," 2 Kings xi. 15. "septa templi," Vulg.
 "ordines," interlinear.
 Craid, "act of vexing," Is. iii. 6.
 Craidaim, "I vex, afflict," Jer. xxiv. 5. *craidaim*, Ezk.
 xxii. 29.
 Craoioirclaim, "I gape," Job xvi. 10.
 Crao, *vb.*, "couch," Num. xxiv. 9.
 Craimim, "I gnaw," Zeph. iii. 3 (printed *craimim*).
 Craioclaim, "I contend," Ecclus. xxviii. 10.
 Craoac, in Exod. xxvi. 36 and xxxviii. 18, is = 'hanging of
 drapery,' etc. pl. -*éac*, 2 Kings xxiii. 7.
 Cuair, "fragrant," Ecclus. i. 15.
 Cuairio, "was incensed," 2 Macc. xiv. 11.
 (Cuir, 2 Sam. xxii. 20, is an early error for cuir, 'a pit,'
 which is in the MS. Not in Coneys.)
 Cuir, "a skirt," Nahum iii. 5, pl. Lam. i. 9. O'R. has
 "shirt," which comes from Shaw.

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Cuimre (or coimre) seems to mean 'limit' or 'limitation' in
2 Kings xxv. 16, ní raib c. ar ppar, and Ps. lxxviii. 41,
na cuirneadar an tdon nlaomta i rrael a scuimr.

Cuing : c. arpal, "a couple of asses," Judg. xix. 3.

Cuirre, "a keel," Wisd. v. 10.

Cúitigim : *dele* "deal bountifully," which is taken from
Ps. cxix. 17, where the Vulg. has "retribue," which
the translator follows.

Culaio : c. na noam, "instruments of the oxen," 1 Kings
xix. 21.

Cum, *sb.* "form, frame," *gen.* cuim, Ps. ciii. 14.

Cumactac, "mournful," Job v. 11. (Cumacac, O'R.)

Cúmad, "a gift," *gen.* -mta, Is. xxxiii. 15 ; pl. id., 2 Chr.
xxxv. 25.

Cumap, "leisure," Ecclus. xxxviii. 24.

Cumga, "narrow," 1 Sam. xiv. 4, Ezk. xl. 16.

Cumgacaim, "I straiten," Prov. iv. 12.

Uala, "espousals," Cant. iii. 10.

Deagbairg (*sic*), "prosperous," 1 Macc. xiv. 36.

Deagmeinneac (*sic*), "pleasant to the taste," 2 Macc. xv. 39.

Deagmeineac, "good (*i. e.* liberal) housekeeping," Ecclus.
xxx. 23.

Deagruac : o. ag eolur oo tuicr De, "privy to the
mysteries of the knowledge of God," Wisd. viii. 4 ;
"that keeps close secrets," P. O'Connell.

Deagus, "forwardness," Wisd. xiv. 17.

Deanma neite, "ado," 1 Macc. ix. 39.

Deanoct, "grievous," 2 Macc. xiii. 6.

Deapga, see Neh. iv. 2, "pulveris," Vulg. ; "of rubbish,"
A. V.

Deapruamugim, "I disobey," 1 Esdr. iv. 11.

Uap, "applied only to persons or personified objects."—
Coneys. See Cant. iv. 2, 5 ; vii. 3.

Uibearg, "rigour," Lev. xxv. 10.

Uiochurim, "I drive away," Jer. xlvi. 15.

- Όιοῖδα, "refuse the worst," Ezk. vii. 24. Cf. οιοῖδα, "ruins," Ecclus. xlix. 13.
- Όιοῖδαλεταρ, "destruction," Job. xxxi. 23, Ps. xci. 6.
- Όιοῖδαίς, also "perish," Zech. ix. 5.
- Όιοῖδαίλας, "despoiled," Jer. xxii. 3.
- Όιοῖδόςηαμ, "helplessness," Is. xli. (heading).
- Όιοῖδουμ, "leasing," and οιοῖδουμ, *sō*, "lease." This is an obsolete meaning of 'lease' = 'glean': "she in harvest used to lease," Dryden (*Imper. Dict.*). The root is the same as German 'lesen.'
- Όιοῖδαιρεας: *dele* "esteemed." See *l. c.* 1 Thess. v. 13. ἡγάσθη αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκπερισσοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, "affectionate," ἡγείσθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκπερισσοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ. The A. V. has "to esteem them very highly in love."
- Όιοῖδαοιμῖσμ, "I profane," Mal. ii. 11.
- Όιον, "a military post or standing camp," 1 Sam. xiv. 6. 'statio,' Vulg., 'garrison'; A. V., with marg., 'standing camp,' here and in ver. 4, where the Ir. has οαινῖον; also in xiii. 23, where the interlinear Lat. has 'praefectus,' and the Irish φαίρε.
- Όιοῖδαίς, "consume," Ezk. xxiv. 10.
- Όιρῖρεας, "vehemency," Judith iv. 9.
- Όις. In HERM., p. 18, l. 6 from bottom, insert "have" before "due."
- Όιρῖρεανυρ, "duty," Ps. lxxxii. (heading).
- Όοῖδαῖς, "impassable," Esth. xv. 24.
- Όοῖς, "pain, or pang," Jer. vi. 24; pl. -ῖς, Micah iv. 9.
- Όοιρε, "a thicket," Jer. iv. 7, = οαοιρ, Jer. iv. 29.
- Όοιρε: Δ ὁρῖλαίτεαρ ο. ὁρῖονηρῖς, "in the reign of several princes," C.P. 7 (compare ἡρεα, "usual," O'R.).
- Όοιρῖρεαν. (Not in Coneys.) A ghost-word. O'Brien has this, explaining "the deep or depth," with quotation from Deut. viii. 7 (but without reference). O'R. follows him. It is, however, an early blunder, resulting from misunderstanding of the correction in the MS., which

originally had $\psi\alpha\iota\gamma\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\theta$. The corrector has drawn a line under ψ and put a small n over, which seems to have been mistaken for μ . Coneys has very properly omitted the word.

$\Psi\eta\upsilon\iota\mu$: ψ . $\eta\alpha$ $\tau\iota\mu\epsilon$, "face of the country," 2 Sam. xviii. 8. (See O'R.)

$\Psi\upsilon\iota\eta\epsilon\alpha\tau\alpha$, "manful," 2 Macc. ii. 21.

$\Psi\upsilon\iota\eta\mu\omicron\lambda\lambda$, for 'sprout' read 'spout', Ps. xlii. 7.

$\Psi\upsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\epsilon$, "exact," Ecclus. li. 19.

$\Psi\acute{\upsilon}\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}\epsilon$, "foundation," Jer. lvii. 26.

$\Psi\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\tau$, "inhabitant," Is. viii. 14.

$\epsilon\alpha\tau\tau$: in Ps. cxxvi. 2, cited for 'thing,' it means 'act.'

$\epsilon\alpha\theta$: $\mu\alpha\rho$ $\beta\upsilon\theta$ $\epsilon\alpha\theta$, "as though he would," 2 Macc. i. 14 ; iii. 8 ; iv. 46.

$\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\eta$, "end (of a house)," Neh. iii. 21. $\iota\omicron\eta\alpha\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\eta$, "in the end thereof," Ecclus. xxi. 10.

$\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\rho\beta\upsilon\alpha\iota\tau$, Is. xli. 29, corresponding to "confusion" in the A.V., "their molten images are wind and confusion."

O'Don. Suppl. has $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\rho\beta\upsilon\alpha\tau$, "swinging in air, whirling aloft overhead." Prof. Murphy has supplied me with other references besides O'Donovan's (some with τ for υ) in which the word signifies 'hovering, fluttering.' I need not quote these, as this signification is not suitable here. The Vulg., however, has "inane"; and this suggests that the key to the word may be $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\rho\beta\acute{\alpha}\epsilon$, 'unprofitable,' so that it was intended to express 'unprofitableness,' while the spelling was influenced by the other word (comp. $\epsilon\tau\alpha\rho\beta\alpha\iota\gamma\epsilon$, 'unprofitableness,' O'Don. Suppl.).

$\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\upsilon\iota\gamma\iota\mu$, "I clothe, array (myself)," Is. xliii. 12.

$\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\gamma\alpha\omicron\iota\iota\eta$, "pity," Job vi. 14.

$\epsilon\alpha\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau$, "order," C. P. 7.

$\epsilon\alpha\gamma\alpha\omicron\theta\eta\acute{\alpha}\epsilon$, "forlorn," Esth. xiv. 19.

$\epsilon\alpha\gamma\lambda\upsilon\eta\tau\epsilon\alpha\tau\tau$, "sacrilege," 2 Macc. xiii. 6.

$\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\eta\tau\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\theta$, "with one thrust," 1 Sam. xxvi. 8.

Εαρηαιδ, "raged," 2 Macc. iv. 4.

Εαρηαιδαι, "needful (expenses)," 1 Macc. x. 39.

Ευόλιος = ελεαδ, "a plea," Deut. xvii. 8.

Εἷς, "some," 1 Chr. xii. 7; νίς εἷς, "somewhat," 2 Chr. x. 4.

Εἰλιγῖν, "I allege," C. P. 361.

Εἰλιγῖς, "allegation," *ibid.*

Εἰλιγῖν, "I profane," 1 Macc. i. 43; ii. 34.

Εἰλιγῖς, "profanation," 1 Macc. i. 48.

Εἰλε αμαδ, "a levy," 1 Kings v. 13.

Εἰλε, "I go, depart," 1 Kings xii. 16, Jer. li. 45; e. lé, "succeed with one," 1 Kings xxii. 12.

Εἰλεορδαι, "an exception," Wisd. xiv. 25, a blunder for εἰλεορδαι. P. O'C. has εἰλεορδαι.

Εἰλε, "a descent"; ἡ εἰ, "headlong," Job v. 13.

Εἰλε, "empty, hollow" (O'R.); εἰλεορδαι, Ps. 1. (heading).

Εἰλε, "a devastating," Is. i. 6.

Εἰλε, "I become," Eccl. iv. 14.

Εἰλεορδαι, "a plant, a grove, a vineyard." Neither of the two latter significations seems established. As to 'grove,' in *l. c.* Gen. xxi. 33 (not 23), the interlinear Latin has 'arborem,' and A.V. mg. 'tree,' which indeed is more correct than 'grove.' (The accepted rendering is 'tamarisk tree.') As to 'vineyard' in Ps. lxxx. 15, 'plant' is adequate, the specific sense 'vine' being supplied by the preceding verse. The P. B. V. has *εἰλεορδαι* quite correctly. The ancient versions take the Hebrew word for a verb 'make perfect.'

Εἰλεορδαι, "waste," Neh. ii. 3.

Εἰλε. I do not know whether there is any authority for the significations "causative, opportune," which seem to be inferred from that of εἰλε, 'cause, reason.' In *l. c.* Ps. lxxx. 15, A.V. mg. has, quite correctly, "yield feigned obedience," which the Irish follows: *εἰλεορδαι*.

ἄνθρωπος . . . ὅσοι ῥά τ' ἐσσι (ῥά τ' ἑσσι, P. B. V.). ὅσοι ῥ. occurs frequently in Keating, T. S., of the figurative or symbolical interpretation of Scripture as: 21¹¹, μετὰ τὸν ὅσοι ῥ. ὑμῶν . . . 17, ῥέσεται ἡ πόλις ὅσοι ῥ. ὑμῶν . . . Also independently at the beginning of a sentence: see pp. 242, 256, 272, 274. Dr. Atkinson interprets ῥά τ' ἐσσι, "prophetical." He also refers to the "strange use" in Oss. iii. 144, 9, by two persons playing chess, ὅσοι ῥά τ' ἐσσι ῥίπλιν. If there is any idea common to these different uses, it seems to be that of hidden subtilty.

ῥεῖδω: ὁρᾷ ῥ., "well!" 1 Kings ii. 18; Susanna 55.

ῥεῖδω, "I bend (a bow)," 2 Esdr. xvi. 13; Eccclus. xliii. 12;

"I fall or bow down," Judith iv. 2 (always with ἐ).

ῥεῖδω, "hissing," rather "whistling." See Is. v. 26;

Zeph. ii. 15; and cp. ῥεῖδω.

ῥεῖδω, "murderer," Num. xxxv. 16.

ῥεῖδω (for ῥεῖδω): ἢ ῥ., "I know not," Gen. ii. 9; muna ῥ., Cant. i. 8.

ῥεῖδω. Also, "a seer," Micah iii. 7.

ῥεῖδω. The signif. 'beasts' is unnecessary: see Prov. *loc. cit.*

ῥεῖδω. In 1 Sam. xxiv. 2, ῥεῖδω.

ῥεῖδω, ὁρᾷ, "bats," Baruch vi. 22; cf. ὁρᾷ.

P. O'C. has ῥ. also.

ῥεῖδω, "a smile," Eccclus. xxi. 20.

ῥεῖδω, ὁρᾷ, "a scarecrow," Baruch vi. 70.

ῥεῖδω, "I justify, verify," Is. xliii. 9; 1 Chr. vi. 17; Ps. li. 4.

ῥεῖδω, "visit," not in the colloquial sense, but = ἐπισκέπτομαι. So in Luke i. 68, al. "visit" (sins), Jer. xiv. 10; "inquire," Gen. xxiv. 57.

ῥεῖδω, "lieutenant," C. P. 77.

ῥεῖδω or ῥεῖδω, "I verify," Ezk. xliii. 26.

ῥεῖδω, "I prescribe," C. P. 23.

ῥεῖδω, "I bereave," Jer. xv. 9, xviii. 31.

- פֹּלִיזְעָאֵט, "family, stock," Tob. vi. 13.
 פֹּרְטָאֵב, "a hindering," 1 Sam. xxv. 26.
 פֹּרְטִיזְוִיט אֶר, "I besiege," Jer. xxi. 9.
 פֶּרְעֻזְרָאֵץ, "exercise," 2 Macc. iv. 9, 12, 14.
 פִּיּוֹטְרָדִיּוֹיִם, "I contradict," C. P. 591, 593.
 פִּיֵּט : וּב פ. . . . טִיּוֹבֵלֵיטְעֵאֵט, "hath dealt bountifully,"
 Ps. cxvi. 7.
 פֻּלָּאֵץ, "stay," in the sense of 'support,' Is. iii. 1 ;
 pl. 'bases,' Jer. xxv. 19 ; 'study,' Cant. i. 11.
 שָׂבָבֵל, "undersetter" is ש. פֻּלָּאֵיִץ.
 שְׂאִירְטָאֵיִם. Also, "I cause to rejoice," Ps. xix. 8,
 lxxxix. 4.
 שְׂאִירְטִיֵּב = שְׂאִירְטֵע, Jos. vi. 2.
 שָׁאֵן : add the phrases וְעַ שָׁאֵן, 'Oh that . . . ! (with
 vb. subst.), Job vi. 2, xix. 23 ; O שָׁאֵן, Deut. v. 29.
 שָׂרְפָאֵב, "field, garden," Deut. xxii. 24.
 שְׂעָרְפִּיטְמֵאִיִּנְנֵעֵאֵט. Is "backslider" right ?
 שְׂעִיִּיִם : וּב שִׁי, "hath budded," Ezk. vii. 10.
 שִׁי, *gen.* "offspring," 1 Sam. viii. 2.
 שִׁינֵאֵמִיִּיִם, "a spring" (Coneys), in *l. c.* 17 ש. נֵא נִיִּרְטֵעֵאֵב.
 שְׂלָפֵלָמ, "manacles," Ecclus. xxi. 19.
 שְׂלֵעֵ (Coneys). For 'poor' read 'pure'.
 שְׂלֵיִיִם, "I jostle," Nahum ii. 4.
 שְׂלֵאִיִּיִם, "I set myself in array," 1 Kings xx. 12.
 שְׂלֵאִיִּרְעֵאֵט, "persuasion," 2 Macc. iv. 34.
 שְׂרֵעֵאֵנִיִּיִם, "I adjure," 2 Chr. xviii. 15, Prov. vii. 16.
 שְׂרִיִּטְטָאִיִּר, "a rattling," 1 Macc. vi. 41.
 שְׂרֻאֵב, "the cheek," Lam. i. 2, iii. 30.
 שְׂטֵט, "disgrace," Ecclus. viii. 4.
 הִיִּן, a Hebrew liquid measure, about 5 quarts, Exod.
 xxix. 40.
 הֹרְפֵנֵט, "a hornet," Deut. vii. 20.
 לֵאֲרָנָאֵט : 1. פֶּיִרְרִיִּזְע, "a ploughshare," Joel iii. 10.
 לֵאֲרָנָאִיֵּב : פֶּעֶר 1., "a beggar," Judg. ii. 8.
 לִמְטֵעֵאֵט אֶר, "concern with," 2 Chron. xxxv. 21, Joel iii. 4.

inbeac̃, "fit, mature," C. P. 389. Lhuyd (*Tit.* ii.) gives this for "aptus". In his Irish Dict. he interprets "come to perfect birth" (*i. e.* 'timely, mature'). O'B. prints this "come to perfect health," and is followed by O'Reilly, "in perfect health." Compare ionbuiḡ (O'Don. Suppl.) or inbair̃, a particular point of time (especially a woman's time of delivery). O'Connell has inbe, 'a notch,' which he derives from ébe, 'to hew,' and hence inbeac̃, meac̃ inbeac̃ being "a graduated beam or balance, an ounce," by which he must mean an ouncel, a kind of steelyard with movable fulcrum now forbidden by law. This inbe would best explain a nīme, Luke v. 7, 'at the point of' (see p. 20), 'in the nick of,' which English phrase had probably a similar origin. It would also explain inbeac̃, 'mature.'

inóeanam̃, sb. "form," 2 Chr. iv. 5.

ineagla, "to be feared," Ps. xcvi. 4.

inḡneamuiḡim, "I persecute," Ps. lxxi. 11.

inim̃teac̃ta, "passable," 2 Macc. v. 21.

inleic̃te, "fit to be referred," 2 Macc. xi. 36.

inneac̃ac̃, "impiety," 2 Macc. iv. 38.

inṡeap̃roa, "able to stand," 1 Macc. v. 40.

ioḡuil, "wrath," 1 Macc. ii. 44.

iolḡa, "tongs," Is. vi. 6. Lhuyd quotes from this, "leis an iolghaibh, *with the tongues*" (his usual spelling of "tongs"). O'Brien copies Lhuyd, quoting the same words without the reference, and, identifying with iolḡuṡ, renders "with various tongues." O'R. follows. P. O'Connell gives iolḡair̃e = "tongs." Walsh and O'Neachtan give "forceps = iolḡa."

iom̃ap̃c̃air̃, "reproof," Ecclus. xx. 3.

iom̃c̃aṡ, "a support," 1 Kings vii. 30.

iom̃oulaṡc̃, "multitude," 2 Macc. xiv. 43.

iom̃luic̃, "a tossing (anonn aḡur̃ aḡall)," Job vii. 4).

iom̃p̃aṡroũin, "full pardon," Wisdom xiii. 8.

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Λογ, a Hebrew liquid measure somewhat less than a pint.
 Lev. xiv. 10.

Λοιγῆαῤῥυιο ἑνντῖγε, "thunderbolts," Wisd. v. 21.

Λύαδ, s., "mention," Is. xlix. 1.

Λυαḡυλ, "toil," 1 Esdr. iv. 22 ; κυῖη λ., "take pains,"
 Ecclus. xii. 11.

Λυαῖḡ, "hath determined," Judith xii. 4.

Λύαῖḡιμ, Deut. xxviii. 56 ; ηαḡ λύαῖḡεαδ, "which would
 not adventure," A. V.

Λυῖβ, "flour," Ecclus. xxxviii. 11.

Μαḡιμπεαῤῥαν ηα ῥύλ, "apple of the eye," Ecclus. xvii. 22.

Μαῖη, "residue," Ezk. xxxvi. 5.

Μαλλυḡ, Prov. xix. 3 : this verb corresponds to 'perverteth.'

In the MS. it is corrected to οῤεοῖυḡ.

Μεαδῤῥαῖμ, "I meditate," Jos. i. 8.

Μεαλλ ηα ῥύλ, "apple of the eye," Ps. xvii. 8.

Μεῖτεαλλαḡ, "fatlings," Ps. lxvi. 15.

Μιḡαλλυḡιμ, "I dote," Ezk. xxiii. 16.

Μῖḡεαῤῥα, "ill according," Wisd. xviii. 10.

Μῖμπεαῤῥαῖμ, "I think little of," Neh. ix. 32.

Μῖνλεαḡ : *dele* "green pasture," taken from Ps. xxiii. 2,
 where the text is α ηῖνβεαῤῥ ῥεῖη μῖνλεḡ.

Μῖοβλαῤῥ, "disgrace," Ecclus. xxii. 1.

Μῖοβλαῤῥα, "tedious," Wisd. ii. 1.

Μῖ(ο)ḡοḡύῥαḡ, "ungodly," 2 Macc. iv. 13.

Μῖ(ο)ḡοδ, "abuse," 2 Esdr. ix. 9.

Μῖοḡοδῖαῖμ, "I profane," Ezk. xxxvi. 20.

Μῖοηδῖαῖλε, "suburb," pl., Jos. xxi. 2.

Μῖοῤῥαῖḡ, "indignation," Ecclus. xxxvi. 7.

Μῖῤεαηη, "fragment, piece," 1 Sam. ii. 10.

Μοḡ : α μοḡα λῖοῖ, "in the twilight" or "at dawn of day,"
 2 Kings vii. 7 = α μῖοḡε λῖοῖ, Judg. xix. 26 ; ḡο μοḡ-ḡῤαḡ,
 2 Kings vii. 7.

Μοῖη-ḡεαῤῥα, "notable," Dan. viii. 8.

Μοῖηḡ, "lees," Jer. xlviii. 11.

- Μορτάοι, "mortar," Is. xli. 25.
 Μότ : το μότ (*sic*), "caused," 1 Macc. xiv. 36.
 Μύδαίμ, *intr.*, "I perish," Jer. iv. 9.
 Μυγυγίμ, *id.*, Jer. xviii. 18.
 Μύζαδ, "perishing," Lam. iii. 18.
 Μυλλαδ, "a mould," 2 Esdr. viii. 2, but erroneously in the sense of 'mould.'
 Νάδ : υέ νάδ, "Oh that" . . . (with verbs other than the verb subst.), Job xi. 5, xiii. 5. See ζαν.
 Νάμνυαδ : *dele* "violent." *l. c.* Ps. vii. 16, has φοιπέγιν ν.
 Νεάμνυονναδτταδ, "niggardly," Ecclus. xxxi. 24.
 Νεάμνχοιγίτ, "neglecting." Rather, 'not sparing,' Col. ii. 23, ἀφείδτα. So A. V. mg.
 Νειμνχίνντε, "infinite," Wisd. viii. 18; 2 Macc. ii. 24; "uncertain," Wisd. iii. 6.
 Νειμνφέδτανυγ, "unadvised," 2 Macc. xiv. 8.
 Νιυνυεαδτ, "wantonness," Ecclus. xxvii. 13.
 Νυαδαρ, "marriage," C. P. 271.
 Οινεαδαίμ, "I go, travel," 1 Macc. ii. 31.
 Οίγεανν : "potsherd" is questionable. It is indeed in A. V. Is. xlv. 9; but the Latin there has 'testa,' which sometimes means 'a sherd,' but more commonly 'an earthen pot.' The word does not occur elsewhere in O. T. for 'potsherd.'
 Ορνόδ : ο. δ λάιμ, 'his thumb'; ο. δςκοίρε, "his great toe," Exod. xxix. 20.
 Ομντα, "daunted," Ecclus. xxxii. 18.
 Ομνταδ, "shame, confusion," Baruch i. 15.
 Ομνταρ, "bashfulness," Ecclus. xx. 23. See υαμ.
 Πιαρτράλμερ, "palmerworm," Joel i. 4.
 Πίττυρ, "picture," Prov. xxv. 11.
 Πιννταίίμ, "I paint," Ezk. xxiii. 14.
 Πιονέρανν, "pine tree," Neh. viii. 15.
 Πορτ, "mount." Better, 'bank'; used of a bank or 'agger' raised against a besieged city, Ezk. iv. 2.

Πρασιον, "affliction, 'angustia,'" 2 Chr. xxxiii. 12.

Πunc, "a note (of music)," Wisd. xix. 18.

Ραβδαρετα, "an overrunning (flood)," Nahum i. 8.

Ρανναμλα, "particular," C. P. 13.

Ρεαο = ρυο, "a thing," gen. -α, Lev. xiii. 6.

Ρειοριζιμ, "I settle (a question)," 1 Kings xx. 40.

Ρειλεαο, "to promote," C. P. 79.

Ριοστρε, "a fellow," 1 Kings vii. 33.

Ροζα, "chief," Jer. xxv. 34; pl. ποιζνε, "chief (persons)," Ezra i. 5.

Ροιμ : ρο ροζα ροιμ, "thy choice among," Gen. xxiii. 6.

Ροιμνιμ, *intr.* "I deal (with, ρε)," Ps. xiii. 6.

Ρολλα : ρο κυρ α ρ, "to enroll," 1 Macc. x. 36, xiii. 40.

Ρυαο, "violent"; ζαοτ ρυαο, "a blasting wind," 1 Kings viii. 37.

Ρυιο, "a charioteer," 2 Macc. ix. 4.

Ρυναριζεοιρ, "a secretary," 1 Esdr. ii. 16.

Σαινρελερ, "chancellor," Ezra iv. 8 (ραιμρελερ).

Σβροζαλλε : *dele* "a cab," taken from 2 Kings vi. 25; "a cab of dove's dung," 'cab' being a Hebrew measure. The printed text has (κυο) ρο ρβροζαλλε εolum ζοα ραλκαρ, in which ρ. manifestly has the meaning 'craw, or crop' (of the bird), which meaning is also in Coneys. But whence did the translator derive this rendering? It was one of several suggestions which are given in the margin of Diodati's Bible, which we are told Bedell consulted. It is not, however, the original reading of the MS.

Σαριτεαε, "the reins," 1 Macc. ii. 24.

Σαρηαο : ρ. αν λαοι, "dawning of day," Jos. vi. 15.

Σοιμνιμ : also "rush," Judg. xviii. 25; cp. 1 Sam. xix. 10 ("slip away," A.V.).

Σοιτε, "chapt," Jer. xiv. 4.

Σοτδαμ, "I bereave," Ezk. xxxvi. 12; "pluck," Ps. lxxx. 12; cp. ρζαε.

- Scpióbán, Job ii. 8, not 'a potsherd,' but 'a scraper.'
- Siabapap, "a gadding about," Ecclus. xxv. 25.
- Simne, "a chimney," Hos. xiii. 3.
- Sioc, "become congealed," Ecclus. xliii. 20.
- Siobáin, "atonement," Ecclus. iii. 3, iv. 30.
- Siobánta, "reconciled," 2 Macc. v. 20.
- Siobáin, "a wretch," 2 Macc. xiii. 4 = pioáin, 2 Macc. xii. 23.
- Slac: *dele* "reed." The Irish in *l. c.* Matt. xxvii. 48 is r. siolcáig.
- Sleáman, "an elm," Hos. iv. 13.
- Soiléap, "cellar," Jer. xxxvii. 16.
- Soite: 50 r., "as far as," Matt. xxiv. 27; Acts i. 8, 22 (should be roice).
- Sotailúg, in Deut. xxxii. 11, is a blunder of the translator. See above.
- Staoanam, "I revolt," 1 Macc. xiii. 16.
- Stacuil = rtaamuil is in the MS. Deut. xxviii. 56 for máot.
- Súmaipeað ná huipceaða, "the receptacles of waters," Ecclus. xxxix. 17 (= rúgmaipeað).
- Taðac, "exactness," Ecclus. xlii. 4.
- Taðuigim, "I exact," 2 Kings xv. 2, xxiii. 35.
- Taíoe, "boasting," Ecclus. vii. 5.
- Taigiuir: *dele* "loud." In *l. c.* Ps. xcvi. 4, it is "joyful" = lxxx. 2.
- Taigiuir (sic), "melody," Ecclus. xxxii. 6. P. O'C. has taigear.
- Tairmteact, "transgression," C. P. 19.
- Tairpe, "dead bodies," Nahum iii. 3.
- Taob, "relying on (né), trusting," Prov. iii. 5, ná bí taob né oo tuigir féin.
- Taobáig. For "thrust" in Coneys read "trust," Prov. xxviii. 26: cp. 2 Kings iv. 3, ná taob né beagán, 'be not content with,' 'non paucifices' interlinear Latin.
- taobáic, "trusty," 1 Macc. vii. 7.

Երրեսցիմ, also *intr.*, Ps. xcvi. 1.

Երրսցիմ, also "draw (as in sketching)," Ezk. iv. 1 :
cp. Jos. xviii. 4 ("describe," A.V.).

Եւծօր, *vb.*, "blemish," Ecclus. xviii. 15.

Եօրանամ, "I border," Zech. ix. 2.

Ելիմ ըսար, "I subsist" (?), 2 Kings iii. 7 ; Ելիմ, *passive*,
նի ուօբսիցիօր, "shall not be visited," Prov. xix. 23 ;
Ելիցիօր, *impers.*, Is. xxiv. 22.

Ելջեօւր, "husbandry," 2 Chr. xxvi. 10.

Երեւեւ, "a fellow-countryman," 2 Macc. v. 8.

Եօջ, "chief (persons) (= Եօջեւ)," Ezra viii. 24.

(նոճ) Եօլջեւր, Deut. xvii. 8. The MS. has Եօլար with the
correction Եօլեւեւր, from Եօլեւր, 'I demand (pay-
ment).' See O'Don., Suppl., and Windisch. The latter
compares Եօ-բեւր. See also Atkinson's Glossary to
Homilies.

Եօլար, "a saw," 1 Kings vii. 9.

Եօլեւրեւր, "I gather," 1 Macc. xv. 3.

Եօլած or Եօլիւած, "heed," Judg. xix. 25 ; 1 Sam. xxv.
25.

Եօլմանամ, "I tingle," Jer. xix. 3.

Երաւ, "quickly," Jos. x. 6, Երաւ Երաւն Երաւ. Երաւն
Երաւ, Zech. viii. 21.

Երաւլ Եւմ, "tend to," Prov. xiv. 23.

Երաւն, "treasurer," 1 Esdr. ii. 11, iv. 47.

Երաւլ, "I find room"; to the ex. given on p. 24 add
2 Chr. vii. 7 ; Ezk. xxiii. 32.

Երաւեւ, "hire, wages," Micah i. 7.

Երաւ " (one's) turn," Esth. ii. 12.

Երաւ "once (as once a year, etc.)," Exod. xxx. 10 ; Lev.
xvi. 34.

Երաւ, Deut. xxii. 19, for 'shekel.'

Երաւլիմ, "I burden," Zech. xii. 3.

Երաւանար, "a being abashed," Ecclus. iv. 25.

Երաւանաւ, "bashfulness," Ecclus. xx. 22. See Օման.

ύιρνιαμ, Hab. iii. 16 " (my lips) quivered." ύιρνιαοαρ
(= ορνιαμ).

υατδ, also, "few," Jer. xxx. 19 (= υαξδδ).

υατμδρ, "grievous," C. P. 279.

υδβδδδμ, "I sigh," Jer. li. 52; Ezk. x. 4, xxi. 7.

ύοδ, "a hood," Is. iii. 23.

υξδμτδ, "saddled," 2 Sam. xvi. 1.

υιρεδμνδδ, "fitting," 2 Macc. xv. 38.

υιριου, "variety," C. P. 13.

υιρμειρνεδδδ, "an encouraging," 2 Macc. xv. 17.

υμαρ, "a press," not specifically 'a winepress,' which is

υ. βριύιγε ριοννα, Is. v. 2; υ. να ρινεδμνδ, Is. lxiii. 3.

In Rev. xiv. 19, 20, it is 'of the wrath of God.'

T. K. ABBOTT.

NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM II.

SOME suggestions by me concerning the problems which this book presents have already appeared in various quarters, particularly in the notes to Mr. Pretor's edition of the book (Cambridge University Press, 1898), in Dr. Purser's notes to his Oxford text, and in the third recension of Vol. I. of the Dublin edition of Cicero's Correspondence (1904). When reference to these works will serve, I shall content myself with it; but in some instances my comments were published with incomplete evidence and argument.

Ep. 1. § 1. *gladiatores Metelli cupide relinquenti.*

Edd. ask what was the occasion of this exhibition, and have sometimes supposed it to be a mere money-making show. It is true that wealthy men kept gladiators as a speculation. But in Cicero's age, and probably long after, etiquette required that every actual exhibitor of gladiators, even if he were a magistrate, should pretend that the show was meant to do honour to some deceased relative. The death, however, which served as a pretext might have occurred many years earlier. When Caesar was aedile in 65 B.C., he presented a *munus* in honour of his father, who had died nineteen years before (Plin. n. h. 33, 53); and the *manes* of Iulia waited eight years for the same honour. Sulla ordered by will that his son should glorify him by a gladiatorial exhibition. The injunction was not

carried out till eighteen years had passed. In 6 B.C. Augustus gave a display for the sake of Agrippa, seventeen years after his death. The father of the Emperor Tiberius committed suicide on the field of Philippi; the show with which his son honoured him must have come long after (Suet. Tib. 7); so with the celebration in honour of Drusus, grandfather of Tiberius (*ibid.*).

Ep. I. § 1. tua illa—legi enim libenter—horridula mihi atque incompta uisa sunt.

While the elliptic or deprecatory or anticipative *enim* cannot be denied to Cicero (cf. ep. 3. § 3 *uides enim cetera*), the appearance of the particle for the usual *autem* in a parenthetic clause which is distinctly corrective, is without certain parallel. The substitution of *enim* for *autem* (and vice versa) in MSS. is very frequent, and is caused by the similarity of marks indicating contraction; so *autem* should probably be read here. The corruption of *diligenter* to *libenter*, assumed by Wesenberg, would be difficult.

Ep. I. § 1. meus autem liber totum Isocrati myrothecium atque omnis eius discipulorum arculas ac non nihil etiam Aristotelia pigmenta consumpsit.

The admiration felt by Cicero for the rhetorical teaching of Aristotle, as well as the internal evidence of the passage itself, proclaim that the text is unsound. Cic. is made to say that in the history of his consulship (written in Greek) he *exhausted the whole* of Isocrates' aromatics, *all* the paint-pots of that teacher's pupils, and *to a slight extent* the colours prescribed by Aristotle. I have long suspected that the words *atque omnia illa* have suffered by contraction and have reappeared as *ac non nihil*. Cic. goes on to say that his very superlative work was hurriedly glanced at by Atticus at Corcyra (*strictim attigisti*), and that Atticus afterwards

received a copy of it from Cossinius. "I would not have ventured to send it you," says Cic., "had I not approved it after slow and scrupulous composition." He then goes on to tell how *nostrum illud ὑπόμνημα* (on the same subject) had reduced to silence the Greeks who had thought of handling the theme. My impression is that Cic. is talking of the same work throughout, and that *ὑπόμνημα* is as indefinite in its use as the corresponding Latin word *commentarius*. Dr. Purser (HERMATHENA, No. 28, p. 48) thinks the word *must* (as I admit it *may*) mean 'a rough sketch.' But even if two writings, a first draft and a finished composition, are indicated, the work seen by Atticus at Corcyra, and afterwards received from Cossinius, is the latter, not (as Purser, Tyrrell, and others suppose) the former. The context, which I have summarized above, makes this perfectly clear. Further, Cic. can hardly have meant to claim that even his first sketch routed the Greeks; this must have been the effect of the book in which, as he says, he exhausted the Greek repertory of literary scents and colours. I take this opportunity of correcting a passage where Lysias, of all people, is praised for his colouring, viz., Brut. 293, Lysiae . . . quo nihil potest esse pictius. The absurdity of *pictius* is obvious from other passages in which Cic. writes of Lysias. Read *perfectius* (which suffered by abbreviation); and cf. Brut. 35: Lysias . . . quem prope audeas oratorem perfectum dicere. For a highly artificial exegesis see Martha's n.

Ep. 1. § 2. conturbavi Graecam nationem.

This is usually taken to mean 'I have thrown into confusion the Greek clan.' Cf. Phil. 21, 32 num te conturbo? But the context suggests another sense: "I have reduced to bankruptcy," for which compare Mart. 7, 27, 10 conturbator aper = aper qui conturbat; id. 10, 96, 9 conturbatorque macellus.

Ep. 1. § 3. The famous passage which enumerates twelve speeches delivered by Cic. as consul, and now to be published in a collection, and to be entitled *consulares*, is too long to quote. It has been repeatedly condemned as a forgery. Most of the objections have been refuted by Pretor, whose views Purser has accepted. I wish to add a few comments. Seeing that *σῶμα* (*corpus*) often applies to the entire collection of an author's works, why should it be thought strange when used of a particular section of Cicero's speeches, defined by him as 'consular' and non-forensic? See H. Landwehr in 'Archiv f. Lat. Lex.' 6, 248; and add to his references Sen. Ep. 46, 1. The absence of two speeches from the list, that for Murena, and that for C. Piso, has been thought strange. The reason for their omission is made clear by the context. These speeches were delivered to ordinary juries; the rest either to the people or the senate. They were all (even the 'Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo') political and not forensic. I have suggested (Tyrrell, ed. 3) that the two speeches for which Atticus asked later (see 2, 7, 1) may have been the two here passed over. For the corrupt *inuocarunt* (Med.) in the passage *nona in contione quo die Allobroges inuocarunt*, the em. commonly adopted is that of Manutius (*indicarunt*). In Pretor's and Purser's notes, I have proposed *inuocaram*, 'I called on the A. to give evidence'; for which cf. *inclamaro* in 2, 20, 5. In these letters Cic. readily glides into the use of the pluperfect tense, as below (§ 7), *conlocaram*; and the context points distinctly to a verb in the first person. I have sometimes, however, thought that *inuocarunt* may have descended from *interrogavi*, by stress of contraction; cf. Sull. 41 *omnia indicum dicta interrogata responsa*. The strangest thing in this whole passage is the word *refractariolo*, as regards both structure and meaning. The sense of *refractariolum iudiciale genus dicendi* is similar to that of

concertatorium iudiciale genus in Brut. 287. Several edd., finding it hard to deduce the meaning from *re* and *frangere*, do not mend matters by having recourse to *refragari*. The word *refractarius* is only quoted from Sen. Ep. 73, 1. The nearest analogy is afforded by *prae fractus*. [The late word *directarius*, "a burglar" (*derectarius* in Corp. Gloss.), is commonly said to be hybrid, from *διὰ* and *ῥήγνυμι*.]

Ep. 1. § 4. quid sit quo te arcessam.

For *quo* (many edd. *quod*) cf. 1, 18, 8 sunt haec fugienda quo te uoco.

Ep. 1. § 4. ego te istim excitarem.

It has been questioned (see Pretor's n.) whether *istim* = *istinc* is possible. But the certain exx. of *istim* in Cic. (below, 14, 12, 1; Fam. 6, 20 §§ 1, 3; also Fam. 10, 20, 1) all carry this meaning; and the facts about *illim* are similar. The question rather is whether Cic. used *istim*, *illim* with the sense of *istic*, *illic*.

Ep. 1. § 5. fregi hominem et inconstantiam eius reprehendi, qui Romae tribunatum plebis peteret, cum in Sicilia hereditatem se petere dictitasset.

The reading of Med. pr. m. is *hereditatem sepe hereditasset*; for *hereditatem* the sec. m. substitutes *aedilitatem*. That *hereditatem* is to be preferred, I cannot doubt. As I pointed out to Dr. Purser (see Tyrrell, ed. 3, and n. to Oxford text), the fragm. 15 (Müller's ed.) of the speech 'In Clodium et Curionem' seems to go against the reading *aedilitatem*. It runs: cum se ad plebem transire uelle diceret, sed misere fretum transire cuperet. Cic. refers to something said by Clodius not at Rome (as Purser thinks), but in Sicily, where he talked freely; cf. fragm. 16 hanc loquacem Siciliam non despexit. He seems to have

pretended that he was anxious to get back to Rome, in order to secure adoption by a rich plebeian, and to mend his fortunes by an inheritance. When he reached Rome, he told another story. Doubtless fr. 15 has come down to us in a mangled form; Cic. must have played in some way on the word *transire*, applied to the adoption and to the coming over to Italy.

The current opinion as to the origin and date of the oration 'in Clodium et Curionem,' though sanctioned (apparently) by the Schol. Bob., is, I think, incorrect. It is supposed that the published speech was based upon an address delivered in the senate on May 15, 61 B.C., and brilliantly described in Att. 1, 16. It is true that, to a certain extent, the description of that address coincides with the fragments. Thus the *patronus libidinis* of fr. 21 is the same as the *patronus* in Att. 1, 16, 10; while fr. 20 concerns an attack made by Clodius on Cic. for frequenting Baiae, which corresponds with one narrated in 1, 16, 8. Again, fragments 8-10 deal with Piso, his prospective government of Syria, and his debts, much as these topics are handled in 1, 16, 8. But this material for invective must have been repeatedly used by Cic. when he "smashed" Clodius (*Clodium praesentem fregi* in 1, 16, 8 and *fregi hominem* in 2, 1, 5). On the other hand, it seems certain that on May 15, 61 B.C., Clodius had not yet declared his intention of becoming a plebeian. Cicero could not have passed over in silence the portentous scheme, as he does in Att. 1, 16. The earliest definite mention of the plan is found in Att. 1, 18, 4 (written in Jan., 60). Just before the date of that letter, Cic. had given Clodius, in the senate, his "usual entertainment" (*hunc accepi ut soleo*), when, in his absence, one of his supporters was trying to bring about his *transitio ad plebem*. If, as seems highly probable, Clodius was in Sicily from the middle of 61 to the middle of 60, then the idea of

becoming a plebeian was hatched in Sicily, and fragm. 15 (quoted above) refers to its inception. The time of the return to Rome is indicated by fr. 12: *confirmat se comitiis consularibus Romae futurum*. The affair of the Bona Dea prevented Clodius from going as quaestor to his province before about midsummer, 61; and the words *cum . . . misere fretum transire cuperet*, taken together with fr. 12, indicate that his chief refused to release him before the end of a full year's service. If, then, Cic. introduced into a speech arising out of the debate on May 15, 61 B.C., any allusion to a desire on the part of Clodius to attain the tribunate, he was guilty of a remarkable anachronism. But I believe that the oration 'in Clodium et Curionem' was based on the attack recorded in 2, 1, 5, about which passage I am now writing. Compare the gibe in § 5, touching the entry by night into the city, with fr. 13: *tanto prius ad aerarium uenit ut ibi ne scribam quidem quemquam offenderet*. Clodius hurries to the treasury to deposit his accounts, but reaches it before any clerk has arrived. Then (§ 5) he addresses a *contio*, no doubt by the aid of a friendly tribune; compare fr. 17: *accesserunt ita pauci ut eum non ad contionem sed sponsum diceres aduocasse*. It may be noted that fr. 1 affords evidence that the quarrel between Cicero and Clodius began at an earlier date than that of the famous trial for sacrilege.

Ep. 1. § 5. *ex Sicilia septimo die Romam; ante tribus horis Roma Interamnam. Noctu introisti; idem ante.*

The first *ante* (for *a* of Med.) is adopted by recent edd. from Lehmann; and *introisti* from Sternkopf, for which MSS. have *introisse*. I should prefer to eject this word as having been repeated here from a passage a few lines above.

Ep. 1. § 5. *ea (Clodia) cum uiro bellum gerit, neque solum*

cum Metello sed etiam cum Fabio quod eos esse in hoc esse moleste fert.

So Med. Corrections have been numerous; among them must be counted the lection in ed. Ven. (1470), *mihi esse amicos* for *esse in hoc esse*. The conjecture of Victorius, to omit the first *esse*, aims at the correct sense, i.e. *eos id agere ne Clodius tribunus plebis fiat*; but if Cicero wrote thus, it must have been hard for Atticus to divine his meaning. I have proposed an easy emendation. Dropping *esse* with Victorius, I suppose *molestos* to have fallen out before *moleste*; *hoc* then means Clodius. "She is vexed that they are giving trouble in the matter of her brother." For the unknown *Fabio*, Bücheler suggested *Flauio*, the proposer of the agrarian *rogatio* in 60. I think Fabricius, a known enemy of Clodius and afterwards tribune in 57, may have been the man, or (less probably) Fadius, another tribune of that year.

Ep. 1. § 6. quid? si Caesarem . . . reddo meliorem; num tantum obsum rei publicae?

So Med. pr. m.; the sec. m. has *non tantum*, only to be understood as *non ita multum*; but to this, as C. F. W. Müller stated correctly in his note on Seyffert's "Laelius," p. 145, there is no parallel. The combination *num tantum* is just as difficult. A favourite correction has been *num tandem*; again a dubious phrase, hardly to be justified by Tusc. 1, 56 *illa tandem num leuiora censes*; or by Leg. Agr. 1, 11 *num quisnam tandem* . . . where the reading is questionable. One MS. (Ambr. 17) has here *num tamen*. Probably *tantum* should disappear; it may have been developed from a marginal variant *tum* for *num*.

Ep. 1. § 7. equitatus ille quem ego in cliuo Capitolino conlocaram.

Why edd. speak of a "conference" between the

equites and the senate on this occasion I do not know. None took place. On the Nones of Dec. 63, while the senate sat in judgment on the conspirators, the equites lined the approach to the Capitol, sword in hand (*praesidi causa*, Sall. Cat. 49). Many ordinary citizens joined them (Phil. 2, 16).

Ep. 1. § 8. Catonem nostrum non tu amas plus quam ego, sed tamen . . .

Here the omission of *quidem* after *tu* is unusual; it may have dropped out.

Ep. 1. § 8. Romuli faece.

Tyrrell's suggestion (*Romulae*) is ingenious; so 1, 16, 11 urbis . . . faecem. But it was not unnatural to substitute the name of the founder for that of his foundation. In Varro's 'Anthropopolis' (fr. III. Riese), *Seplasia Capuae* and *macellum Romuli* stand side by side. The actual Romans are connected with Romulus and Remus in other phrases, as *populo Remi* (Sen.), *turba Remi* (Juvenal), *Romuli nepotes* and *Remi nepotes* (Catullus). [Perhaps the mysterious title of one of Varro's Satires, *Marcopolis*, is an error for *Amurcopolis*, "Dreg-city," meaning Rome.]

Ep. 1. § 9. Fauonius meam tribum tulit honestius quam suam, Lucei perdidit. Accusavit Nasicam inhoneste ac modeste tamen. Dixit ita ut Rhodi uideretur molis potius quam Moloni operam dedisse.

The current explanation, that Fauonius had failed as candidate for the praetorship, and had prosecuted Nasicus, a successful rival, for *ambitus*, will not bear examination. The supposed *comitia praeatoria* cannot have occurred in 60, because the circumstances are obviously recent, and new to Atticus; while the praetorian elections of the year 59 had not yet taken place; nor even the consular

elections. This is clear from the words *Caesarem . . . qui aderit biduo* below. The only elections which can have been completed at the time of writing are those for the tribunate. The words below, *petit* (rather *petet*) *iterum rei publicae causa*, suit the tribunate better than the praetorship. Favonius, "Cato's ape," sought the office, like his leader, in order to "save the country." It is not likely that Nasica (Metellus Scipio) stood for the tribunician office; but apart from that, the election might easily give rise to some charge, *de ui* for instance. [Favonius was aedile in 53.] The remainder of the extract is of course notoriously difficult. But I do not see any advantage in altering *inhoneste* or *modeste*; Favonius may not have consulted his honour in bringing the charge, and yet may have conducted the prosecution with moderation. The jest in *molis . . . Moloni* is feeble enough to act as a stimulus to emendation. Perhaps, however, *molis operam dare* was a slang phrase like our "doing a grind"; cf. De Or. 2, 144 *tibi mecum in eodem est pistrino uiuendum*; ib. 1, 46 *in iudicia et contiunculas tamquam in aliquod pistrinum detrudi et compingi*. The phrase may have excluded the idea of literary leisure.

Ep. 1. § 10. *sed, si ita placuit, laudemus, deinde in dissensionibus soli relinquamur.*

The MSS. readings in this vexed passage seem to me sound. The context concerns a *senatus consultum* passed at the instigation of Cato and an imitator, which in some way made difficult the recovery of a debt due to Atticus from the city of Sicyon. The blow (*plaga*) had affected *multos bonos uiros*, no doubt in their usurious dealings with the provincial cities. With *placuit, Catoni* is to be supplied. It is sarcastically assumed that all Cato's decisions are to be eulogized, as above criticism. Then—we must expect ourselves to be left in the lurch

by the hero in the middle of a quarrel. He shows gratitude to no one, and none can rely on his support. He can be *turpiter maleuolus* and *ingratissimus* (7, 2, 7); the *publicani* were his great friends, then he turned and rent them (1, 18, 7). A full stop, not a note of exclamation or interrogation, is needed at *relinquamur*. Nothing is gained by reading *discessionibus*, though Cic. might have written it; cf. ep. 16, 3 *ne optima causa pereat in senatu*. As to *st!* for *si* (Boot), I note that wherever *st!* has appeared in the text of Cic. it has been due to conjecture, the other passages being Fin. 2, 94 (Madv.); Rep. 6, 12 (Ian, for *et* of the palimpsest); Fam. 16, 24, 2. It has been generally accepted only in Rep. 1. c., where the context suits it especially; but in my opinion should be rejected everywhere.

Ep. 2. § 1. cura, amabo, Ciceronem nostrum. Ei nos συμπαθεῖν uidemur.

I have written (see Purser's text) συμπαθεῖν for *cinos* Θειοι (Med.); this word and συμπαθῶς are used elsewhere by Cic. in connexion with the illnesses of relations or friends, as here; cf. 5, 11, 7; 5, 18, 3; 12, 11; 12, 44, 1. The verb συννοσεῖν, commonly accepted from Muretus, is not used by Cic. elsewhere.

Ep. 2. § 2. o magnum hominem et eo (so Med. pr. m.; eodem m. sec.) multo plura didiceris quam de Procilio.

The reading of C (marg. Crat.), viz. unde in place of eo, which has been accepted by many edd., seems to me, like many other readings which proceed from the same source, to be due to conscious emendation, not to genuine tradition. At first sight the reading of the second hand in Med. suggests that in the parent MS. *de* had been at first overlooked and then written above the line; that the writer of the first hand failed to see

the insertion, which the writer of the second took to be *dē*, and so was led to *eodem*. But *discere de aliquo*, though found in older Latin, is nowhere else employed by Cic.; and it seems more likely that he wrote *ex* (or *ab*) *eo* and *e* (or *a*) *Proclio*; when the preposition fell out in the former place, *de* was supplied, and *e* or *a* assimilated to it. For other conjectural emendations in C, cf. nn. on ep. 7. § 3; ep. 9. § 1 (end); ep. 24. § 2.

Ep. 2. § 2. *mihi credes lege hec doceo mirabilis uir est.*

So the codd. Cic. has just been expressing admiration for Dicaearchus, whom he contrasted with Herodes. Many have been the corrections. I have proposed (n. to Purser's Oxford text) an emendation which involves slight changes, viz. *mihi crede, legens haec doceo; mirabilis uir est*—"Believe me, when I read these writings, I grow in knowledge." As to *legens*, the letters of Cic. employ with greater frequency than literature in general the present participle in the nominative singular. For the use of *doceo* cf. Tim. 31; Clu. 78; Verr. 2, 149. [The absolute use of *docere*, *doceri* is common in rhetorical writings, and emendation has often been wrongly made. Thus in Quint. 12, 10, 50 *commouendos esse docendosque animos imperitorum*, Burmann, followed by Meister, thought *docendos* weak, and changed it to *ducendos*. But *docere* and *commouere* are often joined together, as in Quint. 10, 1, 110; 11, 1, 6; Cic. Brut. 185 and 296; De opt. gen. 3; De Or. 2, 121.]

Ep. 2. § 3. *de lolio, sanus non es; de uino, laudo.*

Undeterred by a gibe which may be found in Boot's note, I have advocated the retention of the MSS. readings, referring to Plin. n. h. 22, 160, where *lolium* '*medetur podagrae*' (see Pretor's n.). Dr. Purser, in his Oxford text, has accepted this view.

Ep. 3. § 1. Valerius absolutus est, Hortensio defendente. Id iudicium Auli filio condonatum putabatur; et Epicraten suspicor, ut scribis, lasciuom fuisse.

This passage, I venture to think, has been misunderstood. For *Auli filio* (which edd. take from Tunstall) the MSS. have *Afilio*, *hatilio* (Med.), *Katilio*. It is to the last degree improbable that a culprit who had Hortensius for his counsel, should have owed his acquittal to Afranius, whose high office only served to bring into relief his personal insignificance. The commentators say that Afranius secured the verdict of "not guilty" because his patron Pompeius lent his influence. In that case Cic. would never have said that the jury acquitted as a favour to Afranius. And if the words be examined closely, it seems that Pompeius "went on the rampage" (*lasciuom fuisse*) not before, but after the acquittal. Again, Messala is supposed to be some dependant of Afranius. Could Cic. have begun his letter with an extravagant expression of joy (*primum, ut opinor, εὐαγγέλια*) because an obscure underling of the despicable Afranius had escaped? We do not remove the difficulties by supposing that the attack was regarded as really delivered against Pompeius. Nor can the first sentence of the letter have been "writ sarcastic." There is a better way. The defendant was M. Valerius Messala, whose mother was sister of Hortensius. He was several times arraigned; see 4, 16, 8 (17. § 5) and 5, 12, 2; also Fam. 8, 2, 1 and 8, 4, 1; Qu. fr. 3, 2, 3; 3, 3, 2; Brut. 328. In two of these passages Hortensius is stated to have defended him; and on one occasion Cic. was his counsel. In 5, 12, 2 Cic. says he sympathised with the distress of Hortensius (*συννηγωνίων*). Caelius in Fam. 8, 2, 1 depicts the triumphant joy of H. over one acquittal, for which the populace hissed him. One speech made by Hortensius in defence of his nephew was famous. Compare Brut. 328, and especially Val. Max. 5, 9, 2, a

passage which shows that Hortensius was devotedly attached to Messala, and at one time intended to disinherit his dissolute son, and make Messala his heir. In place of the corrupt *Afilio* or *hatilio*, *Katilio*, I would read *Catuli genero*, a description of Hortensius himself, which is quite in Cicero's style. In De Or. 3, 228 Catulus speaks of him as *meus gener*. The word *genero* would easily be eclipsed by contraction. I may note Cicero's interest in this Messala. In Qu. fr. 3, 8, 3 he uses, à propos of a later acquittal, language of joy, as here (*vehementer gaudeo*). Again, there is abundant evidence that Pompeius was Messala's enemy. He furthered a cabal to keep M. out of the consulship; see Att. 4, 9, 1; 4, 15, 7; Q. fr. 3, 1, 16; and M. joined Caesar in the Civil War. [The words *ut scribis* should be noticed; Cic. does not himself use *lasciuos*, though he has *lasciuire* once and *lasciuia* several times.]

Ep. 4. § 1. pecuniam solui imperavi, ne tu expensum muneribus ferres.

I still think *muneribus* a gloss (see Pretor's n.). The pleonastic phrase in Nep. Att. 13, 6 expensum ferre sumptui, is a poor parallel, and I have found no other.

Ep. 4. § 1. at quoniam, etc.

On a fresh consideration of all the *primâ facie* examples of purely continuative *at* in Cicero, Caesar, and Livy, none appear to me tenable. It is better to read *et* here with Lehmann, than *sed* with Müller.

Ep. 4. § 2. Clodius, ut ais, ad Tigranen! Velim Syrpie (Med.; *Sirpiae* C) condicione; sed facile patior.

Emendations have been numerous. Many do not harmonize with the context; Cic. certainly wished for Clodius not something better, but something worse than

he was getting. Hence I find it difficult to accept the suggestions of Dr. Purser (*HERMATHENA*, No. 28, p. 50), which are good, palaeographically considered, viz. *in Syriam e condicione*, or *in Cyprum e condicione*. And *e condicione* is a phrase to which I can find no parallel. I have conjectured (see Pretor's n. ; also Purser, l. c., and Tyrrell, ed. 3) *turpiū*, i.e. *turpiore*, a simple change which yields good sense. Cic. would like to see Clodius sent abroad in disgrace. The embassy was indeed not the 'fat' one (*opima* in ep. 7. § 3) for which Clodius had hoped ; it was "a hungry letter-carrying embassy" (*ieiuna tabellari legatio*), but it was too honourable nevertheless. Purser is right, I think, in connecting the *opima legatio* with Cyprus. There was money in that affair ; cf. Dom. 20 pecuniae deportandae. In 55 Clodius was again seeking a *legatio* which would be a *plena res nummorum* ; see Qu. fr. 2, 7 (9), 2, where *libera* is obviously a gloss.

Ep. 4. § 2. cum . . . iste sacerdos Bonae deae cuius modi sit † scius sit (*scierimus*, Orelli and most edd.).

I have conjectured *certius* for *scius* (in n. to Purser's text).

Ep. 4. § 4. minus sum curiosus.

So Med. ; but Σs give *nimis*. The two words are frequently confused (owing to similarity of contractions), and both make sense here ; but *minus* fits distinctly better into the context.

Ep. 5. § 2. . . . et quoniam Nepos proficiscitur, cuinam auguratus deferatur, quo quidem uno ego ab istis capi possum : tuidete ciuitatem meam.

The opening words imply that Nepos would not be leaving Rome, had he not despaired of succeeding his brother as augur. The last three words have been

emended in many ways. I have contended that the only change needed is *uide* or *uides* for *uidete* (see Pretor's n. and Tyrrell, ed. 3). Cic. sarcastically reminds Atticus of the ideal state described in the 'De re publica.' The confession of ambition which he has just made is in contrast with the picture he had painted of the perfect statesman (Scipio). The ideal of conduct there set forth is in several places brought by Cic. into connexion with his own action. See especially 7, 3, 2, a passage which bears much similarity to this (as I expound it). Also 6, 1, 8 praesertim cum VI libris tamquam praedibus me obstrinxerim. In Fam. 7, 28, 2 te ex libris meis animum meum desiderare, perhaps *e VI* or *e sex* should be read for *ex*. In Att. 6, 1, 13 πολίτευμα Catonis is a standard by which other men are to be judged.

Ep. 5. § 3. tu tamen de Curtio ad me rescribere certius et num quis in eius locum paretur et quid de P. Clodio fiat, et omnia, etc.

So the passage is usually printed. Med. has *ut* for *tu* (*tu* is in C) and *Cutio* (m. pr.), *Tutio* (m. sec.); also *nunc* for *num* and *frē* (= *fratre*) for *fiat et* (*fratre* is in ed. Rom.) The difficulties are obvious. The person named in the first line must be again indicated by *eius*. There is not the least probability that *Curtio* is right; not one of the contemporary personages of that name could have been mentioned here. Mr. Pretor proposes *Curio* (referring to 17. § 2); but why should Cic. be anxious to know who would take the place in the senate of an ex-quaestor, just expelled? Indeed, it could hardly be said that any particular person would fill his place. Reading continuously the whole passage from § 2, I think it certain that at the words *tu tamen* Cic. did return to the vacancy in the augurate; and that *eius* refers to no one but Metellus Celer, so that *Cutio* is a corruption of his name, possibly for *Quinto*, possibly for *Caecilio*, possibly

even for *Celere*. He is again indicated by *fratre* applied to his cousin. To Dr. Purser's references for this use add Dom. §§ 13, 70 and Post red. in sen. 25, in all of which places Clodius is called the *frater* of Metellus Celer. And in Att. 4, 3, 4, *fratrum trium* denotes Celer, Nepos, and Clodius. What the information was concerning Celer, for which Cic. asked, cannot be determined. It can have had no connexion with the circumstances of his death, with which Cic. was better acquainted than Atticus. See the remarkable account in Cael. 59 sq.

Ep. 6. § 1. fluctus numero.

The references to authors who speak of "numbering the waves," as we speak of "ploughing the sand," are not relevant. As the context proves, Cic. describes a mere idle seaside occupation; as elsewhere he describes himself as passing time by throwing stones into the sea.

Ep. 6. § 1. Antii, ubi ego malleum duumvirum (*diu nimirum* Med.) quam Romae fuisse.

Before *fuisse* Bosius inserts *me*; C. F. W. Müller (more plausibly) *consul*. I incline to think that a numeral contrasting with *duum* has fallen out; either *trium* in reference to the *dynastae*; or perhaps *quattuor* in allusion to the offer made to Cic. by Caesar that he should join the three, for which see Prov. Cons. 41; Fam. 13, 15, 1; in Pis. 79.

Ep. 6. § 2. tu uero sapientior Buthroti domum parasti; sed, mihi crede, proxima est illi municipio haec Antiatium ciuitas . . . hic hic nimirum πολιτεῖόν.

There is a difficulty here which seems to have escaped notice. It is strange that Cic. should call Antium a *ciuitas* and Buthrotum a *municipium*. It is true that municipal inscriptions occasionally give *ciuitas* instead of the usual designations of the local body politic, viz. *populus*

and *res publica*. The mass of these inscriptions is so great that one must not speak confidently; but the examples, I believe, belong to much later times. At any rate, the usage is not literary and not Ciceronian. In Verr. 4, 26 Reginis, quorum ciuitati . . . the word means "citizenship," not "community." In fragment 10 of the 'In Pisonem' (ed. Müller) Cic. speaks of Placentia as having been a *ciuitas* before the Social War, but not after. [The excerpt of Paul. ex F. p. 160, is corrupt and difficult.] It is conceivable but not likely that Cic. applied *ciuitas* to Antium in jest, as he dwells in Fam. 7, 12, 2 on the *populus* of "empty Ulubrae." But the application of *municipium* remains inexplicable. The text must be corrupt, though emendation is not easy. Perhaps we should read *municipio huic illa ciuitas* (*Antiatium* being a gloss). For πολιτευτήν cf. the quip in Fam. loc. cit. quid fiet populo vlubrano si tu statueris πολιτεύεσθαι non oportere?

Ep. 6. § 2. ἀνέκδοτα, quae tibi uni legamus, Theopompio genere aut etiam asperiore multo panguntur.

Cic. may have intended to imitate a work falsely attributed to Theopompus (see Pausan. 6, 18, 3), which Josephus c. Ap. 1, 24, calls Τριπολιτικός, but Lucian (Pseudologistae 29) Τρικάρανος. Lucian (who treats the work as genuine) is probably correct in the title; see his allusion to Cerberus. The treatise was συγγραφή λοιδόρος (Pausan.), and was directed against the three great powers of Greece, viz. Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. That at the time of the alliance between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus the name Τρικάρανος, "the three-headed monster," was current for the all-powerful Three, is shown by Varro's use of it (Appian, B. C. 2, 9). [For τριπολιτικός in another application see Att. 13, 32, 2.]

Ep. 7. § 2. *auspibus legis curiatae.*

The employment of *auspex* in relation to Pompeius, who as augur was *in auspicio* at the *adrogatio* of Clodius (2, 12, 1), seems to be contemptuous. The word is only twice used elsewhere by Cic., and once by Livy; in all three places, of the common seers who attended on marriages.

Ep. 7. § 3. *in domo Caesaris.*

So Med.; but C gives *domi*; a scholarly emendation. Cf. Off., 1, 139; Nep. Alc. 2, 1 and 3, 6; and Lys. 3, 5.

Ep. 7. § 3. *istorum inter istos dissensio.*

Many edd. adopt *ipsos* from an inferior MS. But Cic. is fond of the other form; he often has *omnium inter omnis*, *hominum inter homines*, etc.; though of course the accus. is often replaced by *ipsos*.

Ep. 7. § 3. *Megabocchus et haec sanguinaria iuuentus inimicissima est.*

The strange name *Megabocchus* is known to have been borne by at least one Roman (see Tyrrell's n.). Here it must be a nickname for a leader among the wild young nobles; perhaps Curio, who in ep. 8. § 1 is connected with the *iuuentus*; also in 24, 2 *manum iuuentutis duce Curione*. These young nobles play a considerable part in the history of the time; Dom. 46 and 129; Mur. 49; Leg. agr. 2, 45. For *sanguinaria*, which does not belong to Cicero's age, I have conjectured *sanguine saginata* (n. to Purser's text), comparing Sest. 78 *qui . . . rei publicae sanguine saginantur*. I need not quote the many passages where turbulent men are spoken of as sucking their country's blood; but cf. especially Dom. 124 *helluatus tecum simul rei publicae sanguine*.

Ep. 7. § 3. spero me praeclaras de istis rebus epistulas ad te saepe missurum.

These words illustrate a fact often forgotten, that even the letters to Atticus are sometimes not careless outpourings of the spirit, but elaborate compositions which (when it was safe) would be circulated and admired.

Ep. 7. § 4. sed illud quid sit scire cupio quod iacis obscure iam etiam ex ipsis quinque uiris loqui quosdam.

The difficulties are notorious. Mommsen's view that the twenty commissioners appointed to execute Caesar's agrarian laws were divided into four sections, so that each commissioner could be called either *Vuir* or *XXuir*, has been commonly accepted. Collectively they could only be called *XXuiri*; hence Manutius wished to read *XXuiris* here. And it is rather easier to understand that "certain of the twenty" should be grumbling, than "certain of the five." But Cic. seems to refer to one of the four sections which stands out clearly from the rest. Some scholars have thought that there was a committee of five which directed the entire operations. I prefer to suppose that "the five" are those charged, under the second of the two laws, with the distribution of the *ager Campanus* and the *campus Stellatis*. Their function would be more important than that of the rest. A seat on this body may have been the *quinqueuiratus* offered to Cic. (Prov. Cons. 41), which is called *XXuiratus* in Att. 9, 2A, 1. Pompeius belonged to this section (Att. 2, 12, 1); probably Crassus; possibly the grandfather of Augustus, M. Atius Balbus (2, 12, 1); M. Terentius Varro (Plin. n. h. 7, 176), and Cn. Tremellius Scrofa (Varro R. R. 1, 2, 10).

Ep. 7. § 5. Cicero tibi mandat ut Aristodemo idem de se respondeas quod de fratre suo sororis tuae filio respondisti.

Certainly *spondeas* and *spondidisti* would be natural

here. The boy wanted Atticus to "go bail" for him ; cf. 16, 1, 6 *egit et pater et filius ut tibi sponderem* ; Fam. 13, 17, 3 ; 7, 5, 3.

Ep. 8. § 1. *si quid in ea epistula . . . fuit historia dignum.*

There is no need to write *istoria* (with Ernesti and others). Cic. uses the word in the general sense of "inquiry" ; cf. Tusc. 1, 108 *permulta alia colligit, ut est in omni historia curiosus* ; Fin. 2, 107.

Ep. 8. § 1. *bene habemus nos, etc.*

There is little to choose between the rival punctuations, for which see Purser's n. *Bene habere* is common (of persons) both with and without the personal pronoun after it.

Ep. 8. § 1. *uenit ad me salutatum.*

Here *me* cannot (as Tyrrell asserts) be governed by *salutatum*, though it would be so governed if *ad* were left out, as in De Or. 3, 17 *admonitum venimus te*. The supine is "epexegetic" here and also in the passage from Caesar quoted by Tyrrell.

Ep. 8. § 1. *appinge aliquid noui.*

Edd. differ about *appinge*, some connecting it with *pango*, others with *pingo*. The latter opinion is surely right.

Ep. 9 § 1. *subito cum mihi dixisset . . .*

The position of *subito* is unusual ; but it stands at the beginning of another letter (Att. 7, 10).

Ep. 9. § 1. *ut tuos elicerem mirificos cum Publio dialogos.*

So most edd. with ed. Rom. ; but the missing word may be *exigerem*, which suits the context better ; cf. 4, 1, 2 and Fam. 15, 16, 1.

Ep. 9. § 1. illum uero . . . quem illa βούπης est ad te relatura sic uelim putes nihil hoc posse mihi esse iucundius.

Müller obelizes *illum* without reason given. There is merely slight anacoluthon. Cic. intended to introduce a verb to govern *illum* (as, e.g., *credo mihi ceteris iucundio rem fore*); but the sentence takes another turn at *nihil hoc* . . . , *hoc* being written in the second place rather than *illo*, according to the usual custom. It is true that anacoluthon more often affects an initial nominative, intended to be subject to a verb which never comes, than an initial accusative; but the principle is the same.

Ep. 9. § 1. ut sciat hic noster Hierosolymarius traductor ad plebem, quam bonam meis putissimis orationibus gratiam rettulerit, quarum expecta diuinam παλινψόδιαν.

It may, I believe, be stated with as near an approach to certainty as is ever possible in such a matter, that Cic. did not write *putissimis*. There is no sure instance elsewhere of *putus* used by itself; for in Varr. R. R. 2, 1, 10, where the MSS. give *sole exorto puto propellunt*, the context clearly shows Pontedera's correction, *potum*, to be right. Again, Cic. did not employ even the combination *purus putus*. The credit of our MSS. is far from sufficient to outweigh these facts. That, as Turnebus thought, *putidissimis* was in the original text, seems to me very probable. Tyrrell (see ed. 3) rejects the emendation, on the ground ~~that~~ Cic. would never condemn his former speeches as "affected." But "affected" does not well render the Latin, which would be better represented by "extravagant" or "high-flown" or "outré." The particular form of affectation indicated by *putidus* is that of going to excess, whether in the language used, or in the emphasis of the voice, or in gesture. For the application to excess in the manner of delivery see Off. 1, 133; De Or. 3, 41. A story of Aeschines and Demosthenes told in Orat. 27

shows that violence and extravagance in language and gesture caused Demosthenes to appear *putidus* to his rival. So in De Or. 3, 51, where note *insolentia et turba uerborum*. In Hor. Sat. 2, 3, 75 the *cerebrum putidius* betrays itself by violence and not by "affectation." Martial 4, 20 describes the young girl who *uetulam se dicit*, as *putidula*, because of the extravagance of her pretence. When Cic. in Att. 1, 14, 1 expresses a fear that it may be *putidum* to plead his press of business as an excuse for a short letter, the word cannot mean "affected," as the excuse was real. The sense is that it would be going far beyond due limits to take advantage of the plea. And in Fam. 7, 5, 3, *putidiusculi* has reference to "tall talk." In a moment of vexation Cic. might well call those speeches *putidissimae* in which, as he says farther on (ep. 21, 4), "he had painted and varnished Pompey's picture with every tint known to art." Whether *putidissimis* is right or not, a word of evil meaning is wanted to contrast with *diuinam*. It is possible that Cic. wrote *quam non bonam*. [In Catullus 42, 12 and 98, 1 and in Mart. 12, 39, 2 *putidus* means "disgusting." A curious epigram of Martial (3, 50) concerns a man who recites five books during one dinner, interposing them between the courses. The line *putidus est totiens si mihi ponis aprum* is pointless unless there is a play on two senses of *putidus*, "rotten" and "excessive."]

Ep. 9. § 1. *festiue, mihi crede, et minore sonitu quam putaram, orbis hic in re publica est conuersus, citius omnino quam potuit: id culpa Catonis, sed rursus improbitate istorum qui auspicia . . . neglexerunt, qui regna, qui praedia tetrarchis, qui immanis pecunias paucis dederunt.*

Many difficulties have been raised concerning this passage, and one or two real ones have passed unnoticed. (1) To replace *in re publica* by *rei publicae*, because *orbis rei publicae* occurs below (ep. 21, 3) and in Planc. 93, is a

needless change. In notes on Fam. 10, 24, 4 and 11, 19, 2, C. F. W. Müller has shown how extensively Cic. employs *in re publica*, attached to nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. Often *rei publicae* and *in re publica* alternate; we have, e.g., both *fluctus rei p.* and *f. in re p.*; *dissensio rei p.* and *d. in re p.*, etc. [Livy in 3, 10, 8 and 42, 42, 6 has *orbis* by itself, meaning a political revolution.]

(2) Why, if Cic. thinks the crisis has passed satisfactorily, does he complain that it had passed too quickly? Perhaps he means that the pace was uncomfortable, but *citius* may be corrupt. (3) There is a complication connected with *omnino . . . sed*. According to usage *omnino* should introduce a concession, while the clause with *sed* should bring in a counteracting consideration. But the two clauses here stand in no relation to one another. Apparently *omnino* has been displaced, and should come between *culpa* and *Catonis*. The admission made is that Cato was in *fault*; the offset to this is the *wickedness* of others. With the transposition of *omnino*, there is no need to touch *rursus*. Nor is it a gain to write *oportuit* for *potuit*.

(4) *Id* has sometimes been ejected, sometimes changed to *idque*; for which *et id* (Leg. 2, 34; Varr. R. R. 1, 7, 7 and 1, 13, 5) or *atque id* would be as good. But *id* sometimes stands thus with asyndeton. C. F. W. Müller, who obelizes it here, has allowed it to pass unquestioned in two similar passages, Tim. 16, and Fam. 7, 32, 3.

(5) The word *praedia*, standing alone, to denote territory bestowed on the tetrarchs, is not only without parallel, but inherently improbable. The conjecture of Klotz, *quasi praedia*, gives good Latin, and has found favour. Tyrrell once adopted it, but has now rejected it; C. F. W. Müller places it in his text. In support may be quoted Verr. 2, 2, 7 *quasi quaedam praedia sunt populi Romani uectigalia nostra*. [In Mart. 12, 72, 3 *deseris urbanas, tua praedia*, Pannyche, lites, the usage is like that of *regna* in Verg.

Ecl. 1, 63, and in Cic., etc., and is appropriate to the context. It is possible that *praedia* is erroneous for *praesidia*; objection may have been taken to compacts made by Pompeius with Deiotarus and other tetrarchs (App. Mithr. 114) because strong fortresses were handed over to them. The two words are frequently confused. (6) The word *regna* refers to the grant of the title "king" to foreign princes; cf. Mil. 73; Phil. 5 §§ 11, 12; 12 § 12; Ad Quir. 20; Dom. 129 regum appellationes uenales erant; Suet. Iul. 54 societates ac regna pretio dedit. In Dom. 124 regna . . . donaras has a different application; see the context. In Fam. 1, 9, 7 Cicero says that in this year 59 he protested *de donatione regnorum*. We know three persons who received the title "king" in this year, viz. Ptolemy Auletes, Ariovistus, and Deiotarus. In our passage there can be no allusion to Ptolemy; he was recognized by the senate as well as the people (Caes. B.C. 3, 107). Ariovistus is said to have been made an ally ἱπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Καίσαρος (Dio. C. 38, 34), but probably the senate assented. The cases to which Cicero objected must have been those in which the senate was ignored; such was that of Deiotarus, whose recognition was involved in the law confirming the *acta* of Pompeius, a law passed in the senate's despite. App. Mithr. 114 suggests that other tetrarchs may have benefited in the same way. In the speech against Vatinius (§ 29) Cic. charges Vatinius with having (in 59) made *foedera cum regibus, cum tetrarchis*. As the *foedus* with Ptolemy certainly, and that with Ariovistus probably, had the sanction of the senate, there seems to be an allusion to compacts of which the details have not been preserved. In the following year "kings and tetrarchs" formed part of the stock-in-trade of Clodius (Dom. §§ 60, 129; Sest. 56 reges appellati a populo qui id numquam ne a senatu quidem postulassent). (7) The words *immanis pecunias paucis* refer primarily to the money

voted to Caesar by the law which gave him Gallia Cisalpina. See Vat. 36 eripueras senatui prouinciae decernendae potestatem, imperatoris deligendi iudicium, aerari dispensationem. But Vatinius plundered the exchequer in other ways; cf. Vat. §§ 5, 10, 29. In the last of these three passages it is shown that part of the money lost to the treasury in this year by the remission granted to the *publicani* went into the pockets of Caesar and his friends. Indeed the reckless dispersion of public revenue under forms of law was a marked characteristic of the régime set up by the "dynasts," as Cic. called them. Money was squeezed out of Ptolemy too by Caesar and Pompeius (Suet. Iul. 54 and Plut. Caes. 48).

Ep. 9. § 2. i. si fuit inuidiosa senatus potentia, cum ea non ad populum sed ad tris homines immoderatos redacta sit, quid iam censens fore?

Here *redacta* (Med.) is replaced in C (marg. Crat.) by *tralata*. This deserves special notice as a clear example of a correction in C, purposely made to smooth over a difficulty. The employment of *ad . . . redacta* being a little out of the way, it was condemned and changed. Cf. Har. resp. 42 quaestum . . . totum . . . ad se redegit; Liv. 5, 26, 8 praeda ad quaestorem redacta.

Ep. 9. § 3. si per illum tuum sodalem Publium licebit, σφιστεύειν cogitamus; si ille cogitat tantum, dumtaxat nos defendere, et quod est proprium huius artis, ἐπαγγέλλομαι "ἄνδρ' ἀπαμύνησθαι δτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνη." Patria propitia sit.

I have conjectured (see Tyrrell, ed. 3, and the Oxford text) that *male* is to be inserted before *cogitat*, comparing Cato m. 18, and *m* = *modo* before (or after) *patria*. A further question may be raised, whether *tantum* is not to be ejected as an explanation of *dumtaxat*. It spoils the sense; if Publius is indifferent, Cic. will play the sophist; if P. forms

evil plans, he will merely defend himself. But *tantum* implies that the plans were not intended to be carried out. The words *quod est proprium huius artis* refer solely to the phrase ἐπαγγέλλομαι, frequently applied to the sophists by Plato, Aristotle, and others.

Ep. 9. § 4. Κικέρων ὁ μικρὸς ἀσπάζεται Τίτον Ἀθηναῖον.

So Med.; the text of Cratander has τὸν after Τίτον, which most edd. accept. But Greek usage does not demand the article, and its insertion by conjecture was easy.

Ep. 11. § 2. haec igitur.

Besides 5, 18, 2 cf. 2, 3, 4 hic sunt haec.

Ep. 12. § 1. negent . . . esse?

This indignant subjunctive is not confined to comedy and Cicero's letters (see Tyrrell's n.); there are a number of instances in Cicero's other writings and in later literature.

Ep. 12. § 2. suum Memmiquē Metelli Nepotis exprompsit odium.

Memmiquē is in Med., whence Wesenberg wrote *Memmi*, Q. The erroneous expansion of Q. in an abbreviation is one of many errors common to writers of MSS. and ancient stonecutters. In C.I.L. 14, 418 *quoquae* stands for \overline{QQ} = *quinquennalis*. So the doubling of a syllable; as in *pococolom* for *pocolom* (C.I.L. 1, 27).

Ep. 12. § 2. de ruminatione cotidiana.

If it were possible to believe that Cic. wrote of "the daily chewing of the cud," we might compare 12, 27, 2 eadem cotidie, and 13, 17, 1 nunc eadem illa. I have proposed *criminatione* (see Pretor's n. and Tyrrell, ed. 3); so Mil. 12 cotidie criminabatur. It is well known that many corruptions both in Greek and in Latin MSS. have been shaped

by the influence of Christian phraseology, to which *ruminatio* belongs. (For this process cf. Diels, *Doxogr. Gr.* p. 15). Nonius quotes two exx. of *ruminor*, the deponent, in a metaphorical sense, from Varro's *Sat. Men.*, and one from his "Logistorici"; also one from Liv. Andronicus; and one is given by Gellius from Laevius.

Ep. 13. § 2. *neminem adhuc offendi qui haec tam lente quam ego fero ferret. Qua re, mihi crede, φιλοσοφῶμεν. Iuratus tibi possum dicere nihil esse tanti.*

In a good many passages of the Letters, philosophy is recommended, because indifference in public affairs is the fruit of it. Cf. ep. 17 § 2, ἀδιαφορία; 1, 16, 13, φιλοσοφητέον id quod tu facis, et istos consulatus non flocci faciteon; 13, 2, 1, ad ista obduruimus; 13, 20, 4; Fam. 7, 30, 2. The sentiment is the same here; *nihil esse tanti* means that nothing in public life is worth what it costs, *nihil* being defined by *haec* above.

Ep. 14. § 1. *ita fac uenias, ad sitientis auris.*

Surely the insertion of *ut* or *quasi* before *ad* is unnecessary; both *ita* and *sic* often point on to a coming clause.

Ep. 14. § 2. *basilicam habeo non uillam frequentia Formianorum †ad quam partem basilicae tribum Aemilianam†. Sed omitto uolugus. Post horam quartam molesti ceteri non sunt. C. Arrius proximus est uicinus . . . Ecce ex altera parte Sebosus. . .*

For the corrupt words I have suggested (see Tyrrell, ed. 3, and Purser's text) *quam partem basilica tribus Aemiliae* (sc. *capiet*)? "The whole Aemilian tribe is pressing into my house, and turning it into a *basilica*. But if it were an actual *basilica*, it would only hold a fraction." An extravagant fashion of saying that the house was all too small for the crowds of visitors. In a similar spirit of extravagance, Triarius in *Fin.* 1, 65, praises Epicurus, who *una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, magnos . . . tenuit amicorum*

greges. The crowds at Cumae also were a nuisance ; cf. 5, 2, 2 habuimus in Cumano quasi pusillam Romam ; cf. also 12, 23, 1 domus ut ais forum. Some edd. have made difficulty about *ceteri* ; but it has its common proleptic sense ; by the *others* are meant all except those mentioned afterwards, viz. Arrius and Sebosus, who (as the next letter shows) consumed all the time which *ceteri* left free.

Ep. 14. § 2. occasionem mirificam.

As against the insertion of *o* before *occasionem* (Purser, Müller, and others) see my n. on 15, 3, 2 in HERMATHENA No. 25, p. 333.

Ep. 14. § 2. magnum quid adgrediamur.

Whether this ex. of indefinite *quid* lies within the limits of Ciceronian usage may well be doubted. The word may, as sometimes elsewhere, be a remnant of *quidquam*.

Ep. 15. § 2. siue ruet siue geret rem publicam.

So I suppose Cic. to have written (see Tyrrell, ed. 3, and Purser's text). "Whether he is going to run amok or play the statesman." The evidence of the codd. is curious ; the words *siue geret* are absent from ΣΔ, and a lacuna in Med. shows that its source was here illegible, while CZ give *-get*. Corradus conjectured *eriget* ; Müller *regel*. As the active *ruere* does not appear in literature till after Cicero's time, the contrast is not between *ruet* and *geret* (see Pretor's n.), but between *ruet* and *geret rem p.*

Ep. 15. § 3. si solus non potuero.

I suppose *esse* to have fallen out after *solus* (Purser's text, n.).

Ep. 16. § 1. ut me ego consoler.

C has *egomet*, but Boot's transposition, *ego me*, is quite as likely to be right.

Ep. 16. § 2. φορβειῶς ἄτερ.

Cf. *apertis ut aiunt tibiis*, Quint. 11, 3, 50.

Ep. 16. § 2. adhuc haec ἐσόφιστο.

Pretor excises *haec* on grounds of euphony ; but ancient ideas of it often do not coincide with ours. Cic., *e.g.*, is very indifferent to the repetition of *qu-* ; see my n. on Acad. 1, 6 and add De Or. 2, 235.

Ep. 16. § 2. potuerit intercedi necne.

This has been sometimes misunderstood ; it means “whether the possibility of a veto was prevented (by violence) or not.”

Ep. 16. § 2. hoc quem ad modum obtinebis ? ‘Oppressos uos, inquit, tenebo exercitu Caesaris.’

The word *obtainere* does not mean “vindicate against adverse criticism” (Tyrrell with Boot), but “against reversal,” such as was afterwards attempted. Because Caesar had as yet no army, and also because Plut. Pomp. 48 and Caes. 14 states that Pompeius in this year packed the forum with soldiers, Gronovius thought that the word *Caesaris* was interpolated. Plutarch, if he was not thinking of the veterans who had once served under Pompeius, must have confused the year 59 with 52. Arms were indeed often used without an army, but *exercitu* cannot refer to the hired gladiators and bullies (Suet. Iul. 20). It seems that Pompeius took seriously the talk about imminent civil war which was already in vogue (Plut. Caes. 14), and placed his reliance on the army which Caesar would have under his command in his provinces. So in ep. 22, 1, Clodius is described as dreading *opes eorum* (the Three) *et exercitus*.

Ep. 16. § 3. si possum discedere ne causa optima in senatu pareat, ego satis faciam publicanis.

Madvig rightly challenged *ne* for *ita ut non* ; nor is

ita . . . *ne* Ciceronian, though, like *sic* . . . *ne*, it is found in other writers (Horace, Ovid, etc.). Accepting *ita discedere* from Wesenberg, I have suggested *ut ne* (Purser's text, n.); we thus get a form of expression which Cic. often employs. The words *causa optima* have been questioned, but are natural enough (for *c. in re publica optima*); so, e.g., *optimus status* in several passages of the 'De re publica.' And in I, 20, 3 *hanc uiam optimam* . . . tenere may be right (*optimatem* MSS.); cf. Cat. 4, 9 *hanc in re publica uiam secutus est*.

Ep. 17. § 1. *turbatur Sampsiceramus*.

The chief objection to *turbatur* (for which *conturbatur* might, however, have been expected) lies in the passage that follows, which implies violent action on the part of Pompeius. The em. of Pius, *turbat*, accepted by many edd., conveys this idea, and is Ciceronian; not so *turbator* (of which silver Latin writers are fond), nor *conturbator*, for which Cicero writes *uexator*.

Ep. 17. § 1. *quid ager Campanus, quid effusio pecuniae significant?*

The idea drawn from Dom. 23 (see Tyrrell) that the money voted for the settlers in Campania was diverted by Clodius, must be mistaken. The Three would not have permitted the diversion, and the tenants could not have been planted on the soil without aid from the exchequer. All that lies behind the exaggerated language in Dom. 23 is this, that if Gabinius had got all the money which the measure passed by Clodius professed to give him, the colonists would have gone short. But the "dynasts" would insist on their prior claim being satisfied.

Ep. 17. § 1. *philologiae*.

Edd. have often questioned this, but it undoubtedly

refers directly to philosophy (as *philologi* does in 13, 12, 3). This is shown by the mention below of the gain which Cic. now seeks from philosophy, *ἀδιαφορία*. The same notion recurs in Qu. fr. 2, 8 (10), 3 nos ita philologi sumus ut uel cum fabris habitare possimus. Habemus hanc philosophiam non ab Hymetto, etc. In Greek writers φιλολογία and φιλοσοφία, φιλόλογος and φιλόσοφος are sometimes scarcely distinguished.

Ep. 17. § 1. conferemus tranquillo animo di immortales

Edd. have recognized that either *di immortales* is in the wrong place, or there is a gap after it. My proposal (ap. Tyrrell and in Purser's text) is to place the phrase after *tranquillo*. It similarly emphasizes an epithet in S. Rosc. 37 scelestum di immortales, et nefarium facinus.

Ep. 18. § 1. mortem et eiectionem quasi maiora timemus quae multo sunt minora atque hic status qui una uoce omnium gemitur.

The copyists evidently construed *atque* as though it were *quam*. I believe (see Purser's text) that *quam* fell out, as often (e.g. in 5, 11, 2), and was replaced by *atque*. For the sentiment cf. Fam. 4, 9, 3 erat tuae uirtutis in minimis tuas res ponere, rei publicae causa uehementius laborare.

Ep. 18. § 1. unus loquitur et palam aduersatur.

Read *palam et*; cf. ep. 20, 3 aperte loquantur; Fam. 8, 1, 4.

Ep. 18. § 2. habet Campana lex execrationem in contione candidatorum, etc.

The meaning of this vexed passage seems to me clear (see Pretor's n.). Candidates were to bind themselves by oath not to disturb the agrarian laws, invoking mischief on their own heads in case of breach. This was to be done in presence of a *contio*, where there would be a

magistrate to record the proceeding. So the "lex Bantina" requires magistrates to take an oath to observe it, publicly in presence of a quaestor or praetor. There can be no reference here to an *oratio in toga candida*, which was not (like the speech made at the entry upon office) a regular function.

Ep. 18. § 3. *haec* (legatio) *praesidi apud pudorem Pulchelli non habet satis.*

As *apud* is unparalleled here, I have suggested (ap. Pretor) *ad*, which does follow *praesidium* in the sense of *contra*, as in Phil. 12, 25. The frequent confusion of *ad* and *apud* in MSS. makes this more probable than a *pudore*, which has been suggested. For *pudorem* some edd. have written *furorem* (from ep. 1. § 4); but Cic. is probably quoting with sarcasm a phrase used by some one who trusted in the promises made by Clodius not to harm Cicero. Why Boot thought *apud* correct with *pudorem*, but incorrect with *furorem*, I do not know.

Ep. 18. § 3. *hanc* (legationem) *ego teneo, sed usurum me non puto, neque tamen scit quisquam.*

Just before this, Cic. wrote of Caesar's invitation to be his *legatus*; then "*etiam libera legatio datur*," after which he applied *haec* to the *libera legatio*. The reference of *hanc* is disputed. The words *ego teneo* point to the *legatio* with Caesar; because the *libera legatio* might be had at any time, while the other offer, once refused, would hardly be renewed. It is not unexampled that *haec* and *hanc* should apply to the two different *legationes*. In the familiar use of Latin, as of other languages, pronouns are often inelegant. In 14, 1, 2, for instance, *eum* occurs twice in one sentence, of different persons. In ep. 19. § 5 (a remarkably similar passage) there is also an ambiguous use of pronouns; see below. The words *scit quisquam* are

obviously indefensible; Cic. had to settle the thing himself, nor can the offer of these *legationes* have been a secret. The other passage (ep. 19 § 5) makes Boot's correction, *certi quicquam*, highly probable.

Ep. 19. § 1. periculis quae mihi intenduntur et sescenta sunt.

C. F. W. Müller conjectures *ea* for *et*, presumably meaning a stop to be placed before it. But here *et* does not merely couple clauses; as often, it introduces something on which stress is laid, as, e.g., in Cato m. 28 quod . . . non amisi, et uidetis annos, where *et* is not exactly for *et tamen* (hence correct a n. in my ed.).

Ep. 19. § 1. cetera in magnis rebus minae Clodi contentionisque quae mihi proponuntur modice me tangunt.

If this sentence be read in close connexion with that which precedes, it will be felt that Cic. did not write the words *cetera in magnis rebus* so as to form a sentence by themselves. Nor can *cetera in m. r.* be for *c. quae in m. rebus sunt*. The slight change which I long ago advocated, that of inserting *ut* before *in* (see Pretor's n. and Tyrrell, ed. 3), still seems to me probable. The limiting clause introduced by *ut* is especially common in the Letters, and the *ut* in such clauses is often followed by *in* with ablative, both in Cicero's writings and in others. Such a clause exactly suits the context here. Cf. especially 11, 19, 2 mihi tantum temporis satis est dum, ut in pessimis rebus, aliquid caueam; 11, 22, 2 ut in malis; 11, 25, 3 ut in perditis rebus; 15, 18, 2; 4, 1, 8; 4, 2, 1; Fam. 4, 9, 3; 12, 2, 2; Ad Brut. 1, 10, 2. Kayser introduced *ceterum* for *cetera*; but this usage is not Cicero's; the word should be ejected from Q. fr. 2, 12 (14) 1.

Ep. 19. § 2. utor uia.

It is surprising that this has been so often altered. In

a good many phrases *uia* means the right road, just as *locus* often means the right spot.

Ep. 19. § 3. *populi sensus maxime theatro et spectaculis perspectus est; nam gladiatoribus qua dominus qua aduocati sibilis conscissi.*

From the context it appears that one of the great Three was "lord of the show" (cf. *dominus funeris, d. cenae*, etc.); but hardly Pompeius (as Tyrrell supposes). He seems to be contrasted with the *dominus*, and moreover he was at Capua, and the *dominus* was clearly present. Apparently he was Crassus.

Ep. 19. § 3. *Caesar cum uenisset mortuo plausu.*

Surely *mortuo plausu* can mean nothing but "when the cheering had died away." The idea of Manutius that *mortuo* was for *intermortuo*, which he supposed (incorrectly) to mean "feeble," is not tenable. The simple fact appears to be that before making his entry, Caesar waited till the derisive cheering excited by some points in the play had died down.

Ep. 19. § 4. *satis bonorum.*

Since Cic. always elsewhere writes *sat boni* with this meaning, I have suggested *sat* here, and it has been accepted by Dr. Purser (see his text and Tyrrell, ed. 3).

Ep. 19. § 4. *Cosconio mortuo sum in eius locum inuitatus. Id erat uocari in locum mortui.*

Cosconius is supposed to have been a *XXuir*, but that is not certain. If he was, this was probably a second offer of a seat on the board; otherwise we should have had Cic. expressing indignation in the earlier passages in which he mentions that he had been asked to join the agrarian commission. But Cosconius may have held some other office. I have proposed (see Tyrrell, ed. 3) to place a comma after *erat*; "this is what their offers meant, after all,

that I should be asked to take a dead man's place." Though *illud* is more usual, *id* does sometimes thus point on to a coming clause, as in Verr. 2, 1, 72.

Ep. 19. § 5. Caesar me sibi uult esse legatum. Honestior declinatio haec periculi; sed ego hoc non repudio.

The resemblance between this passage and that in ep. 18. § 3 is so close that Mr. Pretor makes *hoc* refer not to *periculum* but to the *legatio* offered by Caesar. The objection to this lies in *sed*; but *hoc* might refer to the other offer about which Cic. had expressed indignation; he might nevertheless want to keep it open. In this case cf. *repudiatus uigintiuiratus* in 9, 2A, 1, and in Quint. 12, 1, 16. Faber's *nunc* for *non* collides with *nihil certi* below. If *hoc* be *periculum*, there is no necessity to write *refugio* for *repudio*; the expression has many parallels, as *repudiare officium, consilium, audaciam gladiatoris* (Phil. 5, 10).

Ep. 20. § 1. prorsus mihi persuadet, sed quia uolo. Pragmatici homines, etc.

As I have pointed out (see Tyrrell, ed. 3), it is possible, with this punctuation, to obtain good sense from the MSS. readings. If any change were needed, I would insert *ei* before *uolo*, placing the stop after it. For *uelle* (sc. *omnia*) *alicui*, cf. Tyrrell's n. on 2, 16, 4; and Holden's on Planc. 59; *omnia* is omitted as in *uelle alicuius causa*. It is not surprising that Cic. should have used the word *pragmatici* in its Polybian and late Greek sense, "men of affairs." Practical wisdom expressed in gnomic lines, such as that of Epicharmus quoted in Att. 1, 19, 4, entitles some poets to come under the designation. *Holopragmatici* for *uolo pr.* (Ziehen, eulogized by Gurlitt) is most improbable.

Ep. 20. § 2. simul et quid erit certi.

In a note on Fin. 2, 33 Madvig declared that where Ciceronian MSS. give *simul et* or *simul ut*, the *et* or *ut* has

been inserted by scribes; but if these men felt the need of an insertion, it is curious that they did not choose the more familiar *ac* or *atque*. In commenting on Acad. 2, 51 I pointed out that in ten of fourteen passages where *simul et* or *simul ut* occurs, a vowel or a guttural follows, so that *ac* could not stand. [So with Ad Herenn. 1, 10 and 4, 65.] There are plenty of analogies in Latin for both expressions: as *similiter et*; *similis et*; *similiter ut si*; *idem . . . ut si*; *continuo ut*; *proinde ut* alternating with *p. ac*; and *pro eo ut* with *pro eo atque*. The desire to avoid *ac* before a vowel or guttural has sometimes led to an exceptional *et* elsewhere; so *aliter et* in Att. 10, 11, 1 and 11, 23, 2; *minus . . . et* in Lucr. 3, 1092. Compare also *nec similest ut cum* in Lucr. 2, 72; *alius et* in De Or. 3, 66, etc.; *aeque et* in Fin. 4, 62, etc.

Ep. 20. § 3. de re breuiter ad te dicam.

It is customary to write *re publica*. But Cic. has a curious way of employing *res* in his letters to indicate *the* important matter about which he has to write. So near the end of 2, ep. 6, he has *sed ut ad rem*; 7, 2, 5 *redeo ad rem*; 13, 21, 3 *nunc ad rem ut redeam*; 14, 16, 2 *sed ad rem ut ueniam*; Fam. 3, 7, 6 *sed ut ad rem redeam*. In 7, 2, 5 *redeo* is peculiar, as the *res* is not mentioned earlier in the letter; so, too, in 13, 21, 3. Compare also ep. 12, 3 *tota res fluctuat*; ep. 19, 3 *sane res erat perturbata*.

Ep. 20. § 5. poeta ineptus et tamen scit nihil et est non inutilis.

Lehmann's defence of *et tamen* is good (see Tyrrell), but it leaves the difficulty of the words *et est non inutilis* untouched; *sed* for *et* would be natural. Perhaps *tamen* is out of place and should come before *est*; so *sed tamen non in.* in the corresponding passage, ep. 22, 7.

Ep. 22. § 1. multis denuntiat.

The absolute use of the verb affords no ground for

suspicion. It is not confined (as Tyrrell says) to legal phraseology; cf. Phil. 7, 20; Rab. post. 15; Fam. 4, 3, 1; Quint. 11, 3, 120.

Ep. 22. § 1. *conuertit se in nos, nobis autem ipsis, etc.*

For *nos, bonos* (Wesenberg) is usually written; *nostros*, however, may be the right word.

Ep. 22. § 2. *fidem recepisse sibi et ipsum et Appium de me.*

On *fidem recepisse* for *dedisse* see my note in Tyrrell, ed. 3. For *recepisse* cf. Fam. 10, 9, 1 (Plancus); for *dedisse* ib. 1, 9, 12.

Ep. 22. § 5. *puto Pompeium Crasso urgente, si tu aderis qui per βοῶντιν ex ipso intellegere possis qua fide ab illis agatur, nos aut sine molestia aut certe sine errore futuros.*

It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the words *Pompeium Crasso urgente* are deeply corrupt. (1) Never until he was in exile did Cic. write of Crassus as an enemy. As regards the years 58 (Fam. 14, 2, 2) and 56 (Fam. 1, 9, 9), Crassus is so represented; and we hear that Clodius claimed Crassus as a backer (Sest. §§ 39, 41), just as he claimed the other two "dynasts." But before the exile Cic. ignored Crassus when writing of his dangers. It might be said that the omission is ominous; there are, however, passages in which, if Crassus had been in Cicero's thoughts, he must have been mentioned (as Qu. fr. 1, 2, 16). Everywhere it is implied that the issue depends on Caesar and Pompeius. (2) The fact that Crassus is pressing P. is introduced in a singularly casual manner. One would expect a mention of some circumstance tending to avert the danger, and according with what follows. (3) Crassus, who hated P. at all times, and was now delighting in his unpopularity, was the last person likely to influence him. (4) The words just below, *taedet ipsum Pompeium, etc.*, show that at the moment Cic. had no anxiety concerning P.

Possibly Cic. wrote *Pompeio Caesarem urgente*, "with P. to put pressure on Caesar." Of course the corruptions of names (usually through contractions) are very numerous in the MSS. of the Letters. In Fam. 1, 9, Cic. writes as though he had depended throughout on Pompeius for the goodwill of Caesar, and he represents Caesar as the prime mover in the events leading to the exile.

Ep. 24. § 1. *res est, ut spero, non tam exitu molesta quam auditu.*

Here it appears necessary to read *erit* for *est*. It is usual to write *aditu* with Victorius; but *aduentu* would account better for the insertion of the *u*; cf. Imp. P. 15 and Tusc. 3, 29 *aduentus malorum*.

Ep. 24. § 2. *Vettius negabat se umquam cum Curione†restitisse.*

So Med.; C has *constitisse*.

The reading of the marg. Crat. is not, I think, maintainable, whether *constitisse* comes from *constare* or *consistere*, whether the sense be literal or not. If literal, Vettius denied that he had ever "stood still" along with Curio, *i.e.* met him and talked with him. If *usquam* had been written for *umquam*, we should have had a conceivable but not a probable form of expression. In the other sense, *constare* or *consistere cum aliquo* could only indicate agreement in sentiment or opinion. But it would be strange if an informer, having first made a serious charge, withdrew it by a statement that he and the man charged had never been in agreement. Orelli's conjecture, *constituisse*, gives good sense, but (see Purser's n. and Tyrrell, ed. 3) I think we should start from the reading of Med., and suppose the original lection to have been *rem constituisse* (a common expression). It seems likely that the reading of the marg. Crat. is itself a conjectural correction of *restitisse*.

J. S. REID.

ON THE RELATION OF THE MACEDONIAN TO THE EGYPTIAN CALENDAR.

IT is not my intention in the present paper to enter into a discussion of the difficult problem of the relation of the Macedonian calendar to the Egyptian during the earlier part of the Ptolemaic dynasty. The evidence, though much more abundant than it was in 1898, when Strack published his extraordinary article "Der Kalender im Ptolemäerreich" in the *Rheinisches Museum*, is still too scanty to enable us to solve the numerous problems which present themselves. I hope, however, to prove that the period of apparent confusion can be reduced by about half a century, and to show that part at least of that confusion can be removed.

It has long been known, and was first clearly proved by Robiou, that after the middle of the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes II. the Macedonian calendar had lost all independent existence, and had become purely ornamental, merely providing alternative names for the Egyptian months. That this was so is indicated by a series of double dates in which the correspondence of the months and the number of the day is always the same. During this period, as Strack puts it, "Die ägyptischen und griechischen Daten zeigen stets dieselbe Monats- und Tagesziffer, d. h. ist in dem einen Kalender der 7. Monat genannt, so ist er es auch in dem andern, und nennt die

eine Angabe den 23. Tag des 7. Monats, so nennt auch die zweite den 23. Tag des gleichen Monats." The earliest certain date of this kind occurs in *Tebtunis Papyrus*, I. 25, 7—ἔτους νη Ξαν(δικού) ιζ Μεχέρ ιζ—and belongs to the fifty-third year of Euergetes II.

I shall now produce a similar series from an earlier period, in which the Macedonian calendar is equally ornamental and without independence, though the correspondence of months is different:—

- (1) βασιλευντος Πτολεμαίου του Πτολεμαίου και Ἀρσινόης θεῶν
Φιλοπατορῶν εἶτος τεταρτου και εικοστου μηνος
Δυστρον ογδοη και εικαδι Θωυθ ογδοη και εικαδι ¹
- (2) βασιλευντος Πτολεμαίου του Πτολεμαίου και Κλεοπάτρας
θεῶν Επιφανῶν εἶτος δευτερου μηνος Διου ενατη[ι]
και εικαδι Παχῶν [ενατη κ]αι εικαδι ²
- (3) 5th year of Philometor 7. Artemisios = 7. Hathyr ³
- (4) βασιλευντος Πτολεμαίου του Πτολεμαίου και Κλεοπάτρας θεῶν
Επιφανῶν εἶτος ογδοου μηνος Λωιον τρειςκαιδεκατη
Μεχειρ τρειςκαιδεκατη ⁴
- (5). [βασιλευντων Πτ]ολεμαίου και Πτολεμαίου του Ἀδελφου
[και Κλεοπάτρας της ἀδελ]φ[ης των Π]τ[ο]λεμαίου και
Κλεοπάτρας [θεῶν Επιφανῶν εἶτους] πεμπτου μηνος
Ἀπελλαιου εννεακαιδεκατη Παυνι εννεακαιδεκατη ¹

The lists of eponymous priests have been omitted because they are of no use for our present purpose; and in (2) I have restored the number of the day of the Egyptian month on the analogy of the other dates.

¹ From an unpublished Tebtunis papyrus.

² Amh. pap. XLII. 20.

³ Wilcken, *Ostr.*, p. 782.

⁴ Amh. pap., XLIII. 1.

If we arrange the Egyptian and Macedonian months in parallel columns, we obtain the following table :—

<i>Egyptian.</i>	<i>Earlier identification.</i>	<i>Later identification.</i>
Thoth	*Dustros	Dios
Phaophi	Xandikos.	Apellaios
Athur	*Artemisios	Audnaios
Choiach	Daisios,	Peritios
Tubi	Panemos	Dustros
Mecheir	*Loios	Xandikos
Phamenoth	†Gorpiaios	Artemisios
Pharmouthi	Huperbereaioi	Daisios
Pachon	*Dios	Panemos
Pauni	*Apellaios.	Loios
Epeiph	†Audnaios	Gorpiaios
Mesore	†Peritios	Huperberetaioi



The Macedonian months marked * are those given in the five dates quoted above ; those marked † belong to dates to which some doubt attaches, and which I shall now proceed to discuss.

None of these five double dates was known to Strack, whose list for the period under consideration is as follows :—

Epiphanes, . . Year 23 Gorpiaios 24 = Pharmuthi 24

Philometor, . . $\text{L}\overline{\eta}\ \overline{\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\eta}\ \overline{\delta}\ \overline{\mu\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omega\rho\eta}\ \overline{\kappa\epsilon}$
 Year 24 Peritios = Epiphi 1
 $\text{L}\overline{\kappa\varsigma}\ \overline{\xi\alpha\nu\delta\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon}\ \alpha\ \overline{\theta\omega\nu\theta}\ \overline{\kappa\epsilon}$


The first of these dates is taken from the hieroglyphic Stele of Damanhur, published by Bourriant in the “Recueil de travaux relatifs à la philologie et archéol. égypt., 1885.” The inscription, according to its editor, was very carelessly cut, and is full of mistakes—“la plupart des signes sont mal exécutés.” The name of the Macedonian month is

written out in alphabetic hieroglyphs, but the Egyptian month is given in the Egyptian style as the fourth month of its season. The facts that the number of the day is the same in both calendars, and that the inscription is only one year earlier than a certain date of the earlier identification, suggest that this date should agree with that identification. The month, however, which corresponded to Gorpaios was not Pharmouthi, the fourth month, but Phamenoth, the third month of the season. Under the circumstances, it does not seem an unjustifiable assumption to suppose that the cutter of the inscription intended  to represent , or that he accidentally repeated the symbol four times instead of three. I would therefore suggest that the proper translation of this date is Epiphanes year 23 Gorpaios 24 = Phamenoth 24.

The second date is found in Paris pap. 63, col. 13. It is written on the *verso* of the astronomical papyrus of the Paris collection, in a different hand and with different ink from the preceding columns. There is no doubt that cols. 1-7 of the writing on the verso belong to the sixth and seventh years of the joint reign of Philometor, Euergetes II., and Cleopatra: cols. 8-12 are undated. I am inclined to think that this letter, which refers to a royal rescript granting a general indulgence to all offenders, is merely a late copy of a much earlier document, and that it should be assigned to the reign of Philopator rather than to that of Philometor. If we assign it to the eighteenth year of Philometor, we must suppose that he was restored to his kingdom before the end of that year, and that the discrepancy between the calendars began again after Pauni in the fifth year of the joint reign of Philometor, Euergetes, and Cleopatra—which was really the sixteenth year of Philometor—and that in two years the difference between the calendars amounted to twenty-one days.

Though this hypothesis is not impossible, it is very improbable.

The third date is, like the first, from a hieroglyphic inscription, to be found in Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iv. 27b, quoted by Brugsch, *Die biblischen Jahre der Hungersnoth*, p. 74. In this inscription the months are named one after the other; and no day number is assigned to the Macedonian month. This form of expression would lead us to believe that the calendars had been assimilated; but if we compare the months with those given in the table, we find that the correspondence is just one month wrong. The inscription has the third month (Epeiph) of the season instead of the fourth month (Mesore). Brugsch says: "Der Text leidet im original selber am Fehlern." It is tempting to correct it by the addition of a single line, and read:—



The fourth date is assigned to Philometor on conjectural grounds only.

There is one other much disputed date, which we must now regard as belonging to the earlier period of identification. It is preserved in the stele of Thera published by Hiller von Gärtringen, *C. I. Gr. Ins.* III. 327, and was assigned by its editor, on epigraphic grounds, to Euergetes I., a date which is accepted by Strack and Dittenberger. Dr. Mahaffy, with whom I formerly agreed, was inclined to ascribe it to Soter. The date is $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma\ \eta\ \alpha\upsilon\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\ \iota\epsilon\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\phi\iota\ \iota\epsilon$. This is in exact accord with the earlier identification of the calendars; and accordingly the inscription should be assigned either to Epiphanes or Philometor. If we ascribe it to the former, as I am disposed to do, it is the earliest extant date of its kind, and the regulation of the calendar must have taken place

between the ninth and eighteenth years of his reign. It is uncertain whether it is even possible to assign it to the eighteenth year of Philometor. For the early months of this year would have been ascribed to the seventh year of Philometor, Euergetes, and Cleopatra, the middle months to the seventh year of Euergetes II., and the end of the year, if the third change happened so soon, to the eighteenth year of Philometor; but the exact date of the restoration of Philometor is not known. It is, on the whole, more probable that the inscription belongs to the eighteenth year of Epiphanes.

We may therefore draw the following conclusions. The Macedonian calendar preserved an independent existence till after the ninth year of Epiphanes, in which the inscription of Rosetta was dated by both calendars. At some time between the ninth and eighteenth years of Epiphanes the Macedonian calendar was abandoned, the names of the months being only retained as alternatives for the Egyptian names. At this time Dustros was identified with Thoth, and the identification was maintained till the sixteenth year of Philometor (*i.e.* the fifth year of Philometor, Euergetes, and Cleopatra) at least. There is, at present, no evidence for the period between this date and the fifty-third year of Euergetes II., when we again find the calendars identified, with Dios = Thoth. In the absence of evidence I do not care to enter into the regions of conjecture by offering possible explanations of this change.

J. GILBART SMYLY.

ON THE HISTORIA AUGUSTA.

Hadr. 4 :

Saepe †lisce.

Read *inisse* : so lire for *inire* in MS. *D'Orv.* x. i. 5. 11 of *Hor. C.* iii. 3. 34.

Hadr. 8 :

saepe dixit ita se rem publicam gesturum ut †sciret populi rem esse non priam.

If *sciret* is retained, the nom. must be *res publica*. More probably it is a mistake for *scirent* : sc. 'qui in contione et in senatu erant.'

25 :

The verses *Animula uagula blandula* were known to Petrarch, who (p. 684, ed. Bas. 1581) speaks of them thus : *Quam deditum musis Hadrianum credimus, cuius intentio tam uehemens fuit ut ne uicina quidem morte lentesceret. Prorsus mirum dictu, sub extremum uitae spiritum de animae discessu uersiculos edidit, quos insererem nisi quia uel tibi uel tuorum alicui notos esse confido.*

Ael. Ver. 5 :

Atque idem Ouidii ab aliis relata idem Apicii libros amorum in lecto(s) semper habuisse.

The words *ab aliis relata* '*idem Apicii*' seem to be a marginal note which has found its way into the text of

the biography. Others have recorded the words 'idem Apicii,' i.e. instead of *idem Ouidii*: *relata* refers to the two words. Read therefore *Atque idem Ouidii libros amorum in lecto semper habuisse*.

Ant. Pii. 3:

Capitolinus, in recording a number of prodigies which occurred to presage the coming greatness of Antoninus, affects a repetition of *eius*. Six prodigies are mentioned; in the second of these, the fourth, the sixth, *eius* recurs: *Cyzici . . . ad statuam eius corona translata est . . . fulgur sine noxa in domum eius uenit . . . statuas eius . . . examen apium repleuit*. Then follow without any break the words:

Et somnio saepe monitus †sed penitus eius† Hadriani simulacrum inserere.

For the obelized words Casaubon suggested *est penatibus suis*; Salmasius, *se d(is) penatibus suis*. Possibly we might defend *eius* as a designed repetition of the same word introduced three times before, and intended in each case to bring the personality of Antoninus into more marked prominence, *et somnio saepe monitus est penatibus eius Hadriani simulacrum inserere*: "he was repeatedly advised by a dream to introduce the image of Hadrian among the ancestors of the other, i.e. Antoninus."

Antonin. Philos. 6:

Post excessum Hadriani statim Pius per uxorem suam Marcum sciscitatus est et eum dissolutis sponsalibus quae cum L. Ceionii Commodi desponderi uoluerat impari adhuc aetati, habita deliberatione uelle se dixit.

Some words have been lost after *Commodi*, but the general meaning is clear. Antoninus Pius, seeing that

Verus (here called L. Ceionius Commodus) was too young to be a proper match for his daughter Faustina, broke off the espousals, and told M. Aurelius he wished *him* to be his son-in-law instead. I offer tentatively the following restoration of the words: *et cum, dissolutis sponsalibus L. Ceionii Commodi quae cum [filia fecerat, quam ei] desponderi uoluerat, impari adhuc aetati, habita deliberatione uelle se dixit.*

Then *eum uelle se* = *eum generum se uelle*; *aetati*, 'an age,' *i.e.* 'as a man of an age,' is in apposition with *ei*, sc. L. Ceionio Commодо.

Antonin. Philos. 11 :

Hispanis exhaustis Italica adlectione contra Traianique praecepta uerecunde consuluit.

Perhaps *Traiani quoque*: he would naturally be unwilling to act against any ruling of Trajan's.

Ver. 4 :

Lucius quidem Marco uicem reddens †si susciperet obsecutus ut legatus proconsuli uel praeses imperatori.

Possibly *sic susciperest obsecutus ut l. p.* "Obeyed him in undertaking (the imperial office) on the terms of a legate obeying his proconsul," *i.e.* only as a subordinate, not an equal.

Auid. Cass. 8 :

Antoninus, in an enumeration of the Roman emperors who had come to a well-merited death, mentions by name Nero, Caligula, Otho, Vitellius. Then the historian adds:—

nam de †Pertinace et Galba† paria sentiebat, cum diceret in imperatore auaritiam esse acerbissimum malum.

This may be a corruption of *Serui Galbae nece*.

Ibid. 10 :

†Signitas mihi litteras Calpurnius dedit.

Signitas is in the two best MSS., B (Bambergensis) and P (Palatinus). It may be a different word from *signatas*, with a different sense, not 'sealed,' but 'in cipher.'

Commod. 2 :

mulierculas formae scitioris . . . †perficium (so B, and P m. pr.) lupanarium et (lu)dibrium pudicitiae contraxit.

Turnebus conj. *per speciem* : it might be *per effigiem*, 'to present the appearance.' Cic. ad Q. Fr. i. 1. 8. 23 *Cyrus ille a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperii.*

5 :

puberibus exoletis quos aequè ex plebe ac nobilitate †nieptusque forma disceptatrice collegerat.

May we read *ἀμείπτουςque*, 'and of faultless look'?

11 :

Genera leguminum coctorum ad conuiuium propter luxuriae continuationem †raro uocauit.

Rather *non raro*. Commodus, to lengthen out his pleasures, called in the aid of special legumes, and this frequently. These pleasures were not merely those of dining. From other passages of the *Hist. Aug.* we know that venery was a not uncommon interlude of banquets. Some of the legumes, we may believe, were of a stimulating and aphrodisiacal kind.

14 :

Vendidit etiam suppliciorum diuersitates et sepulturas et inminutiones malorum et alios pro aliis occidit.

Much controversy exists as to the meaning of *inminutiones malorum*. If genuine, it would seem to be 'lessenings of punishment'; i.e. Commodus allowed many condemned to a severe punishment to buy off some portion of its severity. Götz, Thes. Gloss. *inminutio minoratio*. But *malorum* may be an error; perhaps for *membrorum*, 'losses of limb.' Such maimings or mutilations are frequently mentioned in *Hist. Aug.*

Pertin. 3 :

tabernam coactiliariam.

Götz, Thes. Gloss. *coactiliarius*, *πλοποιός*. *quactiliarius*, and *quactilarius* seem to be variants of the same word.

4 :

et ipsi Commodo plurimum placuit, quia illi esset iterum cum Pertinax factus est (es P).

Perhaps, if there is no chronological objection, *quia consulatus illi esset iterum*, 'because Commodus was in his second consulship at the time when Pertinax was appointed urban praefect.'

8 :

uasaque eludo (?) auro ebore argento citroque composita atque etiam †phandouitrobuli ex materie eadem.

I suggest *elephantouitrunculi*, 'chessmen' (or, 'counters') of ivory and glass. The *latrunculus* (or *trunculus*, as it might easily be abbreviated) was frequently of ivory. Suet. Ner. 22, Juv. xi. 132, Anth. L. 196. 8 (Riese), speaking

of ivory, *Consulibus sceptrum, mensis decus, arma tablistis, Discolor et tabulae calculus inde datur.* Wernsdorf, P.L.M. iv. 409, says 'elephant' is a name in chess given to pieces which move in a direct line.

10:

quod quidem credidit dum sibi quidam seruus quasi fauiae †setiqui filius† ex ceioni commodi familia palatinam domum ridicule vindicasset.

Possibly cum (Peter) *sibi quidam seruus quasi Fabiae* esset inquilinus, 'as a slave, pretending to be a lodger of Fabia's, belonging to the household of Ceionius Commodus, had raised an absurd claim to the house of the princeps on the Palatine.'

Fabia was the sister of L. Verus, joint emperor with M. Aurelius; his full name, as the son of L. Ceionius Commodus, being Lucius Ceionius Aelius Commodus Verus Antoninus (Capitol. Vit. Veri 1.). A gloss in Götz, Thes. Gloss., illustrates my view: *inquilinus domesticus*, and justifies the genitive *Fabiae* after *inquilinus*.

12:

cum sine amicis cenaret adhibebat uxorem suam et Valerianum †qui cum eodem docuerat† fabulas litteratas haberet.

A very corrupt passage, not cleared up by Salmasius' insertion of *ut* before *qui*. That *ut*, however, has fallen out is probable, but in a different part of the sentence, perhaps as follows: *qui eum docuerat*, cum eodem *ut* fabulas litteratas haberet, 'in order that he might discourse on literature with the same man who had formerly been his instructor.'

Severus 2:

quaesturam diligenter egit ꝑ omnis sortibus natu militari.

O. Hirschfeld has most admirably restored this *omisso tribunatu militari*.

6:

eodem tempore etiam de Clodio Albino sibi substituendo cogitavit, cui Caesarianum decretum ꝑ aut Commodianum uidebatur imperium.

I read *haut*. Commodus had wished to confer on Albinus the title of Caesar, but he had not accepted it from dislike of Commodus, and fear of being involved in his downfall. But when the great and successful Severus contemplated the same step of making Albinus his successor and giving him the title of Caesar, Albinus was not likely to raise any objection, treating the offer as conferring upon him by decree (*decretum*) a real imperial title (*Caesarianum*), not a questionable claim such as alone a degraded and falling princeps like Commodus could give. This seems to agree with the words of the *contio* which Albinus addressed to his army when Severus asked him to take the title of Caesar: Vit. Albin. 2 *Commodum donantem me Caesariano nomine contempsi*; and he goes on to contrast his position, when considering Severus' offer, with the former and rejected offer of Commodus, *sed et uestrae uoluntati et Seueri Augusti parendum est, quia credo sub homine optimo et uiro forti posse bene rempublicam geri*.

The difficulty of the passage lies in the ambiguous use of the two adjectives in *-anus*, since *Caesarianum imperium* seems to mean the *imperium* of—i.e. implied by the title of—Caesar; *Commodianum*, the *imperium* conferred by Commodus.

cui, I think, refers to Albinus, and depends on *decretum*.

14: *figurata* seems to mean 'covert allusions.'

15:

cum soror sua Leptitana.

Notice *sua*, not *eius*, as any writer of classical Latin would have preferred.

16:

After Severus had taken Ctesiphon, and received the title of Parthicus for his victory over the Persian king, BP (the two best MSS. of *Hist. Aug.*) give

†ob etiam filium eius Bassianum Antoninum . . . participem imperii dixerunt milites.

It is usual to insert *hoc* after *ob*: but perhaps *obiter* = *simul*, 'at the same time,' was misunderstood and caused the mistake. Hand., *Turs.* IV. 364, quotes instances; and so in Götz, Thes. Gloss. *obiter* ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ, and *id est simul*, on which last Götz quotes Juv. iii. 241, vi. 481.

20:

Et reputanti mihi, Diocletiane Auguste, neminem †facere prope magnorum uirorum optimum et utilem filium reliquisse satis claret.

facere seems to be not *fere* (Salm.) but *facile* (Jordan). *prope* qualifies *neminem*, and is out of its proper place. I would write *prope neminem facile*.

21 :

Sallustii orationem, qua Micipsa filios ad pacem hortatur, ingrauius morbo misisse filio dicitur maiori idque frustra † et hominem tantum ualitudine.

tantum I suspect to be a corruption of *tactum*: some words seem to have fallen out, e.g. *idque frustra* [egisse, quamuis patrem et senem] *et hominem tactum ualitudine*: cf. 23 *senex et pedibus aeger*. The construction of *dicitur* would thus be changed from 'he is said' to 'it is said,' as conversely Albin. 3 *nec negari potest quod etiam Marius Maximus dicit hunc animum Seuero primum fuisse, ut substitueret: sed postea et filiis studens . . . et Albini amoris inuidens sententiam mutasse*, sc. *dicitur*. Heliogab. 23 *Serpentes collegisse fertur eosque subito . . . effudisse, multosque adfectos morsu et fuga*.

23 :

Turbatam r. publicam ubique accepi, pacatam etiam Britannis relinquo.

The correspondence of clauses seems to demand [in] *Britannis*.

Pesc. Nig. 10 :

ut denorum gallinaceorum pretia prouinciali redderent decem qui simul furto †conuixerant.

Salmasius explained *conuixerant* as = συνεωχημένοι ἦσαν, "had dined together" on the single cock they had managed to steal. Is it not rather an error for *conixerant*, "had shut their eyes to the theft" which one of their number (*raptum ab uno comederant*) had been guilty of? Nettleship, *Contributions to Latin Lexicography*, p. 419, shows that *conixi* as well as *coniui* was used as

perfect of *coniuere*. The substantive *coniuentia*, 'convivance,' is found in the Life of Alex. Severus 54.

I believe a similar error to lurk in Seneca ad Polyb. ii. 2 *Fortuna, uidebaris eum hominem continuisse*, where I have suggested (J. of Philol. xxviii. 23) *eo in homine coniuissse*, 'Fortune, you seemed to have closed your eyes in dealing with him': so long he remained unharmed.

12:

Amavit de principibus Augustum Vespasianum Titum Traianum Pium Marcum, reliquos feneos uel fuenenatos uocans.

Perhaps *faeneos uel f(a)eneratos*. Götz, Thes. Gloss. *Faeneus* κατάρχειος; and, *pauper, sine fide*. Both words seem to mean much the same thing, men sunk in debt, and of no account for any substantial worth, 'of no solid consideration'; *faeneus* might naturally suggest besides 'men of straw.'

Clod. Albin. 2:

sane ut tibi insigne aliquod imperialis maiestatis fcedam, habebis utendi coccini pallii facultatem.

accedam, the reading of both B and P, is generally changed to *accedat*. It is not quite certain to me that Commodus, from whose letter the passage is quoted, does not mean something more than this: 'that I may lend you extra support in the shape of a special imperial badge.' The writer of the Life might have in his mind the custom of *including* the images of Roman emperors in purchases or deeds of sale; cp. Tac. Ann. i. 73 *nec contra religiones fieri quod effigies eius ut alia numinum simulacra uenditionibus hortorum et domuum accedant*.

9:

multi praeterea dicunt, a militibus (percussum), †cuius nece a Seuero gratiam requirebant.

Salm. changed *cuius* into *qui eius*. It is also possible that *cuius necis*, 'of which execution they looked for a recompense from Severus,' was the original draft. At least *nece*, 'by killing him,' seems unusual. One would expect [*ex*] *nece*.

11:

uxori odiosissimus fuit, seruis (seruiis B) iniustus.

seruiis points to *seruitiis*, I think: it would be very unusual as a corruption of *seruis*.

13:

nostrae illae gentes Ceioniorum Albinorum Postumiorum de quibus patres uestri qui et ipsi ab auis suis audierant †didicerunt.

dididerunt Obrecht; but the word is rare in this sense of 'spreading' a number of stories; *adiecerunt* Petschenig, *tradiderunt* Peter. Possibly *docuerunt*.

Geta 4:

Fuit adulescens moribus asperis, sed non impiis, †anarbore tractator, gulosus cupidus ciborum et uini uarie conditi.

In *anarbore* I believe a deep corruption lies; *samardcorum*, 'cheats, impostors.' Acron on Hor. S. l. 6. 113 *aut fallacem Circum propter Circenses incerti euentus aut propter σαρμάδακον* [*Marda enim*] *qui circa metas solebat*

inducere, and on 114 diuinis] *aut sortilegis aut σαμαρδικοῖς* (so Hauthal; but the spelling must have been uniform). The word is used by Augustine, Acad. iii. 15 = *planus*, 'a cheat.' *planus erat de eis quos samardacos iam uulgus uocat*. Geta might be called *samardocorum tractator*, either as *sounding* such men as to the future, which they pretended to divine, or as expounding and interpreting their utterances.

Macrin. 4 :

hominem prostibulem B and P originally; and Lindsay prints *prostibilem* in Plaut. Pers. 837. I think it should be retained here also.

5 :

ob uestimenta populo †congiaria data. *

Probably *congiario*.

11 :

nam pius et felix poterat dicique uiderique,
imperium infelix est erit ille sibi.

The antithesis points to *imperio infelix est, erit ille sibi*: 'the man might be called and believed pious and fortunate: but in his rule he is, and will ever be, unfortunate to his own cause.' In the sentence immediately following, *delatis* would seem to be an error for *de Latiiis* rather than *de Latinis*: 'some one of the Latians,' i.e. who belonged to Italy, and spoke Latin. This adj. occurs elsewhere in *Hist. Aug.*

Diadum. 7 :

ut scirent omnes Antoninos pluris fuisse quam deos †ac trium principum amore† quos sapientia bonitas pietas consecrata sit.

quos is retained by Jordan and Eyssenhardt, as if *consecrata sit* was a deponent, = *consecrauerit*. This seems

hazardous, unless an example is brought to support it; and it appears more probable that the *s* of *quos* is caused by the following *s* of *sapientia*, and that we should follow Peter in writing *quo*. But I am not convinced that *ac* is *ab* (so Peter, with Jordan and Eyssenhardt); it may be *hoc* on account of this aforesaid love of the three emperors, by which their wisdom, kindliness, and piety have received consecration.

Heliogab. 8 :

coegit denique scriptores nonnullos nefanda immo potius
‡mpace (inpace Harl. 2658) de eiusdem dictum luxuria disputare.

Perhaps *immo potius mythica de eiusdem uictu et luxuria d.*

12 :

ad uicensimam hereditatium mulionem curare iussit, iussit et
cursorem, iussit et cocum et ‡claustrarium artificem.

plaustrarium would accord better with the others—the muleteer, the runner, the cook: cf Claud. 14, where a *carpentarius* is combined with a huntsman, a fisherman, and a confectioner. *Claustrarium*, I suppose, would mean a locksmith. This was a favourite employment of Louis XVI., but the tastes of Heliogabalus were more for *conveyances* of different kinds, as is mentioned later. I may perhaps record here a similar interchange of *p*, *c*, which Lütjohann's edition of Apuleius' *de deo Socratis* (1878) many years ago suggested to me: III. §§ 126 *homines ratione plaudentes, oratione pollentes*, where I read *claudentes* = claudicantes, 'halting.'

[*Claustrarius*, however, occurs in the Life of Alexander Severus, 24 *pellionum claustrariorum argentariorum* (so both B and P): on the other hand, *artifex carpentarius* is found in the same Life, 52.]

16:

Nec distulit caedem consobrini, sed timens †setus ad aliquam† se inclinaret si ille consobrinum occidisset.

setus has long been corrected to *ne senatus* (I may observe that *ne* is omitted also in Harl. 2658), and *ad aliquam* to *aliquem* (Jordan), or *alium quem* (Peter), while Bährens thought *seditionem* had fallen out. May it not be more easily explained as *ad alium quam*, sc. 'lest the senate should sway towards some other than himself (Heliogabalus)'?

16:

Sed milites et maxime praetorianus uel scientes qui mala in Heliogabalum pararant uel quod sibi uiderent inuidiam factaque conspiratione ad liberandam rem publicam primum conscii genere mortis, cum alios uitalibus exemptis necarent alios ab ima parte perfoderent ut mors esset uitae consentiens. post hoc in eum impetus factus est.

Though this sentence is as deeply corrupt as many in Thucydides, the one point emerges with clearness, the contrast of *primum* with *post hoc*. I take this as my basis of emendation, and offer the following: (1) *facta* (*inita*)*que* *conspiratione*; (2) *conscierunt* (? *consilia inierunt*) *de genere mortis*; (3) *uitalibus* is Lampridius' decorous *substitute* for *genitalibus* or *uirilibus*, and must not be altered. Translate: 'The soldiers, and more particularly the Praetorians, either conscious, such of them as had plotted to punish Heliogabalus, or as seeing their act would reflect odiously upon themselves, if they planned and attempted a conspiracy to free the Roman State, in the first instance deliberated as to the kind of death, it being their habit to kill some by removing the genitals, and stab others in their lower limbs, thus to make their death consonant with their life of infamy. Next they made an attack upon him.'

17:

appellatus est post mortem tiberinus et tractatitius et impurus.

H has *tractatus*, an obvious corruption of *tractatitius*, not of *tractitius*, as Jordan and Eyssenhardt print.

23:

ut solet populus ad ludos celebres uenire.

Rather *celebris*, 'in a crowd.'

24:

quae saxa usque ad nostram memoriam manserunt sed nuper
†erudite (so B, eru//te//// P) ex(s)ecta sunt.

H has *eruta et*, which is generally printed as right. The *d*, however, of *erudite* points to *eruderata*.

25:

iussit omnes (herniosos) notari eosque ad balneas suas exhibere.

H also has *notari*; but the right word is perhaps indicated by P's *nomari*, i.e., I suppose, *numerari*.

29:

iunxit et quaternas mulieres pulcherrimas uel binas ad †pam-
pillum uel ternas et amplius et sic uectatus est.

pampillum BPH, *pimpillum* Bod. Canon. Lat. 269, an interpolated MS. I do not feel sure that the original was not *pilentum*, a rare word, sometimes assuming strange and perverted forms, e.g. *pelenium* (Götz, Thes. Gloss., p. 88). In *pampillum* of BPH it is possible that an ocular aberration to *amplius*, which follows almost immediately, may have been the cause of the strange shape the word has assumed. At any rate, *pilentum* was the particular

kind of vehicle which Heliogabalus would naturally select for harnessing women to carry him through the streets: Aen. viii. 666 *Pilentis matres in mollibus*, and Servius there.

Alex. Sever. 9 :

Nuper certe patres conscripti meministis . . . qui gemitus omnium fuerit cum per populi et honestorum coronas una uox esset hunc finte (so BPH) Antoninum dici, per hanc pestem tactum uiolari nomen.

For *inte* write *sinitis*, a question ; for *tactum*, not *intactum* (Bährens), nor *sanctum* (Salmasius), but, as most of the old editions, *tantum* : see my note above on Sev. 21 *hominem tactum ualitudine*, where MSS. give *tantum*.

15 :

nec quemquam passus est esse in Palatinis necessarium hominem.

Before *necessarium* a negative has fallen out, either *non* (as H) or *nisi*, which Jord. and Eyss. state to be the second hand of P. H is not sufficiently trustworthy to make *non* more than possible ; and Peter may be right in preferring *nisi*, which might have been dropped in consequence of the preceding *Palatinis*.

In the next sentence I see no necessity for changing *adscriptum* to *adscripticium*, which is palæographically unlikely : Casaubon's *malum publicum* for *m. pupillum* of BPH is as certain as its antithesis to *bonum publicum*, and the peculiar fitness of such a term in describing an extortionate provincial governor, can make it.

18 :

Si quis caput flexisset aut blandius aliquid dixisset ut adulator, uel fabiciebatur, uel ridebatur.

abigebatur would be more ordinary Latin ; but *abiecit* in

23 *eunuchos de ministerio suo abiecit* is used similarly of dismissing anyone from his position.

28 :

eum (Alexandrum) pudebat Syrum dici, maxime quod quodam tempore frustra ut solent Antiochenses Aegyptii Alexandrini lacessitus erat conuiciolis et Syrum archisynagogum eum uocantes archiereum.

This is, I believe, an anacoluthon. *frusta* is an error for *frustra* (so H), 'idly,' 'aimlessly,' as explained by *conuiciolis*, the subject of the clause *ut solent Antiochenses* returning, in spite of the intermediate *lacessitus erat*, in the plural *uocantes*. There is, however, some doubt as to the arrangement of the last words, *et Syrum archisynagogum eum uocantes archiereum*: solved perhaps most simply by Peter's addition of *et* before *archiereum*; or should we admit a greater change, and write *et Syrum archisynagogum cum uocarent [et] archiereum*?

29 :

dehinc si hora permetteret actibus publicis post †multam operam dabat idcirco quod et res bellicae et res ciuiles per amicos tractabantur . . . et tractatae firmabantur.

For *multam* I think *militiam* should be written, Alexander taking matters of the war department *first*, and then the other business of state.

33 :

chlamydes hirtas Seueri et tunicas asemas, †et purpureaque non magna ad usum reuocauit suum.

H gives *et purpuraque*, which seems very near the true reading, *ex purpuraque*.

35:

Oratores et poetas non sibi panegyricos dicentes, . . . sed aut orationes recitantes aut facta ueterum (uetert B¹) ꝑquam netuli ueniterꝑ audiuit.

Salmasius was, no doubt, right in eliciting *libenter* from *li ueniter*, but *canentes* for *quam netu* is very hazardous. Omitting *netu*, the explanation of which is doubtful, I suggest that *quam* represents *perquam*, 'very willingly.'

37:

habuit quotidie et ꝑnullis sine pipere sextarios quattuor, cum pipere duo.

H has *inullis*. Can this be *inulas*, 'elecampanes'? Pliny, xix. 91, not only mentions various uses, medical or alimentary, to which the herb was applied, but specifies *pepper* and thyme as combining with it to form a stomachic, and as made fashionable by its use as a daily food by Julia Augusta (perhaps daughter of Titus).

Like many other Roman jokes, the exact point of *non secundam mensam Alexandrum habere sed secundum* is obscure. He was very fond of fruits; and a variety of fruit-courses were served up to him. In this way he had, instead of one service of fruit, a regular series, *according to the season*, i.e. *non secundam mensam, sed secundum mensem*. The form *frigu* 'cold water,' which BPH present, points to *frigda*, not *frigida*.

38:

In the hendecasyllables beginning *Pulchrum quod uides esse nostrum regem* | *Quod Syrum detulit propago*, it seems likely that *Quod* is an error for *Quem* or *Quom*, and that after *Syrum* either *Syra* has fallen out or that *de* of *detulit* is a mistake for *-ae* of *Syriae*. The former is perhaps

easier. *detulit* would then mean 'has brought to us,' *de* giving its usual sense of bringing to a particular place or person: such an idea is implied in *nostrum*.

In the second hendecasyllabic passage containing Alexander's reply:—

Pulchrum quod putas esse uestrum regem
Vulgari, miserande, de fabella
Si uerum putas esse, non irascor.
Tantum †comedas uelim lepusclos
Vt fias animi malis repulsis
Pulchris ne inuideas liuore mentis—

it is usual to print *tu comedas*. I prefer *sic comedas*: *ut fias a. m. repulsis* = *ut mala ab animo repellas*. It seems impossible to understand *pulcher* after *fias*, even in such a vilely written retort as this is. Still, Alexander's own reply was in Greek, of which the Latin hendecasyllables are perhaps an inferior version.

41:

accipiebat ab amicis. quod hodieque fit, si praescatur (so P, praeratur B¹, praestatur B²) a praefectis absente imperatore.

If P's *praescatur* may be accepted as the nearest approach to the archetype, *aesca* may form part of the original words, whether *paratur esca* or *praestatur esca*.

aut †gacple paruolae sursum et deorsum uolitarent.

So BP; H has *gacle*, with *glatte* written over. The constancy of *gc* in *gacple* or *gacle* makes Salmasius' *galbulae* or Bährens' *gauiae* improbable. Madvig's *auiculae* would never have assumed so strange a shape as *gacple*. Nearer than any of these is the bird called by Pliny, H.N. x. 73, 96, xxx. 94 *galgulus* or *gauculus*. In xxv. 94, the MS. variants *gagalgulum*, *galgulaim* seem to point to different spellings,

and perhaps pronunciations, of a not very common word. If I am right in this suggestion, the writer of the Life of Alexander Severus, Lampridius, if we may trust the MSS. of Hist. Aug., made the bird feminine, *galgula*, *ae.* The twelfth-century MS. of Pliny's Natural History, Auct. T. 1. 27, gives the following results:—In x. 73, *garguli* twice (in heading and in the text); x. 96, in heading, *cauculo* m. pr. red, corrected in black into *gaugulo*; in the text, *gaugulos*.

43:

nundinia uetera serdine instituit.

So BPH, i.e. *n. uetera* sed ordine, not *uetera* ex ordine, as is usually printed.

45:

Alexander arranged everything on a march in advance till he came to the borders of the barbarian tribes he was attacking. Then

iam inde tacebatur, et omnes ambulabant, ne dispositionem Romanam barbari scirent.

This, if it means anything, may perhaps be a very rough way of stating that horses were kept as much as possible out of sight, for fear of their snorting or neighing being overheard, and attracting the attention of the enemy. Everybody who could walked on foot, the cavalry suppressing themselves as much as possible. Frontin. Strat. II. 5. 31 *in remotissimo equites ne fremitu eorum cogitata proderentur*. Alexander's Parthian expedition, as described in c. 50, illustrates the meaning: *non milites sed senatores transire diceret. Quacumque iter legiones faciebant tribuni taciti* (MS. *aciti*).

The sentence would, perhaps, be somewhat clearer by adding *sic* before *ambulabant*.

48 :

Ovinus Camillus, a man who aspired to be *princeps*, was treated by Alexander as actually such, admitted to the palace dressed in the costume of an emperor, and invited to share in the emperor's military duties. His strength not being up to it, Ovinus resigned this assumed *imperium*, and retired to his private villas unharmed, where he lived a long time securely. Then follow the words—

sed post iussu imperatoris occisus est quod et ille militaris esset, et a militibus occisus est.

This means, I think, that Maximinus, who followed Alexander as emperor, ordered Ovinus to be put to death, because it was only fair that, as he had shared the life and position of Alexander, so he should share his violent death by the hands of soldiers.

51 :

dici iubebat quod tibi fieri non uis alteri ne feceris.

Almost so Orientius' Common. I. 197, 8 *ne facias aliis quidquid fieri tibi non uis, Idque aliis facias quod tibi uis fieri.*

53 :

Quin †contionestis uocem in bello contra hostem, non contra imperatorem uestrum necessariam ?

contionestis is rather *continuistis* than *continetis*.

56 :

falcati currus mille †se.

mille cc, Hülsen ap. Peter : rather *mille c*.

65 :

cum ille diceret Domitianum pessimum fuisse, amicos autem bonos habuisse atque ideo illum magis odio fuisse ꝑ quae rem ꝑ. temporis uitae ille, quia melius est unum malum pati quam multos.

temporis I believe to be a corruption of *turpioris*; the sense points to something like *quia rem ꝑ. turpioris uitae* [hominibus] *ille* [mandauerit].

Domitian was a bad man, but had virtuous friends. If he had used their services, it would have been all well with the state, and he would have excited comparatively little odium; but he chose to employ bad men, and their counsels led him into a line of government which ended with universal disgust, and ultimately killed him.

Saturnin. 10 :

adde quod omnis aetas in imperio reprehenditur. senex est quispiam. inhabilis uidetur ꝑ additur his et furore.

The last words have been variously emended. The only emendation required is *furere* for *furore*. ‘Suppose anyone is an old man, he is thought unfit; what is more (*additur his*), he is thought to be mad as well.’ With *furere* supply *uideri*.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

THE MAGNUM NOMEN.

SOME critic has said that in Lucan's famous phrase, "Stat magni nominis umbra," the word *Magni* should be written with a capital letter, the allusion being to the cognomen of Pompeius. I should go further than this, and suggest that *nominis* should also have a capital, inasmuch as, in the mind of any contemporary of Pompeius, or indeed of almost any Roman for several generations after his death, the words *Nomen Magnum* would immediately call forth the thought of the Great Pompeius; for, speaking ἀνθρωπίνως, this, to a Roman, was a Name above every name.

It is the object of this paper to show the existence of this Name-worship, by quotations from either contemporary writers or from poets or historians who lived near enough to the Great Pompeius to be overshadowed by the glamour of the Magnum Nomen. I, therefore, take the liberty, for the sake of clearness, of writing the word *Nomen*, wherever it occurs in any such quotation referring to Pompeius, with a capital letter.

Not only did the Nomen Magnum distinguish Pompeius himself, but, even after his defeat and death, it continued to surround his sons with an adventitious halo, descending to them like an hereditary title.

So Ovid, referring to the ultimate defeat and death of Sextus, says (*Met.* 15, 25):

Et *Magnum* Siculis *Nomen* superabitur undis:

cp. also Lucan, *Pharsalia*, 6, 420 *sqq.*, speaking of the same Sextus :

Qui mox Scyllaeis exul grassatus in undis,
Polluit aequoreos Siculus pirata triumphos.

The words *magnis nominibus*, 7, 209, 210, occurring in conjunction with *tibi*, *Magne*, *favēbunt*, seem intended at least to suggest and include the *Magnum Nomen*.

I am not sure that the full force of 'Stat Magni Nominis umbra,' hackneyed as the quotation is, is generally appreciated. *Stat* implies here something more than steadfastness and rigidity. The poet is contrasting the apathy of Pompeius, after he had attained to the pinnacle of his fame, with Caesar's restless progressiveness, which urged him on to achievement after achievement. Pompeius was too much disposed to abide content with the laurels he had won, 'nec reparare novas vires,' to rely too much on his Nomen—on the fact that he was *Pompeius Magnus*. The Nomen Lucan goes on to compare to a great oak hung round with trophies, and casting a broad shadow of fame. But its roots are not firm, and so it is liable to fall at the first blast of the tempest. Not so, he says, with Caesar :

Sed non in Caesare tantum
Nomen erat nec fama ducis, sed nescia *virtus*
Stare loco, etc.

The word *loco* added to *stare* expresses more fully the notion contained in the *stat* of *Stat magni nominis umbra*.

For the same contrast, cp. 5, 210 *sqq.* :

Ille feroces
Torquet adhuc oculos, totoque *vagantia* coelo
Lumina, nunc vultu pavido nunc terva minaci :
Stat nunquam facies :

and also Verg. *Aen.*, 10, 467 *sqq.* (a passage which may have been in Lucan's mind):

Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus
Omnibus est vitae: sed famam extendere factis,
Hoc virtutis opus.

In both passages the leading idea is the progressiveness and restlessness of *virtue*. Note also Vergil's *irreparabile*, as compared with Lucan's 'nec reparare novas vires'; and Lucan's 'Successus urgere suos' with Vergil's 'famam extendere factis.'

Plutarch, after saying (*Life of Pompeius*, c. 13) that the title *Magnus* originated with Sulla himself, refers to another account, viz., that Pompeius had been acclaimed with this appellation spontaneously by the army in Africa, and that it was only afterwards authorized and confirmed into a title by Sulla. Be that as it may, this title of *Magnus*, which no Roman had previously borne, greatly impressed the imagination of the Romans, who were already, unconsciously to themselves, under the spell of that influence which ultimately led to Caesarism. There was, however, too much of Orientalism about the name to please strict constitutionalists like Cicero. In his speech *De Imperio Cn. Pompei*, though its theme is the greatness and glory of Pompeius, although the name Pompeius occurs nearly thirty times, the cognomen *Magnus* is never alluded to, and that though he asks, 15, 43:

Quod igitur *Nomen* unquam in urbe terrarum clarius fuit? cuius res gestae pares?

and though the mention of the African war, *bellum in Africa maximum confecit* (21, 61), gives him a suitable occasion for introducing it.

In the letters to Atticus he speaks as a rule only of "Pompeius," except indeed in vi. 1, 22 (cp. § 25 and viii. 6, 3), where, alluding jocularly to the glory he won on the

famous occasion when he swore 'republicam atque hanc urbem mea unius opera esse salvam,' he says, '*Magnus* praetextatus illo die fui.' Cf. also *Ad Attic.* II. xiii., quanto in odio noster amicus Magnus! una cum Crassi Divitis cognomine consenescit.

However, in those letters (included in the eighth book) which passed between himself and Pompeius, Pompeius designating himself by his cognomen, is politely answered in the same style by Cicero: thus—Cn. Magnus Procos. s. d. Ciceroni Imp., and M. Cicero Imp. s. d. Cn. Magno procos.

In the speeches generally it may be said that the cognomen of Pompeius is never used, except when the orator wishes to cap a climax, and then it comes out almost with a shriek, as in *Orat. pro Mil.*:

Quae si non probaret te, *Magne*, tamen ante testaretur;
and *Phil.* II., 26, 64:

Hasta posita pro aede Iovis Statoris bona subjecta Cn. Pompei—miserum me!—bona, inquam, Cn. Pompei *Magni* voci acerbissimae subjecta praeconis.

As I began with a quotation from Lucan, I shall give from the same writer a few passages bearing on the use of the Nomen; but must observe that these are only a very few samples out of an immense number to be found in the *Pharsalia*, this poem being in fact one long declamation on the *Nomen Magnum*. They will, however, sufficiently show the almost superstitious awe with which the name of Pompeius Magnus was regarded even in Lucan's day. Hardly a generation before Lucan, Caligula was so jealous even of the 'Nominis umbra,' that he "forbade the last descendant of the Pompeys to bear the name *Magnus*."¹

¹ *V. Suetonius Calig.* c. 35.
Vetera familiarum insignia nobilissimo cuique ademit: Torquato torquem: Cincinorato crinem: Cn. Pompeio,

stirpis antiquae Magni cognomen (v. l. *Nomen*). However, Claudius restored the nomen to this Cn. Pompeius, to whom he married his daughter.

In *Pharsalia*, 2, 633, Pompeius says, addressing his son :

Euphratem Nilumque move, quo *Nominis* usque
Nostri fama venit.

In 5, 738, Cornelia :

Non audet flentem deprendere *Magnum*.

Sextus, unworthy of his great name, 6, 419, 20 :

Turbæ sed mixtus inerti
Sextus erat, *Magno* proles indigna *parente*.

Lucan, speaking of his own poetic efforts, 7, 209 *sqq.* :

Sive aliquid *magnis* nostri quoque cura laboris
Nominibus prodesse potest.

7, 694 *sqq.* The Name beginning to decline :

Non iam Pompei *Nomen* populare per orbem,
Nec studium belli.

8, 21. Pompeius, victim of his fame :

Cunctis ignotus gentibus esse
Mallet, et *obscuro* tutus transire per orbem
Nomine.

8, 549 *sqq.* :

si meruit tam *claro nomine* Magnus
Caesaris esse nefas, *tanti*, Ptolemae, ruinam
Nominis haud metuis ?

8, 792. The inscription over him :

Inscripsit *Sacrum* semiusto stipite *Nomen* :
Hic situs est Magnus.

9, 90 :

Vel sceptræ, vel urbes
Libertate sua validas impellite fama
Nominis.

9, 203, 4 :

Clarum et venerabile *Nomen*
Gentibus.

9, 1050. Apostrophising Caesar :

Credis apud populos Pompei *Nomen* amantis
Hoc castris prodesse tuis ?

And if the *Nomen Magnum* was worshipped by Roman writers, not less prominent is the *ὄνομα Πομπηίου Μάγνου* in the pages of Greek historians.

Plutarch (c. 13), telling us that Pompeius did not begin to use the cognomen *Μάγνος* as part of his signature until he was sent to the Sertorian war, says, οὐκέτι γὰρ ἦν ἐπίφθονον τοῦνομα (implying that it had been so previously) σύνηθες γενόμενον. In c. 26 he tells us that the fall in the price of provisions which took place immediately after the framing of the Gabinian law, λόγον ἡδομένῳ τῷ δήμῳ παρείχον ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦ Πομπηίου λείλυκε τὸν πόλεμον.

Again, he says (c. 29) that one of Pompeius' officers, Lucius Octavius, by collusion with the brigands and pirates of Crete, owing to his general's jealousy of Metellus, οὐ μόνον νπαχθῇ καὶ βαρὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγέλαστον ἐποίει τὸν Πομπηίου ἀνθρώποις ἀνοσίοις καὶ ἀθέοις τοῦνομα κίχραντα καὶ περιάπτοντα τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν. In c. 39, speaking of the way in which the Armenians and Parthians submitted to his administration after his defeat of Mithridates, he says : μέγα μὲν γὰρ ὄνομα τῆς δυνάμεως.

In c. 64 he tells of the great encouragement given to the soldiers in Pompeius' army at Beroea, ὁρῶσι Πομπηίου Μάγνον ἐξήκοντα μὲν ἔτη δουεῖν λείποντα γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀμιλλώμενον πεζόν, κ.τ.λ.

In the rout at Pharsalia (c. 72), Plutarch says that when he saw his cavalry defeated, he behaved like a madman, καὶ μηδ' ὅτι Μάγνος ἐστὶ Πομπηῖος ἐνοοῦντι.

In the last scene of all (c. 80), when his faithful freed-man was gathering materials for his funeral pyre, Pompeius now lying on the shore, 'sine nomine corpus,' an old Roman, who had served his first campaigns under him, came up and said: τίς ὢν, ὡ ἄνθρωπε, θάπτειν διανοῇ Μάγνον Πομπήϊον. So much for Plutarch.

In Appian also we find much evidence of the same Name-worship, e.g. *Bell. Civ.* 4. 83.

Here he tells us how Sextus Pompeius was at first, after his father's defeat, overlooked as insignificant, and wandered, with a small number of ships, λανθάνων δτι Πομπήϊος εἴη; but after some time, when his force increased and ἐξεφαίνετο Πομπήϊος ὢν—when, in fact, the ὄνομα τοῦ Πομπηίου, as we read in the context, drew adherents to him—Octavian was obliged to send larger fleets and better commanders against him.

In 5. 99, we are told that Octavian had, while conducting operations against Sextus, to send Maecenas to reassure the Romans at home διὰ τοὺς ἐπτοημένους ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν μνήμην Πομπηίου Μαγνου· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐξέλιπεν ἡ δόξα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου. Negotiating with the Parthians, we are told that Sextus entertained the hope that for the remainder of the war against Antonius they would gladly receive the proffered aid of any Roman general, καὶ παῖδα Μάγνου μάλιστα (c. 5, 133); and, while trying at the same time to make terms with Antonius (a duplicity which was to cost him dear), he dwells on the honour which would accrue to him, εἰ τὸν Μάγνου παῖδα περισώζοις.

Even at the last, when Sextus had unconditionally surrendered to Titius, the general of Antonius (5. 144), the *Nomen Magnum* which attached to him almost averted his death-stroke. No one wished that the odium of the slaughter of a Pompeius Magnus should rest on him, καὶ Πλάγκον δὲ γράφαι νομίζουσι οἱ μὲν, συνειδότος Ἀντωνίου καὶ αἰδουμένου γράφαι διὰ ὄνομα τοῦ Πομπηίου.

However, as, notwithstanding this, Sextus was put to death in Miletus by Titius, the *Nomen*, though it had for a time invested him with a fictitious air of romance, proved after all useless.

This word reminds us of Horace. Did Horace, in the fourteenth Ode of the First Book, allude to that part of the Civil Wars which was contained between the Battle of Philippi and the defeat and death of Sextus Pompeius Magnus, or is the poem not allegorical at all? That it is allegorical is the opinion of Quintilian, whose view, based, as Orelli thinks, on tradition handed down from Horace's time, Orelli himself adopts. The comparison of a state in difficulties to a ship labouring in a heavy sea, has been a commonplace of poetry (and oratory) from Alcaeus to Longfellow.

There are high authorities, we know, from Bentley down to the present day, in favour of regarding the ode as a mere "occasional poem," without any meaning beyond that which lies on the surface. Critics of note being thus divided, it is permissible to hold to the view which has the sanction of Quintilian and antiquity.

If the ode is believed to be allegorical, whether it refers to the State in general, as Quintilian thinks, or, as other commentators hold, only to the Republican party after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius, when Philippi sent Horace away crestfallen and with clipt wings, is a matter of comparatively small importance. If, however, we adopt the latter opinion, the word *desiderium* gains in point, as it is applicable to one *who has left the ship*, which, supposing that the Ship = the State, Horace had not done. Horace's position immediately after Philippi suits this interpretation well. He had left the Republican party indeed, but had left many of his best friends behind in it; and anxiety about their fate must have caused him *desiderium curaque non levis*.

The safe return of one of these δορύξῆνοι, Pompeius Varus, he joyfully celebrates in Lib. II., c. vii. This Pompeius was one of those who, as Orelli, quoting from Dio Cassius, 47, 49, tells us, had escaped, after the rout of Philippi, to the sea and joined Sextus. The latter being a great naval commander, θαλασσοκρατῶν, all over the Sicilian sea, and indeed in the whole Mediterranean (like his father before him), the fortunes of the Republican party, now centred in him, might well be compared to a ship. Most appropriately then does Horace, speaking of his friend who had, less prudently than Horace himself, chosen to carry on the struggle under the flag of that corsair-admiral, say :

Te rursus in bellum resorbens
Unda fretis tulit aestuosis.

Even if the ode be allegorical, we are not obliged to press every word into an allegorical sense. There may, therefore, be no special point in the word *Pontica*, as Pontus was noted for supplying ship-timber, and no more suitable adjective could be applied to *pinus*.

But assuming for a moment that Quintilian's view is right, and that the ode is an allegory, would not the word '*Pontica*,' in almost every mind, call up the thought of the man whose Name was inseparably connected with Pontus by his victories over Mithridates? Indeed, the adjective *Pontic* would evoke the memory of Sextus Pompeius Magnus as well as of the Great Gnaeus; for almost immediately before his surrender Sextus had been intriguing with the Pontic nobility (*v.* Appian, 5. 133); in short, would recall the *Nomen Magnum*, with all the associations, glorious and tragic, connected with the name. If, on the other hand, the ode is not allegorical, the occurrence of these two apparent clues, *Pontica* and *Nomen*, within the compass of a few lines, must be considered remarkable.

A. A. BURD.

NAVARINO.

MANY years ago a verse in the *Chronicle of Morea* convinced me that Hopf's derivation of Navarino from the Navarrese Company, who entered Greece in A.D. 1381, is untenable, though it has been widely accepted, and indeed seemed extremely plausible, seeing that the Navarrese settled there, and that their stronghold was called Castel des Navarrois.¹ But τὸ κάστρον τοῦ Ἀβαρίνου in the *Chronicle of Morea*,² which was composed long before their arrival,³ is fatal to Hopf's explanation; showing, as it plainly does, that Navarino comes from Ἀβαρίνος, by the familiar carrying forward of the final letter of the accusative of the article to the beginning of a place-name (as in Nio = <σῆ>ν Ἴον, Nicaria, Negroponte, &c.). I soon found that the evidence of the Chronicle did not stand alone. Pylos is equated with Avarinos in a Bull of Andronikos II. of June, A.D. 1293.⁴ In three lists of "cities which changed their names," printed together by Parthey in his edition of Hierocles, and published critically by Burckhardt, we find a notice that Pylos νῦν καλεῖται Ἀβαρίνος.⁵

¹ Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands* (Ersch und Gruber, *Encyclopädie*) i (= lxxxv), p. 212, ii (= lxxxvi), p. 24.

² l. 8096, ed. Schmitt (p. 189, ed. Buchon in *Chroniques Étrangères*).

³ If there was any doubt about this, Dr. J. Schmitt has made it certain that the work was written about 1300, or

not much later. See the Introduction to his edition (1904).

⁴ Miklosich and Müller, *Acta et Diplomata*, V. (1887), p. 160, εἰς τὴν Πύλον τὸν καλούμενον Ἀβαρίνον.

⁵ *Hieroclis Synecdemus*, ed. A. Burckhardt (1893), pp. 61, 66, 68; ed. G. Parthey (1866), pp. 311 sqq.

The impossibility of Hopf's view is admitted by Dr. John Schmitt;¹ and Mr. W. Miller has recently written to the same effect, citing the evidence to which I have referred.² But the evidence from the city-lists requires investigation; and I will proceed to prove that this evidence is really important, and, in fact, the oldest testimony we possess for the name Avarinos.

List 2 is preserved in a MS. of the thirteenth century (Paris. reg. 854), and List 1 in a MS. of the fourteenth (Palat. 209). But this MS. of List 1 was derived from an older archetype, as Burckhardt has shown by comparison with the other later MSS.³ Hence both these lists were composed before the arrival of the Navarrese. But we can push the date still further back.

An examination of the three lists shows at once that there is a close connexion between them. They were based on the same source; but none of the three was derived from either of the other two.

List 2 contains twenty-seven titles, of which seventeen are identical with titles in List 1. List 3 (which is arranged alphabetically) contains thirty-five titles,⁴ and of these twenty-four are in List 1. There are nine names common to all three lists,⁵ and only one common to the second and third alone.⁶ List 1 is much the longest, and has sixty-eight titles, of which thirty-six do not appear in the other lists.

That the documents are not independent, but were derived from a common source, is shown beyond any

¹ *Chronicle of Morea*, p. 633.

² *The Name of Navarino*, in the *Eng. Hist. Review*, xx. 307 (April, 1905). He also calls attention to a scholiast's note on Ptolemy's Geography, iii. 16, Πύλος δ' καὶ Ἀβαρινός.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. xlvī-xlviii.

⁴ I count 108 Ἰλλυρικοὶ (a) τὰ νῦν

Κανίγια καὶ (b) ἡ Ζερβία, and 118 Ποτίδαια ἢ νῦν Κασάνδρια ἤγονν ἡ Βέρροια, as two in each case.

⁵ These are: 2=63=102; 9=75=94; 10=64=92; 11=65=116; 14=68=93; 32=76=120; 34=87=113; 43a=67=117; 56=89=112.

⁶ 66 Ποτίδαια ἢ νῦν Βέρροια = 118².

possibility of doubt by two longer items which appear in all three.

LIST 1.

11. Πήδαςος ἡ νῦν
Μεθώνη· ταύτης
πλησίον ἐστὶ χειρρό-
νησος ἥτις καλεῖται
Πύλος, ἡ πατρὶς
Νέστορος, νῦν δὲ
καλεῖται Ἀβαρίνος

32. Σέρμιον ἡ νῦν
Οὐγγρία καὶ Στρίαμος¹
Οἱ δὲ Οὐγγροὶ τὸ
παλαιὸν ἐλέγοντο
Γήπαιδες.²

LIST 2.

65. Πίδασος ἡ νῦν
Μεθώνη· ἥστινος
πλησίον ἐστὶ χειρρό-
νησος μικρὰ ἥτις τὸ
παλαιὸν μὲν ἐλέγετο
Πύλη, ἡ τοῦ Ὀμηρικοῦ
Νέστορος· νῦν δὲ
καλεῖται Ἀβαρίνος

76. Σέρμιον ἡ νῦν
Οὐγγρία· καὶ
οἱ Οὐγγροὶ ἐλέγοντο
τὸ παλαιὸν
Γήπεδες.

LIST 3.

116. Πίδασος ἡ νῦν
Μεθώνη, ἥς
πλησίον χειρρό-
νησος ἥτις καλεῖται
Πύλος ἡ πατρὶς
Νέστορος νῦν δὲ
καλεῖται Ἀβαρίνος.

120. Σέρμιον ἡ νῦν
Οὐγκρία,
πρῶην δὲ
Γίπεδον.

We can infer that behind these three lists, of which two were drawn up certainly, and one probably, not later than in the thirteenth century, there was an older and fuller document, from which the compilers of 1, 2, and 3 made their respective selections. It would be not enough—though it would satisfy the purpose of the present argument in its bearing on Navarino—to assume that the original source was a brief note, containing only the nine names which are common to the three lists, and that each copyist added, from his own resources, a much larger number of other names. For this would not explain the

¹ Compare Srem = Σέρμιον. See Schafarik, *Slawische Alterthümer* (ed. Wuttke), ii. 292, note. For the use of Σέρμιον for a region, *ager Sirmiensis*, cp. Kinnamos, i. 4, Ζεβγμην ἐν Σιρμίε πόλιν ἀνέγειρεν (p. 10, ed. Bonn), and v. 8 (p. 222).

² It seems probable that this error was based on a passage in Theophanes,

Chronogr., A.M. 5931, p. 94, ed. De Boor, οἱ μὲν Γήπαιδες—τὰ περὶ Σιγγιδόνα καὶ Σέρμιον χωρία ᾤκησαν. (The whole passage is quoted in Constantine Porph., *De Adm. imp.*, p. 111, ed. Bonn.) The error points to a time when the circumstances of the Hungarian conquest had been forgotten.

occurrence of the names which are common to the three pairs (1×2 ; 1×3 ; 2×3). And since, therefore, we have to admit that the three compilers selected their items from a larger list, it is simpler to suppose that the original contained not only the items which are found in more than one, but also those which are peculiar to each. This question, however, as I have said, does not concern 'Αβαρίνος, which appears in all the lists, and therefore on any theory belongs to the original source.

The fact that our oldest MS. of one of the derived lists dates from the thirteenth century, is sufficient to justify the assumption that the original document, which we are compelled to assume, belonged at latest to the twelfth century. This conclusion accords with the internal evidence. There is no lack of proofs that the catalogue was put together after the Saracen conquest of Syria and the Slavonic settlements in the Balkan peninsula. Compare, for instance,

- 24 = 80 Βέρροια τὸ νῦν Χάλεπε
 20 = 99 Τιβερίόπολις ἡ νῦν Στρούμμιτza
 24^a = 108^a Ἰλλυρικὸν ἡ νῦν Σερβία
 48 Δωδώνη ἡ Βόνδιτza
 53 Σαρδικὴ ἡ νῦν Τριάδιτza

These items establish *c.* A.D. 700 as a prior limit for the date. But the entry 32 = 76 = 120 Σίρμιον ἡ νῦν Οὐγγρία, κ.τ.λ., enables us to advance this limit to the time of the Hungarian conquest of Pannonia, *c.* A.D. 900. On the other hand, while the effects of the Slavonic and even the Hungarian movements were present to the compiler of the document, it does not show the slightest trace of the Franco-Venetian changes which ensued from the events of A.D. 1204-5. We can therefore have no hesitation in concluding that it was compiled between the beginning of the

tenth (an extreme limit) and the end of the twelfth century. It follows that it supplies, through the lists derived from it, the earliest evidence for the name Avarinos.

Since it is clear, then, that Navarino has nothing to do with Navarre, and that the Navarrese settlement can have done no more for the name than perhaps to ensure the change from Avarinos to Navarino, the derivation from the Avars, proposed by Fallmerayer,¹ comes on the scene again.² To establish this derivation, it is necessary to produce some proof that Avars did settle in the Peloponnesus.

The well-known notice in Evagrius, of an Avaric invasion of the Balkan lands, including Greece (καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν), in A.D. 589, does not necessarily imply anything more than devastation. The invaders sacked cities, led away captives, and wrought destruction of all kinds; but there is no suggestion of permanent settlements.³ There

¹ *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea*, i. 188, note.

² Schmitt and Miller, *loc. cit.*

³ Evagrius, *Hist. ecc.* (ed. Bidez and Parmentier), vi. 10. The date is given in vi. 8 as ann. 637 of the Antiochene era, which ran from Nov. 1, 588, to Oct. 31, 589 (see Clinton, *F.R.* ii. 210). As Theophylactus Simocatta, in his fuller account of the Avaric invasions (i. 3-8), does not mention the depredations in Greece, Jeep, with great confidence, proposed to read Ἰλλυρίδα instead of Ἑλλάδα—a very violent correction (*Quellenuntersuchungen zu den griechischen Kirchenhistorikern*, 1884, p. 173, n. 4). I think we must recognise that the silence of Theophylactus is sufficient to make us seriously question the statement of Evagrius that Hellas suffered from the Avars in 589.

The note of Bidez and Parmentier, suggesting that Evagrius has combined here the invasion of Illyricum and Thrace in 589 with an invasion of Greece which happened several years before, probably supplies the true solution. In the Chronicle of John of Biclarum we find the following notice: *Avars a finibus Thraciae pelluntur et partes Graeciae atque Pannoniae occupant* (ed. Mommsen, in *Chron. Min.* iii, p. 215). The chronology of this Chronicle, which attempts to equate the regnal years of the Visigothic kings with those of the Emperors, is confused; and Mommsen queries all the Anni Domini which he has supplied in the margin of his text. This particular entry is placed in the third year of Tiberius, which actually ran from Sept. 26, 580, to Sept. 25, 581;

is, however, such a suggestion in a notice in the Chronicle of John of Biclarum, who, referring to an earlier year, states that the Avars occupied "parts of Greece." This Spanish chronicler was, like Evagrius, a contemporary, and he had spent seventeen years in Constantinople; but he had probably returned to Spain before the date—probably A.D. 581—of this Avaric invasion.¹ It is recorded by another contemporary² that in this year the Slavs overran Greece, and made settlements in it; and the inference seems to be that there was a joint invasion by the Avars and the Slavonic tribes who were more or less in subjection to them. If this inference is justified, we cannot interpret the brief statement of John as necessarily implying Avaric settlements: the settlements may have been entirely

so that the events referred to may, I think, be probably identified with the invasion recorded in John of Ephesus, vi. 25, where, however, Slavonians only, and not Avars, are mentioned. On the other hand, the devastation of Hellas by Slavonians, recorded by Menander (fr. 48, F.H.G., iv, p. 252) under 578, was distinct and earlier. The source of Evagrius for the non-ecclesiastical events which he has recorded in Book vi, was, no doubt, John of Epiphania, as Jeep has shown, *op. cit.* But I find it difficult to accept Jeep's view that Evagrius used Menander directly for Book v. In the remarkable bibliography which he furnishes in v. 24, enumerating works which he used and works which he did not, it is almost impossible to believe that, if he was acquainted with the history of Menander, he would not have designated him, along with John of Epiphania, as a successor of Agathias. Evagrius was in no sense a rival of Menander; John of Epiphania was: for their works dealt with the secular history of exactly the same period. The probability there-

fore seems to be that John used Menander, without acknowledging his debts, or mentioning Menander's name. Evagrius, who had the advantage of consulting his kinsman's work before it was published, would have thus owed much of his information to Menander, at second-hand, and without knowing it. If it could be proved—and I think Jeep is far from proving—that Evagrius used Menander's book directly, we should almost have to assume a conspiracy on the part of the two kinsmen, John and Evagrius, to ignore it. I may note that Jeep is not justified in charging Evagrius with a misstatement as to Agathias. "Ferner aber ist es auch überhaupt nicht richtig, dass Euagrius den Agathias in der That benutzt habe" (p. 175). But Evagrius, in mentioning the work of Agathias, does not necessarily imply that he used it. He is giving a list of books dealing with Roman history: he is not enumerating merely his own sources.

¹ See Joh. Bicl., *loc. cit.* in last note.

² See Joh. Eph., *loc. cit.*

Slavonic. In other words, the notice in the Spaniard's chronicle is not, by itself, sufficient to prove what we want, in order to support the proposed derivation of Navarino.

We have, however, another piece of evidence from a much later period. In the reign of Nicephorus I., there was a Slavonic rising in the Peloponnesus. The insurgents besieged Patrae, and the repulse of their attack was ascribed to the miraculous intervention of St. Andrew. This event is not mentioned by Theophanes, but is described by Constantine Porphyrogennetos, who gives the reign (A.D. 802-11), but not the year.¹ In consequence of the saint's help, Nicephorus conferred, by a Chrysobull, special privileges on the See of Patrae;² and in the reign of Alexius Comnenus, the Patriarch Nicolaus addressed to that Emperor a Synodal Letter, in which he cites the Chrysobull of Nicephorus, and describes the occurrence as follows:—

διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ καταστροφῇ τῶν Ἀβάρων παρὰ τοῦ κορυφαίου τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ πρωτοκλήτου Ἀνδρέου ὀφθαλμοφανῶς γενόμενον θαῦμα, ἐπὶ διακοσίοις δεκαοκτὼ χρόνοις ὅλοις κατασχόντων τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ τῆς Ῥωμαικῆς ἀρχῆς ἀποτεμομένων ὡς μηδὲ πόδα βαλεῖν ὅλως δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥωμαῖον ἄνδρα· ἐν μίᾳ δὲ ὥρᾳ τούτων μὲν ἀφανισθέντων ἐκ μόνης ἐπιφανείας τοῦ πρωτοκλήτου, τῆς δὲ χώρας ἀπάσης τοῖς Ῥωμαιοῖς σκίητροις ἐπανελθούσης.³

Here we have a precise indication of the date. The siege of Patrae occurred 218 years after the occupation of the Peloponnesus. What date did Nicolaus assign to the occupation of the Peloponnesus? It was assumed by Fallmerayer, and doubtless correctly, that Nicolaus calculated his 218 years from A.D. 589, the year under which an

¹ *De adm. imp.*, c. 49, pp. 217 sqq., ed. Bonn. Cp. S. N. Thomopoulos, *Ἱστορία τῆς πόλεως Πατρῶν* (1888), pp. 226 sqq. A. A. Vasiljev, *Vizantiia i Araby* (1900), p. 18.

² Cp. Gerland, *Neue Quellen sur*

Gesch. des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras, p. 3.

³ Leunclavius, *ſus Graeco-Romanum* (1596), p. 278; Migne, *P. G.*, 119, 877-9.

Avaric invasion of Greece is, as we saw, recorded by Evagrius.¹ In fact, the source of Nicolaus for the Avaric invasion was Evagrius.² This gives us A.D. 807 as the year of the siege of Patrae, and the date has been generally accepted. Fallmerayer sought to corroborate it by combining the statement of Constantine Porphyrogenetos, that the Slavs were assisted by a Saracen fleet, with the Saracen attack on Rhodes in A.D. 807; but there need be no immediate connexion between these events.³

The important point for our purpose is that Nicolaus designates the foes who attacked Patras as Avars, whereas Constantine describes them as Slavs. There is no necessary discrepancy between the two statements; we have only to suppose (with Fallmerayer) that both Slavs and Avars were concerned in the attack. This implies Avar settlements in the Peloponnesus. The only means of avoiding this conclusion is that Nicolaus was led to employ the term 'Avars' instead of 'Slavs,' because he found it in that passage of Evagrius which supplied him with the date. This hypothesis seems highly improbable, especially when we consider that Nicolaus was writing an official document. If only Slavs and not Avars were concerned, why should he turn to Evagrius to see what that writer had to say about the Avars? *Nicolaus had the Chrysobull of Nicephorus before him*, and it is an obvious

¹ Fallmerayer, *op. cit.* i. 185.

² Compare the work of Paparrigopulos, *περὶ τῆς ἐποικίσεως Σλαβικῶν τινῶν φύλων εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον*, 1843.

³ Fallmerayer makes a false statement, to which his argument owes its apparent plausibility. "Aus Constantin Porphyrogenetes aber wissen wir dass eine saracenische Flotte die Slavenhäuptlinge bei der Belagerung von Patras unterstützte und dass zur nämlichen Zeit auch die Insel Rhodus mit

mehreren andern Eilanden des Archipelagus durch mohammedanische Landungstruppen verwüstet wurden." But *Constantine says nothing of Saracen descents on Rhodes* or other islands, simultaneous or otherwise. The attack on Rhodes is assigned by *Theophanes* to September, A.M. 6300 = A.D. 807. Thus the link, by which Fallmerayer connects the episode of Patras with the date supplied by Theophanes, is non-existent.

inference that *this Chrysobull*, to which he called the attention of the Emperor Alexius, *mentioned the Avars*. It may have mentioned the Slavs too; but it must assuredly have mentioned Avars. If it had mentioned only Slavs, Nicolaus, whose object was not to perplex but to elucidate, was bound to explain that by the Avars he meant the Slavs.

This document thus justifies us in the conclusion that there was an Avar settlement in the Peloponnesus at the beginning of the ninth century—a conclusion which may be illustrated by the notice of John of Biclarum, as well as by the general probability that Avars, as well as Slavs, should have taken part in the forcible settlements made by barbarians in Greece during the reigns of Tiberius and Maurice. We have thus a positive ground for accepting the derivation of Avarinos which the name so obviously suggests, and believing that a settlement of Avars in Messenia gave a new name to Pylos. The Greeks would naturally have called the region which these settlers occupied Avaria, just as regions occupied by Slavs were called Slavinia. The form 'Αβαρίνος, which cannot be derived directly from 'Αβαριτες, seems to imply 'Αβαρία.

J. B. BURY.

NOTES ON THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES.

Ephesians iv.

τὸ γὰρ ἀξιονόμαστον ὑμῶν πρεσβυτέριον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄξιον οὕτως
συνήρμωσται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ὡς χορδαὶ κιθάρα.

FOR this expression compare the description of woman
in Tennyson's *Princess* :—

Till at the last *she set herself* to man,
Like perfect music unto noble words.

Ignatius returns to this musical metaphor in *Philadelphians* i, where, describing the relation of the bishop to the ordinances, he writes : συνευρύθμισταὶ γὰρ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς ὡς χορδαῖς κιθάρα. The longer Greek recension there reads : ὡς χορδαὶ τῇ κιθάρᾳ, a scribe evidently thinking it more appropriate to say that the strings were attuned to the lyre than that the lyre was attuned to the strings. But that difficulty vanishes if we take into consideration the fact that Ignatius, having spoken of the bishop in his relation to his presbyters as *the lyre* on which the strings are stretched, would be most likely to speak of him again, this time in his relation to the ordinances of his Master, as *the lyre*, the sounding-box which gave the requisite resonance to the vibrations of the strings. In the one case the bishop is the framework of the Church organization ; in the other he is the echo of the Master's voice. It is to be remarked that the Longer Greek of *Philadelphians* i. reads : συνήρμωσται γὰρ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς Κυρίου καὶ τοῖς δικαιώμασιν

ὡς χορδαὶ τῇ κιθάρᾳ, apparently through the influence of this passage in *Ephesians* iv.

Ephesians ix.

ἀναφερόμενοι εἰς τὰ ὕψη διὰ τῆς μηχανῆς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὃς ἐστὶν σταυρὸς σχοινίῳ χρώμενοι τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ. ἡ δὲ πίστις ὑμῶν ἀναγωγεὺς ὑμῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη ὁδὸς ἡ ἀναφέρουσα εἰς Θεόν.

This passage is generally taken to mean ‘raised aloft by the machine of Jesus Christ, which is the Cross, using the Holy Spirit as a rope, faith being the windlass, while love is the way that leadeth up to God’; and *μηχανή* is explained as the machinery used by builders in lifting stones, consisting of (1) framework, (2) ropes, and (3) windlass. But there is no necessity to believe that *ἀναγωγεὺς*, though it might be capable of this meaning, bears it here. Abrupt transitions are frequent in this letter. There is no reason why *ἀναγωγεὺς* should not be rendered ‘conductor’ as in Procl. Hymn. *ψυχῶν ἀναγωγεὺς*. This suggestion is supported by the Latin version of the Shorter Greek Recension *Fides autem vestra dux vester, charitas vero via referens in Deum*, and by the latter portion of the sentence in which love is described as *the way that leadeth up to God*. What more natural, then, than to suppose that Ignatius meant faith is our guide along the road, while love is the road itself? For the intimate union of faith and love, the twin-sisters in these letters, cp. *Ephesians* xiv, ‘faith is the beginning, but love is the end, and the two together are deity.’ To render *ἀναγωγεὺς* by ‘windlass,’ ‘support,’ or words of that kind, is to separate love and faith—the inseparable.

Ibid.

ὅτι κατ’ ἄλλον βίον οὐδὲν ἀγαπᾶτε, εἰ μὴ μόνον τὸν Θεόν.

κατ’ ἄλλον is the reading of the Shorter Greek and Latin, and is clearly wrong. Lightfoot emends κατ’

ἀνθρώπων; and Zahn, καθ' ὅλον. ἄλλον seems to have slipped into a wrong place in the sentence. By reading κατὰ βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀγαπᾶτε εἰ μὴ μόνον τὸν Θεόν, we get an excellent sense, 'that you love nought else in this life save God alone.' The position of ἄλλο gives additional force to εἰ μὴ. βίος is used of this life by Ignatius as contrasted with ζωή, 'the heavenly life,' of Rom. vii. ἡδοναῖς τοῦ βίου τούτου.

Magnesians i.

ἐν ᾧ ὑπομένοντες τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπήρειαν τοῦ ἀρχοντος τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου καὶ διαφυγόντες Θεοῦ τευξόμεθα.

Ignatius frequently uses the prepositions of compound words in their original sense. For instance, see *Smyrnaeans* iii., θανάτου κατεφρόνησαν, ἡνρέθησαν ὑπὲρ θάνατον, 'they looked *down* on death and were found *above* death'; *Trallians* iv., χρῆζω οὖν πραότητος ἐν ᾗ καταλύεται ὁ ἀρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, 'I have need of a gentle spirit whereby the prince of this world is *put down*': cf. καταλύειν ἀρχήν, *Herod.* i. 53; καταλύειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν, *Lys.* 130, 10; and *Philadelphians* i., οὗ καταπέπληγμαι τὴν ἐπιεικειαν, 'by whose sweet reasonableness I am struck with admiration': cf. καταξιοπιστευόμενοι (*Trall.* vi.), in the sense of 'playing *upon* us with affected holiness.' So here διαφυγόντες seems to mean 'effecting our escape *through* his very lines. So shall we attain unto God.' For *through* death we shall obtain life.

Ibid vi.

προκαθημένου τοῦ ἐπισκόπου εἰς τύπον Θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of this celebrated passage is considerably modified by the reflection that, in Rom. v. 14, ὃς ἐστὶ τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος—the possible source of this comparison—τύπος does not, of necessity, imply perfection in representation. For the type is Adam.

Ibid vii.

ἐπὶ ἓνα Ἰησοῦν τὸν ἀφ' ἑνὸς πατρὸς προελθόντα καὶ εἰς ἓνα ὄντα [καὶ] χωρήσαντα.

The καὶ in brackets seems superfluous, for it makes χωρήσαντα fall flat. Without καὶ, the sense is 'having recourse to One Jesus Christ who came forth from One Father, and hath returned to Him Who is One.' The other rendering, 'Who came forth from One Father, and is with One and hath returned unto One,' is based on the idea that εἰς ἓνα ὄντα refers to the Divine relation of Jesus to the Father (cf. for constr. John i. 18, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς); but the passage in the mind of Ignatius seems to be rather John xvi. 28, ἐγὼ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐξηλθὼν . . . καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα. The unity of the Godhead—the divine pattern of human worship—the subject of the chapter—seems to be more emphasized by taking ὄντα with Πατέρα than by taking it with Χριστὸν. If ὄντα were intended to be taken with Χριστὸν, the order would possibly be τὸν ἀφ' ἑνὸς Πατρὸς προελθόντα καὶ εἰς ἓνα χωρήσαντα καὶ ὄντα. The καὶ might easily have been inserted by a copyist who failed to see the construction.

Ibid ix.

ἐν παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν.

There is a tinge of irony to which Ignatius was inclined in the word πράγμασιν, if, indeed, it is the correct reading. The v. l. γράμμασιν, however, has less support. The sense is, 'if they who were brought up in the old business attained unto newness of hope.' πρᾶστέω is used in the invidious sense of meddling interference in *Smyrneans* viii., μηδεὶς χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου τι πρᾶστέω τῶν ἀνηκόντων εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. To translate the word by 'observances' is to remove its sting.

Ibid.

πὼς ἡμεῖς δυνησόμεθα ζῆσαι χωρὶς αὐτοῦ.

The preposition *χωρὶς* is used with great effect by Ignatius. It signifies more than the negative condition of being apart from; it implies in certain cases active opposition, as if the writer had *χωρίζειν* in his mind. The classical use of *χωρὶς Θεοῦ*, *sine Deo*, is mild compared with its Ignatian significance: e.g. οὐκ ἐξόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου οὔτε βαπτίζειν οὔτε ἀγάπην ποιεῖν (*Smyr.* viii), and *χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου μηδὲν ποιεῖτε* (*Phil.* vii.), where he has just been speaking of a *μερισμός*, implies the meaning ‘against.’

Ibid.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὃν δικαίως ἀνέμενον παρὼν ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν.

The use of *παρὼν* in this passage for the Incarnation doubtless leads to the very irregular use of *παρουσία*—the general word for the Second Advent—in *Philadelphians* ix. for the same event: *ἐξαίρετον δέ τι ἔχει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ σωτήρος.*

Ibid. x.

ὑπέρθεσθε οὖν τὴν κακὴν ζύμην τὴν παλαιωθεῖσαν καὶ ἐνοξίσασαν καὶ μεταβάλεσθε εἰς νέαν ζύμην ὃ ἐστὶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.

‘Dispense, then, with the evil leaven which hath grown old and sour, and betake yourselves to the new leaven which is Jesus Christ.’ The chief difficulty in this passage lies in the expression *μεταβάλεσθε εἰς*. The rendering ‘be ye changed into,’ although it has high authority, seems somewhat strained. The rendering given above, which is not, however, adopted, is based on *Xen. Eq.* viii. 10, where *μεταβάλλεσθαι εἰς τοῦπισθεν* is found in the sense of ‘turning to the rear.’ Another rendering, ‘proceed to make use of the new leaven,’ is suggested by the Latin version, ‘percipite novum gratiae

fermentum,' which implies an 'inwardly digesting' of the new leaven. L. and S. (1849) give the meaning of 'digesting food' to μεταβάλλεσθαι τροφήν. Could Ignatius have intended to suggest such an idea to the Magnesians? In *Romans* i. he employed a term εὐοικονόμητος, 'well arranged,' which was used by Diphilus of Siphnus in the sense of 'easily digested' (L. and S.). Ignatius had a *penchant* for medical terms, as Lightfoot has pointed out, and also for ambiguous expressions. And if the word is at all capable of bearing this sense, it is most likely that he intended to use it in this sense in a passage where two striking culinary metaphors occur, ἀλίσθητε ἐν αὐτῷ (after *Matt.* x. 13, ἐν τίνι ἀλίσθήσεται), which the scribes of the Larger Recension, not understanding, read ἀλλίσθητε, 'take up your rest'; and ἀπὸ τῆς ὁσμῆς ἐλεγχθήσεσθε (after 2 *Cor.* i. 14, καὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν τῆς γνώσεως αὐτοῦ φανεροῦντι δι' ἡμῶν). The εἰς might be a corruption of τὴν demanded by the antithesis τὴν κακὴν ζύμην. THN might possibly be confused with ΕΙΣ, H and EI being often mistaken for each other, and a badly written Σ might be mistaken for N.

Ibid. xiv.

εἰς τὸ ἀξιωθῆναι τὴν ἐν Συρίᾳ ἐκκλησίαν διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ὑμῶν δροσισθῆναι.

'So that the Church which is in Syria may be thought worthy to be refreshed by the dew of your Church.' The v. l. εὐταξίας, 'discipline,' though it has weaker documentary authority, seems to be the true reading. It would be easy to explain how the reading ἐκκλησίας arose. The influence of the preceding ἐκκλησίαν may have caused a scribe to write it. But it would not be so easy to explain how εὐταξίας stole into the text. It is noticeable that Ignatius has praised the Church of the Magnesians for their order τὸ πολυεύτακτον τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν ἀγάπης in

the first chapter. What more natural than that he should revert to the same characteristic in the concluding chapter, especially after speaking of ἀγάπη. ἐπιδέομαι γὰρ τῆς ἡνωμένης ὑμῶν ἐν Θεῷ προσευχῆς καὶ ἀγάπης, 'I need your united prayer and love in God,' a phrase which seems to be a comment upon τὸ πολυεύτακτον, κ.τ.λ. Ignatius not infrequently reverts in a closing chapter to an expression in a beginning one: e.g. *Polycarp* viii., ἐν ἐνότῃ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐπισκοπῇ seems a lingering echo of the inscription Πολυκάρπῳ ἐπισκόπῳ . . . μᾶλλον ἐπισκοπημένῳ; and *Philadelphians* ix., where πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐνότῃα Θεοῦ, 'all these are atoned in God,' seems to refer us back to the keynote of the inscription ἅν ἐν ἐνὶ ὧσιν, 'if they are at one.' εὐταξίας seems therefore to be the true reading. For the beautiful metaphor δροσισθῆναι, cf. *Prayer Book*, 'A prayer for the clergy and people,' "and that they may truly please Thee, pour upon them the continual dew of Thy blessing."

Trallians, c. iii.

τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους ὡς συνέδριον Θεοῦ καὶ ὡς σύνδεσμον ἀποστόλων

Might be rendered 'but respect the presbyters as a college of God and a fellowship with the Apostles,' not as 'the band of the Apostles.'

Ibid.

Ἀγαπῶν ὑμᾶς φείδομαι συντονώτερον δυνάμενος γράφειν ὑπὲρ τούτου, οὐκ εἰς τοῦτο ψήθην, ἵνα ὢν κατάκριτος ὡς ἀπόστολος ὑμῖν διατάσσομαι.

This is Zahn's text of one of the most difficult passages in Ignatius. The sense is, 'Although I could write more urgently in his behalf, in love for you I spare you; neither do I consider myself competent while lying under sentence to order you as an apostle.' Lightfoot has adopted the reading συντονώτερον from the Longer Greek Recension, the

Shorter Greek having an impossible reading, *ἐαυτὸν πότερον*. The real difficulty of the passage lies in the words *εἰς τοῦτο ψήθην*, 'in hoc existimet,' Latin version. Lightfoot inserts a number of words, *ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἑαυτὸν*, before *εἰς τοῦτο*; and Zahn inserts *οὐκ*. Having said that he spared the feelings of the Trallians, Ig. proceeded to mention the restraining motive. But the only place where that motive could be expressed is in the place occupied by the words *εἰς τοῦτο ψήθην*, which are manifestly corrupt. In the Epistle to the *Magnesians*, c. vi., Ignatius wrote, 'Do you all, then, follow moral conformity with God, and show respect for one another' (*πάντες οὖν ὁμοήθειαν Θεοῦ λαβόντες ἐντρέπεσθε ἀλλήλους*). In the passage before us, Ignatius is writing of the *respect* due to deacons, presbyters, and bishops: *πάντες ἐντρέπεσθωσαν τοὺς διακόνους, κ.τ.λ.*—*ὃν λογιζομαι καὶ τοὺς ἀθίους ἐντρέπεσθαι*. In his letter to Polycarp (c. i.), he wrote: *τοῖς κατ' ἄνδρα κατὰ ὁμοήθειαν Θεοῦ λάλει, ἰ. ε.* 'Speak to men individually after the manner or example of God.' In this passage there is another reading, *βοήθειαν* (Lat. adiutorium); but *ὁμοήθειαν* has the support of the Syriac. The restraining consideration in the case of Ignatius might well be this *ὁμοήθεια Θεοῦ*, 'moral conformity with God.' The original might have run, then, some way thus: *Ἀγαπῶν ὑμᾶς φείδομαι, συντονώτερον δυνάμενος γράφειν ὑπὲρ τούτου, εἰς δὲ ὁμοήθειαν Θεοῦ οὐκ, ὡν κατάκριτος, ὡς ἀπόστολος ὑμῖν διατάσσομαι, ἰ. ε.* 'But having moral conformity with God in view, I do not order you as an Apostle when lying under my sentence.' The proposed reading substitutes for *εἰς τοῦτο ψήθην* *ἵνα* the words *εἰς δὲ ὁμοήθειαν Θεοῦ οὐκ*. A negative seems required by the sense. In the Shorter Greek it is inserted at the beginning, *ἀγαπῶντας ὡς οὐ*; and in Zahn's version before *εἰς τοῦτο*. Its position in the proposed reading *Θεοῦ οὐκ ὡν κατάκριτος*, where the *ὡν* does not belong to it, and where *Θεοῦ* precedes it, might have led to its dismissal from the text, and the substitution

of quite a different word, *ἴνα*, partly to fill up a gap and partly to make sense. Θεοῦ, in its turn, might easily have been lost after Θεῖαν: εἰς δὲ ὁμο might become εἰς τοῦτο; and ὡθήην, not unlike ὀθήειαν, might have been mistaken for it. In this way, the reading of the text might have originated from the proposed reading, which, if correct, reinstates a word ὁμοθήειαν, which, in another passage, *Poly-carph* i., puzzled the copyist of the same Shorter Greek recension in which this passage is found, and which expresses the natural desire of the saint to live after the likeness of Him of whom he bade the Ephesians to be imitators—*μιμηταί* (*Eph.* i.). Compare *Trallians* ii., ‘I gave glory because I found you to be as I heard you were’—*μιμητὰς ὄντας Θεοῦ*. The whole passage is the patchwork of a copyist who had a corrupted text before him which he strove to emend. For the construction εἰς ὁμοθήειαν, we may compare εἰς ὄνομα Ἰησοῦ, ‘for the sake of’ (*Romans* ix.) εἰς δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ (*Romans* x.), and εἰς μαρτύριον ὧ (*Trall.* xii.).

Ibid vi.

οἱ καὶ τῷ ἰψ̄ παρεμπλέκουσιν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καταξιοπιστευόμενοι, ὥσπερ θανάσιμον φάρμακον διδόντες μετὰ οἰνομέλιτος ὅπερ ὁ ἀγνοῶν ἡδέως λαμβάνει ἐν ἡδονῇ κακῇ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν.

The difficulty and point of this passage lie in ἡδέως, of which ἐν ἡδονῇ seems to be a gloss. Lightfoot, who has made the brilliant conjecture καὶ τῷ ἰψ̄, for which the Shorter Greek has the impossible καιροί, on the basis of καὶ τὸν ἰόν of the Longer Greek, suggests ἀδεῶς, ‘without apprehension,’ after the ἀφυλάκτως of the same authority. But the expression ἡδέως is quite in the ironical style of Ignatius. The taste was sweetness—a sweetness of death. Instead of reading ἐν ἡδονῇ κακῇ, ‘in baneful enjoyment,’ perhaps ἐν ἐκείνῳ, *i. e.* in it (τὸ οἰνόμελι), might be read. The Medicean κἀκεῖ points to this emendation. The

meaning of the text so emended is: 'These people blend even Jesus Christ with their poison; and in their loud professions of sincerity are like those who administer a deadly potion in honeyed wine, which the stranger blithely takes, but finds in it his death.' The verb λαμβάνει thus does duty for two different verbs, being used in one connexion with a good meaning, and in the other with a sinister sense. For the latter, compare δίκην, πληγὰς, κ.τ.λ., λαβεῖν. And for this figure of speech (syllepsis), cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 88, ἔλεν δ' Οἰνομάου βίαν παρθένον τε σύνευνον, 'he subdued the might of Oenomaus, and won the maiden for his bride'; and Horace 'Quas et aquae subeunt et aerae,' 'where the waters flow and the winds blow.' Such a *paronomasia* is quite Ignatian: cf. *Romans* v., ὀναλμην τῶν θηρίων, 'May I enjoy the beasts. And I pray that they may be prompt (σύντομα): yea, I shall provoke them to despatch me promptly (συντόμως).' For other instances of such irony (χλευασμός) see *Trallians* x., λέγουσι τὸ δοκεῖν πεπονθέναι αὐτὸν αὐτοὶ ὄντες τὸ δοκεῖν, 'they say He only seemed to suffer, being but seemers themselves'; see *Smyr.* iv. 'For if these things were done only in appearance (τὸ δοκεῖν) by our Lord, then, too, am I bound in appearance (τὸ δοκεῖν).' Ignatius, like all men who have the gift of sarcasm, was capable of using a word with a new meaning—a meaning that might be eloquently expressed by a gesture or emphasis. His sinister use of ἀλλότριος and ἕτερος, particularly in the compound ἑτεροδοξίαι, are cases in point. His keen wit compared the Christians with the branches of the cross, but the heterodox with a parasitic growth, παραφυάδες. The pointed style of many of his sentences seems to show that the letters were written for public reading wherever they were sent. For it is only in reading aloud, with proper emphasis, that the real eloquence of Ignatius impresses us. This peculiarity is common to all the letters, and is an indirect proof of their

common origin and organic nature. His desire for contrast, *σαρκικῇ τε καὶ πνευματικῇ* (*Sm.* xii.) *λόγος γενήσομαι Θεοῦ*—*πάλιν ἔσομαι ἡχώ* (*Rom.* ii.), which sometimes leads to a play upon words as in *μὴ ἐράτωσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, ἵνα μὴ δοῦλοι εὐρεθῶσιν ἐπιθυμίας*, where *ἐρᾶν* suggests *ἐπιθυμία* (*Polyc.* iv.); his powerful use of the tertiary predicates *ἦν* (*e.g.* *χάριν*) *εὐχομαι τελείαν μοι δοθῆναι*, *i.e.* 'in all its perfectness' (*Sm.* xi.), *ἀκοίμητον πνεῦμα κεκτημένος* (*Polyc.* i.), *i.e.* 'so as to be free from sleepiness'; and his use of favourite words like *ἐξαίρετος*, *ἀμώμως*, *τέλειος*, *ἀντίψυχον*, *κ.τ.λ.*, lead to the same conclusion. Ignatius had also a wonderful gift of throwing a world of meaning into a single word, *e.g.* the effect of *ἀποδιῦλισμόν*, 'a sifting,' in *Phil.* iii. His use of the simple *εἶναι*, like Shakspeare's use of 'to be,' is an instance of this power—*e.g.* *Eph.* xv. *ἄμεινόν ἐστιν σιωπᾶν καὶ εἶναι ἢ λαλοῦντα μὴ εἶναι*: *Mag.* iv. *πρέπον οὖν ἐστιν, μὴ μόνον καλεῖσθαι Χριστιανούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἶναι*. He dreads to *choke* the Trallians with strong food. He employs the prepositions *ἐγγύς* and *μεταξύ* with equal versatility in *Smyr.* iv. *ἐγγύς μαχαίρας ἐγγύς Θεοῦ, μεταξύ θηρίων μεταξύ Θεοῦ*: 'near the sword, near God, in the presence of wild beasts, in the presence of God.' Of his picturesque expressions three are conspicuous: *Rom.* iv., 'the wild beasts (*θηρία*) are to be his tomb (*τάφος*)' (cf. Gorgias, *γῦπες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι*, *Lucr.* v. 993, *vīvo sepeliri viscera busto*); *Eph.* xii., 'The Ephesians are the high road (*πάροδος*) of the martyrs'; *Rom.* vi., 'Death is a *τοκετός*, the pangs of a new birth.' Among his paradoxes the following are chief: 'His silence is more potent than another man's speech,' *ὅς σιγῶν πλείονα δύναται τῶν λαλοῦντων* (*Phil.* i.); 'The virginity of Mary, her child, and the death of our Lord, three mysteries of a cry wrought in the silence of God,' *μυστήρια κραυγῆς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ Θεοῦ* (*Eph.* xix.); 'He who possesseth the word of Jesus is able also to hearken unto His silence' (*Eph.* xv.); 'Your silence giveth me speech,

(*ἵαν γὰρ σιωπήσητε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ λόγος γενήσομαι Θεοῦ, Rom. ii.*). And of his antitheses the following are remarkable: *ζῶν γράφω ἱρῶν τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν, Rom. vii.*, 'In life I am writing, but for death I am longing'; 'Do not stand in the way of my life; do not desire my death' (*Romans vi.*); 'The life of the Christian is not his own; but his leisure is God's' (*Χριστιανὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔχει ἀλλὰ Θεῷ σχολάζει, Polyc. 3*); 'The greater the pain, the greater the gain' (*ὄπον πλείων κόπος πολὺ κέρδος, Polyc. 1*). Among paradoxical expressions are *οὐ καταπέπληγμαι τὴν ἐπιείκειαν, Ph. 1.*, 'I am struck dumb by his sweet reasonableness'—*ἐπιείκεια* is hardly the thing to strike; *εὐνοία ἄκαιρος* 'ill-timed good-nature' (*Rom. iv.*): cf. *Horace*, *sedulitas autem stultæ quem diligit urget*; ἡ δὲ *πραότης αὐτοῦ δύναμις (Trall. iii.)*; 'his gentleness is a power': cf. *As You Like It*, ii. 7, 102 :

Your gentleness shall force
More than your force move us to gentleness.

Romans vii.

ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως ἐσταύρωται καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἐμοὶ πῦρ φιλόυλον

Is generally rendered 'my earthly passion has been crucified, and there is no worldly flame in me.' This rendering seems to have the support of *Gal. vi. 14*: *ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται*. But the early Fathers do not take this view of the case. Origen understands Ignatius to refer to Christ as 'meus amor' (*Prol. in Cant. iii.*); and Clement of Alexandria speaks of 'a really divine passion' (*ἔρως*). It would indeed be strange if the greatest of the Greek Fathers misunderstood Ignatius. There seems, therefore, good authority to regard *ἔρως* as a sacred thing in this connexion. *πῦρ* is another difficulty. It is rarely used in the sense of *flamma*, but see Callimachus, *Ep. 26*, *ἀρσενικῷ θέρεται πυρί*, where it is certainly used in a low and carnal sense. If Ignatius did use *ἔρως* of Christ, giving the word a new and lofty significance, it would be very natural for him to use a distinctly

inferior word like *πῦρ* for other objects of his regard, and thus to introduce an effective contrast between the spiritual and the carnal, which might be brought out by a rendering of this kind: As for my Love—He hath been crucified; and as for passion—there is none in me. The possibility of a noble signification in *ἔρω*—which would have a parallel in many of S. Augustine's expressions in the *Confessions*, notably in '*Deus meus, vita mea, dulcedo mea sancta*'—seems to have been overlooked by the great majority of commentators. The key to this expression may lie in the past life of Ignatius, just as the passionate past of the African Father is the explanation of his fervid utterances to Him to Whom his restless heart has returned, and in Whom it has found its rest. Ignatius, like Augustine, may very possibly have been 'a brand plucked from the burning.' He is ever conscious of and ever proclaims his deficiencies. In this very letter, he describes himself as an *ἐκτρωμα*, and 'the very worst' (*ἔσχατος*) of the church-people in Syria (c. 9); and in other places he speaks of himself as a *περίψημα* in the double sense of 'outcast' and 'offering.' In *Romans* iv. he speaks of himself as *μέχρι νῦν δούλος*; and in comparison with Peter and Paul *ἀπόστολοι*, he is *κατάκριτος*, 'under sentence.' These and other disparaging remarks were genuine, and doubtless are to be explained by a pagan and a Godless past. He, like Augustine, has now learnt '*amare nec aestuare*,' to love without passion (cf. *Conf.* i. 4).

That such a contrast as suggested above between *ἔρω* and *πῦρ* is intended by Ignatius, who loved such antitheses as *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, *εἶναι* and *μὴ εἶναι*, etc., is shown by the context. Ignatius has just said *μὴ λαλεῖτε Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, κόσμον δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖτε*, 'Do not profess Christ and desire the world': cf. *ἄτοπὸν ἐστὶν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν λαλεῖν καὶ ἰουδαΐζειν* (*Mag.* x.); and then he goes on to say, *ὁ ἔμὸς ἔρω*, κ.τ.λ.

The reading of the Shorter Greek φιλόϋλον (carnal) presents another difficulty. A Syriac MS., as Cureton points out, reads

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'of another love,' which suggests a Greek reading φίλον ἄλλο. Other readings are φιλοῦντι and φιλοῦν τί. The reading φιλόϋλον may have been due partly to the following words:—ὕδωρ δὲ ζῶν, partly to the influence of James iii. 5, Ἰδοὺ ὀλίγον πῦρ ἡλίκεν ὕλην ἀνάπτει, and partly to the desire of the copyist to emphasize the material nature of the passion from which Ignatius declares himself to be emancipated. The other readings are more or less corruptions of φιλόϋλον. But the original reading seems to have been simply ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωρ ἐσταύρωται καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἐμοὶ ἄλλο πῦρ.

Romans x.

πιστεύω ὑμᾶς ἐπεγνώκεναι.

"I believe you have received instructions" (Lightfoot). "Credo vos cognovisse" (Shorter Latin). The various meanings of ἐπιγινώσκω, as given by L. and S., are (1) 'look upon,' (2) 'recognise,' (3) 'decide,' (4) 'honour,' 'esteem.' The meaning here seems to be, 'I believe you have shown some recognition to those who have preceded me from Syria to Rome to the glory of God': cf. *Phil.* xi, when speaking of his messengers, Philon and Raius Agathopus, he says: καὶ γὰρ τῇ Θεῷ εὐχαριστῶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ὅτι ἰδέξασθαι αὐτοὺς ὡς καὶ ὑμᾶς ὁ κύριος.

Philadelphians ii.

τέκνα οὖν φωτὸς ἀληθείας.

Lightfoot thinks φωτὸς crept into the text from the Gospel of S. Luke, xvi. 8, τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτός. Ignatius has just spoken in the highest terms of the ἐπιείκεια and other good qualities of the bishop of the Philadelphians.

Having finished the catalogue of his virtues, he says : τέκνα οὖν φωτὸς ἀληθείας. Both words φωτὸς and ἀληθείας seem well established. They are found in the Shorter and Longer Greek Recension, and in the two Latin versions, which have "filii igitur lucis [et] veritatis," and "filii lucis vere," respectively. What, then, is the meaning of φωτὸς? That can only be settled when the point of the appeal has been determined. Ignatius, having written these words τέκνα οὖν φωτὸς ἀληθείας, proceeds to advise the Philadelphians to avoid schism and heresies (τὸν μερισμὸν καὶ τὰς κακοδιδασκαλίας), saying, 'But wherever the shepherd is, there abide as sheep.' What is the backward and what the forward reference of φωτὸς ἀληθείας? Ignatius' *penchant* for *paronomasia*, or play upon words, may throw a light upon this passage. If we could render the words, 'Being the children of a man of truth,' taking φωτὸς from φῶς, 'man,' and remembering its other significance of φῶς, 'light,' we could see the connexion of the words with the preceding eulogy of the bishop, and with the following words of advice, which are no uncertain echo of (S. Paul) Eph. v. 9 :—ὡς τέκνα φωτὸς περιπατεῖτε. ὁ γὰρ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν πάσῃ ἀγαθωσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, in which sentence we also have φωτὸς and ἀληθεία, a remarkable coincidence. For a similar figure of speech, cf. μέλη (Eph. iv.) in the sense of 'members,' but suggestive of songs, i.e. μέλη ὄντας τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, following χρῶμα Θεοῦ λαβόντες ('taking your note from God') ἐν ἐνότητι ἄδετε ἐν φωνῇ μᾶ, and τὸ δοκεῖν in Trall. 10. εἰ δὲ . . . λέγουσιν τὸ δοκεῖν πεπονθέναι αὐτὸν, αὐτοὶ ὄντες τὸ δοκεῖν.

Phil. vii.

ἐκραύγασα μετὰξὺ ὧν, ἐλάλουν μεγάλη φωνῇ (Shorter Greek); μετὰξὺ ὧν ἐλάλουν (Longer Greek).

The reading of the Shorter Greek, of which Latin is-

‘in intermedio existens,’ introduces a strange use of *μεταξὺ*, which can hardly bear the sense of ‘when I was among you.’ The word is used correctly in *Smyrn.* iv. *μεταξὺ θηρίων μεταξὺ Θεοῦ*. The reading of the Longer Greek seems to be a confusion of the ordinary idiom *μεταξὺ λέγων*, ‘in the middle of my speech,’ with another idea which is conveyed by the Latin version *inter eos quibus loquebar*. Accordingly it would seem that this word also was intended to do double duty.

Smyrnæans, ch. i.

ἀφ’ οὗ καρποῦ ἡμεῖς, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεομακαρίτου αὐτοῦ πάθους.

‘From which fruit, that is, from His holy Passion, are we.’ The Longer Greek Recension and its Latin version omit *καρποῦ*, which is found, however, both in the Shorter Greek and its Latin version. Instead of it, the Longer Greek has *καὶ*, which points to some omission of this kind. Pearson understands *ξύλον* as antecedent of *οὗ*; but Zahn refers *οὗ* to Christ, rendering ‘from the fruit of whom.’ He also suggests *καρπῶν*. A simpler alteration would be to read *καρποί*, which might easily have been altered into *καρποῦ* by the influence of the preceding *οὗ*, and the similarity of the words *ΚΑΡΠΟΙ* and *ΚΑΡΠΟΥ*. This reading has the support of the Syriac, which is a plural word, and of the similar expression of *Trall.* xi. *ἐφαίνοντο ἂν κλάδοι τοῦ σταυροῦ καὶ ἦν ἂν ὁ καρπὸς αὐτῶν ἄφθαρτος*, where the Syriac (Lightfoot’s S.) gives *fructus incorrupti*. A phrase in *Clem. Alex.* exc. e Theod. § 33, *ἡ δὲ ἐκκλησία καρποὶ αὐτοῦ*, confirms the suggestion. Zahn’s note is “*fructus autem alicujus dicuntur ii quos laborando lucratus est.*” In this sense we are the *καρποί* of the Passion of Jesus. The early Fathers never spoke of His Cross as a fruit, a *καρπός*, but as a tree, *lignum* (*Tert. adv. Jud.* 13), and a *ξύλον ζωῆς*, *Clem. Alex. Str.* v. 11.

καρποί in the sense of 'offspring' is found in *Xen. Cyr.* i. i. 2, οἱ καρποί ἐκ τῶν ἀγγέλων. This seems to be its meaning here. The passage as emended might, therefore, be rendered :—'Of Whom we are the offspring, even of His holy passion.'

Smyr. iv.

τί δὲ καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἑκδοτον δέδωκα τῷ θανάτῳ, κ.τ.λ.

This is generally rendered, 'Why have I surrendered myself to death, unto fire, etc.?' But there is another sense of ἑκδοτος, which would be more in keeping with the voluntary nature of the death sought. ἐκδιδόναι, in the sense of 'giving in marriage,' is frequent in classical Greek. ἑκδοτος is also found in the sense of 'given in marriage.' There was no betrayal in the case of Ignatius. Martyrdom was voluntarily sought. He might be said to have *espoused* himself to death. Ignatius seems to play on the two meanings of the word, 'union' and 'surrender.' Professor Bury has pointed out a similar phenomenon in the language of Pindar (*Nemean Odes*, Intr. xix.). The example he gives is from *Isthmian* vi. (vii.) 18 :—

ἀμνάμονες δὲ βροτοί
ὃ τι μὴ σοφίας ἄωτον ἄκρον
κλυταῖς ἐπέων ῥοαῖσιν ἐξίκηται ζυγόν,

where the meaning of the passage turns on the double sense of ἄωτος, (1) 'gloss or perfection,' (2) 'breeze or breath.'

The most remarkable instance in Ignatius of one word suggesting another is in *Smyr.* iii., where he describes our Lord's appearance to His disciples after His resurrection. Κραθέντες τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ αἵματι are the words which convey the reason of their belief (καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτοῦ ἤψαντο καὶ ἐπίστευσαν, κραθέντες, κ.τ.λ.). We can hardly doubt that the writer wished to make his readers think also of κρατηθέντες.

The passage might be rendered: 'And immediately they touched Him and believed, convinced by contact with His flesh and blood.' The Latin has *convicti carne ipsius et spiritu*.

These few examples of his style show that Ignatius was no ordinary writer. With an aptitude for creating compounds, and a happy gift of using old words in new lights, he united a power of sarcasm in which he is, to use a word of his own, ἀσύγκριτος, 'sans pareil,' and a vividness of imagination that enabled him to transform a simple word into a picture, which is often framed in true poetry, as when he says of his coming departure, 'It is a fine thing to set from the world unto God, that so one may rise again to Him, καλὸν τὸ δύναι ἀπὸ κόσμου πρὸς Θεὸν ἵνα εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνατείλω (*Rom. ii.*). On this his last journey he is following the course of the sun, 'for God hath granted that the Syrian bishop should be found on the West, εἰς δύσιν, having summoned him from the East, ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς.' He, too, is like the sun, for he has a setting. His coming westward is Romewards and to death; but he also has a rising, a rising unto God.

Behind the hills in peace his sun did set
In all the splendour of the crimson tide;
And Love Divine with human love has met,
And God has moved the veil of death aside.

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

CAITRÉIM CONḠAILE CLÁIRINḠNIG.¹

IRISH scholarship has been guided latterly by philological rather than literary interests, and has been occupied mainly with grammatical studies, or with attempts to ascertain more precisely the text of sagas already well known. Except from Dr. Kuno Meyer, we have not had very much new material. Mr. MacSweeney therefore deserves gratitude for breaking fresh ground. The tale which he has edited is one of the later developments of Irish literature: the MS. in which it is preserved belongs to the seventeenth century, and the language and incidents alike show that the story, in its present form, is a comparatively modern production. But it has its importance all the same for the study of Irish literature. The older tales, though in every way the more interesting, do not cover anything like the entire domain of Irish legend. Far from it: these very tales abound with allusions to persons and incidents now unknown to us, which must have belonged to an immense complex of legends of which only a small proportion has survived. In some cases we can infer the former existence of lost cycles from these scattered and fragmentary references; or again, where the older saga has perished, the legend is preserved in a *secondary* form, distorted and disturbed by the intrusion of extraneous elements.

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The *Caithréim Conghail* is a case in point. The editor shows that a part, at all events, of the materials out of which it is built was in existence in the twelfth century. How much older this part may have been it is impossible to say. The personages belong, for the most part, to what is known, as the 'Ulster cycle.' According to the chronology of legend, Congal should be a generation or two earlier than Conchobar Mac Nessa; but, indeed, the chronology of the tale is sadly tangled. The main action is as follows:—Congal is joint King of Ulster with Fergus mac Leide. This dual control does not please the Ulster men: on appeal to the King of Ireland, Lugaid Luaigne, Congal is dispossessed. He leaves Ireland, and has various adventures in other lands. At last he returns to Ireland, with foreign allies, defeats his rival Fergus, attacks and slays King Lugaid, and takes the kingship of Ireland. There are here points of likeness to the main action of the *Bruiden Da Derga*, and also to the adventures of Lugaid mac Con. It is in the doings of Congal during his absence over-sea that the later elements are most prominent. He assists Donn, King of Rathlin, against the attack of 'Nabgodon mac Iruaith,' that is to say, Nebuchadnezzar, son of Herod! In the Third Part he allies himself to Arthur, King of Britain. This Part, especially sections 46 to 55, is in the fanciful romantic style of the later Ossianic tales; whereas the First Part resembles in tone the earlier Cuchulainn tales, and is occupied with the serious business of life, eating, drinking, marrying, but mainly fighting.

In compiling the First Part the redactor seems to have had the *Fled Bricrend* in his mind; though it is not always easy to say whether certain archaistic turns of expression are due to deliberate imitation, or whether, as is often the case in this secondary literature, they have been adopted from the older form of the legend on which

A competent understanding of the historical development of Irish grammar is necessary for the treatment of a text which exhibits a bewildering mixture of forms; and Mr. MacSweeney has in this respect a great advantage over most native editors. He has studied with care the grammar of Old Irish, and has made use of the results arrived at by scholars like Prof. Strachan. Perhaps he is a little too anxious to find survivals of old forms where there is really nothing more than the mere caprice of the scribe. For instance, the form $\tau\alpha\beta\epsilon\pi\tau$ (p. 18) has no historical significance. It cannot, indeed, be denied that many Middle-Irish forms are to be found throughout the text; the infixed pronoun abounds; in some instances neuter nouns retain the π of the nom. sing., e.g. $\pi\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon$ n - $\tau\lambda\alpha\delta$ (p. 24), $\Delta\xi$ n - $\Delta\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota\delta$ (p. 28), $\tau\epsilon\alpha\delta$ n - $\acute{o}\lambda\Delta$ (p. 164), $b\acute{u}\Delta\iota\delta$ n - $\acute{o}\xi\lambda\alpha\delta\epsilon\iota\tau$ (p. 170). But it is very doubtful how much significance is to be attached to such forms. It might have been worth while to make a study of the verse-passages, in order to discover whether they showed evidence of belonging to an older stratum than the body of the text.

Though the editor generally shows himself a sound grammarian, he is not entirely impeccable. A few passages are here noted, in which it is difficult to agree with him.

Page 48. $R\alpha\delta\alpha\iota\delta$ $\pi\iota\sigma\tau$ $\mu\Delta\iota\mu\pi\iota$, $\Delta\pi$ $C\omicron\eta\gamma\Delta\lambda$, $\Delta\pi$ $c\epsilon\alpha\pi\delta$ m' $\omicron\iota\sigma\epsilon$.1. $\pi\acute{\iota}\omicron\eta\eta\tau\alpha\eta$, 7 $\tau\alpha\delta\pi\alpha\iota\delta$ Δ $\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\mu\iota\epsilon$ $\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau$; 7 $c\mu\pi\epsilon\delta$ Δ n - $e\omicron\epsilon$ 7 Δ n - $\iota\eta\omicron\iota\lambda\epsilon$ $\xi\omicron$ $\tau\acute{o}\eta\eta$ $S\omicron\delta\alpha\iota\pi\epsilon$. The editor renders: "'I shall send,' said Conghal, 'for my tutor Fionntan, and let his three sons be brought with him'; and their armour and trappings were sent to Dunseverick." But this would require $\tau\alpha\delta\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\alpha\eta$ and $\pi\omicron$ $c\mu\pi\epsilon\delta$. Probably $\tau\alpha\delta\pi\alpha\iota\delta$ should be $\tau\alpha\delta\pi\alpha\delta$: the last clause is evidently part of Congal's order. Translate, then: 'Let him bring his three sons with him, and send their flocks and herds to Dun Sobairche.' For the meaning of $e\omicron\epsilon$ cf. *Battle of Mag Rath*, p. 170, $\Delta\epsilon\gamma\Delta\pi\epsilon$

ṛaḡbur a éirí i n-ir faelaid ḡan imcómét, 'a shepherd who leaves his flocks among wolves without a guard.' The proper meaning of mōile is 'cattle.' The point of the passage under discussion is that while Fionntan and his sons are away from home, their cattle are to be kept safe in Dunseverick.

Page 50. ar ren 7 ar rinnren fén, "our old men and our ancestors." The nouns are both singular: the reference is to Fionntan.

Page 76, note. "in-imberrta (*sic*) = particle in + imberrta, past part. of imbrim." So p. 78, note, "in-imteacta = lit. 'fit to be gone.'" But imberrta, imteacta are not participles; they are verbal nouns: in such compounds the particle in is joined to the genitive case of a noun, as in mfr, 'marriageable'; mleigr, 'curable.' The editor has been misled by O'Donovan, *Grammar*, p. 274.

Page 116. nī ḡeubā caṭ no comlann rīot, "I shall not fight or battle with you." This would require nī ḡeub: the meaning is, 'neither squadrōn nor battalion shall withstand you.' The speaker is presenting Congal with a shield of irresistible virtue. Conversely at page 160, nī ḡeub āḡam é is rendered "he shall not receive it from me": it should be 'I will not receive him.'

In other passages the editor has failed to grasp the general sense of his text.

Page 6. The nobles of Ulster have been conspiring to kill the joint kings, Congal and Fergus. Congal hears of their treachery and protests: robo cóir cēna vāmaṭ énfear āḡamne vo millreavh an cúigeaṭ no vo beit ar éccóir a ḡadbail 7 a cúirreachaṭ, 7 a cúir a n-ḡlar no a nḡbeann no ḡom' rīarac vōib fēin é; 7 vā maṭ rinn ar noir-robaṭ cóir ar cceangal 7 ar ccuirreacāṭ 7 ar mbeit i rōrlamār aca. The editor renders: "It would be just moreover were it one of us who would have devastated, unlawfully attacked, and bound the province, or fettered and enchained it till

it were subject to them : and had we two done so, it would have been right to bind us, cast us into chains and into bondage," &c. This is clearly wrong. By placing a comma at éccóir we obtain an intelligible construction : "Were it *one* of us two that had injured the province, or that were acting unjustly, it would be right to take and bind him and put him in prison or in fetters until he should be amenable to their authority : and if it were the *two* of us," &c. uóib and aca apparently refer to the nobles : there is a gap in the text just above.

Page 20. Ro éiríḡ Rí Éireann go moč ar n-a márač uair ba vo gearaib Ríḡ Éireann ḡrian v' erḡe fairi tCeampaiḡ," "Early on the morrow the king of Ireland got up, for 'twas an obligation for the king of Ireland to see the sun rise over him in Tara." But the sense is the reverse of this. A gear denotes that one is forbidden to do a certain thing. See *Leabhar na gCeart*, opening words: Geara 7 urḡarta riḡ Eireno . . . reáct n-urḡarta riḡ h-Eireno annro .i. turcbáil ḡreni fairi ina loigí i muig Theampaiḡ, &c.

Page 22. When Congal is deprived of his kingship, one of the compensations offered by the king of Ireland is that he shall have tpióca cét in ḡac cúigeo a n-Érinn . . . 7 tpióca uó im' cúirmteáctra, which the editor renders: "a cantred in every province in Ireland . . . and a cantred in my banqueting-house." (So also at p. 24.) A 'cantred' is a division of land; and the Irish for it is tpióca cét, 'thirty hundreds.' The last clause here means 'and thirty attendants in my ale-house.' Cf. p. 12, where it is said: vo cuireo va Rí Ulao for rlior poctuarceptač tiḡe móir mioúcuarta . . . 7 tuccao va iomvaoi uóib ḡur cuill ḡac Ríḡ uóib 7 a tpiócao veḡmuin-tiḡe ina [n-]iomvaoib. In this passage iomvao means, not a 'couch,' as the editor renders, but a compartment of the banquet-hall : cf. *Todd. Lect.* viii., p. 68.

Page 74. Donn, king of Rathlin, refuses to give his

daughter to Nabgodon, king of Uardha, which is understood to be a country somewhere in the far East. Donn says: *ḡion ḡo mbeit m' inḡenra aḡ fep oile nī tiubhoinnri úoran í uairi moḡaḡa uaim foḡnam a cleamnuḡa*. The editor translates: "Though my daughter belongs to another man, I would not give her to him, for I am far from completing her marriage." This does not give the meaning of *ḡion ḡo mbeit*, and *cleamnuḡ* means not 'marriage,' but 'marriage-alliance.' Translate: 'Even though my daughter did not belong to anyone else, I would not give her to him (Nabgodon), since it is too distant an alliance to be serviceable': literally 'since the service of his marriage-alliance [reading *a cleamnuḡa*] is too distant from me.'

On the same page, *Tiocfaib moḡra eura tocmairc vo tadbairt sunne* is translated "you can refuse us her wooing," which would require *leat*, not *moḡ*. Rather 'to give us a refusal of our suit will come against you (do you harm).'

Page 142. *no ḡaḡ aḡ foḡraḡ Congail iri comlann ḡur ḡeir a rḡaḡ fair*, "She attacked Conghal in the fight, so that her shield resounded on him." Rather 'She began to press Congal hard in the fight, so that his shield groaned upon him.' *foḡraḡ* is the verbal noun of *foḡriḡim*, or *foḡraḡim*, 'I oppress, crush.' For the groaning of the shield when its bearer is in danger, see *Cath Ruis na Rí*, ed. Hogan, p. 43.

Page 144. *Do cuairt umoirio a n-ḡraḡin 7 a n-ḡaircead vo muiricir muirne . . . 7 vo muḡ énmairm úib uile iri ccaḡraḡ 7 nioḡ úiḡion úóibhion rin*. This is rendered: "There came, however, horror and courage to Muirn's followers, and they inflicted a single defeat upon them in the 'cathair,' and that did not serve them." *vo cuairt* means 'went,' not 'came.' Translate: 'Their terrible-ness and valour deserted Muirn's followers, and they fled

in general rout into the fort, but it was no protection to them.'

More than once Mr. MacSweeney has been misled by dividing words wrongly. Thus, at p. 30, *innir so Rí ċenn ċur óioċuilmir so Ríċe n-úlad ari 7 ċo noiċél in blaċ ele* is rendered: "Tell the king of Ireland that we have avenged on him the kingdom of Ulster, and that I shall avenge the other portion." But if we write *ċur óioċuilmir ní so*, we get a better sense: 'That we have avenged the [loss of] the kingdom of Ulster in part.' So at p. 16, the editor prints *ċerim ċomārc uaim so'n ċrib*, and renders "I send a share to the warrior." It should be: *ċer [ċer] imċomārc uaim*, 'bear greeting from me.' Cf. *ċerir so imċomārc uaimib*, gl. *salutant te qui mecum sunt omnes* Wb. 31^d18, and *ráċċadāio imċomārc beāċad 7 rláinte aice Oss. Soc. Tr. iii. 206.*

This phrase occurs in one of the metrical passages with which the tale is interspersed. Like most Irish verse, these passages are full of difficulties; and it is not surprising that the renderings offered are sometimes merely tentative. It must be observed, however, that the editor often transgresses against a principle of Middle-Irish verse, namely, that the end of each stanza coincides with the end of a sentence, or at least of a sentence-period. Examples of this error will be found on pages 11 and 58.

In the interpretation of Irish verse it is necessary to allow for the constant use of stock metaphors. The verses on p. 116 are a case in point. They are spoken by an old warrior in praise of his shield, and the last stanza runs thus:

Ó'a corrlán ċriċir ċair
 Óo ċelċmīr ā rriar mōr ttor:
 mīmīc vobermīr ā n-āċ
 Con rāccmīr ān āġh mōr con.

In the third line Mr. MacSweeney substitutes *ān cāċ* for the *ān āċ* of the MS.; but this is unnecessary: fords

were favourite scenes of battle. *corrán* is here the edge of the shield: see Meyer's *Contributions*. *cor* and *con* are two metaphorical expressions for 'chieftains,' 'warriors'; literally, 'pillars' and 'hounds.' *rrair*, 'shower,' is probably here the 'rain of blows.' *cair* is a difficulty, as we should expect *car* if it agrees with *corrán*: the word seems to be correct, as it is answered by *rrair*; but the line wants a syllable. The meaning of the whole seems to be something like this: 'From its quivering edge . . . we used to fling aside the blows rained by mighty chieftains; often did we bear it at a ford, and look on the strife of mighty warriors.' Read *corrán* and *áḡ*.

In the little poem at p. 42 we have the line

Δρḡλανν νιαδ̃ νερκαίρ̃ βηρόν.

Mr. MacSweeney writes *δρ ḡλανν*, and translates "pure hero, he saw sorrow," which would require *ḡλαν* and *βηρόν*. *Δρḡλανν* or *Δρclanḡ* means a 'load': see Windisch's *Lexicon* and Meyer's *Contributions*. Probably we are again dealing with metaphors, and the meaning is: 'a grist of warriors reddened the quern' (*νερκαίρ̃* for *νερḡκαίρ̃*): compare the verses cited by the Four Masters, a. 647:

Δν ḡrán meiler̃ Δν muileann
nī coirce áct̃ Δρ̃ νερḡ-ḡuirceann,

'The grain that the mill grinds is not oats, but red wheat,' that is, the bodies of men slain in fight.

Occasionally the editor has neglected the guidance of metre, which is the safest clue to the mazes of Irish poetry. Thus at p. 66 he prints:

Caírbhe dom' lanñ b̃eir, vām̃ áḡ,
Cíuoñtano dom' éli cōm̃oaláḡ,

rendering *vām̃ áḡ*, 'ox of combat.' But both rhyme and alliteration require the reading *vām̃aíḡ*, dative of *vām̃aδ̃*, the adjective formed from *vām̃*, 'company, retinue.'

In the treatment of the text Mr. MacSweeney has been perhaps over-scrupulous. He reproduces religiously all the varieties of spelling of the MS., even when they are plainly wrong and confusing. Thus *blaḡ* does duty both for *blað*, 'fame' (p. 50), and for *bloḡ*, 'a piece' (p. 30). In such cases it would have been better to print the correct forms, giving the MS. reading in a note. Accents and marks of aspiration omitted in the MS. might very well have been supplied silently in cases where there is no real doubt.

What is more important, there are a good many places where the text obviously required emendation : it is one of the duties of an editor to supply, where he can, an intelligible reading. Here are a few examples :—

Pages 14, 15. *clorðem ʒealouirh for a ʒliarṑaib 7 tpoimṑiaṑ uaine ari vealṑan uar a ʒleḡa aite imṑirne, &c.* This will not make sense : *uar a ʒleḡa* is impossible. A reference to the similar description eight lines back shows at once that the word *cionn* has dropped out after *uara* : the sentence then runs : *ari vealṑan uar a cionn : ʒleḡa aite, &c.*

Page 18, § vii, line 5. *iomcuir* should be *iomcuirret*. The next sentence, containing the expostulations of the Ulstermen, is unintelligible as it stands printed—*ní ra teacṑt reo' ʒlaṑṑurṑa aṑaib aṑṑ conac veṑna ecctṑa forṑa ʒeacṑ ʒac cóicceṑac eile vo cóicceṑacuib éṑeann*. The editor writes : "They have come to your kingdom only because they have been treated differently from all the other provincials of Ireland." This is grammatically impossible. *teacṑt re* means 'to rebel against': see Stokes' Index to *Togail Tróí*. The clue to the passage is the *vox nihili* *ecctṑa*, for which should be read *éccurpuma*, 'unfairness': the mark of contraction is presumably wanting in the MS. The meaning then is : "It is not for rebelling against your authority they are, only you should not treat them

unfairly and differently from every other provincial ruler of Ireland."

Page 50, § xxi (verses). The text gives :

ḡadām niall féin co m-bé i ccaét
 ḡsur Cnabó inḡen Durnéaét.

The editor's rendering ignores co mbé. Read i ccaét, 'in confinement.' This makes co mbé intelligible, and mends the rhyme.

P. 56 (verses). The line ḡsur iomab nḡiall pḡap is defective; and why should hostages be 'swift'? nḡiolla gives better sense and metre. In the preceding line pḡianmāra should be pḡianmāra.

It has been already remarked that the Glossary is the least satisfactory part of the book. An editor is in no way bound to supply a Glossary. A good Glossary is a thing to be grateful for; but to be really useful, it should include all the rarer words that occur, and should furnish authority for the meanings assigned: otherwise it is impossible to distinguish certainty from guess-work. Mr. MacSweeney's Glossary is defective and not always correct. *Libeḡna* (p. 10) means 'galley,' not 'habitations' (*Togail Tróí*, Index); *ḡo viciḡeó* (p. 138) means 'was destroyed,' not 'was oppressed' (*Irische Texte*, vol. 4, Index); *ḡliopta* (p. 138) means 'smooth, polished,' not 'sharp-pointed' (Dinneen's *Dictionary*); *ḡoleac* (p. 126) is genitive of *ḡail*, 'willow' (Windisch): the editor confounds it with *ḡalac*, 'dirty'; *ḡoleamra* (p. 38) is a *vox nihili*: read *ḡó leamra*, 'good in my eyes'; *nḡi óeilḡ* (p. 70) means 'he separated,' not 'he lay down'; *bḡiomḡ* (pp. 54, 56) has nothing to do with *bḡuinne*: it seems to be put for *bḡaineacáib*, 'the leading men, chieftains': see Meyer's *Contributions*. *bḡú* (p. 54) means 'brink' (Meyer, *Contrib.*), and is quite distinct from *bḡuḡ*; *comḡórad* (pp. 34, 36) means 'to augment, to assemble' (Meyer, *Contrib.*), not

‘to entertain’; Mr. MacSweeney has probably generalised from the use of the word in connexion with $\text{fleab. } \tau\upsilon\zeta \text{ oibhriacair}$ (p. 48) means ‘he uttered words of insult,’ not ‘he swore’: the earlier form is *ail bréthre* (Meyer, *Contrib.*, 2 *ail*). The editor twice misunderstands the phrase ḡabaim in , ‘I land in’ (pp. 156, 166): see *Togail Trói*, Index.

For a discussion of the literary qualities of the *Caithréim*, reference must be made to Mr. MacSweeney’s Introduction. He writes on the topic with enthusiasm, and that is an excellent quality in an editor when it is allied to solid knowledge and a sound critical method. After all deductions have been made, Mr. MacSweeney’s book remains a contribution of real value to Irish literature; and it is to be hoped that he will follow it up with further publications. Like the rest of the series to which it belongs, the volume is handsomely produced and carefully printed.

EDWARD GWYNN.

TWO NOTES ON THE *DIVINA COMMEDIA*.I.—A NOTE ON *PURGATORIO* XVIII. 19-39.

THE first *terzina* gives the text of which the remainder of the passage is the expansion :—

L' animo, ch' è creato ad amar presto,
Ad ogni cosa è mobile che piace,
Tosto che dal piacer in atto è desto.

Several questions suggest themselves in reference to this *terzina*. First, as to *animo*: some have sought (as Witte) to limit its meaning to the will, others (as Scartazzini) to the will and affections; but such a limitation is excluded by Dante's use of the word in *Inf.* i. 25, *Purg.* xii. 75, and *Par.* xxiii. 90, where it appears as the subject of *rimirar*, *stimava*, and *avvisar*, respectively, all functions of intellect. I think it is here used to denote the *anima rationalis*, and that this was what the two earliest comm., Lana and Ottimo, had in their minds when they took it as meaning *anima*, and that "*razionale*" was understood in their comments, and that we shall do well to render it (with Mr. Butler) "the mind," or (with Philalethes) "die Seele" ("vernünftige" understood). As to *presto*: further reflection has convinced me that it is best not to take it in its ordinary sense of 'quick,' or, as rendered in my paper in *HERMATHENA*, 1904, 'prone,' but to regard it as a Gallicism (O. F., *prest*; M. F., *prêt*), and to render it 'ready,' thus finding in line 19 the expression of the fact that the mind, or soul, has by creation the δύναμις of love. Four further questions suggest themselves:

1. Is line 20 explicative of line 19, or does it state a further psychological fact?

2. Does *in atto* mean *actu* or *in actum*?

3. Is it to be taken with *il piacer*, *il piacer in atto* (pleasure *actu*), or with *è desto*, which gives as the meaning either "is awakened into actuality" (*in actum*), or "is actually (*actu*) awakened"?

4. What is the subject of *è* (line 21)? Is it (a) *l'animo*, or (b) *amor δυνάμει* (*ad amar presto*), or (c) *moto δυνάμει*, contained in *mobile* (line 20)?

1. Line 20 does not seem to be explicative of the preceding; for in lines 25 *et sqq.* Dante speaks of pleasure coming after, not only love *δυνάμει*, but love *ἐνέργειᾳ*, and of the motion of the spirit coming after pleasure. We must then take line 20 as expressing a further psychological fact, viz. that while there is in the soul immediately the *δύναμις* of love (or love *δυνάμει*), there is in it mediately through this the *δύναμις* of motion (or motion *δυνάμει*) towards objects which please, and that this line and the next form the text which is expanded in lines 27-33.

2. This will be answered in answering question 3.

3. I think the conjunction of *in atto* with *piacer* (Tom-maseo, &c.) must be rejected on the ground of redundancy, pleasure being, *qua* pleasure, *actu*. So, too, with the suggestion that it should be taken with *desto* as = *destato actu* (Phil. "wirklich geweckt"), the idea of the implied *destato in potentia* being too bizarre.

We are thus led to the third alternative—*è destato in actum* (εἰς ἐνέργειαν).

4. Of the suggested alternatives (a), though from considerations of syntax the most natural, yet is inadmissible, in view of the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas, so closely followed by Dante, and, in the direction of emphasizing the activity of the mind, advanced upon by him—the teaching, sc., that the soul, and *a fortiori* its highest part,

the *animo*, is essentially ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια; so that to speak of the *animo* being wakened εἰς ἐνέργειαν, and so ἐκ δυνάμεως,¹ would have been for him a *louche* expression, which he would never have used. Of course, different faculties of the soul are thus spoken of, but not the rational soul in general. (δ) To accept this alternative would involve contradiction to what Dante says in lines 25, &c., that pleasure follows upon love already *actu*. (c) The objection to this is that the potentiality of moving towards what causes pleasure of course exists before the actuality, λόγῳ, if not also χρόνῳ. But this alternative is nearest to what I think is the true interpretation; and the above difficulty may be resolved by interpreting lines 18 and 19, not as saying that the potentiality of motion towards what pleases only comes into existence when pleasure wakens it into actuality, but that the potentiality of motion (or rather *moto in potentia*—to provide a masculine noun for *desto* to agree with)—which motion will take place when pleasure wakens it from potentiality into actuality—exists in the soul.

In lines 22–33 Dante expresses in a concise, and at the same time highly poetic, form much psychological teaching scattered throughout the works of Aristotle, and of St. Thomas and the Schoolmen in general; while in the words “da esser verace” he advances beyond any of them. The consideration of this last expression I reserve to the end of this note, merely observing now that I believe Dante to have used it to denote the true inwardness of the sensible world:

Vostra apprensiva da esser verace
 Tragge intenzione, e dentro a voi la spiega,
 Sì che l' animo ad essa volger face.

¹ Or, more strictly, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐνέργειαν and ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι δυνάμει. I use idea. Dante almost certainly did not know Greek. Aristotelean language to express the

Vostra apprehensiva, sc. *virtù*: This answers to the ὑπόληψις of Ar. *De An.* iii. 3, but covers a wider ground, since the context shows that it includes not only ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, φρόνησις, but also αἴσθησις and φαντασία. It includes all the knowing faculties of the soul, and is well translated νοῦς by Musurus.

The psychological process summarised in these lines is that which St. Thomas represents as follows:—The *sensus communis*—"communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum" (*Summa Theol.*, i. 78. 4)—receives through each of the five senses the forms or species (not the matter) of sensible things (cf. Ar. *De An.* ii. 12: ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐστὶ τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἀνευ τῆς ὕλης); these sensible forms, as in things themselves, are *species sensibiles in potentia*, as in the *sensus communis* they are *species sensibiles actu*, as in the *phantasia* they are *phantasmata*, or *species intelligibiles in potentia*, or *intentiones*, or *species impressae*. St. Thomas writes of these as one of the two requisites of natural cognition (*Summa Theol.*, i. 12. 13. c): "*Cognitio, quam per naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit: scilicet phantasmata a sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile cuius virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus.*" Again (*Summa Theol.*, i. 85. 1. c.): "*Cognoscere id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata.*"

The process so far is summed up in the words:

*Vostra apprehensiva da esser verace
Tragge intenzione.*

The use of the active "*tragge*," as contrasted with the passive "*accepta*" of the above passage from the *Summa Theol.*, marks the greater place given by Dante to mental activity in the cognitive process, introducing it, as he does, one stage earlier than it was introduced by St. Thomas,

and, in the word itself, anticipating by one stage the "abstrahimus" of the Angelic Doctor.

The *intellectus agens* acting upon these *phantasmata*, or *intentiones*,¹ or *species impressae*, or *species intelligibiles in potentia*, makes *species expressae*, *species intelligibiles actu*, which thus become immediately *intellecta in potentia*, that in the *intellectus possibilis* they may become *intellecta actu*.

As to this St. Thomas writes (Contra Gent. ii. 76): "*Intellectus agens non facit species intelligibiles actu ut ipse per eas intelligat . . . sed ut per eas intelligat intellectus possibilis.*" Again (Summa Theol., I. 54. 4), after quoting Ar. *De An.* iii. 5: "Ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, he adds: "*Recipere est proprium intellectus possibilis: illuminatio autem est proprium intellectus agentis. . . . In nobis intellectus agens et possibilis est per comparisonem ad phantasmata, quae quidem comparantur ad intellectum possibilem ut colores ad visum; ad intellectum autem agentem ut colores ad lumen.*" This last simile is, of course, taken from the sequel of the above passage in the *De An.*

This process of development of the *intentiones* or *species impressae* into *intellecta in actu* or *species expressae*, is briefly and forcibly rendered by the words "dentro a voi la spiega," the last word most fitly rendering the "*exprimet*" which is implied in the "*expressae*," while "dentro a voi" most aptly expresses the dictum of St. Thomas (Summa Theol., I. 81. 1): "*Operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente.*"

The "apprensiva," by this presentation of the *species*

¹ In the Dizionario Tomistico e Scolastico (Firenze, Giachetti) s.v. *Species*, we read: "*Species impressa* od *expressa* si dice talora *intentionalis* perchè per essa la potenza tende od attende all' obbietto." I think there can be little doubt that the former is the meaning of "intenzione" in the passage under consideration, fitting in so thoroughly as it

does with the place of the word in the development of the discussion, while the *species expressa* does not come in till later in the same line.

Schütz, in his Thomas Lexikon (Paderborn, Schöningh), cites *intentio* as one of the synonyms of *species* when the latter occurs in the sense of Erkenntnisform, Erkenntnisbild.

expressa, the developed *intentio*, causes the *animo* (the rational part of the *anima*) to turn to this *intentio*: "l' *animo* ad essa volger face."

So far no element of emotion or of will has entered; but with line 25 this enters: "se, rivolto, in ver di lei si piega." This renders the sequel of the last quoted words of St. Thomas: "*Operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem.*"

Here enters emotion: "Quel piegare è amor," but not yet choice:

Quello è natura
Che per piacer di nuovo in voi si lega.

Dante here gives an answer to the old question, whether we incline to objects because they give us pleasure, or they give us pleasure because we incline to them. Line 26 points to a natural inclination as the pre-condition of pleasure; line 27 to pleasure as the pre-condition of an intensified inclination: "through pleasure this inclination, this natural love, gets a fresh hold on you."

Then, in lines 28 *et sqq.* he indicates the passage from inclination to desire, from *δρεξις* to *ἐπιθυμία*: the former is a natural appetite, "*inclinatio naturae*," of which St. Thomas wrote (*Summa Theol.*, 22. 26. 6. c.): "*Utraque inclinatio* [the other being *inclinatio gratiae*] *ex divina sapientia procedit*"; while the latter is "*moto spiritale*," a reaction of the spirit has supervened. The simile used in lines 28-30:

Poi come il foco movesi in altura
Per la sua forma ch' è nata a salire
Là dove più in sua materia dura;

suggests the thought that Dante may have had in his mind *Aristot. Phys.* II. i, where Aristotle speaks of *πῦρ* as both *φύσει* and *φύσις*, while of *τὸ φέρεσθαι ἄνω* he says: *τῇ πυρὶ ὑπάρχει*; and adds: *τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν*; and that he meant to

suggest that while *inclinatio* or *appetitus* is "natura," "disire" (line 31) is only *secundum naturam*:

Così l' animo preso entra in disire
Ch' è moto spiritale, e mai non posa
Fin che la cosa amata il fa gioire.

As fire by its form (or essence) mounts upwards, according to the ideas of Dante's time, towards its proper sphere ("la spera sua," as Buti says, "di sotto alla luna tra l' etere—supposed to be above the atmosphere—e la luna"), so the soul laid hold of by pleasure enters into desire, which is a spiritual movement, and never rests till the (possession of the) object of its love gives it fruition.

The following lines¹—

Or ti puote apparer quant' è nascosa
La veritade alla gente che avvera
Ciascuno amore in sè laudabil cosa ;
Perocchè forse appar la sua matera
Sempr' esser buona ; ma non ciascun segno
È buona, ancor che buona sia la cera—

draw the conclusion that not every love is good because its matter is good. We have here a reminiscence of the scholastic *materia signata*, of which St. Thomas wrote in the Sum. Contra Gent. I. 21 ; "*Ipsae etiam essentiae vel quidditates generum vel specierum individuuntur secundum materiam signatam hujus vel illius individui*"; and again, Summa Theol., I. 75. c. : "*Materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus ; non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis, sed materia communis.*" So love is the "*materia communis*," the "cera" of all action ; when it has the "segno" impressed upon it by choice, then it becomes "*materia signata*," a "*principium individuationis*," and thus acquires a moral character, good or bad.

¹ See HERMATHENA, 1904, p. 207.

To revert to line 22. The majority of commentators follow Benvenuto in taking *esser verace* to mean "a real external thing." The only commentator who, it seems to me, has correctly interpreted these words is Dr. Butler: "an essence which speaks true, sc. God." That this is the correct interpretation is strongly supported by the following consideration: a few lines before (line 7) Dante had used "verace" in its true sense of ideal reality—"quel padre verace"—and can we suppose that he would so immediately use the word in its low popular sense as indicating that which can be seen or felt? He here thus traces all that brings into exercise our faculty of apprehension ultimately to God, the *ens realissimum*, so that we may here find an anticipation of Malebranche's theory of the vision of all things in God. "Verace" is here the exact equivalent of ἀληθινός in St. John and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

II.—INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY.

Dante's representation, in the *Paradiso*, of intellectual liberty as implying the freedom of thought from a datum external to it, would seem to be the development of an *obiter dictum* of Aristotle in *Met.* XI. (xii.) 9. In reasoning to the famous dictum: ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις, Aristotle speaks of νοῦς as a θεϊότατον beyond any mere phænomena, and then adds: Πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν; εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη.

Hegel (*Encyc.*, § 24, Zus. 2) affords an instance of the development of the same pregnant saying along the same lines as those of Dante's development of it, thus affording a further instance of the intellectual sympathy between the

medieval "altissimo poeta" and the modern "maestro di color che sanno": "In der Logik werden die Gedanken so gefasst, dass sie keinen andern Inhalt haben als einen dem Denken selbst angehörigen und durch dasselbe hervorgebrachten. So sind die Gedanken reine Gedanken. So ist der Geist rein bei sich selbst und hiermit frei, denn die Freiheit ist eben diess, in seinem Andern bei sich selbst zu seyn, von sich abzuhängen, das Bestimmende seiner selbst zu seyn."¹

H. S. VERSCHOYLE.

¹ "In Logic thoughts are taken as having no other content than one belonging to Thought itself, and produced by it. Thus are thoughts pure thoughts. Thus is mind (or spirit) purely at home

with itself, and thereby free, since freedom is just this, for the mind to be at home with itself in its other, to be dependent on itself, to be determinant of itself."

FURTHER NOTES ON LONGINUS ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ.

xxxii. 8 :

τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐλαττώμασιν ἐπιχειρῶν ὅμως αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ Κεκίλιος ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ Δυσίου συγγράμμασιν ἀπεθάβησεν τῷ παντὶ Δυσίαν ἀμείνω Πλάτωνος ἀποφήνασθαι.

For ὅμως αὐτό read ὁμός' αὐτῷ, to be constructed with ἐπιχειρῶν 'coming to a close encounter with him,' i.e. with Plato.

xxxviii. 5 :

The line from a comedy which appears in *P* thus :

ἀγρὸν ἔσχα ἐλάττω γῆν ἔχον γὰρ στολῆς,

may have been ἀγρὸν ἔσχ' ἐλάττω γῆν γὰρ ἔχον<τ> ἐπιστολῆς. Vahlen retains Valckenär's ἀγρὸν ἔσχ ἐλάττω γῆν ἔχοντ' ἐπιστολῆς, which takes no account of γάρ. I transpose γάρ, and find in its standing so far out of its proper place a reason for at least some part of the corruption in the end of the line. The passage from Strabo i. 2, § 30, p. 36, εἰσὶ τινες ὑπερβολαὶ ἐπὶ ὑπερβολαῖς, ὡς τὸ . . . ἐλάττω δ' ἔχειν γῆν τὸν ἀγρὸν ἐπιστολῆς Λακωνικῆς can hardly be thought to point to Faber's ἐλάττω γῆν σκυτάλης Λακωνικῆς ; it is much more probable either that Longinus omitted Λακωνικῆς as not included in the line, or that the following verse contained a *description* of the letter too long to be quoted. The removal of γὰρ to a position far from its natural place after the first or at least second word of the sentence is common enough in comedy.

xl. 2 :

Ἄλλα μὴν ὅτι γε πολλοὶ καὶ συγγραφῶν καὶ ποιητῶν, οὐκ ὄντες ὑψηλοὶ φύσει, μήποτε δὲ καὶ ἀμεγέθεις, ὅμως κοινοῖς καὶ δημώδεσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαγομένοις περιττὸν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ συγχρόμενοι . . . ὁμως ὄγκον καὶ διάστημα καὶ τὸ μὴ ταπεινοὶ δοκεῖν εἶναι περιεβάλλοντο.

συγχρόμενοι seems to mean that they used *with their other* dictions words of an ordinary and popular stamp. διάστημα is translated by Rhys Roberts 'distinction.' Is it not rather 'difference,' i.e. variety in their style, by which one part was distinguished from another, and did not produce the same effect?

xlii. 2 :

ὁῦλον δ' ὡς ἔμπαλιν τὰ ἐκτάδην ἀπόψυχα τὰ γὰρ ἄκαιρον μῆκος ἀνακαλούμενα.

Toup conj. ἄτε παρὰ μῆκος ἄκαιρον ἀναχαλόμενα. With a slight variation upon this, I would suggest, τὰ παρὰ καιρὸν εἰς μῆκος ἀναχαλόμενα 'prolixities are frigid (Rhys Roberts), I mean such as are (= that is, when they are) let out to unseasonable length': or still closer to *P* τὰ παρ' ἄκαιρον μῆκος ἀνακαλούμενα, 'that is, such as are cited (or appealed to) in consequence of their unseasonable length,' e.g. the epic of Antimachus.

xliv. 7 :

ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἀμέτρῳ πλούτῳ καὶ ἀκολάστῳ συνημμένη καὶ ἴσα, φασί, βαίνουσα πολυτέλεια καὶ ἄλλα (ἄμα, Pearce) ἀνοίγοντος ἐκείνου τῶν πόλεων καὶ οἰκῶν τὰς εἰσόδους τρεῖς δὲ ἐμβαίνει.

Mathews ap. Roberts conj. εὐθύς. It would be nearer to *P* to write ἰθύς.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON THE METHOD AND TEACHING OF ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY.

THE importance of the Science of Geometry will not, I suppose, be disputed, least of all in a University which has in this subject such distinguished traditions as ours.

It is, perhaps, not, however, sufficiently borne in mind that its province extends far beyond what is known as the Pure Science, comprising, in fact, beyond this the ever-widening range of Physics. For Physics, while, on the one hand, it owes to experiment ever fresh starting-points of new developments, yet, on the other, necessarily holds of Space, and as doing so is essentially geometrical, the most advanced mathematical developments in the Science sharing this character with the earliest propositions of Euclid.

It may, therefore, not be without use to consider shortly the true method of the Science, and in connexion with this the true procedure in teaching it, more especially as certain recent changes in this respect in the geometrical curriculum are, in my conviction, a serious and regrettable departure from the true traditions which the University has hitherto endeavoured to uphold.

Although the apodeictic character of Geometry had long been recognized, it is only in comparatively recent

times that its true nature and principle of movement have been clearly laid down.

Much credit in this respect is undoubtedly due to Locke.

The great Kantian doctrine of the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic judgments is stated by him with concise clearness in his "necessary consequence of a complex idea, but not contained in it." He has also the great merit of pointing out Mathematics as the peculiar field of the judgments which he thus describes.

At the same time, Locke's unfortunate use of the term 'Ideas' prevented him from following out this clue, and, indeed, as shown by some of his examples, obscured for him the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic judgments which he had before so clearly seen.

Moreover, while distinctly asserting that Mathematical judgments are necessary consequences of our complex Ideas, but not contained in them, Locke does not attempt to explain how such a paradoxical class of Ideas come to be formed.

This explanation was first given by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, more especially in the Appendix on the "Discipline and Use of Pure Reason in its dogmatic use"—a chapter which may indeed be read with great advantage even by readers who have not cared to master the Critical Philosophy generally.

In fact, while the Theory of Mathematics as "synthetic *a priori*" is, of course, an essential part of Kant's metaphysical system, the views which he develops in this chapter are of permanent value, independently of this system. We might indeed say that while the above famous clause, taken, as a whole, stands or falls with the Kantian metaphysics, the "Synthetic" may be adopted, and indeed has been adopted, equally by adherents, such as Mill, of the Empirical school. Mill's discussion, for instance,

of the foundation of mathematics contains, as I have pointed out, much with which a Kantian would cordially agree.

Kant, in short, to express the matter in less technical language, was the first to show clearly that Mathematics is a Science of Experiment, these experiments taking place by means of construction in Space—such construction being thus the true principle of movement of the Science.

For Kant, indeed, these constructions ultimately lead up to Synthetical Axioms *a priori*, and might be described as experiments on the form of Space. In the Empirical school they are experiments in the matter, reducing themselves ultimately to spatial facts, guaranteed by an induction *per enumerationem simplicem* on a large scale. The difference here is indeed all-important as regards Metaphysics, and with respect to the Philosophy of Mathematics, but is not of moment as regards Mathematical method. As regards this, both schools may be said to be in agreement in making this method to consist in construction in Space, not in analysis of spatial notions.

This method, then, I contend, is that which should be steadily kept in view, and taught from the outset. Besides the method, however, there necessarily comes to be considered, in the discussion of the proper course of elementary Geometrical instruction, the question of a body of elementary Geometry such as may serve, on the one hand, as a foundation for those who wish to proceed further; and, on the other, as a useful mental discipline for those who do not.

In olden times, indeed, this question would have presented no difficulty, elementary Geometry and the six books of Euclid being practically regarded as equivalent conceptions. And still it must, I think, be admitted that these books constitute a definite body of geometrical truth, no part of which can well be omitted from an elementary

course, and to which, on the other hand, but little in the way of new matter requires to be added.

When, however, we pass to the consideration of the mode of proof, the question is different, and there can be no doubt that here considerable improvement is possible.

Not to dwell on minor points, such as the too frequent employment of the method of *reductio ad absurdum*, the want of recognition of the modern conception of the constant, and the curious objection to the notion of difference (Euclid, in fact, usually substitutes for $a = c - b$, $a + b = c$), two leading defects may be noted in Euclid's treatment of Geometry.

The first is connected with the continuity of Space, and bears, perhaps, traces of the time when this perfect continuity was not as yet fully recognized.

To this it is apparently due that Euclid makes the proof of theorems depend on the solution of problems. Thus the middle point of a line could not be made use of till a method had been shown by which a right line could be bisected, nor even so elementary a proposition as Euc. I. 13 demonstrated till it had been shown how to draw a perpendicular to a line at a given point.

There can, I think, be no doubt that in matters like these the possibility of the intuitions required is guaranteed by the continuity of Space, while the actual constructions may be separately treated as problems.

This is known sometimes as the method of hypothetical constructions — an expression, however, which hardly brings out with sufficient clearness the assumption which underlies its validity, that, namely, of the continuity of Space.

The second defect in Euclid's Geometry finds, indeed, a parallel in modern mathematical treatises, yet certainly renders it less fit for elementary teaching.

I allude to the entire absence of the Analytic method,

by which the student might be given an insight into the true spirit and method of Geometry, and might gain some conception how to frame geometrical proofs for himself. It is, in fact, notorious that one who has followed, and that intelligently, the six books of Euclid, may find himself helpless when confronted by a new theorem or problem.

Euclid's defect here is the more strange, as Greek Geometry was familiar with the method of Analysis, which, indeed, formed the subject of distinct treatises.

With all these defects, however, Euclid possesses the great merit of strict adherence to the geometrical point of view. Notably is this the case with respect to one of the two leading problems of Geometry—the treatment of Proportion.

At first the Greek Geometers appear not to have realised the difficulties presented by the incommensurable, and to have frankly treated ratios as ordinary numerical fractions. With the Greek intellect, however, this state of things could not last long; and to Eudoxus of Cnidus the glory belongs of giving a geometrical definition of Proportion free from all approximation, and forming a perfectly sufficient starting-point for the subsequent geometrical development of the sixth book. Herein, as in other departments, it was given to the Greek mind to do work which should last for ever.

In saying this, however, I would not be understood to refer to the actual form assumed by Euclid's definition, but to the two characteristics I have mentioned above—its geometrical form and its freedom from the notion of approximation—two points which Euclid's definition fully satisfies, and which appear to me essential. These being maintained, the definition may take different forms, though I think the difference between these comparatively unimportant, while Euclid's method possesses the advantage of connecting itself more directly and immediately with the

ordinary and natural conception of ratios as fractions. It is, then, the more to be regretted that our University, departing from her old and sound traditions, has recently cast aside this precious heritage from Greek antiquity, and with it the true method of geometric construction, in favour of what may be termed the Algebraic method.

This method may be said to assume one of two shapes. In the former, which we may call the approximation type, we substitute for the true, in general, incommensurable ratios, such as that of the diagonal of a square to its side, successive fractions approaching more and more nearly to them; or rather, to put it more accurately, we substitute for the second of a pair of incommensurables, successive fractions of the first more and more nearly converging to the second.

On this form of the Algebraic method I would remark—(1) that, while no doubt logical, and affording to the beginner an easily apprehended probability, it requires some considerable maturity of thought before its cogency as rigorous demonstration is clearly seen.

In Euclid's method, on the other hand—and this is a point on which I would lay special stress—the strictness of demonstration can be grasped, I may say, as fully by an intelligent student as by the most advanced mathematician.

But (2) further, the doctrine of limits or approximation not only introduces difficulty, but is in this connexion needless and unnatural, and it is one great merit of Euclid's definition to be wholly free from it.

In confirmation of this, I would point to the analogy of the first and second books. We there treat of rectangles with perfect clearness, without troubling ourselves with the question of commensurability, though, of course, if we wished to give numerical form to our results, we should have to do so by approximation. It is, in fact, a grievous

mistake to introduce the notion of approximation into the process of demonstration ; its place is only in the interpretation of the final result.

Thus, to take an illustration from Trigonometry, no approximation is involved in the demonstration of the formula $\sin 3 \theta = 3 \sin \theta - 4 \sin^3 \theta$, though if we wish from this formula to calculate $\sin 3 \theta$ from $\sin \theta$, or $\sin \theta$ from $\sin^3 \theta$, approximation would of course come into play.

(3) As regards the algebraic process itself by which proofs are given for the commensurable, I would remark—and this objection applies to both forms of the method—that the processes which deal with abstract algebraical symbols are less readily apprehended by the ordinary student than the concrete intuitions of Space. Contrast in this respect the perfect intuitive clearness of Euclid, Bk. II. 1, with the algebraic $a(b + c + d + e) = ab + ac + ad + ae$. I would add that while from immemorial tradition Geometry has been held to be nothing if not demonstrative the ordinary student is apt to regard strict proof of the fundamental principles of Algebra rather as a luxury than a necessity.

I pass to the second form of the Algebraic method, which is largely free from the difficulties which beset the first.

Here the radical vice of approximation is avoided, and we assume that ratios may be treated as what we may call geometrical numbers, to which, though admittedly not fractions, the algebraic theorems respecting fractions are strictly and accurately applicable.

This assumption cannot, however, remain an assumption.

It belongs, no doubt, to the nature of Algebra, and is indeed one main source of its power that in virtue of its symbols it suggests extensions of its theorems beyond what has actually been proved. Such extensions, how-

ever, remain suggestions only, until competent proof has been given of them.

In order to this it must be shown that the geometrical numbers are subject to the same laws of combination as the algebraical; and to do this we require, in the first place, a geometrical definition of equality of ratios.

Once, however, this is given, there is no reason why the student should not immediately make use of it, and thus be enabled to obtain all the propositions of the sixth book by processes of which he can fully grasp the demonstrative rigour, and which conform to the true method of geometrical construction.

After this, and prior to entering on Trigonometry, he may be shown good ground for assuming the legitimacy of the application of Algebra to Geometry, inasmuch as ratios and rectangles, though not numbers in the ordinary sense, can be shown to be subject to numerical laws of combination.

And here I would notice a common mistake, which, I confess, I till recently laboured under myself, which has had a large share in gaining favour for the Algebraical method as opposed to the Geometrical.

It may, in fact, be contended by the advocates of Algebra—whatever fastidiousness you may exact in carefully distinguishing Algebraic from Geometric magnitude in Euclid, such scruples must be thrown to the winds when Trigonometry or Analytical Geometry is entered on. Why, then, it will be said, if this be so, should not the student be allowed already to employ in Euclid the method which he must perforce adopt when he passes on beyond it?

If, however, the view which I have taken above be correct, we do not really leave Geometry when we enter on Trigonometry or Analytical Geometry. For in virtue of the identity of the laws of combination in Algebra and Trigonometry, the algebraical processes can be regarded as really

geometrical, and capable at any point of the demonstration of being explicitly recognised as such.

What Descartes did was not, as commonly supposed, to substitute Algebra for Geometry, but to show that we might, by the use of algebraical language, obtain theorems not easily deducible by methods purely geometrical in the ordinary sense.

Geometry thus, without ceasing to be Geometry, obtained all the power and facility attaching to algebraical notation.

Before leaving this part of my subject I would remark that the state in which, by the recent changes, the question of Proportion is left, is indefensible either in the algebraical or geometrical point of view.

Not merely is no security provided that the student really understands the algebraical proofs he employs for the commensurable as distinct from mere acceptance of rules; he is then informed that these proofs are in reality immediately applicable to commensurable magnitudes only, *i.e.* to highly exceptional cases, while at the same time no attempt is made to indicate any line of proof by which he may pass from the commensurable to the incommensurable.

The only reason which I can discover to justify so strange a procedure is the supposed incompetence of the student to grasp Euclid's definition of Proportion. This, however, I submit, is to set a dangerous precedent.

When the question is one of a simpler or a more difficult method of presenting the same matter, we might allow that to the ordinary passman *maxima debetur reverentia*. Here, however, the matter is not preserved: the student is left in practically all of the sixth book derelict of the line of mathematical demonstration which he had hitherto carefully preserved, while neither for himself nor for his brother Honor student is the lapse at any subsequent period made good.

Surely such a course is unworthy of our University.

In conclusion, I would notice briefly some other points connected with the teaching of the elements of Geometry.

If the doctrine of Proportion be one main difficulty which presents itself in Elementary Geometry, the other may be said to be the doctrine of Parallels.

Attempts have been made—favoured apparently by the recent Syllabus—to improve on Euclid's axiom here by the introduction of the modern conception of rotation.

I can only express here the firm conviction that all such attempts are, in the strict sense of the term, preposterous, assuming, as they necessarily do, the axiom in the form in which it should always be presented, viz., 'Through a point only one parallel can be drawn to a line.' This assumption we cannot evade, though we may realize it as a Geometric fact, or experience of Space Intuition.

I may be permitted to add that, in a previous number of HERMATHENA, I have endeavoured to show, I know not how successfully, in what way this intuition may be brought somewhat nearer to the clearness which attaches to 'Two right lines cannot enclose a Space.'

Lastly, I would touch on the question how far it is desirable to introduce into Elementary Geometry what may be termed the modern conception of the limit or the form assumed by geometrical theorems in extreme cases, *e.g. line joining centres of two touching circles passes through point of contact as limit of line joining centres perpendicular to common chord*; or again, *angle between tangent and secant equal to angle in alternate segment as limit of angles in the same segment are equal*.

It is, as I think, desirable that such conceptions, presenting themselves as they do naturally, should be brought before the attention of the ordinary student.

At the same time, he should not be taught to accept them without verification by ordinary geometrical methods.

For, as I remarked when treating of Proportion, the demonstrative character of deductions like these is not fully grasped by the beginner. And even for the advanced student it is most desirable, for the very purpose of giving him confidence in the method of limits, that he should have learnt to trust it by seeing in simple cases the validity of the results to which it leads.

FREDERICK PURSER.

THE DEDUCTION OF SPACE FROM TIME.

A RIGID Deduction of Space would show from the *a priori* subjective conditions of knowledge that the objects of external nature must be presented to us as conforming to a certain schematic arrangement, which is as a matter of fact actualized in space of three dimensions. It is not easy to grasp the significance of the problem, or even to state it in its bare simplicity, for the subject is one of appalling difficulty, and full of traps in the shape of *petitiones principii*. Indeed, it is hard at first sight to see how a *petitio principii* can be avoided; for the conclusion of the Deduction would be, that Space is essential to knowledge, whereas to prove this, we have to assume the necessary conditions of knowledge. It is not circular, however, to argue that the *subjective* conditions of knowledge are *objectively* realised in Space. A method analogous to the Dialectic may be adopted, though the triad arrangement need not be forced. Starting from the simpler conditions of knowledge, it must be shown that these, to avoid 'collapse,' necessarily involve more complex conditions, finally ending in a spatial arrangement. I shall begin with a slight historical view of the question.

A.

It seems probable that the purely formal nature of Space was metaphysically inspected by Pythagoras and

Aristotle. But the problem before us now was first clearly suggested by Leibniz in his description of Space as *an order among possible co-existences*.¹ This is not a circular description, for it refers Space to Time, and it is also intended to emphasize Leibniz's belief, that real things are of such a nature that they must assume a particular intelligible order that does not exist apart from these realities any more than an abstract conception exists apart from its individual expression. One inference is that a vacuum is as absurd and impossible as the grin without the Cheshire Cat.

Berkeley and Hume agree with Leibniz in defining Space as a *manner of arrangement*, existing only for the sake of its content. But there is an important difference; for Berkeley and Hume Space is an arrangement of present sensations, whereas for Leibniz it is the formal aspect of the spontaneous creation of intelligible realities in their mutual relations. A mathematical point is a monad's *point de vue pour exprimer l'univers*.² Space expresses the systematic relations of co-existence between the whole universe of monads. This system is objective for every monad, and, at the same time, exists with an individual difference for each. On the one hand there are unique laws of space; on the other there are a multitude of different positions. Space as a whole is the objective scheme of relations, the different positions in Space representing the subjective *differentiae* of the monads. Thus it is possible for each monad to be a *miroir de l'univers*.³ For the whole system (spatial Nature) is *for* each monad. But the monad is only a mirror, for it must take a particular *point de vue*. As there are an endless number of monads, Space is infinitely divisible.

For Berkeley, the infinite number of monads is re-

¹ See Latta's *Leibniz*, p. 101, sqq. § 11.

² See Leibniz, *Nouveau Système*, ³ *Monadology*, § 56.

placed by a finite number of sentient beings; and it would appear that, for him, Space has no intelligible or necessary structure. Berkeley's important contribution, however, is that Space is meaningless except as a form of representation of sentient beings.¹

Kant's theory of Space makes a step towards a reconciliation between those of Leibniz and Berkeley. With the latter he agreed in treating Space as a mental form of representation; but owing to his deeper geometrical and scientific insight, he was led to regard Space as expressing necessary intelligible connexions between actual phenomena (Mahaffy and Bernard, pp. 211, 212). Unfortunately Kant did not carry out this idea. Space is for him a contingent form of intuition, and is not properly deduced. All he showed was that *some* form of presentation was necessary for knowledge. From the experienced fact that Space is the only such form accessible to us, he infers that Space is the necessary condition of knowledge. The objection to this is that the laws of Space may be contingent, arbitrary, blind, and consequently the basis of empirical perception only, but not of real *knowledge*. In reply to this objection, Kant points to the actual existence of laws of geometry, the apodeictic nature of which cannot be denied. This is a strong argument; but it seems to me to be a verification rather than a proof of the possibility of knowledge. *The complete deduction ought to lead necessarily to the foundations of geometry, expressing the fundamental axioms of the science as laws of Time-construction (phases of the pure schema) to which objects in Time must conform in order that conscious beings in Time may have a knowledge of them.*

Kant assumed Space, but did not deduce it as a scheme of connexion of representations. He made a great advance towards the solution of this problem, by

¹ See Mahaffy and Bernard's *Kant's Kritik of P. R.*, p. 210.

exhibiting—though he did not deduce—the intimate connexion between Space and Time, and their mutual dependence as forms of representation, thus expanding Leibniz's description of Space as an order amongst co-existences. Kant pointed out that both Space and Time are extensive quantities, and that phenomena in Space are mentally constructed (*a priori*) by a process which logically involves, even if it does not psychologically take place in, Time. And Time itself is meaningless without the representation of a permanent in Space. But he has not shown how to pass from the schema of Time to the three-dimensional continuum of Space. There is thus a breach of continuity in his system, corresponding partly to the antithesis between Sense and Understanding. Why need Space have more than one dimension? And if it has three, why are there no more? What is there in the conception of time-process and representation which leads to the relation of perpendicularity and direction in Space? Questions such as these probably occurred to Kant, but his separation of Sensibility from Understanding proves that he believed them to be unanswerable by us. But from his hinting that these two faculties have a common root, we may infer that he believed in the existence of a perfectly rational connexion between Intellect and the forms of Sense.¹

The problem thus suggested was attacked by Fichte—obscurely, as, I believe, most of his writings are obscure. In the science of knowledge, according to Fichte, we begin with the abstract conception of self-consciousness, and end with the concrete concept of the fully-developed self-

¹ The deduction I am looking for is that of Space from Time. Whether Time itself can be deduced is another question not here discussed. Though Time is a form of Sensibility, it is evident from his treatment of the

schema that Kant held Time to be more akin to pure intellectual form than Space. In any case the problem here set has to be solved before the dualism between Sense and Understanding can be removed.

determining Infinite Ego. There is no reality beyond the one all-embracing Ego, which is, like Spinoza's Substance, regarded as having self-conscious Thought as its supreme attribute. The Ego by determining itself creates finite objects (so-called non-Egos) which are really limited phases of its own being. These are thought as *non-Egos* just because they are only partial self-expressions of the complete Ego. The Ego must create such objects for itself, otherwise it would be a mere infinite unity (Hegel's pure Being), could never be conscious of itself, and so would not exist (Being = non-Being, as Hegel puts it). Accordingly the Ego, though essentially subject, breaks into subject and object, in order to preserve its own being as subject. The Ego, as subject, though essentially one, appearing in different beings—*e.g.* man—presents to itself objects constructed according to necessary self-imposed laws. This presentation of objects to the subject is Intuition. The Ego does not consciously create the objects which it intuits; but it is conscious of them when it has spontaneously evolved them¹ according to rational laws, which are simply self-determined laws by which the Ego freely acts. Hence, though we are not conscious of actually constructing Space and Time, it must be possible to exhibit the laws by which the Ego unconsciously constructs them, and to show that these laws spring from the self-determination of the Infinite Ego seeking to realise itself.

I am unable to condense my notion of Fichte any better than the above. Probably anyone unfamiliar with Fichte, and having no sympathy with such inquiries, if he troubles to read the above paragraphs, will take the impression that the Infinite Ego is like the great wicked dragon that

¹ This is the flaw in Fichte; the essence of the Ego being self-consciousness, how can it ever be unconscious of its own activity? Fichte tried too much; objects are *given* to,

not created by, our self-consciousness. The most we can do is to discover the formal laws by which they must be created for us.

fed upon its own brood because—at least in this case—there was no other food within reach. Hence from Fichte there is an easy but illusory step to the Blind Will of Schopenhauer. But this is of no great consequence, and I am not here defending Fichte's general principles. The point is that he understood partly, and faced bravely, the problem—"What are the *a priori* intelligible conditions of knowledge of which the forms of Space and Time are the intuitional expression?"

Fichte's deduction of Space, so far as I can trace it, is as follows:—Unity, freedom (self-determination), and necessity are the three chief attributes of the Ego. The freedom of the subject appears as contingency in the object; for the Ego, being self-determined, is not confined to any particular object or finite set of objects. Accordingly, it represents to itself not one object, but an infinite number. This implies an extensive medium which exists merely to contain in the unity of the Ego, and to present to it, an endless number of objects external to each other. The medium is continuous; for since its *raison d'être* is just to contain objects, it has no part empty; and if there were a gap between objects, that gap would be nothing, non-existent; objects being continuous, so is the medium. Further, it is *infinitely divisible*, for freedom enables the Ego to replace one object by as many others as it pleases, leaving the rest *in statu quo*. This leads to the conception of Space—a *continuous, extended, infinitely divisible medium of intuition*, in which objects in themselves have only contingent claims to their positions, which are actually determined with reference to the whole by the laws of Reason.

Fichte also attempts to deduce Time according to the intellectual order. Objects are both contingent and necessary, being products of the Ego's free and necessary activity. The Present expresses the freedom of the Ego through the contingency of the presented objects. The Past

expresses necessity. Accordingly, every object must be Present and Past in turn. Hence—as I understand it—the deduction of Time, which is intellectually a series *a, b, c, d*, in which each member is both contingent and necessary: by itself it is contingent—just presented; in its determination (the act of the Ego) of another member of the series it is necessary. Any member *must* exist, and *need not* exist. Time is the form by which the Ego escapes from this contradiction.

Fichte also noticed what is clear in Kant, that objects in Space become related, and so actually unified, by means of Time.

The above interpretation may be wrong—for Fichte's metaphysics are far more obscurely expressed than either Kant's or Hegel's. Fichte has made a step towards the Deduction of Space by enunciating the principle that the apprehension in unity of a plurality of connected objects is an *a priori* condition of knowledge. But—so far as I know—he utterly failed to see that the really hard part of the problem was to trace the dialectical genesis of the three dimensions. This omission arose from his deducing Space before Time, whereas Time is dialectically prior to Objective Space—a system connected according to invariable laws (Geometry). Fichte, exhibiting the need for a presentation of a plurality, virtually stopped like Berkeley at the concept of inchoate surface—a congeries of disconnected elements which apart from the third dimension yields no rational geometry.¹

Hegel was the first to see the need for a dialectical construction of the three dimensions. In fact, *rationality*, Kant never passed the first dimension (Time), and Fichte stopped

¹ By 'rational geometry' I here mean the science of the universal laws of *actual* space. The word 'geometry' may be used in a different sense, as the study of series of two or more

dimensions,' the *existence* of the series being hypothetical, and only the *connexions* necessary. (See B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, vol. i., p. 372.)

at the second. By Hegel Space is regarded as the general form of Externality, necessarily implied in the logical development. Internal involves external, and the external as such is a separate sphere to which the Dialectic triad is applicable. Space is abstract externality, and its three dimensions follow thus :—(a) the negation of Space itself in the *point*; (β) this negation as a part of Space—the *line*; (γ) the negation of the negation; this means, firstly, that a line and point determine each other; secondly, that Space returns to itself, with the added moment of negation, as *Space limited by surfaces*.¹ The line is not *formed* by points, but is the point external to itself; the surface is the line suppressed. The three dialectical moments are—first, Space as abstract externality; secondly, the negation of Space (the point), and this negation as external to itself (the line); thirdly, the re-affirmation of Space, its determination by its own negation (Space cut into parts by surfaces).

Hegel's deduction may be quite valid, and full of meaning to those who can interpret it properly; but in any case it is little more than a sketch or general indication of the method to be pursued. Besides, Space, as the object of Rational Geometry, is not mere abstract externality. This view of Space as a system of mutually external units might lead to metrical but never to projective geometry. All the categories of *Wesen* would have to be applied before the concept of Space as a system of *necessary* connexions could emerge. Such an application would be the proper development of Hegel's method, and might end in a true scheme of geometry. The view here taken is that *Wesen*, in the sense in which the past is *Wesen*, is a necessary factor in the transition to a third dimension.

The advance made by Hegel was showing that each transition from one dimension to another is the introduc-

¹ See Hegel's *Phil. of Nature*, § 256.

tion of a new and necessary category, which is not numerical, though subject to measure. The method which I am investigating starts from Time and the conditions of Time-experience; but Hegel's deduction, if developed, would be purely logical, and would be more fundamental if it could be made effective.

Lotze attempted to prove that there is no logical necessity to assume four dimensions—four lines mutually perpendicular. But his argument, as I understand it, is a *petitio principii*.¹ He admits further that his argument is only a translation of certain geometrical truths into the language of logic. He discusses the subject in an interesting manner, but I do not see that he has made any advance beyond Fichte: Space is for him a system of ordered relations between the elements of an external plurality, and he gets no further.

B.

Criticism is easy; and I feel with a sinking of the heart that the easiest part of this paper is finished. I cannot offer a perfectly complete deduction of geometrical relations; but I suggest a method, and use it so far that I believe it would provide such a complete deduction.

A general fallacy underlies the mathematical view of Space, and naturally leads some to a kind of hazy belief in objective n dimensions.² It is supposed that each dimension is only a quantitative repetition of the preceding one—lines

¹ See Lotze's *Metaphysic*, § 135. The same view is taken by B. Russell, *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*, p. 107: 'Lotze's argument assumes what he has to prove, that the number of lines perpendicular to a given line through any point is a single infinity, which is equivalent to the axiom of three dimensions.'

² The term ' n dimensions' is now ambiguous. It may denote either a possible *objective* system, of which our actual Space contains three dimensions, or it may have a logical meaning only, indicating a definable system of relations (cf. B. Russell, *Pr. of Maths.*, vol. i., pp. 374, 375).

of points, surfaces of lines, solids of surfaces, four dimensional 'figures' of solids, and so on for ever. This is quite rational according to the method adopted, because number is infinite. But the application of quantity to points is not the logical deduction of a plane; nor does an endless number of planes create the concept of three dimensions. Space is not a mere repetition of surfaces, but involves the presentation, as actual, of a new intellectual element, just as surfaces involve an element not contained in lines. The advocates of objective n dimensions have to show that Space is deficient as a form of representation of the processes of number and the real intellectual relations between external things. All this Lotze has noticed, and it is fairly obvious. A deduction of Space has to prove that *three dimensions are required and are sufficient to present intelligible external relations to beings whose knowledge is through consciousness in Time*. One inference will be that n dimensions are no more than a convenient algebraic conception, possessing only a logical meaning.

The deduction, then, is not quantitative. *Each new dimension involves a new and necessary category not realised in those below it*. These three are in brief *Construction*, *Presentation*, and *actual Relation*.¹

Objects are ideally constructed by a Time-process (one-dimension). They must be presented to a consciousness in Time as a coexistent and primarily independent plurality. This is the bare conception of surface, a 'picture' of disconnected qualities. Thirdly, all such 'pictures,' and all objects represented in them, must be immediately given as connected with each other (at least possibly) by an objective Time-relation. And as rational geometry involves the last and most concrete element, it follows, as just stated, that even plane geometry, in so far as it expresses necessary

¹ These three stages correspond to possible order, contingent order, and necessary order.

and real relations (as distinct from those which are merely logical), involves the third dimension. Lastly, the homogeneity of Space is deduced from the concept of Permanence.

The above is a general forecast of the deduction here begun. The whole proof rests on about twelve *a priori* principles which are clearly seen to be necessary conditions of our knowledge. They are super-spatial; none of them assumes that our knowledge is in Space; but, taken together, they form a *synthetical* argument for the necessity of a Space-form of three dimensions to give a real knowledge of objects to beings whose consciousness is in Time.¹

I. 1. *Our experience is in Time, and by means of sense-perception in the Present.* This does not assume Space, but only that Time is the necessary form of our internal experience.

2. *There is a world of universal objects also existing in Time.*

3. *This world is composed of an endless plurality of objects.* The possibility of a plurality follows from the quantitative nature of pure Time. This plurality is also necessarily endless. A finite limited number of Time objects cannot be conceived; Time is infinitely divisible and never-ending; hence change,² which alone gives meaning to Time, must envelop an infinite number of states of the subject, and so an infinite number of objects. Indeed, any time-object supposed completed must contain an endless number of phases involved in its construction, and is thus, as regards construction, infinitely divisible. There must be also an endless number of objects existing in the Present if the possibility of the past phases of construction,

¹ The first eight propositions deduce three dimensions; the remaining four prove that Space must be homogeneous.

² It may be said that the Permanent

is assumed. We have a right to assume this, as condition of Time knowledge; but we are not assuming that it is given by *our* spatial form.

even of a single object, is to be represented to present perception. And in another sense there must be an endless series of changes—from the Present state of any object—extending into the Future. Already, then, any object is in a manner ‘triply’ infinite—in the mode of its past construction; in the presentation *now* of that mode; and in its endless future changes.

4. *These external objects must be actually related to each other.* This is involved in the very notion of intelligible reality. It is an absolutely certain superspatial condition of knowledge. In fact, it forms part of the definition of knowledge.

5. That *these relations between objects are Time-relations* follows from 2. Two related things not related by Time must, for a Time-consciousness, be identical. Two entities not related at all are just coexistent in Time.

6. From the preceding principles taken together it follows that *knowledge involves the IMMEDIATE PRESENT PERCEPTION of objects, or systems of objects, related to each other through Time, and constructed in endless Time.* The subjective feelings corresponding to the objects need not be infinite in number; but they must be given in such a form as to express that the objects are endless in the manner described.

7. *The immediate perception of a plurality is primarily (i.e. dialectically first) the presentation of unrelated objects or states of the subject.* We must by 3 perceive a plurality of states *in the present*, for all consciousness is in the present. But these states existing in the *same* moment of Time are as such independent, and quite contingent in reference to each other. For by 5, relation between objects or states of the subject involves a time interval, however small.¹

¹ This stage in the dialectical order corresponds to Surface. The distinction between objects and states of the subject has not emerged. This is the

8. Accordingly, in order to avoid contradiction between 4 and 7, we must have a *present consciousness of a collection of objects which as present are independent, but must appear in such a form that they are immediately apprehended as related to each other through the Past, and to be again mutually related in the Future.*

The foregoing eight propositions form a general deduction of Space of three dimensions. Pure indeterminate Time provides, firstly, the *indefinite* linear construction of a plurality, in which order is merely possible. In 7 we have reached *unordered* surface; and 8 introduces the need of a third dimension, which is no longer indefinite or unordered, and throws back its determinate necessity on the preceding stages.

The following remarks may make the argument more intelligible:—Consciousness requires the *presentation* of an endless plurality of disconnected objects (by 7). These objects are not at first (dialectically) represented as ordered; for if so they would be *dependent* on each other—an impossibility for coexistent objects (by 5). Corresponding to this we have the plane of vision¹ which at first (dialectically) is just a *Menge* of presented images external to each other and primarily unrelated.

This 'plane,' a mere picture of the blind imagination, is at first (dialectically) not analysed, not conceived as divisible into ordered lines, but just taken as it is in its bare immediacy, as an aggregate of different 'qualities,' without any underlying essence.

It is worthy of remark that Berkeley stopped at this

position of Berkeley, for whom all objects are secondary qualities, and as such unrelated (see p. 504). This stage corresponds to the 'blind imagination' which Kant refers to.

¹ The 'plane of vision' is not to be *identified* with the dialectic moment, though it illustrates it. A man blind

from birth must, if he is capable of knowledge, have a corresponding 'plane of touch' of the same intelligible nature as our plane of sight. The 'plane of vision' above referred to has the same intelligible meaning for everyone, blind or not.

point; philosophically speaking, he existed in the second dimension! Things are for Berkeley just presented contingently on 'a flat plane variously coloured' (Locke), or on a touch or smell plane, with various feelings and odours. Hence his mistrust of objective rational geometry¹ which is not possible even *in plano* till the third dimension is reached. In fact, surface is the form of presentation of secondary qualities of every sense so long as these qualities are apprehended as co-existing—not, indeed, surface as we think of it, which involves completed space, but surface as a bare abstract concept viewed as prior to the third dimension, which is required for an intuition of 'primary qualities,' the *Wesen* of the secondary.

The need for a third dimension arises thus:—The pictures on the second dimension are purely ideal, and given as present and disconnected. But the corresponding objects (by 4 and 5) are actually related to each other in Time, and the actuality of their connexion must be intuited. The whole system² of underlying objects (*a*) must be presented as actually emerging from a past system, and (*b*) as actually proceeding into a future system, and (*c*) the past of any one object must be given as actually related to the present of any other; also (*d*) the present of any one object must be given in such a form that it will be actually related to the future of any other object. All this complex of relations is to be given by an *intuition in the Present*.

This shows the *a priori* necessity for representing the possibility of two new types of system, P and F, the one (P) to contain the past of the present system; the other (F) to hold its future. But there is not only one P and

¹ In *The Commonplace Book* (Fraser, vol. i., pp. 12, 86) Berkeley states that π may have different values for different circles!

² Properly speaking, the term 'system' should not yet be used, as we are still

in the *Menge* stage of inchoate second dimension. But there is no word to express the transition state between chaos and system—a chaos which contains the germs of order.

one F; for, Time being continuous and endless, the presented system must be intuited as continuously connected with an infinite series of systems (P) extending indefinitely into the Past, and another series of systems (F) extending into the Future, both series being in a fixed order.

Triadic space gives this possibility, whereas two dimensions does not. First there is the presented surface (L), and on either side of it an infinite series of surfaces (P and F) extending *ad infinitum*. The Time-connexions required by (a), (b), (c), (d) are plainly representable to present intuition, as lines joining all objects in L to all objects in P and F.

Space, then, must at least express the possibility of presenting a complete system of Time-relations between objects. An object, when actually referred thus to its 'place' in the system, becomes a constituent part of reality.

II. So far I have deduced only *cylindrical space*—a system of inchoate surfaces passing out of each other in continuous order and in a distinct direction corresponding to Past and Future. In actual space, however, the direction is arbitrary. The rest of the deduction shows that space is homogeneous round every point, and that direction is mutual and indifferent (a property bound up with homogeneity).

9. A further principle emerges in natural order after 8. *Permanence in Time must be intuited in present consciousness*. Kant shows clearly that the representation of the Permanent is a condition of the apprehension of change, and he seems to have referred this to matter in general. Of course I may have misunderstood him, but the representation of Permanence of matter seems to be vague. Is it quantity of matter? And, if so, how is quantity to be measured? It must be by some *a priori* method which is *certainly* valid in the external world. The

gravitational properties of matter are not necessarily permanent. No one will pretend that an experimental proof of the destructibility of weight is *a priori* impossible, or that if it were possible it would destroy our power of apprehending change. However, he may have meant only that there must be a representation of some undetermined Permanent. The *a priori* need for a present intuition of the form, and consequent possibility, of objective Permanence, is, however, evident from the subjective necessary conditions of Time-experience; and Kant recognises this in his Refutation of Idealism.¹ For since the content of the Ego as in Time is the subjective apprehension of outer realities, a unity of experience through Time would be impossible if this content were purely fluent. Every moment of Time would be isolated, and there would be an infinity of Egos instead of one Ego. And a subjective permanent (psychic memory) is not enough, for every subjective state must be regarded, by 1 and 2, as corresponding to an external objective event in Time. There must exist in the form in which objects are given to us an immediate intuition of the actuality of the permanent. This *form of presentation of Permanence is position* in its pure abstract nature. In the order of Deduction *position* is of course nothing more than such a presentation of Permanence, and even in actual completed space it is nothing more in its conception. The truth of this may be verified by anticipating and examining the pure meaning of position *in concreto*. It is evident that an object, when it does not change its position, is—so far as it is extended—merely permanent. Motion is the perpetual negation of Permanence. It may be objected that a body in its internal structure is permanent, though the body itself may move. But this further verifies the principle, for the internal parts of the body *qua*

¹ Empirically, memory involves an *external* permanent arrangement of nerve-cells.

permanent preserve their relative positions,¹ and a body moving relative to its surroundings merely *changes*—a change which indeed destroys part of its internal permanence, in virtue of the force-connexions between all bodies. The belief in the identity of Permanence with position is the stimulus to theories of matter, which all aim at explaining changes of qualities as corresponding to changes of position.²

10. *Every object presented in Time must have a relative permanence.* For the existence of a thing at only one indivisible moment of Time is inconceivable; it is no more existent than non-existent, accordingly is not a Time-object for consciousness. It must be represented as permanent in its qualities for at least a short interval of Time. There are Zenonian difficulties here; but the time-synthesis which creates a complete object may be compared to a mathematical integration, which is precise and complete, though it involves the same difficulties. An object must be conceived as relatively permanent, though it may be, and is, always changing.

It was proved above that Time-knowledge requires the presentation of three types of systems: L the present, P and F the past and future connected systems—all the objects in L being intuited as time-related to all the objects in all the systems of the types P and F—and that lines are the intuitions corresponding to the concepts of these time-relations. But there is an apparent con-

¹ All position is relative. Not only have we no idea of the Place of the Universe, but it has no absolute place (cf. Berkeley). B. Russell, *Essay on Foundations of Geometry*, claims that relativity of position is a condition of metrical geometry (pp. 159, *sqq.*).

² It may further be objected that a body may change without changing its *position*, e.g. electrification or heat.

But physicists explain this as due to internal movement in the molecules of the body, and it cannot be made intelligible otherwise. And as soon as this change becomes actualized externally, the body moves. Only by spatial motion are the existence and variations of electricity and other properties detected and measured.

tradition here, for the objects in the systems P and F are given to present consciousness. *This contradiction is annulled by the concept of Permanence*, which enables an object to be conceived as the same in the Past as in the Present, and the same in the Present as in the Future. Any member p of a P system regarded as Past is in a Time-relation to the present system, but in virtue of its permanence, p is also conceivable as existing in the Present, and can only thus be presented. The present intuition corresponding to the necessarily conceived Permanence of p is its position. This permanence (position) prevents the collapse of the system P, given as typical of the past, into the system L, which is typical of the Present, while at the same time P is presented *now*.

11. Hence the *reversibility of the intuited Time-relations*. For P is now by permanence given as actual in the Present. L, in like manner, by its necessary permanence—for consciousness of objects merely in the present is impossible—is likewise to be regarded as past. Hence their Time-relations are reversed. A difficulty occurs: Why are there not *two* intuitions of relations between p (an object on P), and l (an object on L), and so two lines from p to l , each representing unique relations, in which each object in turn is past and future respectively? The answer is this:—Any two objects (A and B) co-exist, and being also permanent, have past and future relations with regard to each other. Such relation involves *change* representable by spatial motion from A to B, and from B to A. The *change* effected in B by A is abstractly represented by the line AB, and involves transference of an element from A to B. But *in the same time* that A is changing B, B is changing A. This *sameness of time* is represented by the uniqueness of the straight line AB = BA. The times of mutual influence could not be different (A by B and B by A), just because A by changing is

changed, for action and reaction are mutually implicative. This is a special *a priori* law. It is inconceivable that A should change B without A being changed, and this change is immediately referred to B. Accordingly, the changes AB and BA take place simultaneously.¹

12. *The complete presented system² is homogeneous.*

For extending the above argument to relations between L and F, and between P and F (which are time-related through L), it follows that the system L (originally conceived as present), the types of system P (originally past), and the types F (originally future) may all be regarded as either past, present, or future indifferently. This indifference extends obviously to all the individual objects in each system. The only thing that would prevent this extension would be the necessary connexion between the objects in any co-instantaneous system (e.g. L or P or F); but it was shown that elements in a system (*qua* co-instantaneous) are independent and contingently related (see 5). Accordingly, we may select any number (finite or infinite) of objects on any system (P, L, or F), and regard these objects as co-instantaneous (in past, present, or future), with any other arbitrarily chosen set of objects out of any other systems.³ An intuition of this state of affairs is required. In other words, the complete system as *presented* is homogeneous.

The completed system is thus one in which *any objects or set of objects may be regarded as co-instantaneous, or past or future in reference to each other*, and the *whole* set may of course be regarded as co-existent.⁴

¹ The *sense* of the vector is an intuition of the relation of 'before' and 'after' (Time-direction). The reciprocity in the sense arises from the fact that each object is both past and future with reference to the other.

² *i.e.*, the system which includes all the two-dimensional systems.

³ The concrete meaning is that any number of points chosen at random in space may be intuited as lying on a surface. Even *all* the points in Space may be so regarded.

⁴ This is what Kant means by the third analogy of experience.

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Leibniz's general description of Space as an order among co-existents is therefore only partly true. Two objects in Space must be regarded as being in any time-order with reference to each other. (When viewed as merely co-existent, they are really intuited as lying on one surface;¹ And this state of affairs is possible by the conception of Permanence (intuited as *position*), through which the same object exists in past, present, and future. *Space, in fact, is not merely a static structure, but the representation of permanent dynamical relations between things.* Pure geometers may be tempted to forget this; but no other view could connect pure and applied mathematics. Space as permanent is an intuition of the possibility of the permanence of the laws of nature; but it is an abstraction to regard it as a permanent in itself.

I have exhibited the epistemological need for a general tri-dimensional form of intuition. (1) The indefinite first dimension is just the construction of units one after another in time. But the order is (dialectically) at first contingent; (2) The conception that the units are constructed in any order, and that the whole *Menge* is thus presented, is unordered surface; (3) The need for ordered relation involved in objective Time gives the third dimension.

The whole process is now to be repeated with the new conception of a necessary Time-order. This conception gave rise to transition from second to third dimension; and *before this is evolved rational objective geometry is impossible.* The necessary Time-relations are now intuited as an

¹ Leibniz, as well as Berkeley, logically stopped at the second dimension, the concept of *co-existence*, the bare possibility of *presentation* to a conscious subject. But Leibniz's view is to be preferred; for, though an *order* among co-existences is a contradiction, it

suggests the further development required for the solution of this contradiction. This is Kant's concept of Community of Substances, which co-exist, and are *also* Past and Present in relation to each other.

objective line or lines, giving order where there was formerly confusion. For this reason, I said that even *linear and plane rational objective geometry pre-suppose the third dimension* in the above sense.

There is an argument which I believe is used to show the geometrical desirability of having an objective fourth dimension. In the fourth dimension reflected figures could be shown equal by superposition of parts; but in three dimensions this is impossible, just as in two dimensions Euclid I. 4 cannot be proved for triangles having opposite aspects. In a fourth dimension, a right- and left-handed glove could be superimposed without change of shape! But that this is impossible for us is rather a verification of the completeness of the Triadic Space for Time-beings. For it is a geometrical intuition of the *impossibility* of the coincidence of Past and Future time. I am convinced that this is the Time-explanation of this phenomenon of the duality of Space, though I cannot rationally deduce it. And if there is a fourth dimension, it must be in a world where time goes backwards as well as forwards! This kind of thing happens in *The Strand Magazine*, but nowhere else.

Here is a summary of the deduction. Pure Time is the principle of construction of objects¹ from zero. Every object is conceived as generated by an endless process from the Past; and if any plurality of objects has to be assumed, this plurality must be conceived as generated by Time from zero.

Consciousness in Time is always through present perception, though knowledge is not confined to the Present. Hence, if perception is to be the medium of knowledge, present consciousness must be in a form which

¹ The term 'object' is here used in a very wide sense. It includes every-thing that exists for us—all that has the predicate *Sein*, excepting concrete mind.

contains an endless plurality of objects. The mind must recognise from the form of its perceptions that such a given endless plurality of objects is actually there. Otherwise present consciousness would not be knowledge, but sensation, possessing perhaps a self-contained unity, but having no reference to anything outside itself, and so isolated. There can be no absolute limit to the plurality, for this would mean that the limited thing was isolated as above. Knowledge, however, is knowledge of all Time, and so implies absence of limit in the *present* objects.¹

This endless present plurality of objects cannot be arranged in Time-order (one-dimensionally)—as one would at first suppose—but in a mutually contingent manner. For being *present*, they are regarded as existing in the same moment of Time, and in their immediacy they are therefore mutually independent. For dependence and relation between objects imply a time-transition between them, and so an interval of time, however small, before the one can be affected by the other. This is the stage of the unordered second dimension. That quantitatively it is 'doubly infinite' will afterwards be proved.

The endless present plurality (L) is, as present, a mere collective *Menge* without mutual relations. This requires intuited reference of L to a Past set of systems of type P—such that all objects on P are given as Time-related to all objects on L—and to another continuous ordered set of systems of type F representing the Future. This corresponds to the stage of cylindrical space.

The homogeneousness of the complete system (S) of all these systems follows from the consideration that all objects S are *present*, and that their reference to the Past can only be represented by presented intuitions (Time-

¹ It is of course empirically true that sensation implies contrast, but this is not the same thing, for sensation

does not require reference to an endless number of sensations.

lines). Now any presented object must be intuited as having a persistence or permanence in Time (the form of the intuition corresponding to permanence is position); accordingly, it must be viewed as existing in past and future, and it is *given* in the present. Consider any two objects, A and B, in any of the systems. They must be viewed as co-instantaneous, and so lying on a surface. A must be regarded as prior in time to B; this gives line AB. B must be regarded as prior in time to A; this gives line BA.

The general deduction of Space given above shows that three dimensions emerge by applying in turn the three 'categories' Construction, Presentation, and Relation. It is clear that the deduction is not quantitative, as mathematicians may be disposed to think; but each new dimension is not merely a repetition of the former, but is required by a new conception. But the three dimensions of Cartesian geometry are mutually interchangeable and of a quantitative nature. Only after the complete deduction can the reason for this interchangeableness be shown. It follows:

1. From the need for representing all quantity as a Time-genesis;
2. From the proved homogeneity of Space.

Quantity cannot be applied at random, but only according to objective laws; hence, though three is not the last number, we have no right to infer n dimensions until an objective—as distinct from a quantitative—necessity for it arises.

The quantitative three dimensions follow in an obvious way. Firstly, Time (non-objective order of units) is the first dimension. How from this can we construct the *Menge* for the inchoate second dimension? Not by Time alone, but by Time operating indiscriminately on its own ordered products, whereby the linear order is lost—as it must be. Observe that it is not the need for constructing more things that leads to the 'double infinity,' for a line contains just

as many parts as a plane, being absolutely unlimited, but the need for constructing a plurality which is not Time-ordered by means of a plurality that is Time-ordered. The construction has to be schematised by another Time process.

And the *quantitative* third dimension by which solid space is measured follows simply in the ordinary way. For we have deduced the need for a plurality of *Mengen*, and this plurality is quantitatively got only by applying the ordered Time-genesis of units to the surface *Menge*.

But here, as before, it is not the need for a larger number that leads to the triple infinity, for there is no larger number. The number of images on a plane is just as unlimited as the number of parts in solid space.

The deduction above given is only a beginning. Any further inquiry would have to trace the laws of projective as well as metrical geometry, and to establish the strictly Euclidean nature of actual space. The notions of position, the straight line, distance direction, perpendicularity, &c., should all be traced in the dialectical order, and shown *a priori* from the conclusions now reached to be concepts required for the representation of real relations.

R. A. P. ROGERS.

LETTERS OF HENRY BRADSHAW ON IRISH TYPOGRAPHY.

[COMMUNICATED BY T. K. ABBOTT.]

ABOUT fifteen years ago I learned from the "Life of Henry Bradshaw" that he had written to Mr. Talbot Baines Reed (of Fann Street Letter-Foundry, London, author of "A History of Old English Letter-Foundries," London, 1887), on the subject of Typography in Ireland. I communicated with Mr. Reed; and he kindly sent me the letters, with permission to copy, but not to publish them. Quite recently Mr. Reed's successors, Sir Charles Reed and Sons, have given me permission to publish the letters, which I now do with great pleasure. The only omissions are of purely personal matters.

KING'S COLL., CAMBRIDGE,
Oct. 15, 1885.

I hope you will not put down my silence for five days to ingratitude, but I have been absolutely unable to get five minutes' peace in which to answer a letter which has given me more pleasure than any I have received for many years past. It is a real satisfaction at last to find someone who can interest himself in this subject of Irish Typography from a typographical point of view. There is happily always plenty of work left for posterity to do, however minutely careful we may be. Here have I been working for years at these several founts of type, and yet until your letter came I never realised that O'Reilly's *Grammar* (as distinguished from his *Dictionary*) and

his *Irish Writers* contained, both of them, the actual type cut for Robert Boyle for the New Testament of 1681.

Your time, like mine, is, no doubt, fully occupied, or I wish heartily you could some day find time to come down to Cambridge that I might show you numberless things which you would be glad to see, and that I might ask you questions with the actual books *before you*. In my own work and collections upon Irish books I am obliged to make the Union (1800) a landmark. The last book I know in the Irish character before that appeared in 1742 (Donlevy); and during the rest of the eighteenth century I can find not the slightest trace of any Irish alphabet *in use*. Marcel's *Alphabet Irlandais*, printed at Paris in 1804, shows the first symptoms of a revival. This is the fount used at Rome from 1676 to 1707, which Napoleon brought from the Propaganda at Rome; and after a little doctoring of the matrices, it was used for this book (and, I believe, for one other) in Paris. But the great revival in the United Kingdom seems to have come in 1808; and from that time onward there has been a succession of new founts, which from the small number of letter-foundries ought to be easily capable of having their history written with exactness. This is a plain fact, and the very existence of the actual blank half century from 1750 to 1800 makes it easier to treat the two periods distinctly. (I am wrong. I see in Fry's *Pantographia* of 1799, page 166 contains a specimen of Moxon's type, as might be expected from what you say.) The old founts, so far as I have been able to ascertain the facts, are these:—

1. Dublin, 1571, sent over by Q. Elizabeth.
2. Louvain, 1616, belonging to the Irish College there, founded in 1616, but first used at Antwerp in 1611. (See below.)
3. Louvain, 1645 (another fount, larger than the preceding, and used at different press).
4. Rome, 1676, Propaganda College.
5. London, 1681, cut by Moxon.
6. Paris, 1732.

These founts (there was more than one alphabet at some of these places) are all perfectly distinct, and cannot be confused with one another. In order to get an accurate idea of the use to which they were put, it is necessary to examine not only the books printed wholly in the Irish character, but also the Latin or English books

from the same presses, which show an incidental use of words printed in the Irish character. I do my best to get possession of all the books I can buy; and for those which cannot be bought, I try to know where I can examine them thoroughly.

Having said so much, let me take your printed list in order, making just a few notes, and adding one or two omitted books as I go on. Only note that when I say 4° [etc.] I mean what I say, and do not use these words at random.

1571. O'Kearney, Aibidil (Church Catechism and Articles of 1566 in Irish). Dublin, 20 June, 1571. 8°. I have on my table a copy borrowed from Lincoln; and I have also examined the copies in the B. M. and in the Bodleian.

[1571. A poem on the last judgment, printed at Dublin in 1571, on a broadside sheet. I have before me, borrowed from Corpus Christi College, the copy which was apparently sent over to London to the Abp. of Canterbury as a specimen of the press.]

1602. New Testament. Dublin, 1602. F°. I have a copy; and I have examined two or three more in Cambridge, besides those in the B. M. and Bodleian. Issued with a dedication to James I. in 1603.

1608. Common Prayer. Dublin, 1608. F°. Not issued till 1609. I have two copies, and I have examined others in Cambridge, at the B. M., Bodleian, Dublin, &c.

[†1608. O'Hussey, Catechism. Louvain, Irish College, 1608. This statement is made by Wadding, who also tells us that the Irish College was founded and the first stone laid in 1616. So 1608 must be a misprint, perhaps for 1618. In two cases mentioned below, his figures have undoubtedly been misprinted.]

1611. O'Hussey, Catechism. Antwerp, "*apud Jacobum Mesuim*" (bookseller, nothing said about the printer), 1611. 12°. I have seen this in the B. M. and Bodleian. The type is that which after the foundation of the Irish Franciscan College at Louvain was used at the press of that College.

1616. Conry, Sgathan an Chrabhaigh [Sgáthan an Chrábaigh], Louvain, 1616, 8°, the year in which he founded the Irish Franciscan College at Louvain. The book is a translation of the well-known *Desiderius*. By a misprint, Wadding gives 1626 as the date, in which he is followed by Harris. In the seventeenth century the

figure 1 was commonly written 2; and unless the author was familiar with the date, a misprint might easily pass without correction. I have a copy of the book; and I have examined another here, and a third at the B. M., and others elsewhere. The B. M. copy of the edition of 1616 is Grenville, 4771.

1618. M'Caghwell (Cavellus), *Mirror of the Sacrament of Penance*, in Irish. Louvain, Irish College Press, 1618. 12°. I have Charles O'Connor's copy, formerly at Stowe. Wadding (from whom Harris and others all borrow) gives the date as 1628. But this is a misprint which has been accounted for in the preceding article. The author died in 1626.

† 1618. O'Hussey, *Catechism*. Reid¹ mentions this reprint, but gives no authority. I have not been able to find any trace of a copy anywhere, unless this is the date of some undated copy of an undated edition mentioned below. It may be the real date of the edition placed by Wadding under the year 1608.

(No date, but between 1616 and 1619.) O'Hussey, *Catechism*. Louvain, Irish College Press. 16°. My copy, which I bought in its original limp vellum binding, was given to the Irish Franciscans at Toulouse in 1619; and the author is called on the title, "poor brother of the order of St. Francis, at the College of St. Anthony at Louvain," so it must be subsequent to the founding of the College in 1616. I have seen another copy in the B. M. marked 3505, a. 7.

(No date, but between 1616 and 1619.) Three poems by Bonaventura O'Hussey, printed at the Irish College Press at Louvain, 16°. My copy was bound with the preceding article in the original binding, and so must be from 1616 to 1619. But it is to be noted that on the title-page of the *Catechism*, the author calls himself "poor brother," etc., as above, while here he calls himself "Guardian" of the College. I believe Guardian was an office held only for a time; and the records of the Irish Franciscans at Louvain ought to afford a clue to the year to which these two books belong. Some of these records are to be found in the Brussels Library, and others are now with the Franciscans in Dublin. There is a copy also in the B. M. misbound, in 3505, a. 7.

¹ [Reid, John, *Bibliotheca Scoto-Celtica*; or an account of all the books which have been printed in the Gaelic language. Glasgow, 1832.]

† 1626. Conry. Misprint for 1616 (see above).

† 1626. Grammar by Florence Gray. The author was a Franciscan at the I. C. at Louvain ; and Wadding must have known him. But though he mentions his Grammar, neither he nor Harris speaks of it as having been printed. Harris says the author was living in Dublin about 1630 ; and Reid, quoting this, suggests that if the book was ever printed, it probably appeared about 1626.

† 1628. M'Caghwell. A misprint for 1618. See above.

† 1631. *The A B C in Irish and English*. Published by Bishop Bedell. Dublin, 1631. 8°. I have examined Archbishop Sancroft's copy now at Emmanuel College, and the B. M. copy, but I have seen no others.

1641. *Rule of the 3rd Order of S. Francis*, translated into Irish by B. C. (Bernard Cuney). Louvain, Irish College Press, 1641. 12°. The author, who was a Franciscan at the Irish College at Louvain, is mentioned by Wadding (and from him by Harris) as having written this ; but neither says anything of its having been printed. I have examined the copy in the Pepysian Library here, and one at the Bodleian.

1639. *Catechism in Irish and Latin*. By Theobald Stapleton, an Irish secular priest (not a Franciscan). Brussels, 1639. 4°. This is printed in the Roman character. I once preserved a copy which is the same, I believe, which is now in the Irish library of Mr. Shirley, at Lough Fea, County Monaghan. There is also one in the Grenville collection in the B. M.

(Before 1641.) Harris and the biographer of Bishop Bedell mention a second edition of the *A B C*, to which extracts from the Fathers and other matters were added. I have never found a trace of the existence of the edition ; but as only two copies are known of the edition of 1631 (see under that year), these may yet be found. They would certainly be printed at the Dublin Press.

1643. *Seanasan nuadh* (a vocabulary), by Michael O'Clery. Louvain, Irish College Press, 1643. 8°. I have examined the copies in the B. M. and the Bodleian. The author, who was an Irish Franciscan, is best known as one of the "Four Masters" of Irish history.

1645. *The Paradise of the Soul*, translated into Irish by Anthony

Gearnon. Louvain, Irish College Press, 1645. 18°. I have two copies ; and I have seen others in the B. M. and elsewhere.

1645. *Acta Sanctorum Hiberniae*, tom. i. By John Colgan, the Irish Franciscan. "Louvain, apud Everardum de Witte," 1645. F°. There is no name of printer, only of the publisher. The Irish type which occurs in many places throughout this volume is not at all the same as the type belonging to the I. F. C., but a larger fount, which does not range well, and certainly would not have been used had the I. C. type been in existence in the same office.

This larger type occurs also in the *Sancti Rumoldi Acta*, edited by Hugh Ward, and published after his death by Thomas Sirinus (both Irish Franciscans), at Louvain, "typis Petri Sasseni," in 1662. On the other hand, the *Trias Thaumaturga*, published by Colgan, at Louvain in 1647, F°, "apud Cornelium Coenestonium" (without printer's name), has the ordinary Louvain Irish College type. No whole book is known printed in the larger type.

1652. The Catechism, with the Six Points of W. Perkins, translated into Irish by Godfrey Daniels. Dublin, 1652. 8°. This is practically Bedell's *A B C* with additional matter. I have a copy formerly belonging to Edward Lhuyd (see 1707); and I have examined others at the B. M. and the Bodleian. It is the last book printed in the Dublin fount of 1571. I have found single words of this type used in Sir James Ware's books, printed in London by E. Tyler in 1656 and 1658; and I think the fount itself must have shared the fate of the rest of Bladen's printing materials in Dublin after the Restoration. The statement that it passed to the Continent originated with Andrew Sall, the converted Jesuit; but my own present belief is, that Sall had only seen abroad the Louvain College type, which was certainly in use at the time of which he is speaking.

1662. *Acta S. Rumoldi*, edited by Hugh Ward and Thomas Simms, Irish Franciscans. Louvain, "typis Petri Sasseni," 1662. 4°. The Irish type in this book is the same as that used in Colgan's *Acta SS.* (See above.)

1663. Catechism in Irish, by John O'Dowley. Louvain, 1663. 8°. Ir. Coll. type. I have not yet seen the title-page. The only copy I know which has it belongs to Prince Lucien Bonaparte. I

have one, and there is one which I have examined at the B. M., but both want the title-page. My copy belonged to the Jesuit College at Louvain; and it is bound in one volume, with Archdekin's Treatise on Miracles, printed at Louvain in 1667. 8°. They are in contemporary Louvain binding, the Archdekin standing first, and the O'Dowley standing next, and wanting the title-page. I have no doubt whatever that this is the identical volume (then at Louvain) from which Harris's correspondent derived all the information known about either book. He says that the "Treatise of Miracles" is in Irish and English, whereas there is not a word of Irish in the book; and he omits all notice of the existence of O'Dowley's Catechism, which he would hardly have done, had not the titleless Irish Catechism which follows the Treatise of Miracles in this volume been mistaken for an Irish portion of the first work. As a matter of fact, he says that the work is in English and Irish—not in Irish and English, as he would naturally have done if it had been an Irish work with an English version. Archdekin's other name was M'Gillacuddy, which Reid prints with such a long hyphen that the name has been misread as if M'Giolla alone.

†1667. M'Giolla, a mistake (see preceding).

1676. *Lucerna Fidelium*, by F. Molloy. Rome, Propaganda College, 1676. 8°. I have two copies; and others are to be seen in the B. M. and many libraries. The late Mr. Geo. Smith, of Dublin, bought the remaining stock at Rome from the College, and the uncut copies now in circulation are derived from this source. This is the first book in which the Irish type of the Propaganda College appears.

1676. Various Irish Grammars mentioned by Reid, but there is no ground to suppose that any of them were printed.

1677. *Grammatica Latino-Hibernicum*, by F. O'Molloy. Rome, Propaganda College, 1677. 12°. There is a good deal of Irish printing in this book. I have two copies, and there are others at the B. M. and in many other libraries. One of my copies, which I bought at David Laing's sale, is very interesting. It belonged to Robert Kirke, who edited the little Bible of 1690 in Roman type, modifying the Irish into Scotch Gaelic for the benefit of the Highlanders, for whose use the book was printed. . . .

Friday, Oct. 16, 1885.

. . . After the date at which I have arrived (1677) the Louvain type is used, so far as I know, only once, in McCurtin (1728), which has at the end a reprint of O'Dowley's Catechism of 1663. The larger Louvain fount of type I have not been able to trace in use after 1662. The Propaganda fount appears afterwards in an edition (called *Secunda Editio*) of O'Hussey's Catechism, printed at Rome in 1707, and in a little brochure of four leaves containing the story of the house of Loreto, which I have generally found annexed to the O'Hussey of 1707. This little piece is without title or date.

The Paris fount appears only, I believe, in O'Begley and M'Curtin's *English-Irish Dictionary*, printed in 1732, and in Donlevy's *Catechism*, printed in 1742. The Donlevy of 1723 is, I feel sure, a myth or a misprint. The Lhuyd is 1707, not 1706, and was printed (under the title of *Archæologia Britannica*) at Oxford, not at Rome, and in Roman characters. Your query *Rome* ? ought to have been *Roman type* ? and then it would have been right enough.

O'Brien in 1768 (Paris) used only the Roman character. So Vallancey. So also the little Catholic books like Gallagher, O'Reilly, &c., printed in England and Ireland, so far as I have been able to ascertain.

After the Union a new chapter opens, which I am very anxious to see dealt with from a purely typographical or type-founder's point of view. You can help materially in this. . . .

I know pretty well about the books in which the London type is used ; but I still want to have a really clear statement of all the books in order, and then I can trace out the history of the type in an orderly manner.

Then for the nineteenth-century founts it will be comparatively straightforward work to continue the investigation ; and the books can be rationally arranged under their presses and the presses under the letter-foundries which supplied them with type.

I am very glad indeed to hear of the Belfast movement about local books. I wish very much I could be put into communication with those who are interested in the subject.

Oct. 21, 1885.

. . . I wish my long letters were as full of facts as your short ones are. . . .

Fournier I have not seen. No doubt it is in the library; but I am delighted to hear the Paris type is there in 1764, and that he seems to be the owner of it. . . .

I think you mean the Transactions of the Gaelic Society (Dublin, 1808, 8°), which has the large type in question. But I cannot lay my hand on the book at the moment. But note this: I have two issues of O'Reilly's *Dictionary*, 1817 and 1821. In 1817 the title has John Barlow as the printer; and this leaf and the dedication to the Duke of Kent hang together. The whole of the *Dictionary* is in Barlow's type, and has his name at the end. The *Grammar* is in Moxon's type, and was, I presume, printed last, and perhaps by O'Neill. In 1821 a new title was printed with O'Neill's name at the foot; and the second leaf of this sheet contains a poem addressed by O'Reilly to Paul O'Brien, in Moxon's type. This sheet was substituted for the Barlow title of 1817, the leaf containing the poem being folded so as to follow the dedication and preface.

Now, on looking at E. O'Curry's *Irish Grammar*, printed at Dublin in 1808 by Barlow, I notice two founts, one much larger than the other. The ordinary one is that in which Barlow printed O'Reilly's *Dictionary* in 1817; and the larger one bears some distant resemblance to the Paris Fournier type; but any comparison shows that the letters are wholly different, though memory might lead one to identify them. I have them both before me at this moment (E. O'C. and Donlevy), so there is no doubt. To have found some one who will aid in carrying the matter back beyond the printers to the letter-founders is an advance which I hardly expected to live to see.

I purposely left out all notice of Moxon's fount in my letters, as there are such numbers of books in which it occurs from 1681 onwards (I doubt about 1680); and though it would not take me long to write out a fair list, I can't give the time at this moment. . . . The letter is too long and too technical for the *Celtic Magazine* to print, as it is a matter which really interests a very few;

but if I had my letter (of which I have no copy), I would gladly put the greater part of [it] in type to keep as a memorandum of what to start from in further investigations. In plain fact it is a branch of natural history, and ought to be studied as such. Until people come to look upon it as such no real advantage can come from the study. . . .

HENRY BRADSHAW.

We have the Fournier.¹

¹ [Fournier, Pierre Simon, *Manuel Typographique*. Paris, 1764-6. 2 tom.]

BRIAN MERRIMAN'S 'MIDNIGHT COURT.'¹

IF there is one verdict upon which native Irish scholars are unanimously agreed, it is that Brian Merriman's 'Cúirt an Mheadhoin-oidhche' is the most difficult poem in the modern language. Wealth of diction, poetic license, dialectical peculiarities, local allusions, delicate *nuances*; ambiguities, intentional and otherwise; a subject *risqué* in its very essence, and a humour at times subtle, at times Rabelaisian—all combine to constitute a formidable sea of troubles. And since it is acknowledged that these difficulties present themselves to native scholars who have been "raised out of Gaelic," as we say, it will be realised that Herr Stern must have been fortified by no ordinary modicum of *robur et aes triplex* in the shape of knowledge, judgment, and ability, before launching forth upon the arduous task of editing, annotating, and translating the famous 'Midnight Court.' The result of his labours is one which merits the highest commendation, for it bears the marks of those characteristically German qualities—thoroughness and accuracy. Accordingly, it will be understood that the following remarks are made in no captious spirit, but as suggestions rather than criticisms.

As regards the text, one cannot help thinking that the insertion or retention of the 'Hülfsvokal' is an orthographical blemish. The vast majority of the disyllabic words so

¹ *Cúirt an Mheadhoin-oidhche*, ed. L. C. Stern (*Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, v. 2).

treated are, in the mouth of a native speaker, invariably trisyllabic. The perpetuation, therefore, of the adventitious sound is not only unnecessary to the scholar, but misleading to the student. Besides, the process has not been consistently carried out. If 'bologach' and 'tologach' are trisyllabic, so are also 'dearbhadh' and 'airgid.' The adoption of such spellings as 'ciniodh,' 'fuinnimh,' 'tairigion,' is decidedly a retrograde step now that a standard system of orthography is almost a *fait accompli*. *D'imig* is without excuse, while *amm*, *lomm*, *cromm*, are as awkward and as old-world as a plesiosaurus at a garden-party. The intention of the editor is evident, but, after all, *à quoi bon?* A Munsterman will naturally diphthongise the short vowel in all such words, while no inducement that can be held out in the guise of additional *m*'s will tempt the inhabitant of Leath Chuinn to do likewise. Such orthographical reversions to type are, consequently, to be deplored.

It must have been exceedingly difficult to choose between so many and bewildering 'Varianten'; nevertheless, the Golden Canon would have proved a safer standard in more than one passage. *A bhfarradh* is decidedly a better reading than *farradh* in line 93. Possibly *do dhearbhaig* (line 94) is also preferable to *dearbhadh*. *Lioghaide* (line 735) should certainly read *luigide*. In line 298 *m'ingint* is just as impossible in Irish as *m'athair* is *máthair*. Read *m'ingne's mo ghruaig*. In line 594 *seinnte* is more in accordance with the sense of the passage than *sainte*. The collocation of 'hired musicians' and 'quarts of biotdille,' as expenses traditionally connected with marriage festivities, is much more natural than 'schmarotzendes Volk.' The present-day pronunciation of *bainse*, at any rate, would lead one to expect the assonance supplied by *seinnte*. Line 851 should read *go dealbh gan foighne*, and *ainimh* (line 902) is false—read *ainm*.

The metrical German translation is a veritable masterpiece. Herr Stern has evidently entered fully into the spirit of the poem, and, while avoiding a slavish adherence to the letter, has succeeded in preserving, in a remarkable manner, the grace and vigour of the original. One can only wish that an equally presentable English version were forthcoming. Happy renderings are numerous: 'Das Lumpengesindel mit Brocken und Sack' for *Lopaig gan bhrígh, lucht mór is mála*: 'Pötz Donner und Blitz,' &c., for *Dar a bhfuil impe tinnte is tóirneach*. 'Der lückige, rissige, grinsende Flunsch' is worthy of Brian himself. There are, however, errors in translation to which nothing short of a misunderstanding of the text could give rise. For example, 'bedrohen' is rather strong as a rendering for *bagairt* (line 8). 'Nodding' is all that is intended, and the peaceful scene described by the poet demands it. *Gabhtha chum saothair* (line 25) does not mean 'ging an die arbeit,' but rather 'settled down to work' (lit. *harnessed*). The translator has failed to grasp the meaning of *uachtarlámh ag fáslaig shaidhbhre* (line 82): "it is the rich *parvenus* who have the upper hand." In several places the translation is quite evidently only a '*buille fá thuairim*'—a random shot, and sometimes wide of the mark. For example, line 250 means *not* 'Wo sollte ich u. s. w.,' but 'If I were like some others of my acquaintance' (lines 247-249), 'then, indeed, I might well be pardoned for my pessimism.' (In parenthesis, be it remarked that *cá* does not invariably mean '*where*.') Line 293 means 'I considered it no hardship to fast with the strictness of a devotee.' Line 390, *not* 'Ich kenne dich *trotz* deiner Haube,' but 'I remember a time when the only headgear in your possession was a "kipe."'" Very probably it was the sarcasm of line 393 that baffled Herr Stern. The line simply means 'Judging from this dazzling vision of ruffled cambric, surely only the veriest cynic would suggest

that there was a time when you lacked that necessary article of clothing.' In line 466 read *theanntaig féin í*: the *seanduine* is astonished at the irony of fate, viz. *go raibh sí seang nuair theann gach aon í*, but *ag druidim le clann* just when *do theanntaig féin í*. The explanation of *balluighe fód* (line 672) is ingenious but unnecessary. As the translation does not profess to be literal, it would be obviously unjust to carp at minor details. It must, therefore, be dismissed with a parting expression of admiration.

The glossary appended to the poem is an excellent one, and shows an accurate knowledge of the modern language, together with an indulgent attitude, admirable as it is unusual, towards such irregularities and *léimeanna ar leithre* as are inevitable during the transition stages of every living tongue. There is little room for criticism; however, attention should be directed to the following:—*blosc* or *blosca* = light, radiance; *dámhaoil* = (not 'schnarch-end,' but) dozing, nodding; *láthair* (line 735) = place, room; *márlach*, not *márla*, is the singular of *márluigh(e)*, and is by metathesis for *malrach*, which means 'a strapping young fellow.' Surely *lóithne* can dispense with a query? It is universally understood to mean 'a breeze.' *Ruic* has no connexion whatever with the English 'reek'; it is the plural of *roc* or *ruc*, 'a wrinkle.' *Stágach* means 'awkward,' 'ungainly.' *Teo* is the plural of *te*, and, wherever found in the text, is in agreement with a plural substantive.

It is not surprising that the names of the various love-philtres should have proved puzzling to a foreigner, and perhaps it is better so. The materia medica of folk-therapeutics is even more malodorous and nauseous than the stock of the official Pharmacopœia. *Míol* (not *meill*) *na mbualthach* (line 341) is simply the insect known by the not euphonious name of 'dung-fly.' *Cuile na móna* is an insect (?) which moves about on the surface

of the water in bog-pools and wells with extraordinary rapidity. Attempts at capture invariably end in failure; but the chase is exciting, and has ere now brought a thousand woes upon the loitering schoolboy, as the writer knows to his cost. As he has not as yet succeeded in securing a specimen for purposes of identification, the above vague description must suffice. Insects as well as herbs are laid under contribution in the manufacture of charms and love-potions. In cases of hysteria or unrequited love any *bean feasa* will stake her professional reputation on the efficacy of a spider (*horresco referens*) wrapped in its own web and bolted whole.

To write a metrical index to the '*Cúirt*' would be a Herculean task; and, wisely enough, Herr Stern has not attempted it. In Irish poetry the words follow the rules of sense-combination rather than those of metre, and therefore the division of the opening lines into trochaic and dactylic feet by the introduction of a '*Vorschlagssilbe*' is unfortunate. The sense demands an iambic measure for the whole of the first two lines, for the last three feet of the third and fourth lines, and for the last foot of about twenty-five per cent. of the verses of the entire poem. So that to the sentence, "Die Verse sollten . . . trochäisch oder dactylisch sein," Herr Stein might also have added "iambisch." Trochaics are in the majority, it is true; but there is no doubt that the whole poem may be recited with more pleasing effect by stressing the syllables from the caesura to the close of the verse either as iambi or as iambi and amphibrachs. The syllables leading up to the caesura may then be scanned either as two iambi, amphibrach and iambus, trochee and iambus, two trochees, or, better still, by considering them as *one foot* of the Arabian metre *Bahri wáfir*—thus, *Mūfā'īlātūn*. *Do ghealach mo chroidhe, a' bagairt a g-cinn*, and *Bhi duilleabhar craobh*, are examples which lend themselves

readily to this metre, while *caithe gan bhrigh, fiorthan is fear* require the variable foot of *Bahri Rajaz* (Mūftādīlūn). These metrical examples are not quoted in order to make confusion worse confounded, but to demonstrate the impossibility of binding the Irish Muse by any mechanical metrical system. In short, the only practical way of escape from such difficulties would be merely to indicate the stressed syllables in each line, and to leave the further subdivision to the individual taste. In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that Irish studies in general are under a debt of gratitude to Herr Stern for his most valuable contribution to the hitherto neglected treasury of modern Irish literature.

F. W. O'CONNELL.

SOME THOUGHTS AS TO THE ABSOLUTE.

WITH NOTES ON THE REALITY OF MATHEMATICAL
CONCEPTS, AND THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN
CHRISTIANITY.

IN defining the "Spirit" of man, we saw that Spirit is that underlying element in man's nature in which the discords between the conclusions of "Pure Reason" and "Practical Reason" find their harmony and reconciliation.¹ We have found that this Spirit must be identical with the Ego, in an individual; that it is necessarily, in each case, a Unity; that it is the true source of our knowledge of Unity and Reality; that it is coextensive with all individual experience, whether real or what is called "imaginary"; and that belief in its Unity and Continuity is the primary postulate of all rational Ontology.

Secondly, we saw that belief in my own individual experience forces on me the belief that there are other Spirits, limited egos, like myself, and that these limited egos occupy Time, as mine does. Just as my own ego lives in that dimension of Time which we call "Succession," these other egos live side by side with mine in that other Time-dimension which we call "Simultaneity." Thus my knowledge of the world of egos, as subjective entities, implies as its basis the Knowledge of Time as containing

¹ HERMATHENA, 1904, p. 213.

at least two dimensions; and every human ego has its subjective experience bounded by those two dimensions, Succession and Simultaneity.

Thirdly, we saw that Time is known only by its contents, which form our "experience," and that this experience compels me to admit the existence of something that is neither my ego nor any other limited ego, but a true non-ego; and that this non-ego not only compels me to admit Space as a part of my experience, but also obliges me to recognise that it and the Space to which it belongs are common to myself and other egos. Thus, all limited egos have a common *objective* world, whatever the true nature of this objectivity may be; and the common possession of this object-world is one of the links that bind ego to ego in a united humanity. Moreover, though Time is essentially the condition of subjectivity, we saw that the non-ego contains objective elements that are inseparable from Time. Thus the basis of subjective experience, Time, is inseparable from the non-ego, and the basis of objective experience, Space, is inseparable from the Ego.¹ Thus, Space and Time, Object and Subject, are inseparably blended in experience; and, though the basis of this Unity is, so far, outside our knowledge, we cannot avoid asking the question, "What is this basis?" In other words, we cannot avoid the search for the Absolute, which we may provisionally define as the Unknown Basis of that Unity which we find in Experience.

Finally, we saw that we were intellectually compelled to believe in the existence of an Ego that can, by its

¹ We can *abstract* the idea of Time from the object-world, and imagine an unchanging non-ego, just as we can *abstract* the idea of Space from the Subject-world, and imagine an Ego with no experience save the knowledge of itself unaffected by anything outside

itself. But the former of these concepts certainly cannot be realised, even in imagination, as a part of any experience; and the second could have no experience in any way resembling that with which we are acquainted.

nature, account for the existence of limited egos, and that has *the* Non-ego, as a whole, as *its* non-ego. And, from the nature of Mathematical Law, we saw that the Non-ego, as a whole, must (even in its relations to Space and Time, and still more certainly when we realise that *possible* experience may have other relations besides Space and Time relations) transcend the bounds of our possible knowledge. Thus, we found ourselves intellectually driven to the belief in a Higher Experience, whose Subject is Personal and Spiritual, containing in itself every element, intellectual, emotional, and practical, that goes to the making of Spiritual Personality. And we can assign to this Being no lesser non-ego than the sum of all possible objectivity. Thus stated, we reached what we may call the transcendental evidence for Theism, for we can reach no higher idea of God, nor can any lower idea satisfy the conditions of our experience and the necessary inferences we draw therefrom.¹

Can any of the elements thus found in actual or possible experience be identified with the Absolute? Can the Absolute be God, Experience, the Ego of myself, or a transcendental Ego; Thought, Space, Time, the Non-ego; the Unity of Space and Time as we find that Unity in Experience; pure Subject, pure Object? Can it be the same as the Infinite?

We may remove these possible answers one by one. The very reason why we have to seek for the Absolute is the fact that the Infinite, being in every respect unlimited, has no *direct* connexion with a world—an experience—full of limits. The old definition of the Infinite is “the unconditionally unlimited,” of the Absolute “the unconditionally limited.” It must contain the possibility of all Reality, all Truth, all Good; and it must exclude all unreality,

¹ See Note I. (p. 543).

falsity, evil. But by excluding anything from the Infinite we destroy its Infinity.

Again, the Absolute cannot be Experience. It certainly cannot be my Experience: for individual Experience is possible only through conditions. *My* Experience is itself conditioned by Space and Time; and, further, it is conditioned by the existence of other limited Experiences. Nor can it be a transcendental Experience, seeing that such an Experience would still be an Experience, and would be conditioned by its own laws and by the existence of other limited Experiences.

Nor can the Absolute be a transcendental Ego, seeing that an Ego must be conditioned by a non-ego, and that this non-ego must be outside the Ego, however transcendental the latter may be. No Ego, as such, can account for the Non-ego:—and I have brought proof¹ that the Non-ego must be faced as a reality, if we are to give an intelligible meaning to Experience.

Nor can the Non-ego of the individual, or a transcendental Non-ego, be identified with the Absolute. For the Non-ego is so definitely conditioned by the Ego that it cannot be thought of save as the Object of some Subject. I may think of a purely objective world: but I can go no further than to imagine it as the Object of an unknown Ego. Divested of its sensual and rational relations, it is in itself nothing; and it certainly cannot be the reasonable basis of the existence of any Ego, whether limited or transcendental.

Nor can the Absolute be either Space or Time. As we know them, each of these is conditioned by being confined to certain dimensions: and, even if we got rid of these conditions, an Absolute Space would be conditioned by its separation from Time, and an Absolute Time by its separation from Space. Space is continuous in itself, and

¹ HERMATHENA, 1904.

so is Time : but they are not continuous with each other : and continuity must be an attribute of the Absolute. So, too, both Space and Time are (like the Ego and Non-ego) cognisable only in relation to Experience, and as parts of Experience : and if Experience cannot be the Absolute, assuredly neither can any of its parts.

Nor can we find the Absolute in the Unity of Space and Time as we know them : for that Unity depends on Experience, and Space and Time have no other meeting-point, and are not analogous in their nature. Both have dimensions : but their dimensions are not analogous. The dimensions of Space are similar ; those of Time are dissimilar—one is the condition of continuous personality, the other of separation between personalities. In any case, such a Unity of Space and Time as we find in Experience—or could find in even a transcendental Experience—possesses no definite Unity. It is one, simply because Space and Time are united in Experience.

Finally, we cannot identify the Absolute with Thought. Even if we could believe, with Hegel, that an Absolute Thought produces the Ego and the Non-ego, we should have to face other difficulties. Experience, as we have seen, is not limited to Thought. It includes Emotion and Will : and in Emotion the Ego is plainly the passive element, while it is the active element in Volition. Even in the Pure Reason the consciousness of the Ego is no stronger than the consciousness that the Ego precedes and determines its thoughts : a fact fatal to the Hegelian system.

The Absolute, then, cannot be Experience, individual or transcendental : and, still more certainly, it cannot be anything that is given *in* Experience. In addition to the reasons already given for the latter statement, I may add another. We seek for the Absolute mainly as a means of reconciling the contradictions that inhere in Experience :

we have seen that these contradictions arise largely because the elements that make Experience, though individually continuous, are mutually discontinuous and exclusive: we have also seen that we cannot get rid of their discontinuity by merging them together. It seems perfectly plain that the Absolute must be found (if it can be found at all) as something above and beyond either Experience or any of its elements. To the Metaphysician, the whole sum of Being cannot be an aggregation of its parts: the Law of the Whole can no more be a mere enumeration of individual laws than an Algebraical rule can be a mere summary of Arithmetical results. Therefore, if Experience cannot be identified with the Absolute, neither can any of its elements. There remain, then, three great concepts, each of them superior to Experience. Can any one of these be the Absolute? These three are (1) the Infinite: (2) Spirit: and (3) God.

Before examining these, we ought to consider the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled by the Absolute. Briefly, we may summarise them, for practical purposes, as follows:—

(α.) Since Space and Time are not merely laws of the Ego, but of all things that, so far as our knowledge goes, exist, the Absolute must afford a Unity that can comprise both Space and Time.

(β.) Since Mathematical Law¹ gives us a reasonable certitude of the extension of both Space and Time beyond our Experience, and practically sets no limits to that extension, the Unity of the Absolute must include Space and Time to the fulness of their possible existence.

(γ.) Since the Absolute must also, obviously, account for the Ego, and since (as I showed in a former article) my conscious experience compels me to believe in other

¹ See Note I. (p. 543).

Egos, any Ego that can afford a basis for Experience must also make possible the existence of many Egos.

(δ.) Since the *existence* of the Non-ego—though not the definition of its nature—is also (as I have shown) a necessary inference from Experience, the Absolute must account for the existence of at least a phenomenal Non-ego. And since¹ the Non-ego is involved in both Space and Time, and the Absolute must account for these to the fulness of their possible existence, it must also account for the existence of a Non-ego capable of extension far beyond our knowledge. Thus the Absolute must be a reasonable basis, not only for a noumenal Ego, but also for a noumenal Non-ego.

(ε.) Since Emotion and Will are as real as Thought, and these are certainly united in Personality, and in no other way of which we can form an idea, in the search for the Absolute we must assume that it is *at least* Personal. And since Personality must² be Spiritual, the Absolute must also be Spiritual.

(ς.) So, too, since the Absolute is *ex hypothesi* unconditioned (or, rather, contains its own conditions absolutely within itself), it must have the conditions of its own Personality within itself.

Thus we get another provisional definition of the Absolute. It is, at least, a Spiritual Personality, containing the conditions of its Personality within itself—at least a transcendental Experience, unconditioned from without—at least a common basis of Ego and Non-ego. And it is the reasonable basis of all possible Experiences, and of the conditions of all possible Experiences.

We may now consider the possibility of finding the Absolute among the three great concepts that are superior to Experience—the Infinite, Spirit, and God.

(1.) We might identify the Absolute with the Infinite,

¹ See (β.).

² See HERMATHENA, 1903.

if we could identify the Infinite. And we should not need to search for the Absolute at all if the Infinite by itself could be regarded as the ultimate cause of the Finite, without the intervention of the Absolute. All thought, and all the things of thought, are lost and merged in the concept of the Infinite. But we are seeking for the womb of being, not for its grave: and the very need of the search for the Absolute arises from the fact that the removal of *all* limits leaves us—vacuity. To put it another way, we have already shown that neither Experience nor any of the contents of Experience can be the Absolute: and the ground for this belief was not, in any case, that any of these things was *finite*. Therefore, if finite Space cannot be the Absolute, not because it is finite, but because it is Space,—if a finite Ego cannot be the Absolute, not because it is finite, but because it does not contain the Non-ego,—it is equally plain that no (relatively) infinite Space, Ego, etc., can be the Absolute, because infinite Space is still only Space, and an infinite Ego is not a Non-ego. Each of these infinities is conditioned from outside, not by its own nature: therefore, each is limited. But the true Infinite is unconditionally unlimited, and can of itself account for nothing at all.

(2.) Pan-pneumatism is certainly an attractive system: and we have seen that in man, Spirit is “that underlying element in man’s nature in which the discords between the conclusions of Pure Reason and Practical Reason find their harmony and reconciliation.” But (with all due respect to Mr. Bax’s theory of the “community” of human personality—a theory apparently arising from an ambiguous use of the word “community,” and not altogether unconnected with its discoverer’s desire to find a metaphysical basis for Socialism) the “human Spirit” means, after we have followed it to the utmost bounds within our reach, simply “human Spirit.”

True, human Spirits are united by the intermingling of their lines of experience, by the possession of a common Non-ego. But this leaves them individually definite, and their unity is not continuous. And if we could find no ground for the Absolute in either Experience of itself, or the Non-ego of itself, it seems something more than absurd to seek for one in a kind of Unity that involves no more than a relation to Experience and to the Non-ego.

(3.) In the third idea—that of God—we may more reasonably hope to find an answer to our question. We have already seen¹ that the legitimate conclusion from the existence of human Spirits and the conditions of Experience is the existence of a “Higher Experience, whose Subject is Personal and Spiritual, containing in itself every element, intellectual, emotional, and practical, that goes to the making of Spiritual Personality.” And “We can assign to this Being no lesser Non-ego than the sum of all possible objectivity.” We saw, too, that “We can reach no higher idea of God, nor can any lower idea satisfy the conditions of our experience and the necessary inferences we draw therefrom.” Holding this belief, one might be tempted to say at once, “If there be a God, there can be no Absolute but God. We have found the Absolute.”

But this conclusion is only partly true. We can find no *higher* idea of God: but the idea of God is fuller. And such a Spiritual Personality as has been defined may fulfil the conditions of the Absolute, and yet leave a hiatus between the idea of God and the idea of the Absolute. A Theist must seek for the Absolute *in* God: but a purely Theistic definition of God may yet contain elements incompatible with the nature of the Absolute: for pure Theism is obliged to treat God as, above all

¹ HERMATHENA, 1904.

things, Transcendent, and God in His Transcendence as Infinite.

There are, in fact, two purely Theistic possible ideas of God. In one, He is simply a Demiurge, shaping the Universe out of something outside Himself—or out of nothing—by creative power. In the other, He lies outside and beyond all things—*sans point d'appui*: as Brahm sleeps his great sleep. The Brahman idea follows naturally enough from the latter view: what can anything be but a dream, a fictitious existence, to Him whose Being is involved in an absolute self-contained complacency? He sleeps,—He dreams: and Eastern Metaphysics have found their Absolute in the entire abandonment of any search for any Absolute. So, too, the idea of God as simply a Demiurge is the abandonment of all Metaphysic: it substitutes a necessarily false analogy for an answer to the question as to the relation between the Creator and His works: it sees in God a greater active Will or a greater Thinker, but gives no solution of our difficulties as to the material on which this Will acts or the Non-ego of this Thinker's thought.

And yet the Absolute must be sought in God: nay, it must be sought *as* God, unless we are to find as our ultimate result a Universe unreal because it is not continuous with God, or a God unreal because He is not continuous with His Universe. In short, we must seek for the Absolute in God: but not in the God of the pure Theist.

That God, as we have seen, may easily be taken as the basis of the Infinite and the Transcendent: but since we are dealing with the relations of an All-real God to a real world, we must find some means by which we can think of God as capable of contact with His world. He must be in fact, "unconditionally limited," His limits in this respect being simply what is involved in the fact that

He does bear a relation to His world. In an anonymous book dealing with the deeper Mysticism, and called "The Canon," there is a drawing of an ancient symbol, called the "*Crux Mysticorum*." It is a cross divided into squares: the breadth of each limb = 1; the length of the upright = 28; the length of the transome = 13. The explanation is curious, though simple. 13 = half of 26, which is the numerical value of the great Name of God, the "Tetragrammaton" (יהוה). 1 represents the Unity of God. 28 stands for our World, both because (a) $28 = 7 \times 4$, 4 being the number representing the earth (conceived originally as a square), and because (β) the numerical value of the word עולמים, "the worlds," = 196, which divided by 7 = 28. The whole thing is simply a symbol devised by someone—probably a Christian—on the lines of Jewish "Gematria." But there is one point about this cross that bears on our subject. Its chief meaning is said to be this, that the intersection of the limbs represents the *immanence* of God in His works. Now, if we think of God as Absolute, we must think of Him much as He is represented in this symbol. His Unity is a necessity of Thought; He can neither be merged in nor absorbed into the sum of finite Reality, nor can He be separated from it: the Absolute must be Himself, and yet not exhaust Himself. In fact, while the Abysmal God, the Infinite One, must be nothing less than a Spiritual Personality, the Absolute must *be* a Spiritual Personality. Thus the Absolute is the Infinite so far as we can apprehend the Infinite, and is within reach of the Finite, so that we can reach the knowledge of it from our experience of the Finite. In short, as we have said, the Absolute must be sought in God, and as God; but as God brought near to Creation, immanent in Creation, shown forth in Creation.¹

¹ The word 'Creation' is used here whether conceived as "The Real" or to save circuitous language. I simply as "the work of God." mean the sum of Finite Existence,

So realised, the Absolute is a distinct personality—is continuous with experience—gives continuity to Space, Time, and all the elements of Experience—has as its Non-ego *the* Non-ego in its fulness, and is itself a definite Ego, and definite Spirit. And It is continuous with the Abysmal and Infinite God. If there be a God, God must be the Absolute: but only by such an explanation as this can we escape from the difficulty of regarding an Infinite God as the Absolute, and a Personal Absolute.

The real interest in this view of the question is that it is the view taken, though not directly on philosophical grounds, by Christianity. The New Testament contains, and the historical development of the Christian Church has followed, certain definite philosophical principles.¹ These are generally expressed in the formulæ that set forth the doctrine of the Trinity: but the doctrine of the Trinity is itself a consequence of certain doctrines that are nearer the surface of Christianity. The first of these is the Incarnation. It must not be forgotten that this doctrine is not exhausted by the statement that the One and Abysmal God was made Man, by a Union that left the *Personality* of God unaffected, and that did not destroy the Reality of the human nature thus taken into Godhead. The doctrine goes further. The Union thus made was not merely with an individual human nature, but with all human nature, and it is a Union with all Creation. Moreover, the Union is not merely a Union; it is an "Epiphany," a "showing forth" of something already existing. And these two historical developments, the Incarnation and the Epiphany, rest on a greater belief lying behind them: the belief in the LOGOS. The Logos is the means of God's contact with His works; the only form in which the Godhead can be realised by us. He is Personal: He is *a* Spirit: He is the impressing surface of

¹ See Note II. (p. 549).

the Divine Seal: He is the "shining out of the Father's glory," the Absolute from everlasting. He is, in fact, just what the Theist must seek, if he wishes to find the Absolute in God: and He is what He is because of the necessity of the Nature of God. So, too, all that He is and does is "limited" by conditions depending entirely on His own Nature: and thus He fulfils all the idea of the Absolute. If there is an Infinite God, we can seek nowhere else for the Absolute: and if there is an Absolute, we can find it nowhere else than in the Logos.

NOTE I.

ON THE REALITY OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS.

This argument, as set forth in my last year's paper, practically rests on two main points as to Mathematical Law: (1) the reality of so-called "imaginary" points and quantities, and (2) the reality of more than three dimensions in Space. The latter, of course, also implies the possibility of more than two dimensions in Time. Now, speaking generally, I may say that (so far as my own experience goes) the strongest objectors to the reality of these supersensual Mathematical Concepts are to be found among Mathematicians themselves. To put it another way, Mathematicians are above all men sceptics as to the truth of their own general laws and, apparently, infallible conclusions. But I cannot help feeling that—as a very eminent Mathematician once wrote to me, in allusion to another Mathematician's theories as to the possibly finite nature of Space—Mathematicians are very poor Metaphysicians. And the Metaphysics of Mathematics no more belong to the Mathematician than the

Metaphysics of Sensation belong to the Biologist. The Mathematician is often inclined (though he ought to know better) to look on Algebra as an extension of Arithmetic. To a Metaphysician, the facts that Algebra contains the general laws which transcend and govern Arithmetical principles, and that the proofs of many Arithmetical laws can be found only by means of Algebra, necessarily point to the belief that Arithmetic is simply a "particular case" of Algebra. Any other view destroys the "universal *a-priori*" character of Mathematical truth. Historically, too, the order of Mathematical development is not the order of the relation of its truths. $3^2 = 9$: a fact of which men were aware before the discovery of Algebra: and this is obviously the same as $(2 + 1)^2 = 2^2 + (2 \times 2 \times 1) + 1^2$. So, too, $5^2 = (3 + 2)^2 = 3^2 + (2 \times 3 \times 2) + 2^2$. $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$: but this truth, though it came later than the truths as to 3^2 and 5^2 , does not rest on them. On the contrary, they rest on it, and it accounts for and explains them. Now take the case of so-called "imaginary" points or quantities. The law that every equation must have as many roots as equal the numerical value of its index does not depend on the summarising of arithmetical cases: it rests on abstract law. It is never *false*: but the roots obtained are sometimes "imaginary" (*i.e.* the quantities cannot be realised in our experience), but definite. Thus 1 has two square roots, 1 and -1 : three cube roots, 1, ω , and ω^2 . Now we cannot realise ω and ω^2 $\left(\frac{-1 \pm \sqrt{-3}}{2} \right)$ in our experience: nevertheless, these two quantities, properly treated, actually do produce 1. So, too, with such a quantity as $\sqrt{-1}$. We cannot realise it: but we find it as an actual result in actual Mathematical work. We cannot cut it out of a formula in which it occurs: it leads to truth. So it is not equivalent to nothing: it is a key that unlocks real truth:

it is a result of processes which cannot be true unless they are universally true. It seems to me, therefore, that it is Mathematically real, and differs from other realities only in the fact that we cannot realise it in our experience. Again, geometrical law declares that, when two circles intersect, each cuts the other in four points, *two of which are imaginary*. Here, too, we see at once that all four points equally satisfy the conditions of the geometrical law: but two of them lie outside our experience. Moreover, the two that are outside our experience are *definite* points. Their existence follows from the same law by which the position of the two sensibly-perceptible points is determined: they have no positions in experience, but they have positions in the Mathematical world of geometry. They are not *false*:—if they were, the Mathematical theories from which they result would be false too, and (as in the other cases examined) pure Mathematics would be a Science of the False and Unreal. In fact, taking a full view of Mathematical Science, the doctrine that Imaginary Mathematical Concepts are unreal reduces Mathematics itself to a fictitious system, which happens to correspond in some points with experience. Thus its *a-priori* character is destroyed, and with its *a-priori* character we lose the possibility of Mathematical proof.

The theory of the unreality of Mathematical Imaginary Concepts rests largely on a doctrine that is generally current among Mathematicians:—the doctrine that one may annex to any symbol any meaning, provided that this meaning is not inconsistent with the accepted principles of Mathematics and the accepted meaning of the other symbols employed in the same work. Thus, we are told that Sir William Hamilton annexed new meanings to the signs of multiplication and addition in Quaternions, thereby creating an entirely new branch of Mathematics. This doctrine is partly true, but illogi-

cally expressed. The new meanings are not *arbitrary*: they must be consistent with each other and with other meanings already known. This fact in itself determines them, within certain limits. Therefore (some-what obviously) the Mathematical discoverer is simply removing unnecessary limitations, and thereby extending the compass of a Science that possesses other limitations which he cannot remove. Again, the new branch of Mathematics is tested by the truth of its results, so far as they fall within experience. There are (for example) certain propositions concerning parallel lines, triangles, &c., which can be proved by ordinary Geometry, but can be more quickly proved by Quaternions. How can I be justified in saying that these results, which can be tested, are *real*, but that the results which I cannot test are *unreal*? The Mathematical explorer is like all other explorers. He can enter new fields—if they are “there”: but the fields are not of his creation. Sir William Hamilton’s discovery of Quaternions may have been the work of a new Columbus in a new sphere: but Columbus could not have discovered a non-existent America, and Hamilton could not have discovered a non-existent Truth. The navigation of Columbus led him back again to the Spain he already knew: the processes of Quaternions work both ways also, and (as we have seen) lead us back from the unrealisable Mathematical world to the Mathematics with which we are already acquainted.

The Mathematical theory of more than three dimensions depends partly on certain results attained in the higher branches of that science, and partly on another consideration. From what has been already said, it will be seen that Mathematics is a deductive *a-priori* science—that, in fact, the Mathematical results which can be tested are special cases of higher laws, which cannot be tested. But, admittedly, our experience is limited by certain con-

ditions; and the special condition of our Space-experience is that it is limited to three dimensions. But Mathematical law is not limited to the quantity, its square, and its cube. It seems, therefore, more reasonable to suppose that our failure to realise in Space a fourth or fifth power is due to the admitted imperfection of our experience than to suppose that Mathematical science is Fact up to the cube, and beyond the cube Fiction. Here, as before, we destroy the *a-priori* character of Mathematics by supposing its results—its definite and self-consistent results—to be true as far as we can follow them by means of our senses, and purely untrue beyond that limit.

It is a little interesting to observe that, lately, some physical scientists have come to the conclusion that there seems to be at least probable physical evidence of the existence of a fourth dimension in Space. Among the phenomena of polarised light we find one that is both startling and suggestive. A beam of polarised light, on passing through certain substances, suffers “deflexion of its axis.” This deflexion is of two kinds, “right-handed” and “left-handed.” But the curious point is that certain substances—including tartaric acid—are “dimorphic” in their relation to polarised light, existing in two forms, one “right-handed” and the other “left-handed.” The mass, specific gravity, appearance, chemical behaviour, and effect on organic bodies are exactly the same in both forms of tartaric acid: but one deflects the polarised light to the right; the other, through exactly the same angle, to the left. Now, it is perfectly certain that, in the case of points, lines, and surfaces, a similar effect is produced, but only by means of movement through one more dimension than the point, &c., itself occupies. The case of the point is a little complicated: but we may take the line and the surface. A line A B may pass from a right-handed to a left-handed position—*i.e.* A may take the place of B, and *vice versa*—

only in one way, by motion over a surface. Again, a plane figure, such as a triangle, may pass from a right-handed to a left-handed position—*i.e.* may be converted into a similar triangle lying in an opposite direction—only by motion through a third dimension. So the line can be reversed only as part of a surface, and the surface as part of a solid. Again, if the triangle be cut by a line, that line produces certain angles at the points of intersection; but, on turning the triangle over, each of these angles would be “reversed,” though it would retain its magnitude. It is only reasonable to suppose that the same law would apply to solids. There is no known means of “reversing” a solid—because we cannot turn it through a fourth dimension—*i.e.* treat it as part of a super-solid. But if we could, its behaviour when traversed by a ray of polarised light would, apparently, be exactly the same as that of which we have experience in the behaviour of the “right-handed” and “left-handed” forms of tartaric acid. The extent of the action of solids in the fourth dimension may be too small for our senses to perceive, or for any perceptible solid to move in. But it may be a large enough sphere for the movement of the ultimate particles of a substance—say, of tartaric acid. Thus the hypothesis of a fourth dimension affords an explanation of the behaviour of dimorphous substances which is both the simplest that we can find and the one most in analogy with geometrical laws, as we know them in three dimensions.

To conclude, the denial of “reality” to Mathematical imaginary quantities makes Mathematics an inductive science; but its methods are not inductive. It assumes that the limits of our intelligence are the limits of all possible intelligence: whereas a Mathematician cannot explain the facts within our ken without transcending our intelligence. It divides the field of Mathematics into a real part and an illusive part, both governed by law; and yet

asks us to believe that both are the legitimate objects of science. It takes us out of the somewhere that we know into what it declares to be nowhere; and yet asks us to believe that the law of that nowhere produces results somewhere. It takes its stand on Reason, and yet submits that Reason to imperfect Experience. I will none of it. To me, Reason is the evidence of Reality; and it is far more easy to believe that the limitations of my experience shut me out from the actual knowledge of what is reasonably proved, than to hold that my experience is the ultimate test of Reality.

NOTE II.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENT IN CHRISTIANITY.

There is a great difficulty, to minds of a certain class, in uniting Metaphysics with any definite form of Religion. "The Union of Religion with Philosophy" (it has been said) "is the marriage of an Immortal with a Mortal." And others state the difficulty in this way: "Christianity is a single Divine Revelation: what right have we to claim its authority for any of the ever-changing forms of a science so eminently liable to vary, so absolutely dependent on uncertain and unverified results of human speculation, as Metaphysics?"

To me, this difficulty seems to lie entirely on the surface, and to depend partly on unsupported assumption, and partly on the want of due consideration as to the manner in which Religion grows and develops. The religion of a savage may have no Metaphysical contents: but this is simply because the savage is incapable of

philosophical thought. The man who thinks of God as "a magnified non-natural man in the next street" may have a religion without Metaphysics: but that, surely, results from his imperfect realisation of the Idea of God, not from anything incompatible with Metaphysics in the fundamental Idea of Theism. So far as I can see, there is an element of Philosophy in *all* great religions; and Christianity is precisely the one case in which I should be most surprised to find it absent. This element may not present itself to "the Man in the Street." Neither can the Spirit of Man be found in the dissecting-room, nor the Theory of Equations in the mind of the school-boy who is beginning to solve simple Quadratics. But, in this case as in the others, we may safely say with Edna Lyall that "No one but a fool would think of looking for it there": and, in all three cases, the deeper missing element may be absolutely necessary as a foundation for the simpler stages—Quadratics, mere Body, and the practical Religion of daily life. Taking account of these points, we may find several answers to the objections raised against the assumption of a Union between Religion and Philosophy.

(1.) As regards the first form of this objection, the difficulty seems to rest on a pure assumption. "The marriage of an Immortal with a Mortal" is a phrase with an ugly sound, simply because we assume that the Immortal will somehow be made to partake of Mortality. Is this certain? Ethics are a part of Philosophy: but no one objects to unite Moral Science with Religion. On the contrary, we use Ethical texts wherewith to judge of the genuineness of Revelation; and we use Religion as a means of strengthening our Moral Science. Religion is closely wed to the Emotions: Religion is reckoned worthless unless it governs the Will. She has, as inseparable companions, Love and "Good-living":

how can she be hurt by a union with Thought? Is the Pure Reason more separable from the "knowing that God is" than the Practical Reason from the knowing that, if He is, we must keep the Law of the Eternal?

(2.) Metaphysic is certainly a Science as to which there have been, and may continue to be, great differences of opinion: and I, at any rate, regard Christianity as a Divine Revelation. But I cannot be blind to the fact that there have been, and may continue to be, great differences of opinion as to the deeper things of Christianity. Some of these differences are Metaphysical:—as an example, we may take the conflicts between Jesuit and Jansenist, between Calvinist and Arminian. In some cases, these Metaphysical differences have arisen for philosophical reasons: in others, on grounds that may be considered purely religious. There seems, then, to be some absurdity in fearing that Metaphysic may be dangerous to Religion, by destroying her claim to our respect as a Divine Revelation, seeing that both those who accept and those who deny the religious use of Philosophy find much the same difficulties in coming to a common belief as to certain parts of that Revelation.

(3.) If Religion, as a Divine Revelation, is free from any union with Metaphysics, what is the reason? She certainly deals with certain points in common with Metaphysics. God, the Universe, the Soul, the Spirit of Man, the Will are certainly Metaphysical concepts. If she gives Metaphysical teaching about these things—as I certainly think she does—this in itself justifies me in examining these Metaphysical concepts by their own proper science. If she does not, I am as obviously free, as a believer in Religion, to follow out higher Metaphysics as I am to learn—say—Determinants or Quaternions. The late Professor Asa Gray described himself as "scientifically, a Darwinian Evolutionist; philosophically, a Theist;

theologically, a Churchman believing the Nicene Creed." It is to be presumed that he did not keep his Physical Science, Philosophy, and Theology in water-tight compartments; but, even if he did, he certainly felt that his Religion was no more inconsistent with Philosophy than it was with Physical Science: and I agree with him. But no thinking man *can* block out his Theology from contact with his other beliefs; therefore, if the Divine Revelation deals with the matter of Metaphysics, it cannot avoid contact with the Science of Metaphysics.

(4.) Historically, there has always been a Metaphysical element in all great—all civilised—religions. The Theism of the Brahman and the Atheism of the Buddhist alike rest on Philosophy; without their Philosophy both drop to pieces. Confucianism has no Metaphysics to speak of; but it contains no Religion to speak of either. Lao-tse taught a religion entirely resting on the Metaphysics of the Pure and the Practical Reason; as his Theism lost its philosophical element, it sank into a degrading superstition.

(5.) Christianity had as its prelude Judaism; and Judaism has a Metaphysical foundation. Apart from all other points, "the people who, alone among the nations of the earth, worshipped only the Eternal Mind," did so with a distinct sense of His Metaphysical Nature. The great Jewish Name for God—the Tetragrammaton—is essentially Metaphysical. The utterances of the Prophets dwell not only on Divine Ethics, but on Divine Ontology.

(6.) During the period between the Old and New Testaments, the principal literature of the Jews was the Apocrypha; and the Apocrypha shows—and its evidence can be confirmed from other sources—distinct traces of the influence of Greek Philosophical thought. As a matter of fact, the basis of this thought was Stoicism—a philosophical system that originated with a Phœnician,

and already contained elements akin to the Philosophy of the Old Testament. From the influence of Stoicism on Judaism came Pharisaism—a system partly Ontological and partly Ethical. The effect of Pharisaism, in its earlier development, is to be found in the “Sophia” Books—Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom. The former is mainly Ethical; the latter is more definitely Metaphysical. In the Book of Wisdom we find, among other curious points, the shaping out of the conception of “Wisdom” as, in a manner, personal; and it is worth noticing that in the descriptions of “Wisdom,” as given in the Book of the same name, we find strong resemblances to the accounts of the “SON” or “LOGOS” in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in Philo.

(7.) We next come to Christianity. We may admit, at once, that the Christian Religion is neither expressly nor mainly a Philosophic System. But it has philosophical elements that cannot be separated from it—Ethical and Metaphysical. It could not be otherwise. It assumed the truth of the Jewish—Metaphysical—Ideas of God and of the Spiritual Nature of Man. There is now no reasonable doubt that Christ knew, and the Evangelists knew, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, and that our Lord Himself frequently referred to the former book, and occasionally to the latter. St. Paul, the greatest of the Apostolic Teachers, was a Pharisee: and, philosophically, he remained a Pharisee to the end. He quotes from a Stoic poet: he uses all the most distinctive terms of Stoic Ethics. St. Luke, too, was obviously well versed in the Apocrypha and in Greek Ethics. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews—whom I take to be St. Luke—was (as I showed in a former article in *HERMATHENA*) soaked in Greek Philosophical thought: and he was also armed with a strong knowledge of the Apocrypha, particularly of the Book of Wisdom. His description of the Logos as “the shining out of His Father’s glory, and the Impress of His Being” is directly copied

from two passages in the Sophia literature. His description of Creation is not Demiurgic but Philosophical. St. John shares with him and Philo the Idea of the Logos.

(8.) Finally, the whole history of Christianity shows that the most powerful factors in Christian Thought were three doctrines—the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Epiphany. The Doctrine of the Trinity rests on the Idea of the Logos; the Doctrine of the Incarnation is impossible except as a result of these two: the Doctrine of the Epiphany involves all three. If these doctrines underlie the New Testament, if they are essential to the understanding of Christianity as an historical and Divine Revelation, surely Christianity is united with Metaphysics; and a Christian Theologian cannot cut his Divinity loose from Philosophy.

This is all my contention. Christianity contains, by selection, a series of Jewish, Greek, Eastern philosophical thoughts. It also contains a new philosophical element, in which it binds together, enlarges, and unifies these elements. By this means Christianity bridges the gulf between pure Theism—the belief in God as THE ETERNAL or “the Infinite”—and God as the Absolute. And it does one thing more: for the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Epiphany answer the question as to the relation between the Absolute and Finite things. My answer to the question “What is the Absolute?” may be called religious, rather than philosophical: but it is the answer of one who believes that Christianity contains a Metaphysic that cannot safely be separated from it. Nevertheless, I have sought for that answer on purely Metaphysical principles.

ALEX. R. EAGAR.

THE LATIN GENITIVE IN *-AI*.

AS is well known, the genitive of the First Declension ended, in the oldest period of the Latin language, in *-ās*. Between this earliest *-ās* and the classical *-ae* we find a genitive suffix *-ai*, still preserved in inscriptions and MSS., and mentioned by the grammarians. About the genitive in *-ās* there is no difficulty. It was an inheritance from the proethnic language. But about the genitive in *-ai* nearly everything is still uncertain. From its use by the poets we learn that it often had the value of two long syllables, but we do not know how it was pronounced. It is usually assumed to have been pronounced *-ā-ī* when dissyllabic; but that assumption is certain only if there is no alternative. In fact, as will be shown, such a pronunciation cannot be defended; and it has been an obstacle preventing a satisfactory explanation of the origin and use of the form. It seems, with high probability, to contain the genitive suffix *-ī* of the *o*-declension; but its exact relationship to the older *-ās* and the newer *-ae* has not been convincingly explained.

A recent attempted explanation that has about it an air of completeness—though it does not, I think, claim to be certain—is that of Professor Sommer in his very useful *Handbuch d. lat. Laut- und Formenlehre*. Sommer (p. 354) supposes the classical *-ae* to have arisen from *-ās* by the following changes. The gen. *-ās* was transformed (*umgestaltet*) to *-ā-ī* by the influence of the *-ī* of the

Second Declension, and this $\bar{a}\bar{i}$ was regularly contracted (*normalerweise kontrahiert*) to $\bar{a}i$, $-ai$. Granting for the moment that $\bar{a}s$ could have been thus "transformed" to $\bar{a}\bar{i}$, it is hard to see how this $\bar{a}\bar{i}$ was "regularly contracted" to $-ai$; but leaving these points for the present, let us proceed to the explanation given of the dissyllabic $-ai$ of historical times. This is said to be a survival of "the older dissyllabic $\bar{a}\bar{i}$," and to be due to the influence of the genitive in $\bar{e}\bar{i}$ of the Fifth Declension. Turning to the explanation of the genitive in $\bar{e}\bar{i}$, we find it stated (p. 430) that it arose from an original $-(i)\bar{e}s$ in exactly the same way as $\bar{a}\bar{i}$ is said to have arisen from an original $\bar{a}s$; that is to say, $-(i)\bar{e}s$ became $-(i)\bar{e}\bar{i}$, which, according to Latin sound-laws, ought to have become successively $-(i)\bar{e}i$, $-(i)\bar{e}i$, $(i)\bar{i}$, but was arrested in the $\bar{e}\bar{i}$ stage by the influence of the dative of the same declension. We turn, again, to the explanation given of the dative of the Fifth Declension, and we find (p. 430) that "the normal dative form $-(i)\bar{e}i$ " owes its existence to the analogy of a (prehistoric) $*r\bar{e}i$, dative of $r\bar{e}s$! To sum up this long series of changes, all having their starting-point in one little word: the historical genitive in $\bar{a}\bar{i}$ is not according to sound-law, but is fashioned on the model of the genitive in $\bar{e}\bar{i}$: the genitive in $\bar{e}\bar{i}$ also is not according to sound-law, but is fashioned on the model of the dative in $-(i)\bar{e}i$: finally, the dative in $-(i)\bar{e}i$ is not according to sound-law, but is due to the influence of a prehistoric dative of $r\bar{e}s$. Now if a dative $*r\bar{e}i$ exercised any influence on the genitive of the First Declension from so great a distance, it certainly did not exercise it through a Fifth Declension dative in $-(i)\bar{e}i$ as a link in the chain; because a Fifth Declension dative in $-(i)\bar{e}i$ is a comparatively late appearance. Professors Seyffert¹ and Lindsay² have shown that, in early Latin, the ending of the dative of the Fifth

¹ *Studia Plautina*, p. 26.

² *Class. Rev.* x. 424 ff.

Declension is always monosyllabic, while the ending of the genitive is also dissyllabic. Even when the ending of the genitive is monosyllabic, its treatment in Plautus shows that it cannot have been identical in pronunciation with the dative. The dative (*rei*, *fidei*, etc.) is regularly elided in synaloepha; but the monosyllabic genitive (*rei*, *fidei*, etc.) cannot be elided.¹ This capability of elision in the dative points to monophthongal pronunciation of its suffix (*rē*, *fidē*), while the impossibility of elision in the genitive with monosyllabic ending points to a fully diphthongal pronunciation. As therefore the Fifth Declension dative in *-(i)ēi*, through which the influence of a dative **rēi* is supposed to have been ultimately transmitted to a genitive in *-āi*, did not come into existence till comparatively late times,² the whole structure of this explanation falls to the ground.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to bring any other objection to this theory; but it might be pointed out that a dative **rēi* (from I.-E. **rēiai*) cannot have existed at any period at which it was possible for it to influence a genitive in *-āi*, as it is supposed to have done, by perpetuating its existence.³ That influence must have been exercised at a time earlier than the shortening of the *ē* by the law, *Vocalis ante uocalem corripitur*, but later than the passing of the *-ai* to *-i*. Now the *ē* must have been shortened very early (e.g. **flēiō > flēo*), but unaccented, *-ai* did not become *-i* till the time of Lucilius. Further, we

¹ Cf. Leo, *Plaut. Forsch.*, p. 323 f., who gives many examples of elision of the dative in *-ei*—e.g. *Pers.* 193; *Trin.* 117, 119, 128, 142; *Rud.* 717; etc.

² See Lindsay, *l.c.* There seem to be only three isolated instances in republican Latin of a dative in *-ei* with a dissyllabic ending—*Lucr.* i.

688; ii. 236; *Hor. C.* iii. 24, 64. They do not become usual till the time of Manilius and Seneca.

³ It need hardly be said that Prof. Sommer is not here referring to the dative *rēi* actually found twice in Lucretius. See his foot-note in *Handb.*, p. 430.

should have to suppose that I.-E. **rēiai* escaped contraction when passing through a stage **rēei* (pronounced *rēē*)—a stage through which it must pass on the way to **rēi*. But that is impossible. Again, the supposed **rēi* must have escaped a series of changes postulated (unconvincingly) by Sommer on page 430, whereby *-(i)ē-i* “regularly” became *-(i)ēi*, *-(i)ēi*, *-(i)i*. Finally, at any time at which **rēi* could remain unchanged as a spondaic word, a genitive *uiāi* could do the same; and it would be unnecessary to postulate the influence of **rēi*.

II.

This and all other attempted explanations of the form are based on the assumption that when genitive *-ai* was dissyllabic, it was pronounced *-ā-i*. But that pronunciation is so extraordinary—not to say impossible—that we are justified in inquiring whether there is any alternative. If there is, it may throw some light on the origin, use, and history of the form.

It is argued by Sommer (*l.c.*) that there is no proof of the existence of dissyllabic *-ai* in the spoken language in historical times, because it can only be recognised by metre. But that is not sound reasoning; for a poet may use the spoken tongue in metrical writing, as Plautus does. His use of this form is sure evidence that it was heard in the living popular speech in the early second century. Plautus markedly avoids using the genitive of the First Declension (for a reason to be considered later); but, in spite of that fact, Professor Leo has shown¹ that the dissyllabic genitive occurs in Plautus at least thirty-three times if only those instances be counted in which a word beginning with a consonant follows; or at least forty-six

¹ *Plautinische Forschungen*, p. 316 ff.

times if those instances be added in which a monosyllabic genitive-ending (-ae, of course, in the MSS.) seems to stand in hiatus. The suggestion that Plautus may have used the form consciously as an archaism will not bear examination.

If the word *uia* had a genitive which was pronounced *ui-ā-i*, a well-known sound-law was broken—the law, namely, *Vocalis ante uocalem corripitur*. But sound-laws cannot be broken. As well might we assert that rivers could occasionally flow up-hill under the same conditions under which they usually flow down-hill. The effect of a sound-law may of course be obscured or reversed by the influence of analogy; but even then the sound-law must first have taken effect. To show any laxity in applying this principle in all its rigour, even when appearances are against it, is a species of scientific infidelity. If a form *vi-ā-i* ever came into existence, it certainly became **vi-ā-i* from the first moment at which the law in question was fully operative, and nothing could turn it back into *vi-ā-i* but the influence of some analogy strong enough to work such an effect. But what analogy can be suggested? Not that of a Fifth Declension genitive in *-ēi*, for that is itself just as much in need of explanation: not that of a dative in *-ēi*, for it did not then exist.

It may be doubted whether any analogy would be strong enough to maintain such a pronunciation as *ui-ā-i*. Analogy reverses the effect of the law *Vocalis ante uocalem corripitur* only in the case of the vowels *i* and (in early Latin) *u*; e.g. *illius*, *fiō*, and, in early verse, *fūit*. The reason is that between *i* or *u* and the following vowel, the homorganic consonant was heard (though not usually written) as a glide. Thus *fiō* = *fīiō*: cf. Oscan *fiet* = *fiunt*; *fūit* = *fūuit*: cf. FVVEIT, C. I. L. i. 1051. We may reasonably doubt, therefore, whether it was in the

power even of analogy itself to lengthen *a* or *e* before a vowel.¹

We are helped in seeking an alternative pronunciation by the grammarians. The genitive of *Pompeius* is usually spelt *Pompei* (cf. COCCEI in C.I.L. i. 1044), a spelling approved by Probus (K. iv. 104), though MSS. sometimes add an *i* (e.g. Lucan ii. 280, and elsewhere)² In verse it has regularly the value of three long syllables.³ Lucan uses it twenty-four times, always with that value (e.g. ii. 280, 283; vi. 245, 589). Martial has it with the same value in ii. 14. 10, and *Coccei* occurs in Horace, with spondaic ending, in *Ep.* i. 5. 50. How was *Pompei*, with the value of three long syllables, pronounced? If *Pom-pē-i*, whence came the length of the *e*? The nominative *Pompeius* was pronounced, as is well known, *Pompējjus*, the *e* being short by nature, but long by position. From a nominative so pronounced, we should expect a genitive pronounced *Pompējjī*; and, according to Priscian, that was actually not only the pronunciation, but also the spelling of the form by the "*antiqui*." He tells us that that spelling had the sanction of Julius Cæsar, and of a certain grammarian named Victor. After explaining that the ancients used to spell *mai-ius*, *ei-ius*, and the like, he continues (K. ii. 14): "*unde 'Pompeiii' quoque genitivum per tria i scribebant, quorum duo superiora loco consonantium accipiebant, ut si dicas 'Pompelli'; nam tribus i iunctis qualis possit syllaba pronuntiari? quod Caesari doctissimo artis grammaticae placitum a Victore quoque in arte grammatica de*

¹ Scansions like *Troïli* in Plaut. *Bacch.* 954, *āēr*, &c., are not exceptions to this statement. A foreign word may have a foreign pronunciation. Yet even in *Troïli* Plautus probably pronounced *Troi-j-īli*, just as *Troia* was pronounced *Troi-j-a*. Interjections, too, like *ēheu*,

should not count. They are scarcely words.

² See Neue-Wagener³, i. p. 134 ff.

³ Sommer states that the genitive *Pompei* could be a dissyllable (*op. cit.* pp. 369, 171 f.). He gives no instance, nor do I know of any.

syllabis comprobatur." There is no reason to doubt these definite statements of fact by Priscian; and therefore we are bound to admit that, in Latin, a spelling -ei might represent a pronunciation -ejjī. That explains the observed scansion of such forms in the only way in which it really can be explained; for a pronunciation like *Coc-cē-ī* (Hor. *Ep.* i. 5. 50) would be inexplicable.

Cassiodor(i)us also enjoins the spelling of such forms with three *i*'s. He says (K. vii. 206): "quidam huius Pompei Tarpei, hi Pompei Tarpei, his Pompeis Tarpeis per unum *i* scribunt: nonnulli pusillo diligentiores alterum *i* his addunt: ego quoque tertium addendum praecipio."

The Romans seem to have practised a curious economy in the writing of the letter *i*. In words like *Pompeius* it is certain that one *i* did duty for two (both consonantal), and in *Pompei* it evidently did duty for three (the two first consonantal). There are other traces of the same economy. The Plautine dative *eiiei* (*eiei*) became the classical *ei*. There is no intermediate step, such as **eiī*, in the spelling; but that there was an intermediate step in the pronunciation is shown by the Lucretian scansion *ēī*, pronounced *ejjī*.¹

If, therefore, the genitive *Pompei* was pronounced *Pompejjī*, as the grammarians assert, we are quite justified in assuming *uiajjī* as a possible pronunciation for the genitive *uiai*—in the absence, that is to say, of any indications to the contrary. It is true that the grammarians do not specifically mention such a pronunciation as *uiajjī*, while they do speak of a pronunciation *Pompejjī*; but there is a reason for that. The genitive in dissyllabic -ai was utterly obsolete, and regarded as even monstrous, in the

¹ This economy in the use of the letter *i* has led Sommer (*Handb.*, p. 171) and Brugmann (*Kurse v. Gr.*, p. 95) to assert that *jj* went out before

i in Latin, thus leaving the Lucretian *ēī*, and such scansions as *Pompēi*, without an explanation.

time of the grammarians, as is proved by Martial's lines (xi. 9. 5) :—

attonitusque legis 'terrai frugiferai'
Accius et quicquid Pacuuiusque uomunt.

Such genitives as *Pompei*, *Gai*, *plebei* were, of course, still in everyday use. It is true also that such spellings as *uiatii* or *uiatii* are not actually recorded. Nor, I think, are such spellings as *Pompeiii*, though Priscian says that they were used by the "*antiqui*." Yet perhaps there are some traces of such a spelling as *uiatii* still to be found in corruptions. In our MSS. of Plautus the genitive of the First Declension is always spelt *-ae*, except in *Poen.* 51. But in *Poen.* 1045, A has *ANTIDAMATI*, and B and C have *anthidamarchi* for the genitive of *Antidas*. Such corruptions would easily arise from so unfamiliar a spelling as *ANTIDAMATI*: cf. also *Aul.* 295, where B and D have *filiae in nuptiis* (for *filiaii nuptiis* ?); *Trin.* 1108, where MSS. (= P) have *nil est moracii* (or *moratii*) *ambula* (for *nil est moratii. i ambula* ?).

III.

If the current view be right that the dissyllabic *-ai* was pronounced *-ā-ī*, it is hard, as we have seen, to explain its origin and continued existence. It is hard also to explain its passing into classical *-ae*, and the apparent existence and use of the forms side by side in the spoken Latin of the time of Plautus. But these difficulties grow less if we adopt what we have seen to be the permissible alternative view,—that dissyllabic *-ai* was pronounced *-ajjī*.

No exception can be taken to the current theory that the final *-ī* of that ending is identical with the *-ī* of the genitive singular of the *o*-declension, and that its use in the *a*-declension began with masculine stems,—the

genitive, e.g., of *agricola* and *uerna*, being formed after the model of the genitive of *colonus* and *seruos*.¹ But to what was this *i* added? Sommer supposes the old genitive *ui-ā-s* to have been transformed (*umgestaltet*) by the removal of *s* and the addition of *i*; but so apparently deliberate and arbitrary a transformation is unparalleled and incredible. Why was *s* only discarded, and *-ā-* kept? If the analogy of the *o*-declension was operating, then why not *uern-a*, **uern-i*, after the model of *seru-os*, *seru-i*? But even if such a change as that from *uern-ā-s* to *uern-ā-i* had been possible, the penultimate *ā* could not have remained long before *-i*. We know exactly what happened in Latin when *ā* came to be followed by *i*. The classical *quae* (nom. fem. sing. and neut. pl.) is from *quā-i*, where **quā* is the original nominative, and *-i* is a particle, identical with that of Greek *οὐροσί*: cf. also *haec* (nom. fem. sing. and neut. pl.) from **hā-i-ce*. *Quae* was already monosyllabic in the earliest historical times; therefore the genitive of *uia*, if formed from *uiā-i*, must also have been monosyllabic, unless some undiscovered analogy had intervened.

If dissyllabic *-ai* was pronounced *-ajjī*, there is nothing in the sound-laws of Latin to prevent its having arisen by the addition of the *-i* of the *o*-declension to the old locative in *-ai*. The result of adding *-i* to the locative *uiai* (where *-ai* is a monosyllable) would be a form pronounced *uiai-j-i* (or *uiajjī*, which is quite the same), where *-j-* is a glide. It is more convenient to leave the glide unexpressed, and to write this form *uiaiī*. If it be granted that *uiaiī* (i.e. *uiajjī*) is a possible pronunciation for the genitive *uiai*, there can be no objection to the origin here suggested for it on phonetic grounds. Are there objections to it on any other grounds?

The locative was more freely used in old than in

¹ So Brugmann, *Gr.* ii. § 229; Lindsay, *L.L.* vi. 17; Stolz, *Lat. Gr.*³, p. 126.

classical Latin. In Plautus, for example, such uses of it occur as *proximae uiciniae*, *Mil.* 273 (cf. *Ter. And.* 70: *Phor.* 95); *die septimi*, *Men.* 1156; *die crastini*, *Most.* 881. In Oscan and Umbrian the locative singular was a living form, with full syntactical functions. Further, its functions in old Latin may well have overlapped those of other cases. In Sanskrit the constructions of the locative may take "in the later language a very wide range, touching upon genitive and dative constructions."¹ In the Greek Third Declension, as is well known, the locative supplanted the dative by taking on its functions in both the singular and the plural number. Sometimes in the older Greek the use of this quasi-dative, really a locative, approaches very nearly the use of the genitive²:
e.g.

τῶν τοι ματαίων ἀνδράσιν φρονημάτων
 ἢ γλώσσῃ ἀληθὲς γίγνεται κατήγορος.

AESCH. *Theb.* 438f.

Brugmann³ quotes, as an example of the locative in Old Indian, *Agnāy-i*, 'Agni's wife,' where *Agnāy-* is a locative, and *-i* a feminine suffix—literally, 'she by Agni.' It may well be then that, at a time when the locative was freely used in Latin, it might be occasionally used almost, or quite, with the force of a genitive.

If the Latin genitive in *-ai* was developed from a locative in the manner here supposed, some special circumstance must have arisen, causing a disinclination for the use of the original genitive in *-ās*, and stimulating the use of the locative with the force of a genitive. Some such circumstance there must have been; but one cannot do more than hazard a conjecture as to what it was. It may have been the falling together, as regards form, of the original

¹ Whitney, *Sansk. Gram.* § 303a.

² *Kurze v. Gram.* § 466.

³ Cf. Giles, *Manual of Comp. Phil.*²

genitive singular in *-ās*, and the original accusative plural in *-ans*. The change from **uians* to *uiās* took place later than the primitive Italic period, as is proved by Osc. *vlāss* (acc. pl.), beside *vlās* (gen. sing.), and Umb. *eaf* (acc. pl. = Lat. *eās*), beside *erar* (for **eisās*, gen. sing.). This falling together of two cases as regards form, or some similar circumstance increasing the possibility of ambiguity, may have disturbed the equilibrium of the Latin case-system, causing an increased use of the locative at the expense of the genitive in *-ās*. That would, it is true, only be a choice of evils; for the locative already had the same ending as the dative, and therefore, if it took on the function of the genitive, one ending would practically be doing the work of three cases. But this inconvenience would be remedied if the strictly genitive suffix *-i* was added to the locative in its genitival use; and in this endeavour to distinguish a genitively used locative from the true locative (and, incidentally, from the dative) we have, I suggest, the true explanation of the origin of the Latin genitive in *-ai*.

The form *uiaii* would, on this theory, have two case-suffixes—the one locative, the other genitive—if indeed the genitive suffix *-i* (not *-ei*) did not itself originate, in some hitherto unexplained way, in a locative suffix. The doubling of inflexional suffixes can easily be paralleled. The English *children*, *nearer*, and *foremost*, all contain double suffixes; but the closest parallel is perhaps to be found in Latin itself, if I am right in my former suggestion regarding the origin of the early Latin forms *quoius*, *quoiiei*, etc.¹ The early forms *quoius*, *quoiiei* seem to have been developed from the old loc.-gen.-dat. **quoi* (still existing in the *quoiquoimodi* of Cic. *Att.* iii. 22. 4, and elsewhere), by the addition of the distinctive genitive and dative endings *-os* (*-us*) and *-ei* respectively: thus, *-us*

¹ HERMATHENA, xxviii., p. 208 ff.

added to **quoi* gave *quoi-j-us*, as *-ī* added to *uiai* (loc.) gave *uiai-j-ī*. If that is so, the formations are exactly parallel; and the correspondence between them extends, as will be seen, even to their metrical treatment in early verse.

IV.

If it is hard to explain the origin of a genitival suffix pronounced *-ā-ī*, it is no less hard to explain how it became *-ae* without at the same time demonstrating the impossibility of the historical existence of *-ā-ī*. It was consciousness of this difficulty, probably, that led Brugmann to suggest¹ that the genitive in *-ae* was not perhaps developed from the genitive in *-ā-ī* by the operation of sound-laws alone, but was in part due to the analogy of the dative in *-ae*. But Leo well points out² that the existence of a dative in *-ae* must have hindered rather than aided the development of an identical genitive form. Sommer's explanation has been already mentioned. He claims that *-ā-ī* "normalerweise zu *-āi*, *-ai* kontrahiert wurde." But he does not refer to any other example of this curious change said to be normal; and without further proof the change from *-ā-ī* to *-āi* must be pronounced impossible.

It is a noteworthy fact that both forms of the genitive of the First Declension—the form with a spondaic ending, and that with a monosyllabic ending—seem to occur in Plautus side by side. Typical examples of the fuller form in Plautus are—

optumést: iam istóc *morae* || mínus erít. iam ego apúd te eró.

Stich. 537.

senex óbsonári *filide* [in] núptiís. *Aul.* 295.

The MSS. (in *Stich.* 537 = A, P) are, as usually,

¹ *Grundr.* ii., p. 571.

² *Plaut. Forsch.*, p. 319 n.

agreed in the spelling -ae: *morai* and *filiai* are restored by editors. As an example of the contracted, presumably later ending, we may take—

erróris ámbo ego illos ét *deméntide*. *Am.* 470.

The suggestion that Plautus used the fuller form as an archaism is not supported by evidence. He uses it, apparently, just as he uses the shorter form, when there is nothing in the context to justify the use of an archaism. Again, had Plautus desired to use an archaism, there was a third form of the genitive still in literary use in his time, which would presumably have served his purpose better. His contemporary Naevius, his older contemporary Andronicus, and his younger contemporary Ennius, all still use the genitive in -ās in serious poetry. But Plautus never uses it; though one would suppose that, if he had desired to make a comic effect by burlesquing the elevated style, that is the form that he would have chosen. Whatever theory we may hold as to the origin of the genitive in -ai, it was indisputably an innovation of popular origin; and if, as I have tried to prove, it was derived from the locative, it would not at once quite displace the true genitive in -ās, but the two forms would live for a time side by side, the older and more dignified ever yielding to the newer and more familiar, until at last the former was driven from every position, except a few phrases consecrated by religion or the majesty of the law. Into certain legal phrases, as is well known, the new genitive was never admitted. It is extremely unlikely that the genitive in dissyllabic -ai was an archaism in the time of Plautus, or that it was a specially dignified form. That position was held by the genitive in -ās.

The simultaneous use in the spoken language of these two forms, the one of them seeming to be the older

form from which the other was developed, is a fact of some significance. Leo sees in it evidence of the existence of an intermediate form; but, if such a form existed, its ending must have had either varying or indeterminate quantity; and that would itself require an explanation. The fact is the more significant, because it is the practice of Plautus, in using words that were current in the spoken language in two forms, to confine the longer and presumably less familiar form to a certain place in the line—generally the last foot, as being the place in which it would be least likely to cause metrical ambiguity. Thus such forms as *amauero*, *amaueram*, *audiuero*, *audiueram* are found in the last foot of dialogue metres only: in any other place in the line, Plautus uses the forms *amaro*, *amaram*, etc. Other forms found regularly only in the last foot of the line, or hemistich, of dialogue metres are *periculum* for *periculum* (and words similarly formed), *danunt* for *dant*, *siem* for *sim*, *fieri* for *fieri*, *mauolo*¹ for *mālo*, the infinitive passive in *-ier*, and others. But no such restriction is to be observed in the Plautine use of the two forms of the genitive of the First Declension. He uses either form in any part of the line.

A similar indiscriminate use by Plautus of forms admitting at least a varying scansion, is to be observed in the case of the genitive and dative cases of *is*, *hic*, and *qui*. *Eius*, for example, may be trimoric or dimoric in any part of the line; contrast the strict rule governing Plautus' use of *fieri* and *fieri*, or *siem* and *sim*. If the genitive in dissyllabic *-ai* was pronounced *-ajjī*, it obviously has something in common with the Plautine forms *eius*, *eiiei*, etc., which were pronounced *ejjus*, *ejjei*, etc. Indeed the phonetic correspondence between these forms is complete.

¹ *Mauolo* occurs once in the first foot in *Pseud.* 728. For details of the Plautine use of this and other parts of

the verb *mālo* and *nolo* see Solmsen: *Studien z. lat. Lautgeschichte*, p. 55 ff. Cf. also Lindsay: *Capt.* p. 41 f.

I have already suggested,¹ as an explanation of the early republican prosody of *eiūs*, *eiiei*, etc., that those six forms had common, or—as I should now prefer to call it, in this case—indeterminate quantity in the first syllable. The sound-law on which that indeterminate quantity depends may be formulated as follows:—

A syllable closed by intervocalic *-j-*, which was normally pronounced, and sometimes written, as *-jj-*, had indeterminate quantity in early republican Latin.

Thus, in the time of Plautus, *quoiūs*, *quoiiei* could be scanned *quojjūs*, *quojjiei*, or *quōjūs*, *quōjiei*; and it is well known that a similar indeterminate quantity is found in Greek under the same circumstances. If it be admitted for Latin, it also explains the republican prosody of such of the compounds of *iacio* as have for their first element a preposition ending in a vowel. Thus the compound of *iacio* with *ē*, spelt *eiēcio* in republican times, could be scanned, in Plautus and later, either *ejjēcio* or *ējēcio*.² Here, in a third case, I believe it will throw light on the prosody and history of a difficult form.

If *ejjūs* could be pronounced *ējūs* (by the simplification of *-jj-*), and *ejjēcio* could be pronounced *ējēcio*, then it was possible for *uiajjī* to be pronounced *uidjī*. But with *uidjī* the process of simplification would necessarily go further. It would become *uidī*, by the sound-law that *j* disappears in Latin before *i*.³ At the same time the final *-i* would be shortened under the law of *Breves Breviantes*, the accent would shift to the root-syllable by the laws of Latin

¹ HERMATHENA, xxviii. pp. 208 ff.

² This question is discussed at length in HERMATHENA, xxx. pp. 129 ff.

³ It does not follow that, because *j* went out before *i*, therefore *jj* must have gone out in *uiajjī*. There the

second *j* would be held by the first, as a glide. If *jj* had gone out before *i*, it would be impossible to explain the scansions *Pompēi* (= *Pompejji*), and *Coccēi*, and the Lucretian *ēi* (= *ejji*).

accentuation, and the analogy of the accent of the other cases of the singular number, and *uidi* would become *utāi*, a dissyllable. From *utai* it would regularly pass to *uiaē*. In the variable quantity of the pronominal genitives and datives, and the variable form of the genitive-ending of the First Declension in Plautus, we have—if the argument is sound—essentially the same phenomenon.

The two forms of the ending used by Plautus might be conveniently distinguished by spelling the fuller form -*aii*, the shorter -*ai*. The spelling -*ae* for the genitive would seem to be later. The fact that the genitive in (monosyllabic) -*ai* is not elided in Plautus, while the corresponding dative is regularly elided, is a proof that the two endings were, at any rate, not pronounced in the same way.

A genitive case whose prosody was so variable, its normally spondaic ending often slipping into a single long syllable, must have been metrically inconvenient; and there is evidence that it was felt to be so by Plautus. It has been pointed out by Leo (*op. cit.*, p. 319) that he avoids using the genitive of the First Declension. In the four plays *Rudens*, *Trinummus*, *Truculentus*, *Asinaria*, he uses the dative in -*ae* eighty-two times, the corresponding genitive only thirty-four times. Avoidance of the genitive is conspicuous, again, in such cases as:—

si tibi pudico <homone> est opus et nōn malō
cibique mīnimi *maxumaque industria*.

Vidul. 40 f.

Compare also the following two lines:—

nē ille ecāstor hīnc trūdētur || lārgus *lācrumarūm* forās.

As. 533.

audīn hunc *ōperā* ut lārgus ést || noctūrnā? nūnc enim ésse.

Ibid. 598.

Lucretius is conspicuously fond of the spondaic genitive in -ai, as he is fond of the spondaic dative of *is*; yet he also seems to feel that both are metrically inconvenient. Spondaic *ei* (= *ejjē*) occurs seven times, always in the last foot.¹ Spondaic -ai is oftenest found in the last foot, though it also occurs as the first word in the line, or as the word immediately following or immediately preceding the penthemimeral cæsure. It is in the last foot, for example, in i. 29, 112, 283, 307, 453; in other parts of the line in i. 84, 85, 725. The metrical inconvenience of the form possibly hastened its disappearance from literature. It disappears at the same time as the variable scansion of *quouis*, *eius*, *reiecio*, and similar compounds of *iacio*—that is to say, in Vergil's time. Vergil, who has the spondaic genitive four times, has *quōius* (not yet *cuius*) in *Catal.* xi. 35; *rējēce* in *Buc.* iii. 96 (so to be read, according to Priscian [K. ii. 14]).

The genitive in dissyllabic -ei must have arisen in the same way as the genitive in -ai. Thus, a genitive *diei* may be explained as having arisen from the locative *diei* (two syllables) by the addition of -i. In Plautus the form and prosody of the genitive and dative cases of the *e*-declension exactly correspond to the form and prosody of the same cases in the *a*-declension. The genitive has a spondaic or a monosyllabic ending; but the latter cannot be elided in synaloepha: the dative has a monosyllabic ending only, which, before a vowel, must be elided.² The only difference is, that *rēs* has a genitive *rēi*, beside *reū* and *rei*, a difference due to the fact that *rēs* is the only monosyllable in the *a*- and *e*-declensions. When *uidi* became *utai*, there was recession of the accent, in obedience to the laws of Latin accentuation, and the analogy of the accentuation of the other cases of the

¹ Places in Neue-Wagener³, ii. p. 378.

² See Seyffert and Lindsay, *ll. cc.*; Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 323 f.

singular; when *reū* became *rei*, no such recession of the accent could take place; and it was possible for the two vowels to remain heterosyllabic. It is even doubtful if there is in Plautus a truly monosyllabic genitive of *rēs*, the pronunciation *rēi* (by the law of *Breves Breviantes*) being generally admissible where the monosyllabic genitive has been supposed to occur. The genitive *rēi* seems to be found in the last foot only (e.g. *Men.* 323, 494; *Ep.* 203; *Ter. Eun.* 652). An exact parallel to the Plautine scansion of genitive *rei* is to be found in *ais*, which occurs scanned *ajjīs* (e.g. *Am.* 283, 344; *Poen.* 985; *Most.* 593) and *āīs*. Some editors, however, look askance at *āīs* (that is, *ajjīs*), and correct it away. Cf. also the scansions *āi* (*ejjī*) : *āi*.

The rules given by the grammarians for the genitive and dative cases of the Fifth Declension are, as has been pointed out, of late origin, and certainly do not represent the usage of the spoken language—at least, before the time of Quintilian. Of the Plautine genitives *dieū* and *diei*, the former would not change, though it would become obsolete; but the latter, together with the dative *diei*, would become *diī*, which became *diē* by the principle of dissimilation which turned **aliūnus* into *aliēnus*.¹ In the same way, the old locative *diei* should have become **diī*, but appears as *diē* in *postridie*, etc. Similarly, of the two Plautine genitives *fideū* and *fidei*, the latter, together with the dative *fidei*, became *fidi* in the age of Lucilius. The influences that turned *diī*, *aciī*, etc., into *diē*, *aciē*, did not, of course, affect *fidi*; nevertheless it became *fidei*, following the analogy of the more numerous nouns in *-iēs*. *Fidi* remained, however, in use, occurring, for example, as a genitive in C.I.L. ii. 5042, l. 3. Gellius (ix. 14) also quotes numerous genitives in *-iī* (*aciī*, *speciī*, etc.). There is no reason to doubt that he found them, as

¹ See HERMATHENA, xxx., p. 150 f.

he says, in MSS.; but the possibility is not excluded that they were modernizings of forms in *-ēi* (*aciēi*, *speciēi*, etc.), made before the grammarians had imposed on all writers the rule that the genitive and dative must end in *-ēi* (*aciēi*: *fidēi*). Gellius himself supplies evidence which puts that possibility beyond doubt. He quotes (*l. c.*) a passage from the *Annales* of Quadrigarius, in which *faciēs* was used as a genitive, and tells us that he found the word obliterated in some MSS., and *faciei* (i.e. *faciēi*) substituted; while in one MS. *faciēs* was written in the text, and *facii* beside it ('*contra*'). It was possible for successive 'corrections' of old forms to be made in successive ages, the spelling being continually—to use a familiar phrase—'brought up to date.'

The historically correct forms *diē*, *fidē* (gen. and dat.)—sometimes spelt *diī*, *fidi*—occur, as is known, in the literature of the best age; but they have generally been altered by the copyists into conformity with the rules of the later grammarians—at any rate, in prose-writers. The whole chapter of Gellius referred to above (ix. 14) is very instructive as to the way in which this happened; and he has unintentionally given us a means of testing his statements. He mentions that Caesar, in the second book of his *Analogue*, gave *diē* and *speciē* as the correct forms for the genitive. But we do not find those forms in modern editions of Caesar. Isolated MSS. are said to have *diē* for the genitive in *B. G.* vii. 11. 5; *B. C.* i. 14. 3; iii. 76. 2; and perhaps elsewhere; but Mr. Du Pontet's recent edition, in the Oxford series, does not even record the few remaining traces of the form which the great grammarian, *sermonis praeter alios suae aetatis castissimi*, declared to be alone correct. *Diē* also occurs as a genitive in some MSS. of Livy and in Sallust.¹ In verse it was obviously less easy to get rid

¹ Details in Neue-Wagener³ i., p. 573 f.

of these forms; and *diē* (gen.) has been allowed to remain in Verg. *G.* i. 208, and (by some editors) in *A.* i. 636. *Fidē* occurs as a dative in Hor. *S.* i. 3. 95; as a genitive, in Ov. *M.* iii. 341; vi. 506.

CHARLES EXON.

TWO NOTES.

I.—HOMERIC HYMN TO DEMETER, ll. 22-23.

οὐδέ τις ἀθανάτων οὐδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
ἤκουσεν φωνῆς, οὐδ' ἀγλαόκαρποι ἐλαῖαι.

SO MSS. and Messrs. Allen and Sikes, who regard this passage as an early example of the tendency in Greek poetry to personify Nature. They compare Theocritus vi. 74 ; Bion i. 31 ; Lycurgus, 130 ; but to me these do not seem to be parallel instances at all. To personify Nature, to say that the trees lament and sympathise with human sorrow, is poetry : to say that 'the trees did not hear the cry' is bathos, or a delicious fatuity worthy of Lewis Carroll. Sense, as well as poetic feeling, demands that the lines should run 'neither god nor man nor her mother heard her cry.' The mother's ear would be most keen to hear her child's cry for help, as the husband's would be most keen to hear the shriek of the captured wife in *Il.* vi.

In *Athen.* xiv. 10, Semus of Delos is quoted on the word Ἰουλος, and we are told that Ἰουλώ was an epithet of Demeter. The Harvester's Song ran—

Πλείστον οὔλον οὔλον ἱεῖ, ἱουλον ἱεῖ.

I would suggest that the line in the Hymn originally was

οὐδ' ἀγλαόκαρπος Ἰουλώ.

I had previously thought of Ἀλφῆ : Demeter is styled in the Orphic Hymn

σπερμείη, σαρπίτις, ἄλωαή, χλοόκαρπε.

One of her festivals was τὰ Ἀλφᾶ. Perhaps the line in Aristophanes' *Knights*, 407—

τὸν Ἰουλίου τ' ἂν οἶομαι, γέροντα, πυροπίπην
ἡσθέντ' ἱππαιωνίσαι καὶ Βακχέβακχον ᾄσαι,

derives its point from the pun on ἴουλος ; the 'son of the Harvester' may well be called an 'ogler of wheat.'

II.—EURIPIDES, *Hippolytus*, ll. 294-5.

THE nurse is comforting Phaedra : she says—

κεῖ μὲν νοσεῖς τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων κακῶν,
γυναῖκες αἶδε συγκαθιστάναι νόσον.

The Scholiast's remark is : γυναῖκες αἶδε συνδιοικήσουσι, ἀποκαταστήσουσι, θεραπεύσουσι τὴν μοιχείαν, κ. τ. λ.

The existing reading is usually supported by appealing to the use of καθιστάναι in Hippocrates. But Hippocrates' general use of this term is to signify either the preparation of the body for a course of treatment (τὸ σῶμα καθιστάναι), or, in the second aorist, the middle, and perfect, to denote that a disease has reached a certain organ (cp. the use of στηρίζω, Thuc. ii. 49) : e.g. αἱ ὀδύναι ἐς ὑπογάστριον καθίσταντο, *Hippocr.* 1235 C. (cp. Thuc. ii. 65, 7). But I cannot find any parallel that would permit us to assume that καθιστάναι νόσον could mean τὸ σῶμα καθιστάναι ὑγιὲς ἐκ νόσου, or γυναῖκά τινα νοσοῦσαν καθιστάναι. As far as I can discover, Hippocrates *especially* uses καθιστάναι of the

reducing of fractures, bringing down an inflamed organ, but never in the sense of curing or treating a disease : e.g. *de morb. mul.* I. καθίσταται τὸ ἐξεστηκὸς κατὰ τὴν λαπάρην, '[the swollen part is reduced, *de fract.* 8. ἀγαθὴ γὰρ ἡ κατάστασις (so Littré, *κατάτασις* vulg.), 'this method of setting the fracture is a good one.' I therefore suggest that *συγκατισχῶναι*, or, if Porson (*Eurip. Or.* 292) is correct, *συγκατισχᾶναι*, may be the right reading. The metaphorical use of *ισχναίνω* and its compounds is common to Aeschylus and Euripides. See *Pr.* V. 271, 282 ; *Eum.* 142, 264 ; *Iph. Aul.* 694.

ERNEST H. ALTON.

REVIEWS.

The Peace of Aristophanes. Edited, with introduction, critical notes, and commentary, by H. SHARPLEY, M.A., late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. William Blackwood & Sons. 1905.

MR. SHARPLEY'S edition of the *Peace* of Aristophanes is a sound and laborious work. The editor has studied well-nigh everything that has been written to elucidate the text from the linguistic side; and to the student of Attic idiom his book will be most useful. It cannot, however, be considered a complete commentary on the play, as it omits, in the main, all reference to much that, at least in recent days, has been thought to come within the purview of a commentator.

(1.) The first great omission concerns the *scholia*. It is to be regretted that the editor has not given his readers a transcription of the scholia in the *Venetus*, which have not yet been printed in full, in a form above suspicion. Roemer (*Studien zu Aristophanes*) has shown that Rutherford's transcription of the scholia in the *Ravennas* is 'durch und durch unbrauchbar' (*op. cit.* p. 1) apart from V; in fact, that the original, from which both were excerpted, exists in a more complete form in V than in R, which is often unintelligible apart from V; and that the scholia can be edited only on the basis of a new recension of the scholia in V.

(2.) Another great omission in Mr. Sharpley's edition is practically all reference to metrical difficulties. In no author is help in metrical questions more needed. In Aristophanes' lyrics, allusions to other poets cross and recross, parody is mingled with lyrical ecstasy, sudden ascents and descents in the scale of emotion occur with startling frequency; and, in many cases, a clue to the change of manner can be found only in a careful scrutiny of the metrical form. Much has recently been done in this field by Westphal-

Rosbach, Christ, Zielinski, Muff, Arnoldt, Wilamowitz, and others. No part of the elucidation of Aristophanes presents greater difficulties, but none is more fruitful. It is to be regretted that Mr. Sharpley has neglected this aspect of a commentator's duty.

(3.) Another omission in Mr. Sharpley's edition is a detailed examination of the historical questions which are suggested in great profusion by the text. For example, 603 seqq. would require an excursus. Much material has been collected, in recent years, which every new editor of Aristophanes should sift, e.g. in J. Beloch's *Die Attische Politik seit Perikles*, Gilbert's *Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens*, Müller-Strübing's *Arist. und die historische Kritik*, Wilamowitz's *Aristoteles und Athen*—all indispensable books—and numerous dissertations by Keck, Leo, Fränkel, &c. The Porsonian School, to which Mr. Sharpley belongs, has done much for the text of Aristophanes; and the time has come to treat our poet from a broader, and perhaps more fruitful, point of view.

(4.) Another omission in Mr. Sharpley's edition is all reference to the facsimile of the *Venetus*, published by the Hellenic Society. For the readings in V he is indebted to Blaydes, van Herwerden, and the Oxford edd. In general, the latter are more accurate than Blaydes, so far as I have compared their critical notes with the facsimile, and Blaydes is more accurate than van Herwerden; but all the edd. have attributed some readings to V which it is impossible to find in the facsimile: e.g., on p. 35, Mr. Sharpley records among errors in V, not in R, 475 εὐδ' (very doubtful), 711 καταγέλασας (very doubtful), 969 τοῖσι (τοισδι is quite plain). Again, on p. 49, Mr. Sharpley gives Suidas as the sole authority for the correct reading *κνάθους* (l. 542); but this seems to be the reading of V, and is certainly read in G, which is a careless copy of V.

The following readings, found in V, but omitted in Mr. Sharpley's Critical Notes, perhaps deserve attention:—35 τε om.: 52 υπερτούτοιςιν (sic): 76 πτερ τον: 110 ιὸν *qualer*: 120 ἄν om.: 137 μελ' εἰαν (sic): 172 ὠφλήσει: 175 γρ. πᾶγμα interlin. (so schol.): 186 om., but supplied on margin, sine *μαρώτατος*: 217 πιστέον: 281 φέρησι: 291 ὑμῖν also in V: 407 ἐπιβουλεύονται: 469 ἀλλ' om.: 481 δρῶσιν sine οὐδέν: 520 πόντι: 521 λάβημοι: 566 σφύρα: 672 κατέσπενδεν: 680 νῦν ἄρτι τοῦ (a gloss): 736 θυγάτερα: 739 μὲν om.: 746 σε corr. pr. m. to σοι: 760 εἵνεκα: 821 μικρόν: 867 ὄντας om.: 896 not omitted in V, as the editor says: 897 om. V.: 925 δέ: βούλεσθαι: 1025 πρόσφορ' ἅπαν': 1047 perhaps οὗτος pr. m.: 1076 κεν corrected from καί: 1088 μῆρα om.: 1126 πώησει is quite plain: 1257 ἐνεστιν τοῖς: γρ. ἔσ' ἐστὶ m. sec.: 1301 there is no trace of δέ in V.

The following points may be noted in Mr. Sharpley's Commentary:—

Line 1: The omission of the article with *καθάρω* is not, I think, due "to the desperate haste of the excited slave," but

indicates that κ. is personified "for Monsieur Scarabée" (Mazon). Line 4: The editor has not noticed the comic effect of πεπλασμένην, for μεμαγμένην, 'moulded.' Line 17: ἀντλίαν cannot mean 'bilge-water' (ἀντλον). The editor should have referred to Lucian, *Ver. Hist.* II. 4, and to the schol. on Euripides, *Hipp.* 767, for the use of ὑπερέχειν, which requires illustration. Line 34: παραβαλὼν is "obscure" according to the editor; but M. Mazon correctly translates "il déploie de droite et de gauche ses jambes dentelées," and refers to a passage in M. Fabri, which makes the beetle's action plain, and also explains why γομφίους, not γαμφηλάς, is written. Line 37: συμβάλλοντες means 'twisting,' not 'coiling': cp. σχοινοσύμβολοι, 'restiones.' Lines 43-45: The editor has not observed that the δοκησίσοφος speaks philosophically in asking for a definition (τί), and an explanation (πρὸς τί), thus employing two categories (Mazon). Thus τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα τί does not mean 'what's all this?' The mention of the Ionians seems to be due to a desire to ridicule their dialect, and also to drag in Cleon, who was unpopular in Ionia on account of the doubling of the tribute in 425 B.C. (cp. Keck, *Quaest. Ar.* c. iii. and *Vesp.* 669 seqq.). Dr. Verrall's idea that Ionia is satirized as being "the home of the new learning," seems groundless, as there is no philosophy in the Ionian's reply. Line 43: It may be noted that many scholars (e.g. Mazon, Ruppertsberg, Helmbold) attempt to remove the difficulty in this line by making κείνος refer to the beetle, not to Cleon. Line 139: There seems to be no point in a tragic παρήγησις of σ. τ, and -οις in a line which is not tragic in metre. Line 145: καθάρου λιμὴν was the large harbour of the Peiraeus, not a small inlet to the right of the entrance, as can be seen by referring to Frazer's Pausanias, vol. II. init. Line 199: κύτταρα. Why neuter? Line 201: ὁ κατὰ τοῖν σκελοῖν, sc. ὁ χέζειν ποιῶν. The explanation is correct; but κατὰ c. gen. must follow a verb compounded with the same preposition: here, perhaps, κατατλᾶν. Line 246: The editor reads ἐπιτρίψεσθ'; but the 'durative' fut. would be strange with αὐτίκα. Line 266: παράξει is undeniably right: τρίψει might have been expected; but τ. is used in a moral sense, in order to remind the spectators of the allegorical signification of the whole scene. Line 295: 'A. Palmer' should be 'Paulmier.' Line 303: κακῶν φοινικίδων is surely right, and there is no difficulty in κακῶν, 'cowardly.' Line 316: The editor reads οὐδ' ἐκείνων in the sense of 'the dead'; but it is not every ἐκείνος that has this sense: nor has he noticed, when condemning καὶ νῦν as nonsense, that in 326 we have μὴ τι καὶ νῦν, and in 337 the same words, which may defend the whole phrase οὔτι καὶ νῦν, although elsewhere οὔτι is found only in οὔτι πον and οὔτι χαίρων. καὶ νῦν must then be translated, with M. Mazon, 'this time, *par exemple*.' If the text is to be amended, I should prefer οὐδ' ἐκεῖ νῦν. It may be noted that in 326

the editor reads *μοι νυνί*, and in 337 *μηκέτ' οὖν νυνί*, which would seem to be 'from the purpose of criticism.' Line 341: *βινεῖν*. The editor notices that *κινεῖν* is read in seven other similar passages in A. Why, then, read *βινεῖν* here, as the alliteration with *καθεύδειν* recommends the reading of the codd. ? Line 382: *λακήσσης*, in spite of the editor's defence, is simply bad Greek. It is not obvious why *λακήσομαι* should have suggested *λακήσσης*, any more than *λακῆς σύ*, which seems to be the right reading. The editor says *λακήσσης* is "neither Attic nor Doric, but Hermean"; but Hermes did not say *λακήσσης*, but *λακήσομαι*, a perfectly correct, though poetical, form. Line 390: *μὴ γένῃ παλίγκοτος*. The editor quotes Hermann's em. *μὴ 'πίκοτος ἀντιβολέουσιν ἡμῖν γένῃ*, apparently with approval. But this is just the sort of passage that shows that trochees in an ode can correspond to pæons in an antode: cp. on this question Zielinski, *Gliederung*, pp. 332-3; Roszbach-Westphal, *Theorie d. Musischen Kunst*, p. 738. Certainly no copyist introduced such a word as *παλίγκοτος* as a gloss. Line 479: *ἔχονται τοῦ ξύλου*. This has never been satisfactorily explained. The editor's idea that the prisoners are represented as "fondly clinging to the pillory" is simply nonsense. There may be something in M. Mazon's suggestion that *ὁ χαλκεὺς* must be somebody on the side of the Spartans, and that it may be a pun on *ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς*, the Chalcidians having refused to adhere to the peace of Nicias (Thuc. v. 26). *ἔχονται τοῦ ξ.* may be 'those who are connected with the pillory,' viz. the relatives of the Spartan prisoners. Line 507: "edge off a little to the sea" means more than an allusion to the advice of Themistocles (*ἀνθεκτέον τῆς θαλάττης*, Thuc. i. 93, 4, Plut. *Them.* 4). As M. Mazon says, the advice here is to surrender their ambition for a continental empire. After the capture of Sphakteria, the Athenians wished to assert their claims to Nicaea, Pagae, Troezen (Thuc. iv. 23. 3). In 421 B.C. they had to surrender Methone and Pteleos to Sparta; but, no doubt, this was after a strong resistance. Line 527: The editor makes needless difficulty about *ὁμοιον*. Supply *ὄζει* and *αὐτῆς*, and the sense is plain: 'has Theoria the smell of a wallet?' Line 536: *κόλπον γυναικῶν διατρεχουσῶν εἰς ἀγρόν*. The editor is inclined to "solicit" the text of this line, which suggests the pretty picture of the fluttering folds of the women's robes, as, in *κῶμοι*, they speed in rivalry from the city to the country, on the declaration of peace. *εἰς <τόν> ἀγρόν*, which is normal in this context (cp. *Ach.* 32 *ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἀγρόν εἰρήνης ἔρῳν*), shows that this is the sense. Line 712: The editor correctly reads *οὐκ, εἴ γε κυκεῶν*, in spite of Porson's *dictum*; but he has not given the reason of the apparent exception. Porson seems to have been right in holding that when *γε* qualifies *εἴ*, it should be separated from it by at least one word; but here *γε* is due to the ellipse: so in *Eq.* 1350 *καὶ νῆ Δι'*, *εἴ γε, γε* goes with *καὶ*, not with *εἴ*: and in *Plut.* 1202 *γε μέντοι* (like *γε μὴν*) is a

common locution, in which γε has nothing to say to εἰ. Line 744: Rutherford's theory of adscripts here, followed by Mr. Sharpley, is very questionable. ἐξήγον may easily mean 'represented,' in the sense of εἰσήγον, the difference being that ἐξήγον means 'brought on the stage' through the door of the house represented on the σκηνή; εἰσήγον would mean 'brought into the orchestra' from the παρασκήνια: nor is it easy to see why the common ἐξείναι of an actor's appearance should not justify the use here. Most certainly ἐξήγον would be an unnatural gloss on ἐξήλασε. The more one studies the theory of adscripts, the more sceptical one becomes as to its soundness. The editor should have referred to H. Lübke (*Observ. Crit. in Hist. Vel. Graec. com.*, p. 43) on this passage. Line 752: θηροῖ. The editor thinks Dr. Merry's correction convincing: others may think it impossible. The corruption of τοῖσι to θηροῖ would certainly be astonishing. It is not certain that any emendation is required, on account of the line in the *Nubes*, 549 δὲ μέγιστον ὄντα Κλέων ἐπαῖος εἰς τὴν γαστέρα; but if the line is wrong, I prefer my own suggestion (see *Vesp. Crit. Append.* 1029) τοῖσι γ' ἀμείκτοις, ἀμεικτος being a satisfactory epithet of Cleon, as of the Centaurs (*Soph. Trach.* 1095), or of the Cyclops (*Eur. Cycl.* 429), and μεγίστοις would be an error, by anagrammatism: cf., for a similar blunder, Aesch. *Eum.* λήναι μεγίστω, where Mr. Davies reads γεμιστόν. Line 874: ἐπέμπομεν. Nothing can be more certain than that ἐπαίωμεν is right (cp. παίειν δρύττειν πῦξ ὁμοῦ καὶ τῷ πέει): nor can I see why we should not say, in English, 'we kissed her <all the way> to Windsor.' If a double sense is required, we may take ἐπαίωμεν as meaning, 'we beat the cymbals in her honour' (so Mazon): cp. κόπτεσθαι τινα; but this is not necessary. The editor thinks the common confusion (in oral Greek) of αι and ε may explain the degeneration of ἐπέμπομεν to ἐπαίωμεν; but no Greek, ancient or modern, pronounced ε in πέμπω otherwise than as we do. It is different in such cases as αἶπος and ἔπος, ἐπιβουλεύοντε and -ονται, &c., in which ε and αι are indistinguishable (viz. both are pronounced as ae). Van Herwerden's ἐπέμπομεν is really unworthy of notice. Line 892: There is no reason why the editor should reject ἀρ' here, on the ground that Aristophanes never elides the syllable at the end of a sentence. Like many other generalizations, this is quite unsound: cp. *Vesp.* 793 εἴφ' (at a change of speaker), and V. Bamberg *de Rav.*, p. 27. Line 960: σείσω τε. This emendation of van Herwerden is a bold departure from σείον σύ of the codd. It is not impossible that σείον σύ was addressed to the victim which was sprinkled with the water, so that it might shake its head in affirmation of its willingness to be sacrificed (Mazon). Line 1306: κενὰς παρέλκειν: properly 'to row in the air.' The opposite is in Athen. 446 A πῖθι οὖν, ὃ ἐταίρε, καὶ μὴ μεστὰς αἰεὶ ἔλκωμεν. It is strange that the editor should think that κενὰς will not suit this view. Any rowing-man knows what Aristophanes meant.—W. J. M. S.

T. Macchi Plauti Comoediae, recognouit breuique adnotatione critica instruxit W. M. LINDSAY, in Uniuersitate Andreana Litterarum Humaniorum Professor. Tomus ii. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

It is too early yet to expect anything like a definitive text of Plautus. His orthography and pronunciation, his accident and syntax, the metrical rules he observed, his vocabulary and familiar phrases, need all to be better known; because the strangeness of all these to later ages—including our own—have been in a great measure the cause of the ruinous state in which much of his text remains. Meanwhile, we expect each new edition of the whole text to mark an advance—to prove that settled principles are being established, and order gradually evolved. From this point of view Professor Lindsay's new text is somewhat disappointing. It need not be said that it is the work of a scholar who is thoroughly familiar with the wide literature of the subject; but the value of a new edition must depend on the soundness of the critical principles chosen by the editor. The principles observed by Professor Lindsay are set forth in the *Praefatio* to *Tom. i.*, and, at greater length, in his *Ancient Editions of Plautus*, 1904. The most important of them is, that the consensus of the Palimpsest (A) and the Palatine mss. (P) must always be accepted as conveying the '*ipsa verba*' of Plautus, unless there is evidence that scribes have independently fallen into the same error (*Anc. Ed.*, pp. 110 ff., 150). There is only one way of establishing this principle—to prove by the method of exhaustion that there is no passage in which a manifest error is common to both recensions—excepting always such trifling errors as might arise independently. This Professor Lindsay can hardly claim to have done. In *Pers.* 319, an iamb. 7., he is constrained by his theory to read (with A and P)

enim metuo ut possiem (possim *lib.* = A, P) in bubile réicere
ne uagéntur.

The line so arranged has three blemishes: *possiem*, for *possim*, is found regularly only in the last foot; the verse has no diaeresis (every other verse in the scene having it); and it contains a wrongly divided proceleusmatic (-lě réice-). If Plautus wrote it so, when he might have written it

enim métuo ut possim réicere in || bubile ne uagéntur,—

it is very strange. Again, in *Stich.* 701 ff. Professor Lindsay prints (I add, here and elsewhere, marks of ictus in first feet)—

séd amica mea et tua dum † cenat † dumque se exórnat, nos uolo
tamen lúdere inter nos. strategum te facio huic conuiuió.

STI. nímíúm lepide in mentem uenit quam potius in subsellio
cynice [hic] áccipimur quam † in lecticis †! SA. immo enim
nimio hic magis est dulcius.

Here Professor Lindsay, tied by his theory, is helpless to emend. He has, however, transposed *potius quam* of A, P (regarding it, presumably, as an error independently made), cut out *hic* (not in P), and in his Schema Metrorum indicates that the metre changes from trochaic septenarii to iambic octonarii (in the middle of a sentence), returning to trochaics at v. 706! This change, of course, necessitates the scansion *uēnit* in v. 703. In his critical note he suggests *inlectice* in v. 704, presumably a comic formation from *in lectis*, comparing 'accubuo' in *Truc.* 422. But *accubuo* is there an instantly understood play of words on *assiduo*. A theory which would forbid us for all time to emend this and similar passages, on the ground that their seeming errors are common to both the recensions, will certainly not conduce to the improvement of the text of Plautus. Without this theory the passage can be, and has been, easily emended.

Professor Lindsay holds very strongly the opinion that a syllable that would be accented in prose cannot be shortened in Plautine verse by the metrical *ictus* under the law of Breves Breviantes (see Tom. i., Præf. p. vi; *Capl.* 1900, p. 39). Others hold that such shortenings do occur in anapæsts, and in the first foot of dialogue metres; while in the body of a dialogue verse they occur in seeming only, not in reality, when the accent has been shifted by enclisis or elision. We are here concerned not with the soundness or unsoundness of Professor Lindsay's opinion on this point, but only with its effects on his text of Plautus. It is obvious that it is in danger of coming into collision with the doctrine of the infallibility of the consensus of A and P. Such collisions occur abundantly. In *Poen.* 922, A and P give—

ero ūni potius intro (intus P) ero odio quam hic sim vobis omnibus.

Here the editor is in a dilemma: he must needs regard the text as at once sound and unsound—sound, as supported by A and P; unsound, as containing an impossible shortening by the *ictus*. What does he do? He prints the line a little further from the margin, implies in a critical note that its metre is not trochaic, but without saying what it is, and after all includes it, in his Schema Metrorum, among the other 106 trochaics of which the scene consists! The assuming of a sudden and brief change of metre in the middle of a dialogue scene is a device often used by Professor Lindsay: cf. *Stich.* 701 ff., quoted above, *Pseud.* 997, where he gets rid of *épistul(am) ergo* by that means, *Pers.* 225 f. to escape *alléräst*, *Pseud.* 1259 f. to escape *ūbi ältera*. His treatment of other similar cases is most inconsistent. In *Pers.* 264 *dīe ūno absólutam* (A, P) is accepted in silence: in *Mil.* 1278 *quia ædēs* (A, P) is 'corrected'; in *Mil.* 69 *molēstde sunt* (A, P) is accepted: in *Most.* 504 *scelēst(ae) hāe sunt* (P) is obelized as

hopeless; in *Trin.* 983 *dbir(e) actūtum* (P) is changed to *ire a.*: in *Pseud.* 168, where Ballio is dismissing several slaves, *intro dbir(e) atque* (A, P) is scanned *intro ābite*. In many places (e.g. *Trin.* 385 *sēd ādde*, *Pers.* 543 *sēd ōptume*, *Stich.* 614 *per hōrtūm*, *Poen.* 871 *mēae alae* [see crit. note]) such shortenings are accepted, though sometimes with a protest ('*displicet*,' '*vix ferendum*'). To maintain that such shortenings are impossible, and, at the same time, that readings like those just quoted are the '*ipsa verba*' of Plautus because supported by A and P, is to defy logic.

A Plautine editor who ties himself by mutually destructive critical principles is compelled to leave open many doors of escape from difficulties. For this reason, apparently, Professor Lindsay refuses to recognise rules which have been established for Plautus by long and laborious research. He admits few restrictions in the use of hiatus, writes *siem*, *danunt* and the like in the body of a verse, elides the genitive *-ae*, uses the un-Plautine (but Terentian) *nossem*, etc., and so forth. Thus in *Stich.* 220 he reads *adeūnt*, *perquirunt quid siet caussae* ilico. Here, if *caussai* be read, two blemishes disappear at one stroke. Professor Lindsay keeps both. In *Trin.* 957 he prints—

m̄hi concrederet, nisi mē ille ēt ego illūm *nossem* probe—

in preference to—

m̄hi concrederēt, nisi me ille et ēgo illum nouissēm probe.

(cf. *ibid.* 790, and *Rud.* 1229). Marks of *ictus* are not generally used, whereby some awkward questions are avoided. One would like to know exactly how to scan such lines as *Poen.* 871, *Pers.* 264, *Poen.* 922; to know what causes the shortening in *cōnditūmst cōnsilium* (*Pseud.* 575)—in prose *cōnditūmst cōnsilium*—and so forth. The innovation of omitting *s* in words like *magis*, *satis* is not an improvement. And why is *s* omitted in lines like *Most.* 84, *recōrdatū' mūltum* (bacchiac)? This would suggest to a student that a short syllable was required there, which is not the case: cf. *ibid.* 99, 121, *Merc.* 343, etc. In the *apparatus criticus* departures from the reading of the mss. which can hardly be classed as insignificant are sometimes not recorded: e.g. in *Trin.* 93 there is no hint that *peruenant* is not in all the mss., whereas it is in none; cf. *ditiās* in *Rud.* 542, *fenstras* *ibid.* 88, etc.

In spite of defects, this is pre-eminently a learned edition, and will, it may be hoped, stimulate the study of Plautus. If it does not mark so great a forward step in Plautine criticism as one would desire, the fact is to be attributed, we believe, to the adoption of a rather unfortunate method.—C. E.

(1.) *Selections from the Old-Irish Glosses*: by JOHN STRACHAN. 1904.

(2.) *Old-Irish Paradigms*: by JOHN STRACHAN. 1905.

THESE two small volumes, prepared by Professor Strachan for the use of his classes in the lately-founded School of Irish Learning, will prove an invaluable aid to students beginning the study of Old Irish—and not to beginners only, for they are the work of one of the highest authorities on Irish grammar, and they embody the numerous discoveries that have been made in this domain in the last twenty years.

Anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of the Irish language, and to grapple with the still unsolved difficulties of the older literature, must first make himself thoroughly well acquainted with the grammar of Old Irish. Until now this preliminary task presented extraordinary difficulties to the student. It was not enough for him to master Zeuss' great work; he must ransack half a dozen periodicals, in order to ascertain what had been done since Zeuss' day. Windisch's grammar, published in 1879, did not take him much beyond Zeuss. He must acquaint himself with the essays of Windisch, Zimmer, Atkinson, Thurneysen, Stokes, Strachan, Pedersen, Sarauw, and others. Nowhere could he find a statement of results at once succinct and authoritative. Professor Strachan's little manuals have both these qualities. The author has himself contributed perhaps more than anyone else in the last ten years to settling the accidence of Old Irish. His papers in the *Transactions of the Philological Society*, the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, and elsewhere, are models of scientific method; and his conclusions always inspire confidence because they are based not on speculation but on laborious induction. It is superfluous to add that he is perfectly familiar with the investigations of other scholars. The general results of such studies are here presented in the briefest possible compass. The *Old-Irish Paradigms* are, in fact, a summary of the Accidence condensed into eighty small pages: in them is contained the anatomy of the language of the Glosses. The companion volume shows the living organism: it is a *Selection of Old-Irish Glosses*, with explanatory notes at once complete and concise: a Vocabulary is appended. Both books were evidently compiled for the use of a class, and both require in some degree the explanations of the lecturer. With a view to their wider use it is, perhaps, a pity that Professor Strachan did not add a few definitions of terms. What, for instance, will the unaided beginner make of the division of verb-forms into Absolute and Conjunct, complicated as it is by the further divisions into Deuterotonic and Prototonic? It

would greatly add to the usefulness of the book if the Verbal System were introduced by a brief statement of the principles of verbal accentuation discovered by Thurneysen and Zimmer.

It is in the exposition of the Verb that the advance in the understanding of Irish grammar is most remarkable. Order was first introduced into chaos by the famous discovery just referred to. Since then successive investigations have established the existence of a distinct series of forms appropriate to the relative use of the verb; the tenses of the subjunctive mood, formerly mixed up with the futures, have been disentangled; the forms and functions of the Preterite and Perfect have been made clear; the list of verbal particles has been increased; the endless complications of the infixed pronouns, and the innumerable forms of the Substantive Verb, have gradually been reduced to system. Let anyone compare the teaching of the present volumes on these points with the statements of Zeuss or Windisch, and he will realize that the laws of Old-Irish grammar are at last approaching a state of fixity. Much, no doubt, remains to be done before the complete and final Historical Grammar can be written. When the time comes, let us hope that it will be written by Professor Strachan.

The Euthydemus of Plato, with Revised Text, Introduction, Notes, and Indices, by EDWIN HAMILTON GIFFORD, D.D., Honorary Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and formerly Archdeacon of London. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1905.

THIS edition of the *Euthydemus* is intended for the use of University Students and the Higher Forms of Public Schools.

The Introduction is excellently arranged. The first section sets forth the contents. The feelings of Socrates, when he joined the music-class consisting of juniors, make us think of J. S. Mill devoting himself at a mature age to the study and practice of dancing. Theophrastus is less sympathetic, not to say more ill-natured, towards the *ὀψιμαθής*. In the 9th line of this first section there is a misprint or mistake: 'Ctesiphon' ought to be 'Ctesippus.' The fourth section finds the *λογογράφος* aimed at in the end of the dialogue to be 'Isocrates.' In the fifth section, the discussion of the date of the dialogue is interesting. The conclusion is that (1) Plato, *Phaedrus*, (2) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, (3) Plato, *Euthydemus*, were published, in this order, 'within two or three years after B.C. 388, in which year Plato

was forty-one and Isocrates forty-eight years old.' On p. 32, l. 6, ἀπολλέλανκα is, of course, a misprint for ἀπολλέλανκα. The section on Logical Principles and Fallacies reminds us that some of the things familiar in modern text-books on Formal Logic are very old. The section on the meaning of the term σοφιστής mentions Grote's famous defence of the Sophists in his History of Greece: 'The effect produced by that brilliant, but paradoxical, essay was, however, of short duration.' In this section, p. 43, l. 2, there is a slight misprint. On p. 45, 'Mr. Poste's own conclusion' is not given explicitly. On p. 47, l. 13, is not 'Diodorus' a slip for 'Dionysodorus'? In the text the editor introduces two slight emendations of his own, and both seem good.

The notes are nearly always well written, and deal with criticism, grammar, philosophy, and general explanation. On p. 42, and again on p. 57, we observe that the editor uses '*Pol.*' as an abbreviation for the '*Republic.*' Even though the numbering keeps one right, and though other scholars use it, this abbreviation is slightly objectionable, owing to the existence of Plato's other dialogue, the '*Politicus.*' On p. 52 (notes) there is a serious inadvertence in the following: "Patrocles was the nephew (ἀδελφιδούς) of Socrates, being the son of his half-brother Chaeredemus (E 7)." The reference itself is sufficient to show that Patrocles was not the nephew but the half-brother of Socrates, the former being the son of Chaeredemus and the latter of Sophroniscus. Perhaps the inconsequence of the argument of Dionysodorus was for a moment taken seriously by the editor, and led him into confusion about this piece of genealogy. Iphicles and Patrocles jingle; but the relation of the one to Heracles and that of the other to Socrates are not symmetric. Elsewhere, e.g. on p. 7 (Introduction), this mistake is not made. On p. 62, l. 15, there is the erratum of ἀπυρόν τινα for ἀπορόν τινα. At p. 65 the note on ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον is not satisfactory. The beginning is in favour of the comparative, while the middle is in favour of the superlative (and the superlative is printed in the text); and the end seems to change back in favour of the comparative. At 304, a, 1, the text, to be consistent with the note, should omit or bracket τὸ σοφόν.

The Velus Cluniacensis of Poggio, being a contribution to the textual criticism of Cicero, Pro Sexto Roscio, Pro Cluentio, Pro Murena, Pro Caelio and Pro Milone, by ALBERT C. CLARK, M.A., Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series—Part x.). Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1905.

POGGIO, when he went across the Alps to the Council of Constance, obtained at Cluni a MS. of Cicero's speeches which he knew contained the *Pro Cluentio*, *Pro Sex. Roscio*, and *Pro Murena*. This MS. he sent, without long delay, to his friends in Florence. Writing to Niccolo Niccoli in 1425, he asked him to say what other speeches there were in the volume. There were apparently other speeches in the volume; and Poggio seems to have asked the question as he had not had time to examine the MS. thoroughly, especially as it was much the worse for age and very illegible.

In the Cluni catalogue there is an entry "496 Cicero pro Milone et pro Avito et pro Murena et pro quibusdam aliis." This is apparently the only mention of the *Pro Murena* in the mediæval catalogues; and as it occurs in the Cluni catalogue, we may conjecture that it was the MS. which Poggio procured. Poggio's MS. then contained also the *Pro Milone*. Poggio's MS. is now lost. But Mr. Clark's good fortune—in this case good fortune being the result of genius, learning, and patient labour—has made us no longer seriously regret the loss.

A companion of Poggio in his travels was Bartolommeo de Montepulciano. His copy of Asconius (written in 1416), which is now in the Laurentian Library (liv. 5), is well known. The same volume contains also a set of Excerpts from certain speeches of Cicero—viz. from *Mil.*, *Cael.*, *S. Rosc.*, *Muren.*, *Cael.* again, *Cluent.*, *Muren.* again, *Cluent.* again, *S. Rosc.* again. These Excerpts are fragmentary, Bartolommeo apparently having jotted down whatever interested him for the moment—a passage, a phrase, or even a word. It is most probable that, as Bartolommeo used his friend Poggio's MS. of Asconius in making his own copy of that author, so he used Poggio's MS. of Cicero, the Cluniacensis, in making these Excerpts. We have seen that Poggio's MS. of Cicero contained four of these speeches, and that there was reason to suppose that it probably contained at least one more, so that the presence of the *Pro Caelio* causes no difficulty.

By these considerations Mr. Clark, in his endeavour to get a basis for the criticism of the *Pro Sex. Roscio* and *Pro Murena*, was led to a consideration of these Excerpts with most fruitful results. The examination of them showed that the Cluniacensis in the *Pro Cluentio* was largely in agreement with S, one of the "integri codices" (Monacensis, 15,734, so much used by Halm); in the *Pro Caelio*

with S, and with the Turin palimpsest; and in the *Pro Milone* with H (Harleianus, 2682); and that it was from the Cluniacensis that the supplements and marginal notes were derived which appear in several fifteenth-century Italian mss. and are incorporated in the text of S; and so has confirmed what Mr. Clark said many years ago in his edition of the *Pro Milone* (p. xxxv), that S was a highly corrected manuscript, and that it was to the infiltration of superior readings introduced from Transalpine sources that S owed its importance. Mr. Clark, in the Appendix, gives a full collation of Bartolommeo's Excerpts.

Possessed of this information, and guided by this hypothesis, the outcome of true critical insight, Mr. Clark was able to see the supreme importance for the *S. Rosc.* and *Muren.* (and to a considerable extent for the *Mil.*, *Cluent.*, and *Cael.*) of a Paris MS. 14,749 of Cicero's speeches (Σ). It originally belonged to the Abbey of St. Victor, and is the "Codex S. Victoris" used by Lambinus and Gulielmus, and (though he had only fragmentary knowledge of it) rightly deemed "praestantissimus" by Madvig. In this ms. the first copyist left in many cases a lacuna which the second copyist filled up by a corruption of some kind. This indicated great faithfulness of transcription of a difficult original. The first copyist left what he could not read; the second scribe made the best attempt he could at exact reproduction of the original;¹ and in many of these cases the much-discussed Wolfenbüttel ms. (W) gives a strange corruption. But W has no lacunæ; it is copied straight on from one manuscript. That ms. is either Σ, or one derived from it: for, among other reasons, W often omits just one line of Σ. So, as Mr. Clark says (p. xii), "The claim advanced on behalf of W—viz. that it is an independent copy of the Cluniacensis, made before Poggio removed this to Italy—is true of Σ." Again, while in the text of *Mil.*, *Cluent.*, *Cael.*, Σ presents nothing remarkable, its marginal notes and supplements are taken from the Cluniacensis, as appears from the fact that the variants coincide with the Excerpts of Bartolommeo. So that the important result issues that the view that the lacunæ in the "codices mutili" of the *Pro Cluentio* were filled up from the Cluniacensis is proved from Σ to be correct.²

Mr. Clark now proceeds to a most interesting digression on the orthography of Σ;³ and this orthography proves that the original of Σ was unaffected by the Carolingian reformation of spelling. And Σ had other archaisms; to take one example, Σ gives (as indeed

¹ e.g. *Murena*, § 10, quod dandum est amicitiae. The first writer omits quod, leaving a lacuna. The second scribe inserts caud, c and q being occasionally interchanged in the Cluniacensis. W corrupts the latter into cano.

² From Σ have been copied two

Paris mss. 6369 and 7777, already collated by Steinmetz, which Mr. Clark finds superior to W.

³ By Σ is meant its copy of *S. Rosc.* and *Muren.*, its marginalia to *Cael.* and *Mil.*, and its marginalia and supplements to *Cluent.*

the other mss. also give here) Rosc. 60 *pepugisset*, a spelling attributed by Gellius (vi. 9, 15) to Cicero. Owing to its orthography, we cannot date the Cluniacensis later than the eighth century. Mr. Clark has given in the Appendix a full collation of Σ (in the limited sense indicated above).

Coming to the question of the affinities of the Cluniacensis (as shown by Σ), we find it gives all the important readings of H in the *Pro Milone*, e.g., § 74, the celebrated *harenam* for *arma*; and it would appear that the ancestor of the German H was a gemellus of the French Cluniacensis. In the *Pro Caelio* we find a close connexion with the two palimpsests, and with most of the better readings known from W and S; and with many of the better readings ascribed to the old editors. It would appear that these readings were mostly drawn from the Cluniacensis by Italian collators, and are not due to conjecture. In some cases, too, what have been regarded as interpolations, are found not to be interpolations. Thus Σ gives, at § 24:

Titus Gaiusque Coponii, qui ex omnibus maxime Dionis mortem doluerunt, qui cum doctrinae studio atque humanitatis, tum etiam hospitio Dionis tenebantur. Habitabat apud Titum, ut audistis, Dio, erat ei cognitus Alexandriae.

P¹ left a lacuna of 4½ lines after *Gaiusque*. P² inserts "omni cum doctrina homo atque humanitatis tum etiam hospitio Dionis tenebantur. Habitabat apud L. Luceium ut audistis, fuerat ei cognitus Alexandriae," leaving a blank space for a line before *omni*. E G W follow P². S has been supplemented from the Cluniacensis and reads with Σ ; except that for *Titum* and *Dio, erat*, it gives with P² *L. Luccium* and *fuerat*. Thus the reading of S is virtually right, and is not a supplement excogitated by the Italians. In the marginalia and supplements to the *Pro Cluentio* the agreement of Σ with ST (T = Lag. 12) is very great, though there are some readings of ST which may be right, and for which no evidence is found in Σ .

We think that Mr. Clark's great gifts of insight, patience, and love of completeness, exhibit themselves more brilliantly than ever in tracing the origin of these readings; though it would be quite impossible to show this in the space of a short review. He has examined a great number of mss., from some half-dozen of which he has been able to trace the gradual introduction of readings, partly taken from the Cluniacensis, partly due to conjecture, into the Italian mss. These appear first as marginal notes, especially in the three Florentine mss., Laur. xlviii. 25 (= Lag. 25), S. Marci 255 (= Lag. 6), Laur. (Gadd.) xc. sup. 69, the last of which contains the most complete collection of variants taken both from the Cluniacensis and from other sources. He finally discovers that S and W have incorporated these marginal notes into their text, and are accordingly highly worked-up mss. not fitted to serve as a basis for a revision of the text.

But there is one Italian ms., containing the *Pro S. Roscio* and *Pro Murena*, which deserves especial attention. It is Lagomarsini's 10, now Laur. xlviii. 10, called A by Mr. Clark. It is dated February 15, 1415, the year in which the Cluniacensis is stated to have arrived in Italy. Mr. Clark shows that it was copied from a rough copy of the Cluniacensis, and so believes that the latter must have reached Italy in 1414. A is thus a copy of the Cluniacensis independent of Σ ; and though somewhat impaired by correction—for the writer, Johannes Arretinus, was a good scholar and palæographer—yet is of great value. Mr. Clark has given what amounts to a full collation of this ms. in the two speeches mentioned and in the conclusion of the *Pro Cluentio*, which conclusion in A is taken from the Cluniacensis.¹

We may sum up Mr. Clark's results in his own words (p. lxiv):—"The results of these conclusions are of great importance. In the *Pro. Sex. Roscio*,² the two mss. chiefly relied upon have been W and S. It now appears that W is a copy of a copy made from Σ , and that S is highly composite and tainted by conjecture. In the *Pro Milone* the Cluniacensis emerges from the darkness to strengthen the authority of H (Harl. 2682), and to prove the antiquity of the recension found in that ms. In the *Pro Cluentio* ST are dethroned from the primacy assigned to them, which must now be assigned to the French and Italian marginalia. In the *Pro Caelio* the new evidence is such as to necessitate a fresh revision of the text."

We cannot conclude without noticing Mr. Clark's interesting statement that Σ in the *Pro Caelio* has confirmed the emendations of several scholars, notably no less than six of Madvig's. One is especially noteworthy, as it involves the addition of three words:—

§ 45. Hoc quidquid est quod nos facimus in dicendo, quoquo modo agendo (so PEG, non modo agendo S) verum etiam cogitando possit sustinere.

Madvig read *quoquo* <modo facimus non> modo agendo, &c. This addition is found in Σ . Again, § 43, ex quibus neminem mihi liquet nominare (P reads *liquet*: EGS *necesse est*—an emendation based apparently on Phil. ii. 1). Madvig suggested *libet*, and such is the reading of Σ . The facsimile page of Σ given at the beginning of Mr. Clark's volume will show these two emendations. But we think Madvig's greatest triumph is the confirmation by Σ of his emendation § 58 ad eam rem ipsam, for ad eadem rem ipsam P¹, ad rem ipsam P² and the other mss. See Madvig's acute note in Opusc. Acad. i. 403 (= 326²). Another brilliant confirmation is § 37 *dide ac disce* of Puteanus for *dide ac disce* of P.

The importance of this "Anecdote" of Mr. Clark's can

¹ A has not filled up the other lacunæ found in the "codices mutili."

² Should we not add 'and in the *Pro Murena*'?

hardly be overestimated. It has provided strikingly new, and, it would seem, firm foundations for the criticism of the speeches of Cicero of which it treats. We offer Mr. Clark our warm gratitude and congratulations.

The Tragedies of Seneca, rendered into English verse, by ELLA ISABEL HARRIS, PH.D. (Yale). London. 1904.

THE aim of this book is, the author says, to afford the student of modern drama a knowledge of Seneca sufficient to show him the influence which Seneca exercised in that branch of literature. It will indeed let the student know to some extent what Seneca wrote; but we fear that it will not enable him to appreciate the subtleties and artificialities in which Seneca delights. The choral odes are translated into the same blank verse as the speeches and dialogue, so that a considerable monotony results, especially as the blank verse is rather lacking in distinction, and is such as could easily be written by anyone with a fair command of language. We must confess, however, to having read only the *Phaedra*; and to it alone our remarks refer.

As examples of inadequate renderings of the original, we may quote 161 *negata magnis sceleribus semper fides*, 'Protection hitherto denied to crime,' where the emphatic word *magnis* is ignored. 163 *animusque culpa plenus*, 'the heart that knows its fault,' a very mild rendering of *plenus* ('the o'erfraught heart'). 517 *regios luxur procul | est impetus fugisse*, 'I wish not royal luxuries,' which is somewhat tame for 'an impulse seizes me to have escaped far from royal luxuries.' For *impetus est* with *inf.*, cp. Ovid *Met.* ii. 663, *Her.* 5. 64, and often in Ovid. 588 *Attolle vultus, dimove vocis moras; | tuus en alumna temet Hippolytus tenet*, 'O nursling, lift thy head, | Speak, see, Hippolytus embraces thee,' where the very strong and emphatic word *tuus* is wholly disregarded.

In point of accuracy of translation there is something to be desired. 234 *calcanitem (aspera saxa)*, 'mocks the cruel rocks,' is hardly right: the word means little more than 'treading': cp. Hor. *Carm.* i. 28. 16; Ovid *Her.* 2. 1210. 389 *quae fila ramis ultimi Seres legunt*, 'the web the distant Eastern people weave.' The reference is to silk, which the Seres were supposed to gather (*legunt*): cp. Verg. *Georg.* ii. 121, *velleraque ut foliis depectant tenuia Seres*, and the commentators thereon. 474 If the race of animals died out, *Solis et aer pervius ventis erit*, 'and all the ether be | a path for sun and winds alone'; but surely there can be no reference to the sun. 528 *nullus in campo sacer divisit agros arbiter populis lapis*, 'No judge with boundary-stones set off their lands.' Can this be right? Is not the boundary-stone itself the *arbiter*, as in

Statius *Theb.* vi. 330, *hinc saxeus umbo Arbiter agricolis*: cp. Verg. *Æn.* xii. 898; Tibull. i. 3. 44 (also of the golden age), *non fixus in agris Qui reget certis finibus arva lapis.* 537 *Sed arva per se feta poscentes nihil | pavere gentes*, 'but the fields untilled | Brought forth their fruit, nor feared mankind's demands.' But does not *pavere* here rather come from *pasco* than from *paveo*? cp. Ovid *Met.* i. 103 ff. 649 *Cnosii*, 'Theban,' is a mere slip; but we are not so sure that such is the case in 900 *regale patriis asperum signis ebur, capulo refulgit generis Actaei decus*, 'the royal hilt of ivory, carved and bright, the glory of Actaeon's race,' an indifferent translation. The reference seems to the Athenian (*Actaei*) *τέττις*. In 838 the translator seems puzzled by *Eleusin* nominative; and in 1234 *meumque poenae semper accrescat tecur* '(Let the vulture) hover about my liver and increase my punishment,' fails to bring out the idea which is 'and let my liver keep ever growing anew for the torture': cp. Verg. *Æn.* vi. 596-600 (of Tityos), *nec fibris requies datur ulla renatis*.

But it is only bare justice to say that there is an elevation of style about the whole translation. Here and there, too, the translator is happy, e.g. 27 *Si quem tangit gloria silvae vocat hunc Phlyeus*, 'If a huntsman's pride is felt by any, Phlius calls to him'—though the reference is probably to a dweller in the Attic deme of Phlya, not to Phlius, which was in the Peloponnesus. 169 *expelle facinus mente castifica horridum*, 'make thy mind chaste, drive out the horrid thought.' 344 *virgatas tigris*, 'the striped tiger.' 430 *malus est minister regii imperii pudor*, 'Poor servant of the royal will indeed | is loyalty to duty.' 1153 *constat inferno numerus tyranno*, 'The tyrant finds hell's number still the same.'

On the whole, however, we cannot help feeling a certain disappointment in the work.

Minucius Felix und Seneca, von Franz Xaver Burger.
München. 1904.

THE question of the relation between the *Octavius* of Minucius and the writings of Seneca has been dealt with by many scholars from Elmenhorst at the beginning of the seventeenth century to Boenig, whose edition of Minucius appeared in 1903. The subject of Dr. Burger's monograph is, therefore, not a new one. But he claims to have done the work of comparing the two writers in a more thorough and systematic fashion than his predecessors. He divides his treatise into two parts. In the first he collects passages in which the thoughts of Seneca are reproduced, with more or less of variation, in the *Octavius*; in the second he seeks to prove that

the earlier writer has influenced the style of the later. It was to be expected that many of the most striking resemblances should have been pointed out by previous workers; but not a few are now added which have been hitherto unnoticed. There is scarcely a chapter of Minucius, it would seem, in which it is not possible to discover some trace, in matter or in form, of the influence of the Stoic philosopher. In some cases, it is true, the similarities do not prove literary connexion. Some of them, indeed, may be deemed wholly imaginary. But most of those who will take the trouble to examine the passages which Dr. Burger has brought together, and to read his careful discussions of their value, will find his conclusion irresistible, that Minucius was a close student and an imitator of Seneca. A table, with which the essay concludes, makes it appear that the works of Seneca which Minucius had most thoroughly assimilated were his *De Superstitione*, and some portions of his *De Beneficiis*, and of the Dialogues and Epistles.

Nouum Testamentum Domini nostri Iesu Christi Latine sec. ed. Sancti Hieronymi ad codicum mss. fidem recensuit IOHANNES WORDSWORTH, S.T.P., Episc. Sarisburiensis, in operis societatem adsumpto HENRICO IULIANO WHITE, A.M., Coll. Merton, Socio. Partis Secundae fasciculus primus. Actus Apostolorum. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano. MDCCCV.

THE volume before us differs from its predecessors in the greater prominence which is given to confessedly Old Latin texts. The *apparatus criticus* presents the readings of seventeen mss. of Jerome's revision and of all the extant Old Latin texts. These, of course, are very few in number compared with those that are available for the Gospels; but this circumstance, while it lessens the labour of collation, renders the determination of the true Hieronymian text more difficult. There are not, in fact, more than three or four O.L. mss. which contain the whole of the Acts; and as these differ constantly among themselves, presenting occasionally three or four distinct variants, it is at least possible that in many places in which the Vulgate differs from them it may preserve an O.L. rendering. It is generally acknowledged that Jerome did not revise the Acts and Epistles as carefully as he had dealt with the Gospels. It is most probable that he merely corrected the Latinity of the best ms. that he could find.

The learned editors of this edition of the Acts do not base their text on the readings of any one of the ancient recensions, whether of Alcuin or of Theodulf. They divide the seventeen mss. which they use into four classes, the *codices primarii* being Sangermanensis, Cauensis, Amiatinus, Fuldensis, and Armachanus.

These represent the best Hieronymian texts of South Gaul, Spain, Naples, Capua, and Ireland respectively. The St. Germain, the Amiatine, and the Armagh codices belong to the same family; Cod. Fuldensis represents Alcuin's recension; Cauensis, the Spanish type. It is a little surprising to find such prominence given in this edition to the St. Germain ms., which Mr. White describes elsewhere (*Scrivener's Introd.*, ed. 4, vol. ii., p. 70) as having "a strong admixture of Old Latin elements." Some readers, indeed, will probably think, owing to the confession of the editors themselves (p. xvi), that the text has been here and there determined arbitrarily. None the less, the obligation under which Bishop Wordsworth and Mr. White have laid scholars is immense, and their labours will last for many generations.




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
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